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Abstract 
This dissertation examines universities and the development of middle-
class politics in Brazil in the latter half of the twentieth century. It asks: how did 
the middle class become increasingly important to Brazilian politics and society? 
By focusing on the university system as both a physical and discursive site of 
negotiation, the dissertation traces how the military, bureaucrats, business leaders, 
pedagogues, students, and parents entered into complex debates over education 
and national development. Drawing from police records, bureaucratic archives, 
private collections, and oral interviews, it studies how the middle class and the 
state under military rule strengthened the role of the middle class by connecting 
university education, development, and white-collar professions. Thus, the 
analysis moves beyond narratives of repression and resistance to examine the 
complex nature of state-society relations before and during Brazil’s military 
dictatorship, and reveals considerable ideological heterogeneity within the student 
population. In doing so, it contributes to the political and social history of Brazil, 
as well as adding to the small but increasingly important scholarship on the 
middle class in Latin America.  
 ix 
The dissertation shows how universities became increasingly central to 
middle class politics. Early chapters trace the rise of universities’ importance to 
different visions of national development. When the military dictatorship rose to 
power in 1964, universities functioned both as physical sites to resist the 
dictatorship as well as discursive fields where society and the state debated 
Brazil’s future. In these discursive struggles, groups with widely varying 
ideologies coalesced around the idea of expanding the middle class as the primary 
vehicle for national development. As increasing economic turbulence and gradual 
political opening took place after 1975, students and university-trained 
professionals with particular material and political expectations became a major 
force in the push for a return to democratization. By the dictatorship’s end in 
1985, the emphasis on university education across the previous thirty years had 
helped the middle class emerge as a major voice in Brazilian society and politics. 
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Introduction 
During Brazil’s 2006 presidential debates, Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva 
made his case for re-election by highlighting the fact that during his first 
administration, Brazil had finally established a federal university in every state.1
                                                 
 
 
According to Lula, this accomplishment spoke to the country’s progress under his 
government, as each state could now provide its own citizens with free higher 
education. To an outsider, citing federal universities in every state may have 
seemed like an odd issue for Lula to raise. Yet his emphasis on the federal 
universities marked the end of a decades-long process in Brazilian development 
and education. Since the 1950s, politicians, students, bureaucrats, military 
officers, pedagogues, parents, and professionals had been pushing for the 
expansion and improvement of Brazil’s higher education system. Between 1955 
and 1990, these disparate groups invoked modern developmentalist thought to 
transform the Brazilian university system. In spite of widely varying political 
ideologies, these actors often found common ground in envisioning the 
universities as arenas that would privilege middle class growth and participation 
in Brazil’s political, economic, and social life. Even with the end of the military 
dictatorship in 1985, universities continued to be central to politics and society 
throughout the 1990s and up to the 2006 presidential elections. Lula’s boast 
confirms just how important universities were to national politics. 
1  The final federal university was the Federal University of Tocantins. Although created 
through presidential decree in May 2000, the university only began to function in 2003, during 
Lula’s first term. Indeed, during the debate, Lula claimed he should be re-elected so that he could 
finish overseeing the University’s development. 
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This dissertation uses the Brazilian university system to examine the rise 
of middle class politics between the years of 1955 and 1990. Although a minority 
of Brazilians attended universities in this time period, colleges and universities 
were important sites of physical and discursive conflict between the Brazilian 
state and society. While leftist student leaders and right-wing military hard-liners 
might have been polar opposites in many regards, they, along with other social 
groups, all had a major stake in the status and conditions of Brazilian universities. 
Students and poorer families viewed universities as means to acquire greater 
material comfort and social mobility, while the government saw universities as 
central to Brazil’s ability to assume its rightful place within the “developed 
world.” As social, political, and economic realities changed in Brazil between 
1964 and 1985, the focus of students, military leaders, white-collar professionals, 
and bureaucrats shifted as well, responding to external factors like the oil crises of 
the 1970s as well as to internal challenges like the gradual return to democracy in 
the 1980s. Yet as the military ceded control in 1985, the impact of the debate over 
universities did not disappear. Throughout the remainder of the decade and into 
the 1990s, university reform would continue to occupy a major space in political 
and social discourse. In this period, Brazil’s growing middle class played a major 
role in national politics and society, and the universities continued to be a major 
axis around which these debates and struggles revolved. 
Late Arrivals: Universities in Brazil 
Universities were key to visions of development in twentieth-century 
Brazil. Unlike its Spanish American neighbors, some of whom had universities in 
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the 16th century,2 Brazil did not have a fully formed university system until the 
1930s. The reasons were numerous, and depended in no small part on the 
Portuguese crown’s efforts to control all education and dissemination of 
knowledge (including outlawing printing presses in Brazil) into the early 1800s, 
when the Portuguese court relocated to Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic 
invasion.3 Even after gaining independence in 1822, many Brazilians continued to 
matriculate at the University of Coimbra in Portugal for their higher education, 
while those who remained in Brazil attended new law schools in São Paulo and 
Olinda.4
Only in the 1900s did Brazilian politicians and educators begin forming 
universities, and even those early efforts often petered out. The first official 
university in Brazil was the University of Manaus, formed in 1909, but defunct by 
1926.  Similarly, the University of São Paulo was formed in 1911, but was 
dissolved by 1917, though it did lay the foundation for the eventual foundation in 
1934 of the University of São Paulo that still exists today.  The University of 
Paraná was created in 1912, but like its predecessors in Manaus and São Paulo, it 
 These independent faculdades, or colleges began to flourish in the mid- 
to late-1800s, creating a web of isolated, unconnected, and highly specialized 
engineering, medical, and law schools. 
                                                 
 
2  Mexico’s first university, the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 
formed in 1540, and the Real e Pontifícia Universidad de México was established in Mexico City 
in 1551. In the Dominican Republic, the Universidad Santo Tomas de Aquino was founded in 
1538. 
 
3  See Kristin Schultz, Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal 
Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821, (New York: Routledge, 2001), and Raimundo Martin da 
Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle: The Idea of a Brazilian University and Its History,” Ph.D. 
diss., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1982. 
 
4  Andrew J. Kirkendall, Class Mates: Male Student Culture and the Making of a Political 
Class in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 
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had dissolved by 1922. In this context, the University of Rio de Janeiro was 
founded relatively late, in 1920.  This university never closed, later becoming the 
University of Brazil and, by the 1970s, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
(UFRJ). However, the University of Rio de Janeiro’s status as the first official 
university in Brazil remains a point of contention, as it was originally little more 
than the combination of already-extant Law, Medicine, and Engineering schools 
in the city, designed to impress Belgium’s king and queen upon their visit to 
Brazil in 1922. 5
As late as the 1930s, Brazil still had very few universities in the modern 
sense of the word. This situation began to change during the years of Getúlio 
Vargas (1930-1945). Vargas transformed Brazil, centralizing the Brazilian state 
and affecting everything from labor laws to gender roles to cultural projects to 
education.
 
6
                                                 
 
 The government finally established the Ministry of Education and 
Health (MES) in the early-1930s after years of calls for a federal ministry devoted 
5  For various views on this debate, see Luiz Antonio Cunha, A Universidade Temporã, 
Chapter 3, and da Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle” Chapter V.  For the visit of the Belgian 
royalty and its effect on culture and landscape in Rio de Janeiro, see Sueann Caulfield, In Defense 
of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000), Chapter 2.  Here, I will consider the University of Rio de Janeiro to 
be Brazil’s “first” university. 
 
6  For a general narrative of the Vargas years, see Thomas E, Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 
1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy, 40th anniversary edition, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). For a detailed analysis of Vargas, see Robert M. Levine, Father of the Poor? Vargas 
and His Era, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For detailed analyses on labor, 
gender, and culture during the Vargas years, see John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: 
Class Conflict and Alliance in Modern São Paulo, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991); Joel Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil’s 
Industrial Class, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Susan K. Besse, Restructuring 
Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 1914-1940, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Daryle Williams, Culture Wars in Brazil: The First 
Vargas Regime, 1930-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 
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to education.7 Curiously, while Vargas’s government centralized federal authority 
in many ways, education remained decentralized. The MES did begin to attempt 
to govern higher education by issuing Brazil’s first comprehensive university 
policy, and it assumed full control of the nascent federal university system, but by 
and large, in its early years the MES simply “established norms for states and 
municipalities to follow.”8 As a result, during the Vargas years, reformers and 
doctors were responsible for the reform campaigns that turned elementary and 
high schools into nation-building institutions that would create patriotic (and 
hygienic) citizens.9
Students first mobilized in the late 1700s, when a Brazilian youth 
approached Thomas Jefferson in Paris and sought his support for an intellectuals’ 
rebellion in Minas Gerais. Throughout the 1800s, students (and future political 
leaders) in Brazil’s law schools at Olinda and São Paulo participated in events 
 Higher education was the exception. The government 
assumed control of the nascent federal university system, and established 
nationwide regulations that private universities like the Catholic Universities and 
state universities like the University of São Paulo would have to follow. As 
important as the formation of MES was to future university policy, perhaps more 
importantly, the National Student Union (União Nacional de Estudantes, UNE) 
formed in 1937, just as Brazil entered the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-1945).  
                                                 
 
7  Jerry Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social Policy in Brazil, 1917-1945, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003,) pp. 4, 34,  
 
8  Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness, p. 62, 63. 
 
9  Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness, p. 32. 
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like the conservative political shift of 1850 and the abolition of slavery in 1888.10  
In 1910, students from isolated professional schools gathered, hosting the First 
National Congress of Students, but nothing came of the event. Thus, UNE marked 
the first time that students had formed their own organization. In 1938 UNE held 
its first national meeting which they called, for some reason, the “Second National 
Congress of Students.”  At that meeting, UNE proclaimed the need for university 
reform.11 However, given the still-small numbers of universities, students during 
the Estado Novo tended to focus on political reforms rather than educational ones, 
pushing for Brazil’s entrance into World War II on the side of the Allies and then 
for a return to democracy in 1945.12
Social and military pressure forced Vargas out of office in 1945, and 
General Eurico Gaspar Dutra became president. Educational transformation 
continued during Dutra’s administration (1946-1951). In 1948, Minister of 
Education and Health Clemente Mariani submitted the “Law of Directives and 
Basic Rights” (LDB) to Congress. In its original form, the LDB focused on broad 
educational reforms at all levels, including pledging twelve percent of the national 
budget and twenty percent of municipal budgets to education, making primary 
 
                                                 
 
10  Kirkendall, Class Mates, especially Chapters 5 and 6. For the Thomas Jefferson anecdote, 
see Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, (São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2002), p. 227. 
 
11  Maria de Lourdes de A. Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, (Rio de Janeiro: 
Editora UFRJ, 1995), p. 15.  
 
12  Shawn C. Smallman, Fear & Memory in the Brazilian Army & Society, 1889-1954, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002,) Chapter 4, and Maria Paula Araujo, 
Memórias Estudantis: Da Fundação da UNE aos Nossos Dias, (Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro 
Publicações, S.A., 2007), pp. 63-67. 
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education obligatory, and expanding the university system.13 However, the law 
stalled as Brazilian politicians dealt with the return of Getúlio Vargas’s populist 
administration in 1950 and his suicide in 1954, military instability in the 1955 
elections, and the creation of Brasília under Juscelino Kubitschek. These events, 
in combination with ongoing debates about the extent of the reforms, meant the 
LDB would not pass into law for thirteen years. Even so, the university system 
gradually expanded under Mariani’s guidance.14 This expansion would continue 
in the second Vargas administration of 1951-1954. In 1953, he reorganized the 
cabinet, creating the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) and giving Health 
its own ministry.15 By the time Vargas committed suicide amidst political scandal 
in 1954, Brazil had sixteen universities.16
                                                 
 
 Although Brazil was still lagging in 
higher education compared to its Latin American neighbors, the Vargas years laid 
the foundation for the creation of a university system in Brazil. Over the next 30 
13  See, for example: “Carta de Paulo de Almeida Salles a Anísio Teixeira, informando-lhe 
envio de cópia da moção aprovada pelo plenário da assembléia de fundação da associação de pais 
e alunos na Universidade Mackenzie, São Paulo,” Photos 159-164, Roll 40, AT c 1960.06.25, 
CPDOC; “Entrevista concedida ao Diário de Notícias versando sobre questões educacionais no 
Brasil,” CMa pi Mariani, C. 1953.09.17, CPDOC; “Apresentação na Comissão de Educação do 
Senado Federal sobre sua gestão no Ministério da Educação e Saúde,” CMa pi Mariani, C. 
1977.09.01, CPDOC; “Documentos sobre educação. Entre eles, a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da 
Educação Nacional, a questão da educação gratuita nas escolas particulares e a federalização de 
estabelecimentos de ensino superior,” GC k 1951.01.10, CPDOC; and “Correspondência entre 
Anísio Teixeira e Lourenço Filho,” LF c 1929.10.24, CPDOC. 
 
14  See Luiz Antônio Cunha, A Universidade crítica: o ensino superior na República 
Populista, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves Editora S/A, 1983). Evidence of the debate 
over which schools to federalize between 1945-1950 is available in Clemente Mariani’s private 
archive at the Centro de Documentação e Pesquisa de História Contemporânea do Brasil (herein, 
CPDOC) at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro. See, for example, CPDOC, 
Cma mes ce 1950.12.23.  
 
15  It would remain the Ministry of Education and Culture until 1985, when the new 
democratic government separated Education and Culture into two separate ministries. Curiously, 
the Ministry of Education is still commonly referred to as “MEC” to this day, perhaps revealing 
just how much education dominated the MEC’s agenda. 
 
16  Cunha, Universidade Crítica, p. 95. 
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years, as Brazil went from a democracy to a military regime and witnessed 
economic rises and collapses, this system would rapidly grow and take on a new 
importance in Brazilian society, even as Brazilian political life experienced 
extreme upheaval. 
From Republic to Military Regime and Back: National Politics in Brazil, 1955-
1985 
After Vargas’s suicide, Brazil initially seemed to be headed towards a new 
era of success. When Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) took office, Brazil’s 
future seemed boundless, with the prosperity and development of the country 
symbolized by the modernist, airplane-shaped capital of Brasília and the rapid 
industrial growth of the country. However, cracks were already beginning to 
emerge in the political and economic landscape. Kubitschek had only been able to 
assume office after War Minister Marshal Henrique Lott launched a pre-emptive 
coup in 1955 in order to ensure Kubitschek’s inauguration in the face of right-
wing opposition from within the civilian and military sectors.17 While Kubitschek 
became popular as the face of Brazilian development, his state-sponsored growth 
programs led to rising inflation by the end of the 1950s. In the 1960 elections, the 
right pinned its hopes on the erratic Jânio Quadros, while the Brazilian electorate 
promoted the “Jan-Jan” ballot of Quadros for President and the leftist Brazilian 
Workers Party’s candidate João “Jango” Goulart for vice president.18
                                                 
 
 Public 
opinion and an anti-corruption campaign swept the two into office. 
17  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, pp. 149-158. 
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Shortly after the 1961 inauguration, Quadros’s erratic behavior and 
independence began to appear. He sought to forge a foreign policy path that 
depended neither on the United States nor the Soviet bloc, and alienated his 
former right-wing supporters by awarding Ché Guevara the Cruzeiro do Sul 
Order, one of Brazil’s highest honors.19
                                                                                                                                                 
18  Brazil had split-ballot elections between 1945 and 1964, allowing for candidates from 
two different parties to be elected to the presidency and vice-presidency. 
  Congress grew increasingly worried with 
Quadros’s moves. When in August 1961 Quadros tendered his resignation (for 
reasons that remain cloudy even today), Congress accepted, and Brazil was 
thrown into political turmoil. While people had been thrilled with the Jan-Jan 
ballot, many right-wing politicians, middle class sectors, and most importantly, 
the military, were strongly opposed to Goulart assuming the presidency, fearing 
his leftism. Complicating the matter, Goulart was on a diplomatic mission to 
China when Quadros stepped down, which only further damaged Goulart’s image 
among opponents. Military leaders stepped in to prevent the transition, but 
Goulart’s brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, with the support of UNE and other 
organizations, masterfully executed the “campaign for legality,” taking to the 
radio waves to demand that Brazil’s Constitution be obeyed and Goulart become 
president. In the face of growing opposition, the military agreed to let Goulart 
assume office, but only on the condition that it be with greatly reduced powers. 
Thus, in September 1961, Goulart became president, but now had to work with a 
prime minister and a parliamentary cabinet. In late-1962, people went to the polls 
 
19  To understand Quadros’s erratic nature, one need only to know that less than two months 
before awarding Guevara, he sent the military to break a strike among the law students in Recife. 
They had begun to strike after the dean of the school had banned a meeting. The guest speaker at 
that meeting was to be none other than Guevara’s mother. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-
1964, pp. 391-392 (fn. 15).  
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and overwhelmingly voted to restore full presidential authority to Goulart in a 
plebiscite. Rapid inflation and an increasingly polarized political atmosphere left 
Goulart more and more isolated politically, however, as moderates like 
Kubitschek began to doubt Goulart’s policies. In response, he took a page from 
his mentor Vargas and appealed to workers and leftists while supporting sergeants 
who had revolted against their military superiors. This leftward shift and support 
of what military leaders saw as insubordination ultimately led to the military 
rising up against Goulart with broad middle class and political support. On March 
31, troops moved on Rio de Janeiro from Minas Gerais, and by April 1, Goulart 
was out of office.20
While Brazil’s military had become involved in Brazilian politics before 
in the twentieth century, 1964 marked the first time that it assumed full political 
control. The military immediately began stripping left-wing politicians and labor 
leaders of their political rights and clamping down on opposition. Shortly after the 
coup, the Congress elected Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco president (1964-
1967). Castelo Branco immediately made inflation, which had reached 100 
percent by 1964, his top priority, and spent much of his three years trying to turn 
Brazil’s economy around. Although Castelo Branco represented what many have 
considered the “moderate” branch of the military dictatorship, he also increased 
political repression, most notably in the Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), which 
 
                                                 
 
20  For general narratives of the coup, see Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, (São 
Paulo: Editora Schwarcz Ltda., 2002), pp. 43-125; Ronaldo Costa Couto, História indiscreta da 
ditadura e da abertura – Brasil: 1964-1985, 4th edition, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2003), 
pp. 37-62; Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1985); Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, pp. 294-330; 
and Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 3-44. 
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abolished all old political parties, created two new officially-sanctioned parties, 
and made gubernatorial and presidential elections indirect. His administration also 
tried to outlaw UNE with mixed success, forcing the organization into “semi-
clandestinity.”  
Arthur Costa e Silva (1967-1969) succeeded Castelo Branco and 
represented the rise of the hard-liners within the military. Political and social 
unrest increased during his administration. Between 1964 and 1968, the number 
of radical leftist groups had expanded rapidly. The Leninist Brazilian Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, PCB) splintered as some members 
advocated continuing on the path of revolution from within the system; others, led 
by Carlos Marighela, advocated a more violent path to revolution, and the Maoist 
Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCdoB) increasingly 
gained strength as the decade progressed. In addition to these two major groups, 
several other splinter groups of Communists, generally referred to as 
“Dissidences” and allied neither with the PCB or the PCdoB, had formed, taking 
on a dizzying array of acronyms like VAR-Palmares, MR-8, and POLOP. By 
1968, most of these groups consisted of university students in either the “ranks” 
or as leaders. 
Nor were these the only ways in which society had become increasingly 
polarized. By 1968, workers were striking and hundreds of thousands of students, 
parents, artists, and others took to the streets to protest the regime’s growing 
repression.  In September, congressman Márcio Moreira Alves innocuously 
suggested that Brazilian women not date soldiers as a form of protest in what 
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came to be known as the “Lysistrata speech.” Outraged, military leadership 
demanded Congress strip Alves of his congressional immunity so that the military 
could charge him with treason. When Congress refused to do so, the military used 
the speech and Congress’s intransigence as a pretext to issue Institutional Act No. 
5 (AI-5) in December 1968, ushering in a new repressive phase in Brazil.  
Unrest continued into 1969 as the military tried to strengthen its control. 
Costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August 1969, leading to a one-month military 
junta, followed by the election of Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974). Often 
considered a figurehead leader, some scholars have characterized Médici as a 
hands-off president who gave his ministers and the military apparatus relatively 
free reign to implement torture and other repressive practices.21
In 1974, Congress elected Ernesto Geisel president. A member of Castelo 
Branco’s staff, Geisel marked a return of the “moderates” to the presidency. 
Geisel tried to rein in the abuses of hard-liners in the security apparatus and 
promoted a top-down “slow, gradual” return to democracy. However, the 
economic situation worsened during Geisel’s administration as Brazil confronted 
the international oil crises and the consequences of the high foreign loans that had 
spurred growth during the “miracle.” By 1979, when João Baptista Figueiredo 
 As a result, his 
presidency simultaneously saw rapid economic growth that exceeded 10 percent a 
year in, commonly referred to as the “Brazilian miracle,” even as the security 
apparatus entered a new phase of repression that witnessed widespread torture, 
disappearances, and sustained campaigns against both urban and rural guerrillas.  
                                                 
 
21  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil 1964-1985, Ch. V. 
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became the final military president, inflation was once again spiraling out of 
control, reaching over 100 percent (the same rate that had helped bring down 
Goulart) in the early 1980s. Although Figueiredo tried to continue the top-down 
“distensão e abertura” (“distension and opening”) begun under Geisel, a 1979 
general amnesty that allowed exiles to return and pardoned political prisoners and 
torturers in the security apparatus alike made military control of the 
democratization process more difficult. Growing political opposition had more 
room to maneuver in the context of abertura, and the economic turmoil led to 
popular mobilizations against the dictatorship. New political parties (including 
Lula’s Workers’ Party, or PT) formed, and in 1985, a broad political coalition in 
Congress elected opposition leader (and former Prime Minister under João 
Goulart) Tancredo Neves president of Brazil. On the eve of inauguration, 
however, Neves died, and vice-presidential candidate José Sarney, who had been 
a member of the pro-military party until the early 1984, became Brazil’s first 
civilian president in twenty-one years. 
Historiography 
By focusing on the period immediately prior to and during the 
dictatorship, this project participates in a diverse historical literature of state, 
class, and education in modern Brazil. The most prolific writing on the Brazilian 
state and society in the twentieth century has focused on the populist 
administrations of Getúlio Vargas. The path-breaking work of Robert Levine 
demonstrated how Vargas finally centralized the Brazilian state and its 
consequences for Brazilian society. More narrowly focused monographs by 
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Barbara Weinstein, John French, Joel Wolfe, Jerry Dávila, and Daryle Williams 
followed, focusing on labor, education, and the politics of culture during the 
Vargas era.22
In comparison, the body of work on the post-Vargas era, including the 
dictatorship, is relatively scant. A brief burst of production and analysis of 
Brazil’s military governments followed the dictatorship’s end in 1985.  Thomas 
E. Skidmore, Maria Helena Moreira Alves, and Alfred Stepan all provide 
narratives of the political and economic history of the dictatorship.
 Thus, scholars have gained a strong understanding of Brazilian state 
formation and associated social changes in the years up to Vargas’s suicide in 
1954. 
23 Lawrence 
Weschler compares the efforts to deal with torture in Brazil and Uruguay during 
the transition to democratization.24 Kenneth Serbin offers important insights into 
the complex relation between the Catholic Church and the military government.25
                                                 
 
 
More recently, Victoria Langland’s dissertation focuses on the student movement 
22  Robert M. Levine, Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the 
Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996); John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: Class Conflict and Alliance 
in Modern São Paulo, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Joel Wolfe, 
Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil’s Industrial Working Class, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Jerry Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social 
Policy in Brazil, 1917-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); and Daryle Williams, 
Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001). 
 
23  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985; Maria Helena Moreira 
Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); and 
Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988). 
 
24  Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New 
York: Viking Penguin 1991). 
 
25  Kenneth P. Serbin, Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, Torture, and Social Justice 
in Authoritarian Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
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and memory during the dictatorship, as well as examining gender within the 
student movement, particularly in the 1960s.26 Ben Cowan’s work examines the 
ways in which the dictatorship associated “subversion” and sexuality.27 Mala 
Htun’s work has considered the complex nature of state-society relations in the 
struggles for women’s issues in dictatorships and democracies in South America, 
including Brazil.28 In Brazil, Carlos Fico has extensively considered the effect of 
the dictatorship on collective memory and Brazilian identity.29  Elio Gaspari’s 
comprehensive four-volume set provides an incredibly detailed political narrative 
of the dictatorship from 1964-1977, drawing on private collections from some of 
Brazil’s highest-ranking military officials to reveal the internal divisions within 
the military as well as the broader political challenges between the dictatorship 
and society.30
As the dictatorship neared its forty-year anniversary in 2004, a number of 
conferences within the academic community led to edited volumes that analyzed 
  
                                                 
 
26  Victoria Ann Langland, “Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and Collective 
Memory in Authoritarian Brazil.”  PhD diss., Yale University, 2004. 
 
27  Benjamin A. Cowan, “Sex and the Security State: Gender, Sexuality, and ‘Subversion” at 
Brazil’s Escola Superior de Guerra, 1964-1985,” Journal of Sexual History 16:3 (July 2007), pp. 
459-481. 
 
28  Mala Htun, Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family Under Latin American 
Dictatorships and Democracies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
29  See Carlos Fico, Reinventando o Otimismo: Ditadura, Propaganda e Imaginário Social 
no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1997), and Como Eles Agiam: Os 
Subterrâneos da Ditadura Militar: Espionagem e Polícia Política (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 
2001). 
 
30  Elio Gaspari, A ditadura encurralada, (São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2002); A ditadura 
envergonhada, (São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2002); A ditadura derrotada,  ((São Paulo: Editora 
Schwarcz, 2003); and A ditadura escancarada, ((São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2004). 
  
 
29 
the state and society during the dictatorship from various angles.31
In studying the political context of the dictatorship, students occupy a 
major space in the scholarship. Numerous works have focused on UNE’s 
resistance, culminating in massive street protests and a subsequent government 
crackdown that led to Brazil’s repressive “years of lead” (anos de chumbo) 
following 1968. These works have provided detailed narratives and documentary 
materials of the student movement’s leftist leaders, often drawing heavily from 
the memories of those leaders.
  However, 
none of these works concentrates on issues of class politics and identity or use 
social history methodology. Instead, their efforts focus primarily on torture, 
censorship, and resistance to the dictatorship.  As a result, the scholarship on the 
post-1955 period in Brazil has generally provided narratives based on the 
economic policies and political repression of the military government. 
32
                                                 
 
 However, these works neglect the great majority 
of students who were neither directly involved in UNE nor were political radicals. 
Thus, a more nuanced and complete understanding of student demands outside of 
the UNE leadership is lacking for the military dictatorship, and an admittedly 
vocal minority of activists has taken on almost mythical proportions. 
31  For example, see Carlos Fico et. al., editor, 1964-2004: 40 Anos do Golpe: Ditadura 
Militar e Resistência no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Viveiros de Castro Editora Ltda., 2004), nad 
Daniel Aarão Reis, Marcelo Ridenti, and Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, eds., O golpe militar e a 
ditadura: 40 anos depois (1964-2004), (Bauru, São Paulo: Editora da Universidade do Sagrado 
Coração, 2004). 
 
32  For examples of studies that focus on students’ open resistance to military repression, see 
Daniel Aarão Reis and Pedro de Morais, 68: a paixão de uma utopia, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 
Espaço e Tempo, 1988); João Roberto Martins Filho, ed., 1968 faz 30 anos, (São Carlos, SP: 
Editora da UFSCar, 1998); Flamarion Maués and Zilah Wendel Abramo, eds., Pela Democracia, 
contra o arbítrio: A oposição democrática do golpe de 1964 à campanha da Diretas Já, (São 
Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006); and Justina Iva de A. Silva, Estudantes e 
Política: Estudo de um movimento (RN – 1960-1969), (São Paulo: Cortez Editora, 1989). 
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Similarly, scholarship on universities in Brazil has tended to neglect the 
dictatorship and post-dictatorship periods.  Luiz Antônio da Cunha, Raimundo 
Martin da Silva, and Maria de Lourdes de A. Fávero have considered the role of 
the university in Brazil, tracing its ideological roots back to Jesuit educators in the 
1500s, yet these works have several thematic and chronological limitations. 
Silva’s dissertation and Fávero’s work on universities both stop in 1945, just as 
Brazil’s university system really began to develop. Cunha’s work extends further, 
tracing the history of Brazilian universities in theory, formation, and policy 
between 1500 and 1968, yet even he stops his analysis of universities at the exact 
moment when Brazil’s military finally issued its University Reform (Reforma 
Universitária). Additionally, these works collectively do little to address how 
universities actually operated in Brazil or analyze the linkages between academic 
institutions, political movements, and class politics. Rather, these scholars tend to 
treat the university as an abstract and autonomous institution, divorced from state-
society relations outside of isolated incidents of popular mobilization. 33
Explorations of middle-class politics and culture are also fleeting in Latin 
America specifically but in world history more generally, as U.S historian Robert 
D. Johnston has observed.
 
34
                                                 
 
 Johnston’s work provides important theoretical and 
33  Raimundo Martins da Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle: The Idea of a Brazilian 
University and Its History,” PhD diss., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1982; Maria de 
Lourdes de Albuquerque Fávero, Universidade & Poder: Análise Crítica, Fundamentos 
Históricos: 1930-1945 (Rio de Janeiro: Achiame, 1980); Luiz Antonio Cunha, A Universidade 
Temporã: O Ensino Superior da Colonia a Era de Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 
Edições UFC, 1980);  A Universidade Crítica: O Ensino Superior na República Populista (Rio de 
Janeiro: F. Alves, 1983); and A Unviersidade Reformanda: O Golpe de 1964 e a Moderniza,cão 
do Ensino Superior (Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1988). 
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conceptual questions that demand greater attention to the middle class as a 
complicated, heterogeneous social category. Some scholars have begun to 
consider how the middle forms and operates in different contexts in Latin 
America. Patrick Barr-Melej and David O. Parker have provided important 
analyses for class formation and national politics in the early twentieth century in 
Chile and Peru, respectively.35 For Brazil, Brian Owensby demonstrates that, as 
late as 1950, the middle “classes” still lacked unity.36 Cristina Peixoto-Mehrtens’ 
urban history emphasizes the role middle-class professionals played in politics 
and regional identity-formation in São Paulo in the Vargas Era.37 Maureen 
O’Dougherty’s later ethnographic study, by contrast, argues that consumerism 
and university education lent coherence to the Brazilian middle class by the 
1990s. 38
Methodology 
 However, the era between 1950 and 1990, when the middle class came 
to fully develop its own sense of identity and politics, remains largely unexplored. 
In discussing middle-class politics, it is important to first address what 
exactly “middle class” meant and means in Brazil. While economic data are 
                                                                                                                                                 
34  Robert D. Johnston, The Radical Middle Class: Populist Democracy and the Question of 
Capitalism in Progressive-Era Portland, Oregon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003). 
 
35  Patrick Barr-Melej, Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the 
Middle Class, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), and David S. Parker, The 
Idea of the Middle-Class: White-Collar Workers and Peruvian Society, 1900-1950, (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
 
36  Brian P. Owensby, Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle-Class Lives in 
Brazil, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
 
37  Cristina Peixoto-Mehrtens, Urban Space and National Identity in Early Twentieth 
Century São Paulo, Brazil: Crafting Modernity, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
 
38  Maureen O’Dougherty, Consumption Intensified: The Politics of Middle-Class Daily Life 
in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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useful, class identity transcends mere income. Social and cultural factors such as 
profession and family background all play an important part in class identity in 
Brazil and elsewhere. As Brian Owensby has demonstrated, the Brazilian middle 
class began emerging as early as the 1920s; yet even by the 1950s, as a whole the 
middle sectors had little in the way of positive identity beyond ephemeral 
political, economic, and social anxieties. Even in the mid-twentieth century, 
Brazil’s middle class identified itself primarily in the negative – “not-rich/not-
poor” – and lacked a cohesive unifying identity. 39
This dissertation defines middle class as white-collar professionals with 
sufficient income levels to provide access to non-essential material goods, yet 
who remain highly susceptible to economic upheaval. In other words, Brazil’s 
middle class had greater fiscal flexibility and material expectations than the 
majority working classes, yet at the same time, were more vulnerable to economic 
crises than elites. This definition is supported with reference to censuses, 
government studies, and other economic data while also considering social and 
cultural markers of class, such as one’s neighborhood and ownership of an 
apartment, a car, or the most recent non-essential appliances. Additionally, 
professors’ unions and national engineering or medical students’ organizations in 
the 1970s and 1980s helped reinforce class identity and defined class interests in 
 Yet as Maureen O’Dougherty’s 
ethnographic work demonstrates, by the late-1980s and early-1990s, the middle 
class had a strong understanding of its own consumptive patterns, material 
expectations, and socio-economic status in relation to other Brazilians. 
                                                 
 
39  Owensby, Intimate Ironies. 
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society more generally. Although participation in these groups was not universal, 
their demands and concerns reflected broader class-based material interests. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I turn to Brazilians’ own self-identification 
through my own personal interviews as well as a number of published interviews 
and testimonies. These interviews provide the clearest markers of what jobs, 
material goods, and lifestyles constituted a “middle class,” giving a particularly 
Brazilian flavor to our understanding of class. For example, nearly all of the 
students who participated in the Projeto Memória Estudantil project claimed to 
come from middle-class backgrounds, generally with a father in a field like 
engineering, law, journalism, or public administration, and a mother who often 
“earned a degree but never participated in a profession.”40 By emphasizing 
Brazilians’ own perception of what it meant to be middle class and analyzing who 
was included or excluded, this work avoids the temptation of “defining the middle 
class a priori,” as David Parker urges.41
                                                 
 
 By referring to these diverse class-
markers, this dissertation traces how the economic the middle class solidified its 
identity in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
40  Quote from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 1. 
Martins’ mother had gotten her degree in pharmacy, but as was the case with many students’ 
families at the time, she ended up being a housewife while the father worked.  For just a small 
sampling of other students who came from middle-class backgrounds as they themselves defined 
it, see personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, 
published interviews with Adriano Diogo, Antônio Carlos Peixoto, Bernardo Joffily, Cacá 
Diegues, César Maia, Claúdio Fonteles, Comba Porto, Daniel Aarão Reis, Franklin Martins, 
Geraldo Siqueira Filho, Gisela Mendonça, Jean Marc von der Weid, Juca Ferreira, Luís Raul 
Machado, Luís Roberto Tenório, Marcelo Cerqueira, Maria Augusto Carneiro Ribeiro, Paulo de 
Tarso Venceslau, Roberto Amaral, Sepúlveda Pertence, and Vladimir Palmeira, among others. For 
the small number of students whose parents were from poore backgrounds, see personal interview 
with D.N., 26 August 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Aldo 
Rebelo, Amâncio Paulino de Carvalho, and José Genoíno. 
 
41   Parker, The Idea of the Middle-Class, p. ix. 
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Using these characteristics to define the middle class, it becomes clear that 
university education plays a central role in the formation of a middle class 
identity. Most directly, the university degree and the access it provided to non-
manual white-collar jobs as lawyers, journalists, professors, teachers, engineers, 
and doctors made it a keystone in middle class identity.42 As Brian Owensby has 
demonstrated, already by the 1940s, entering white-collar professions that defined 
the middle class required a degree.43
Because the material, cultural, and social benefits of a university degree 
were central to middle-class identity in this period, universities themselves 
became a major engine driving middle-class politics in Brazil in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Students used failings in the university system to challenge 
the political authority of the military regime and to carve out their own political 
voice in the new context of authoritarian rule. Parents came out in favor of 
expanding the university system so that their children could have access to greater 
levels of social mobility than the parents themselves had. Additionally, the 
increasing importance of the university-trained middle class politics emerged not 
 Yet the importance of higher education did 
not stop there. With the acquisition of white-collar jobs, individuals also had 
access to the material goods associated with the middle class. Thus, university 
education came to function as the keystone of “being” middle-class. 
                                                 
 
42  Although teachers generally attended normal schools, the model of teachers’ colleges 
gained traction in the 1960s, and the dictatorship would emphasize the importance in training and 
education for them as well. Additionally, as we shall see in Chapter 6, teachers regularly 
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only from the middle class’s own internal forces, but through external forces as 
well. Thus, as the dictatorship privileged white-collar professionals in its own 
developmentalist policies, it gave a greater political heft to these professionals 
that professors, doctors, engineers, and others would increasingly employ as the 
dictatorship neared its end. As a result, the growing social and political 
importance of the middle class was a synergistic process between the state and 
society.  
In this way, universities came to be a major factor in middle-class politics. 
In dealing with such disparate elements of the middle class, including radical and 
non-radical students alike, and the military regime, universities were contested 
institutions.  Indeed, the late development of a Brazilian university system 
compared to other parts of the Americas made the institution all the more 
unformed and potentially malleable, leaving plenty of space for competing groups 
to project widely varying ideals and hopes into the universities. Where the 
military saw universities as a means to create a white-collar professional class that 
would catapult Brazil into the “developed” world and offer a “strategic” means to 
legitimate the dictatorship, the growing middle class projected their desire for 
social mobility and material gain into a university degree, making university 
education a “practical” need to many in Brazil.44
                                                 
 
 Yet universities themselves 
brought these different groups together, serving as the unifying discursive field 
through which political and social actors from all parts of the political spectrum 
entered into dialog. Through debates over the roles of universities and university-
44  Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, 
and Revolution in Nicaragua,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 227-254. 
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trained white-collar professionals, divergent groups formulated a single vision of 
the university as central to personal and national development in Brazil, even 
while their opinions of what constituted “development” varied greatly. Thus, 
universities in Brazil functioned as discursive sites in which everybody had a 
stake; they were expansive and pliable, unifying various groups that had similar 
goals but wildly varying ideologies. 
Most visibly, universities in Brazil during the military dictatorship were 
physical spaces where the dialog between the military regime and students and 
faculty played out, often in violent ways. When the military invaded campuses in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1966, in Brasília in 1968 or in any number of other instances 
throughout the country, the brutality of that dialog was on display for all of Brazil 
to see. The expulsion of “dangerous” professors also revealed the ways in which 
the military could enforce its will on campuses. Yet such instances stand out 
exactly because of their uniqueness.45
                                                 
 
 Just as importantly, universities occupied 
central places in the discursive struggle over development, class, and nation in 
Brazil, whether through new state policies, professional outrage over the inability 
to find jobs upon graduation, or on-campus student protests and pamphlets 
45  The first years of the dictatorship saw several armed invasions of campuses, including in 
Brasília in 1964, 1965, and 1968; Minas Gerais in 1965; and Rio de Janeiro in 1966. After 1968, 
the military regime abandoned this tactic in favor of installing secret police members in 
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universidade interrompida: Brasília 1964-1965, 2nd ed., (Brasília: Editora UnB, 2007) ; and 
Antonio de Padua Gurgel, A Rebelião dos Estudantes: Brasília, 1968, (Brasília: Editora Revam, 
2004). 
  
 
37 
demanding reform. In this way, universities were both physical and discursive 
sites of contestation and negotiation. 
Two theoretical frameworks are useful in understanding the universities’ 
role in Brazilian discourse. Maxine Molyneux’s understanding of practical 
interests and strategic interests provides us with a valuable way to understand the 
heterogeneous demands students and other groups made. According to Molyneux, 
strategic interests focus on subordination and “the formulation of an alternative, 
more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist,” while practical 
interests focus on “an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail 
a strategic goal.”46 In the case of student demands in Brazil in the 1964-1985 
period, objectives like an end to the dictatorship or torture constituted strategic 
interests, while issues like better restaurant food or improved educational 
infrastructure constituted practical interests. Although Molyneux’s original 
framework applies to women’s movements,47
In analyzing universities as discursive battlefields, Michel de Certeau’s 
understanding of strategic struggles and tactical struggles is also useful. Unlike 
Molyneux, who focuses on interest groups, de Certeau’s framing of tactical and 
strategic struggles provides a framework that incorporates physical and rhetorical 
sites of struggle. According to de Certeau, tactical struggles over issues such as 
 her understanding of strategic 
issues and practical needs is also valuable in understanding the various demands 
Brazilian students made. 
                                                 
 
46  Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation?,” pp. 232-233. 
 
47  Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation?,” p. 234. 
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amnesty and an end to repression, or what Molyneux would consider “strategic 
demands,” lacked a physical locus from which students could base their critiques 
of the government. Instead, these struggles were defined by particular temporal 
events, such as the death of a colleague or the declaration of new repressive 
measures that were beyond the students’ control.  Though these struggles were 
reactive, students were able to use these events to push for broader political 
struggles. By contrast, de Certeau’s strategic struggles are firmly tied to physical 
spaces, such as universities. In Brazil, students used their experiences on the 
campuses to challenge the military’s authority by criticizing its educational 
policies, the lack of infrastructural development, saturated job markets, and other 
issues.48
                                                 
 
  In doing so, they both defined the issues that the military regime would 
have to deal with, while also struggling with and responding to the government’s 
own vision over the role the university should play in Brazilian development and 
democracy. While Molyneux and de Certeau apply the term “strategic” to two 
different dynamics of struggle, the broader distinction between more concrete, 
physically situated demands versus more amorphous and abstract political 
principles is the essential distinction I wish to make here. 
48 Michel de Certeau originally came up with the notion of “tactics” versus “strategies.”  
According to de Certeau, the former are temporal struggles, in which a group or groups have no 
“proper locus” in which  they can challenge authority.  Thus, tactics are dependent upon and gain 
validity through specific temporal moments beyond the group’s initial control.  By contrast, 
strategies are grounded in spatial relations, in which there is a proper, physical place “that can be 
delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of 
targets or threats […] can be managed.”  While de Certeau’s insistence that tactics are merely an 
“art of the weak” and his suggestion of tactics and strategies as an either/or proposition are 
limited, his typology of different types of resistance is useful nonetheless.  See Michel de Certeau, 
The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 35-39. 
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Students did not simply employ these tactics and strategies in a vacuum. 
Their complaints and protests continued to respond to the military’s policies in a 
complex nexus of discursive struggle between students and the state under 
military rule.  Throughout the twenty-one years of the dictatorship, military 
governments and students were very much aware of the others’ demands, actions, 
and rhetoric. Just as the Brazilian military continued to use the state to mold 
educational policy to visions of development and to try to prevent student 
agitation, students continued to challenge the state’s policies and the conditions of 
the universities at individual campuses throughout the country. In this regard, 
students were involved in a constant interaction and dialogue with state policies, 
adapting to and shaping the new political and educational landscape. As students 
expressed their concern over issues as diverse as torture, amnesty, campus 
restaurants, and high expulsion rates, they discursively contested and 
demonstrated against the state’s definitions not only of what role the universities 
would play, but how democracy and economic development in Brazil actually 
functioned. These definitions often directly engaged with and reshaped the 
military’s visions, impacting governmental policy as much as governmental 
policies affected students’ concerns in the 1970s. This process could and did 
include coercion, in the form of arrests, torture, and even deaths of students. It 
also included limited consent, as when students framed their arguments by 
accepting some of the military government’s new educational policies in the 
1970s but reshaped them to their own expectations and interests as an emerging 
middle class. In acknowledging some of the government’s reforms and rejecting 
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others, students engaged in a “dialectic of culture”49 with technocrats, politicians, 
and the state under military rule. All of these processes reveal the ways in which 
the middle class increasingly participated in a process of cultural hegemony with 
the government that drew on Gramsci’s original understanding of hegemony as 
both coercion and consent.50
As the Brazilian middle class grew and took on an increasing importance 
in the military’s vision of development in the 1960s and 1970s, middle-class 
actors increasingly interacted with the military government, entering into a 
hegemonic struggle over their role and future. This relationship often took on a 
coercive nature, as the military responded to student protests with repression and 
clamped down on freedom of expression. Yet it also involved consent, as when 
students challenged the military for failing to fulfill the promises of the 1968 
university reform. In doing so, they implicitly accepted the military’s new policy 
even while criticizing the military for failing to meet their expectations. Nor was 
this consent negotiated solely from the bottom up. In its implementation of 
 
                                                 
 
49  E.P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?” 
Social History 3:2 (1978): 133-165.  William Roseberry was rightly critical of the simple 
polarization inherent in Thompson’s original “field of force,” which, as Roseberry put it, “is 
bipolar, and most of the social situations with which we are familiar are  infinitely more complex.”  
In the case of Brazil, Roseberry’s critique is accurate; students were far too heterogeneous to 
completely oppose the state or its policies in the bipolar manner that Thompson suggested.  
However, the fact that various groups were struggling with the state over the cultural, social, and 
political role of universities, in a complex process that continued to influence and be influenced by 
state policy, makes Thompson’s understanding of a cultural dialectic germane. See William 
Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel 
Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in 
Modern Mexico, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 355-366. 
 
 
50  Although the question of how to define “hegemony” is present throughout Gramsci’s 
work, his “Notes on Italian History” are particularly useful in dealing with this question in depth. 
See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., (New York: International Publishers, 1999), pp. 40-120. 
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university reform, the military dictatorship found itself agreeing with students on 
the shortcomings of the university system in the 1960s, even while their 
ideologies differed. Thus, with university reform, the military dictatorship sought 
not only to improve national development, but to increase its support and the 
population’s consent by addressing one of the biggest issues that students and 
others had used to challenge the regime’s legitimacy in the 1960s. The middle 
class and the military government as “historical blocs” (however internally 
heterogeneous) sought “legitimation” through hegemonic struggles. These 
hegemonic struggles between the state and society during Brazil’s dictatorship 
ebbed and flowed as middle-class identity solidified, in turn leading to a middle 
class that, “as it develop[ed] in the economic sphere, [found] some values more 
congenial than others, more resonant with its everyday experience.”51
Finally, in focusing on these debates over development, it is important to 
contextualize what exactly development meant. Ever since the formation of 
Brazil’s First Republic in 1889, the political and economic elites had been 
concerned with Brazil’s modernization and “development.” Promises to meet 
 When the 
military governments could not address those values, the middle class turned 
against the dictatorship, revealing the limitations of the military’s hegemonic 
efforts towards legitimacy and ultimately fueling the return to democracy in 
Brazil in 1985. The idea of the “historical bloc,” however, must be used 
cautiously. It connotes homogeneity when “historical blocs” could actually be 
quite heterogeneous within.  
                                                 
 
51  T.J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,” pp. 
567-593. 
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Brazil’s full developmental potential dated back to the founding of the First 
Republic in 1889, as evidenced in Brazil’s most enduring positivist symbol, the 
national flag, which bears the slogan “Order and Progress” to this date.  
Throughout the 20th century, presidents made promises to meet Brazil’s 
potential, be it extending telegraph wires while exploring Brazil’s interior in the 
early 20th century, the centralization of federal power and increased 
industrialization of the Vargas Years, projects like Brasília and the Rio do Vale 
steelworks during the Kubitschek years, or Goulart’s promises to make Brazil 
economically independent of foreign powers.52
In the second half of the twentieth century, different groups in Brazil had 
different understandings of what constituted “national development.” Yet the 
debates over development between 1955 and 1990 originated from a context 
particular to Brazil. The beginning of the 1929 Great Depression had catastrophic 
effects on Brazil’s economy, which was based on coffee exportation. With the 
global economic crash, demand for coffee and other goods like sugar plummeted, 
and Brazil had no major alternative source of income for the national economy. In 
response, Getúlio Vargas began a policy of import-substitution industrialization 
(ISI), which sought to enhance national economic independence by rapidly 
building and expanding national industry. In this way, Brazil (and other Latin 
 
                                                 
 
52  For more on these issues, see Todd A. Diacon, Stringing Together a Nation: Cândido 
Mariano da Silva Rondon and the Construction of a Modern Brazil, 1906-1930, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004); Robert M. Levine, Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil: 
Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: Class 
Conflict and Alliance in Modern São Paulo, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991); and Brian P. Owensby, Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle-Class Lives 
in Brazil, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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American countries that turned to ISI) could diversify national production while 
also becoming more self-sufficient, producing their own manufactured goods 
rather than importing them from other countries. Although cracks emerged in ISI 
by the 1960s, the military governments of the 1960s-1980s continued to turn to 
rapid industrialization and scientific improvements as the engines of national 
development in the hopes of making Brazil even more “modernized” and self-
sufficient. At the same time, groups like leftists, students, and scholars declared 
that development hinged on a greater equality between social classes, and 
demanded a mixture of national economic independence with social programs to 
reduce inequalities. Thomas Skidmore has called this blend “radical nationalism” 
and pointed out that it extended well beyond Communists and members of the 
Old Left.53
When analyzing students, it is important to keep in mind that, as with any 
set of social actors, students were a heterogeneous group, with different 
ideologies, goals, voices, and opinions. The scholarship on students in Brazil has 
tended to equate the National Student Union (UNE) to “the” student movement. 
 What emerged during this period were two poles: one, representing 
the Brazilian government’s vision, that viewed development as economic and 
based on a collaboration between private enterprise and the state (laying the 
groundwork for the later neoliberal policies of the 1990s in Brazil), and the other 
drawing from leftist ideas that framed national development in terms of often-
vague calls for social justice and equality alongside economic growth, best 
represented by students. 
                                                 
 
53  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 89-90. 
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Yet not all students who dialogued with and protested against the government 
were activists or connected with UNE. Sometimes students demanded issues like 
university reform even while allying with the military dictatorship. Additionally, 
issues like university reform could take on myriad meanings, ultimately leading to 
many student movements, rather than “a” student movement. Finally, as this 
dissertation will argue, UNE periodically found itself having to recalibrate its own 
agenda to better respond to students’ demands. While much of the scholarly focus 
has emphasized the radical leaders of UNE, most students were moderates who 
did not share radical leaders’ ideologies. This is not to say that the two groups did 
not have overlapping interests, however; rather, students could and did share 
similar goals, even if the ends differed. Where one radical student might want 
reform to lead to a socialist society, another might desire reform to provide better 
libraries or food on campus, or a simple curricular reform. Referring to “the” 
student movement does not do justice to the variety of motivations, beliefs, 
organizations, and discursive tactics students employed.  
Students from diverse ideological and social backgrounds made a variety 
of demands regarding universities, in turn simultaneously revealing the 
heterogeneity of students and the power of the university as a unifying discursive 
field. Students came from a variety of ideological and social backgrounds, and 
often had competing visions of what the university’s exact role was. Similarly, 
their push for university reform was not a simple matter of resisting military rule. 
Students, along with their parents, pedagogues, white-collar professionals, 
military officers, politicians, and others often negotiated, collaborated, and 
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compromised in defining reform. Thus, while resistance and repression were a 
significant component of the debate over the future of Brazil’s universities and the 
country itself, state and society often relied upon more complex and nuanced 
forms of negotiation that included dialog and similar goals and interests. Nor were 
the “radicals” and the “moderates” clearly defined internally; numerous radical 
groups formed in the 1960s over what appeared superficially to be minor 
quibbles. Similarly, “moderate” students rarely uniformly agreed on what issues 
were worth fighting for and which were not. In this way, some moderates could 
find themselves agreeing more with radical leaders than with other moderates or 
conservatives, and vice versa. Thus, while a division between “moderates” and 
“radicals” suggests that student movements were polar rather than heterogeneous, 
the variety of concerns and different emphases on different issues within the 
“moderate” and “radical” camps belies a dualistic division within student forces. 
Likewise, “the” military dictatorship was no more monolithic than the 
student movements. Different military presidents had alternative visions and goals 
for Brazil’s universities and development. Throughout the twenty-one year 
military regime, internal conflicts and disagreements were constant. Yet these 
struggles were seldom leaked to the public. In this regard, when studying Brazil’s 
dictatorship, it is useful to remember Derek Sayer’s idea of the “mask of state,” in 
which governments disagree behind closed doors even while presenting a public 
front of unity to the populace. Other scholars have demonstrated just how deep 
some of these rifts were in recent years.54
                                                 
 
 Consequently, though I refer to “the” 
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military dictatorship, I also make a point of referring to “military governments” 
and “military administrations” to remind readers that, across twenty-one years, 
five presidencies, and one junta, Brazil’s military dictatorship was shifting and 
rarely completely unified. 
In order to bring together these divergent issues of class politics, state-
society relations, education, development, and nation, this dissertation draws on a 
wide range of sources. Secret police documents from the Arquivo Público do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro (APERJ) and the Arquivo Nacional (AN) provided 
excellent details regarding student demands. Jeffrey Lesser has commented on the 
methodological challenges scholars face when dealing with documents that 
involve narratives and details extracted only after the use of torture (or threat of 
torture).55
                                                                                                                                                 
54  See especially Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, and A Ditadura Derrotada (São 
Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, Ltda., 2003). For a partial eye-witness account, see Carlos Chagas, A 
guerra das estrellas, 1964/1984: Os bastidores das sucessões presidenciais, (Porto Alegre, Rio 
Grande do Sul: L&PM, 1985). 
 While this is often the case for many documents within the archives of 
various Brazilian security apparatuses before and during the military dictatorship, 
not all secret police documents were based on information extracted after the 
state’s use of torture. Indeed, many of the documents in archives from the 
Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (DOPS) at APERJ and the Divisão de 
Segurança e Informações (DSI) at the AN simply served as basic reports of the 
activities, student or otherwise, that police agents witnessed taking place on 
campuses. These reports did not rely on torture; additionally, they often 
transcribed, paraphrased, and even included in annexes the pamphlets, 
 
55  Jeffrey Lesser, A Discontented Diaspora: Japanese Brazilians and the Meanings of 
Ethnic Militancy, 1960-1980, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 91-92. 
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newspapers, and posters found on campuses and elsewhere, all of which were 
material simply taken from walls or handed out by students.  In addition to simply 
offering insight into how Brazil’s security apparatus viewed particular “threats” 
from a political and ideological standpoint, these collections also offer us (via 
their numerous appendices and photocopies) first-hand documents from 
universities, factories, think tanks, and other groups that would otherwise be 
difficult to access.   
This dissertation also draws on APERJ’s collections of underground 
newspapers and the private collections of radical student leaders such as Jean 
Marc von der Weid and Daniel Aarão Reis. The documents in these collections 
include many radical analyses of the political, social, and economic contexts 
confronting Brazil in the 1960s. However, many of these documents include 
nuanced analyses of student actions and the military’s responses. These 
documents, particularly in the Aarão Reis collection, also reveal the issues that 
radical leaders had in convincing their more moderate brethren to join in radical 
causes. Additionally, these documents often include quotations or full apendices 
of non-radical pamphlets, newspapers, and other student documents, making them 
important repositories in understanding not just the radical left itself, but the 
student movements more generally. 
Private collections at the AN and Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de 
História Contemporânea do Brasil at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPDOC) in 
Rio de Janeiro provided invaluable resources for understanding the complex 
debates over higher education in Brazil. Documents in the Ernesto Geisel 
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collection at CPDOC and the Luís Viana Filho collection at the AN provided 
fascinating and rare glimpses into education and the military dictatorship behind 
the “masks of state.” The IPES and Paulo de Assis Ribeiro collections at the AN 
and documents from Anísio Teixeira, Eugênio Gûdin, and numerous other private 
collections at CPDOC proved invaluable in helping me incorporate pedagogues 
and business leaders into my narrative. 
I also conducted research at the Regional Coordinator of the National 
Archive (COREG) in Brasília, where the Ministry of Education and Culture’s 
archive stores thousands of internal memos, policy drafts, reports to the president, 
and statistical data on education nationwide as well as at particular institutions. 
Thus, as with many other collections at COREG, the MEC collection offered me 
unprecedented access to the internal workings of a branch of the military 
dictatorship between 1968 and the early-1980s. At the same time, the bureaucratic 
nature of these documents often leaves us with faceless documents, and the stories 
of the individual bureaucrats remain hidden. Nonetheless, these documents do 
reveal the uncertainties, shifts, and debates within the bureaucratic apparatus 
under the Brazilian military dictatorship, providing a new way to understand the 
workings of the regime. The result is a much more multi-faceted analysis of the 
complexities of state-society relations in Brazil than scholarship that focuses 
simply on repression and resistance. 
Finally, this dissertation draws on both personal and published interviews. 
On these latter sources, the Projeto Memória Estudantil (Student Memory Project) 
has proven invaluable. In an attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the 
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National Student Union (UNE) from its origins to the present, the Projeto 
interviewed student leaders from from the 1930s to the present, culminating in the 
publication of the book of the book Memórias Estudantis: Da Fundação da UNE 
aos Nossos Dias. Typical to narratives of the student movement, the book focuses 
primarily on the political aspects of students’ struggles in UNE; however, the 
interviews from the Projeto itself are far more extensive and complicated. With 
the help of private companies and public institutions, the Projeto made the full 
transcripts of these interviews available to researchers online.56
At the same time, the Projeto Memória Estudantil’s emphasis on leaders 
from the ME has reinforced the domination of radical students in the narrative of 
student movements in Brazil. As a result, I have supplemented these interviews 
with my own interviews with regional student leaders and with students who did 
 In the full 
transcripts of these interviews, student leaders acknowledge the shortcomings or 
flaws in their struggles in hindsight. The interviews of activists during the military 
regime, often exceeding thirty pages of transcription, discuss not only political 
ideologies or beliefs, but also the quotidian struggles that UNE confronted, 
conditions on campuses, the family background of activists, and many other 
topics.  These documents are still an invaluable resource to scholars on Brazil’s 
student movement and national politics from 1937 onward, providing a level of 
detail in both political and personal matters that are difficult to find in the archival 
record, making student movements much more “human” than secret police 
documents can. 
                                                 
 
56  See http://www.mme.org.br/main.asp?View={017C677B-B51B-4952-8C5E-
89EC5C37A9D0}. 
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not participate in the student movements directly, self-identifying as moderates or 
even conservatives while they were in school. Together, these interviews have 
allowed me to move beyond the leftist leaders most often associated with anti-
dictatorship struggles to incorporate students whose names are not a part of the 
main narrative. They too were active participants and witnesses to the 
transformations in Brazilian universities and society during the military 
dictatorship. 
Although most of my research was based in Rio de Janeiro, my 
dissertation truly is national in its scope. By focusing on universities as both 
discursive and physical sites of resistance, I look at the student movement 
nationally while simultaneously demonstrating regional particularities. 
Governmental policies before and during the military dictatorship affected federal 
universities and private schools throughout the country. Previous scholarship on 
student movements has tended to place Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Bahia as 
centers of student resistance. However, the periodization of my research from 
1957 to 1990 allows me to incorporate not only those major metropolitan areas, 
but also traditionally “peripheral” states such as Rio Grande do Sul, Maranhão, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, Espírito Santo, Amazonas and others. In this regard, this 
work is unique among the historiography on student movements and the military 
dictatorship. 
Chapter One traces the rise of debates about the university system in 
Brazil in the decade leading up to the dictatorship. Between 1955 and 1964, 
students gradually formulated a coherent call for university reform, turning their 
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gaze inward towards higher education and away from the broader national 
political struggles for issues like the nationalization of oil in the early-1950s. 
Students’ voices were anything but unified. As this chapter demonstrates, while a 
minority of leftist leaders increasingly placed universities within a broader 
struggle for social equality in the Cold War context, many other students were 
concerned with the quotidian struggles they faced in schools, leading to a gulf 
between UNE’s leadership and the majority of Brazilian students. 
Simultaneously, the new accelerated developmentalist policies of Juscelino 
Kubitschek, perfectly summarized by his desire to advance “fifty years in five,” 
led to universities occupying new space in the national government’s vision of 
development. This emphasis on universities as the vanguard for social and 
economic transformation would continue through Jânio Quadros’s brief 
administration and into João Goulart’s turbulent presidency. Pedagogical experts 
and conservative business leaders joined in the fray, making the debate over 
universities part of a broader debate between multiple sectors of society and the 
state. These various actors laid the groundwork for subsequent struggles between 
the military regime and society, while also revealing early malleability of 
universities in discursive struggles over ideology, development, and class. 
Chapter Two focuses on the military regime’s educational rhetoric and 
policy between 1964 and 1968. During its first four years, the military 
dictatorship relied more on speeches and study groups than policy implementation 
when it addressed the need to transform university education. Although the 
military sought to exert total control over the issue, it constantly found itself 
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butting up against and having to respond to students’ demands and protests. As a 
result, the military increasingly turned to repression to monopolize the discourse 
over university reform. In doing so, however, it inadvertently brought middle-
class parents and pedagogues into the fray, with the result that universities 
became a central part of the public debate in the early years of the dictatorship. 
This led to a struggle in which many actors participated, agreeing on the need for 
university reform even while struggling over goals and implementation. This 
debate culminated in the military regime issuing the University Reform and the 
repressive Institutional Act No. 5 (Ato Institucional No. 5, AI-5) just two weeks 
apart at the end of 1968, setting the educational, social, and political context for 
the 1970s. Ironically, the state had finally passed a long-standing demand while 
simultaneously repressing its most vocal advocates. 
Chapter Three moves into how society shaped and responded to the 
military dictatorship’s educational policies, repression, and developmentalism, 
focusing on students, parents, business-leaders, and pedagogues between 1964 
and 1968. In these years, the arrival of the dictatorship fundamentally shifted 
student demands. In response,  UNE leaders incorporated quotidian demands into 
UNE’s platform in order to gain more followers, leading to a context in which 
practical demands for university reform became tied to strategic anti-dictatorship 
sentiment. This new context helped the organization bridge that pre-1964 gap 
between the vanguard and the masses within the student movements. Even 
students who supported the military dictatorship called for university reform in 
these years, demonstrating that reform had become a central platform in students’ 
  
 
53 
struggles in spite of competing ideologies. At the same time, parents who had 
supported the dictatorship entered into the debate over education and democracy 
as the government increasingly responded to their children’s demand for greater 
access to higher education with violence. At the same time, conservative business 
leaders concerned with the future of the country’s economy pushed the 
dictatorship to reform the university system with the hopes of spurring the 
business class. Although these groups came from diverse ideological 
backgrounds, they collectively placed the university system at the center of 
national development and pressured the government. As these demands grew, the 
relationship between middle class expectations and university education 
strengthened. 
Chapter Four follows the state under military control between 1969 and 
1979. It details the marked shift in the state’s approach to universities after the 
University Reform. After 1968, the passage of University Reform forced the 
government to shift from rhetoric to implementation of policies that expanded and 
improved university education, particularly in areas like engineering and 
medicine, to transform Brazil’s economy. In implementing these policies, the 
military governments of Emílio Garrastazu Médici and Ernesto Geisel gave the 
middle class a new social, economic, and political importance that it had not had 
before, demonstrating the ways in which external forces like state policy played a 
role in solidifying class identity in Brazil. Nonetheless, shortcomings in the 
University Reform and subsequent related policies, as well as increasing 
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economic, political, and social unrest constantly forced the military to re-evaluate 
and reform its own policies throughout the 1970s. 
Chapter Five returns to students and white-collar professionals between 
1969 and 1979. While UNE was all but extinct by 1972, students did not stop 
mobilizing. Rather, this chapter shows how students re-framed their demands to 
respond to both the post-Reform context and to the heightened political 
repression. With UNE gone and a national movement all but impossible, students 
focused on local struggles, turning to professional organizations and regional 
encounters to formulate and circulate their demands. Additionally, as the 
University Reform changed the structure and curricula in the Brazilian university 
system, the simultaneous economic turbulence of the late-1970s led to students 
increasingly incorporating material and economic issues into their challenges 
against the dictatorship. This shift marked a subtle but important transformation in 
student movements. Students became critical of the government not only for the 
failings within the university reform, but for its inability to address their needs as 
eventual white-collar professionals. In these years, student movements 
increasingly embraced the markers of middle-class identity and incorporated them 
into their struggle against the dictatorship rather than addressing human rights 
violations head on. 
Chapter Six examines the final six years of the dictatorship. In this period, 
president João Figueiredo tried to complete the “slow and gradual” end of the 
dictatorship even while Brazil’s economy rapidly spiraled out of control. In terms 
of education policy, Figueiredo departed from his predecessors, shifting his 
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emphasis away from the universities and placing elementary schools and rural 
education at the center of his development plans. Even as Figueiredo redirected 
his attention elsewhere, however, universities assumed a new importance in 
Brazilian politics. Students continued to mobilize against the dictatorship, striking 
over conditions in the universities, and participating actively in movements like 
the fight for a direct presidential election in 1985. The return of UNE facilitated 
this process somewhat; yet UNE also faced its own challenges as it returned, as 
many students were leery or unreceptive to the radical leadership’s demands. As a 
result, UNE’s return was marked by both external pressures and internal divisions 
that gave the student movements of the 1980s a more multi-faceted nature. At the 
same time, as important as students were in resisting the military government, 
they were no longer alone. New middle class actors joined students in mobilizing 
heavily against the dictatorship between 1979 and 1985. University professors 
and staff, doctors, engineers, and bankers all turned against the dictatorship as its 
economic policies did not fulfill their material expectations as white-collar 
workers. The return of exiles following the 1979 amnesty coupled with economic 
instability contributed to a middle class that was both well-educated and 
politicized. Thus, even as the military regime de-emphasized universities and the 
middle class that they trained, those same middle-class workers took on an 
unprecedented level of political and social participation to challenge the military. 
The Conclusion briefly looks at the years of 1985-1998. Although the 
military dictatorship came to an end in 1985, the issues that dominated discourse 
during the regime did not simply disappear just because the state had changed. 
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The economy continued to worsen through the 1980s, and students continued to 
demand a “true” university reform that could satisfy their varying ideological, 
material, and educational demands. Likewise, the civilian government of José 
Sarney (1985-1989) returned to an emphasis on higher education as a means to 
help Brazil out of its troubled times. New political actors such as the Workers’ 
Party (PT) and neo-liberals under the guidance of president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1994-2002) incorporated universities into their own platforms and 
policies. The issue of university reform would continue to be central to Brazil’s 
political and social discourse well after the military had exited the stage.  
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Chapter One – The Ivory Tower, or the Tower of Babel? The Origins of 
University Reform, 195-1964 
The subject of university reform was a major piece of student resistance to 
the military dictatorship in Brazil. However, the issues behind students’ demands 
actually pre-dated the dictatorship by several years. Students originally focused 
on the generic need for pedagogical reforms, but as the 1950s and 1960s 
progressed, more radical student leaders increasingly outlined a vision of 
universities that placed them at the center of social transformations through 
programs such as literacy campaigns for the poor. At the same time, a more 
moderate majority of students focused on specific issues they confronted on a 
daily basis within universities: the instructional system itself, infrastructural 
inadequacies, even simple things like non-functioning drinking fountains.  
Although these strains varied, in both cases students began to define not only the 
role of ideal universities, but also the nature of Brazilian development and the 
nation. Additionally, they demanded a broader voice within university 
administration to effect these changes, as well as turning to strikes to make their 
demands heard. In doing so, universities became both discursive and physical 
sites of debate over the direction of national development and the role of higher 
education within it prior to military rule. 
Although university reform played an increasingly central role within 
student movements in the late-1950s and early-1960s, scholarly works on student 
movements have overlooked the participation of other groups in debates over the 
role of universities in Brazilian society and development. Politicians, technocrats, 
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pedagogues, and private citizens were also increasingly concerned with Brazil’s 
economic and political development, and placed the universities at the center of 
debates and policies on development and growth. However, these visions often 
were as heterogeneous as the groups debating them. Although Brazilian 
universities served only a scant portion of Brazil’s overall population, the 
universities came to have national prominence within the discourse on the nation 
that politicians, business leaders, and even military leaders articulated. However, 
these groups varied on the particulars regarding the institutional role of 
universities and the social role of students. These debates would come to have 
increasing importance as the 1960s progressed, laying the foundation for a vision 
of nation and development that hinged on middle-class labor. 
Imperialism or Infrastructure?: Students and Calls for University Reform 
 Although the National Students’ Union (UNE) only began to take shape in 
the late-1930s, Brazilian students had been active in politics since the colonial 
period.  Students educated at individual faculdades, or post-secondary schools, 
had been the leaders of major political and social change for generations, but they 
had never formally organized their own political-cultural organizations.57
In 1937, students gathered at the Brazilian Student House in Rio de 
Janeiro, with the intention of forming their own organization. The meeting took 
 An 
organized student movement was born in the midst of Getúlio Vargas’s Estado 
Novo, just as Brazil’s university system was beginning to take shape.  
                                                 
57  See Arthur José Poerner, O Poder Jovem: História da Participação Política dos 
Estudantes Brasileiros, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S.A., 1968), Chs. 1-5, da 
Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle”; Kirkendall, Class Mates; and Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de 
Autoritarismo, p. 15. 
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place with the government’s consent, and Minister of Education Gustavo 
Capanema inaugurated the ceremonies. Some consider this meeting to be the 
founding of the National Students’ Union (União Nacional dos Estudantes, 
UNE). However, students did not adopt the organizational name of União 
Nacional dos Estudantes until 1938, at the II National Congress of Students. 
UNE’s founders had still wanted to call its 1938 meeting the “First National 
Congress,” but when one of the participants from the 1910 meeting got wind of 
UNE’s intentions, he allegedly threatened to sue. Thus, they settled on calling 
their meeting the “Second National Congress,” which avoided offending the 
participants of the 1910 meeting and even suggested a legacy of activism upon 
which the founders were building upon.58
 When the Second National Congress took place in 1938, representatives 
from nearly eighty universities, isolated colleges, and high schools attended, 
 At the same time, proclaiming their 
meeting the “second” after the 1910 meeting denied the legitimacy of the 1937 
meeting by failing to acknowledge it as the “first” (or “second”) meeting of 
students. This was important to several of the new organization’s leaders, as they 
believed that the 1937 participants were too closely connected and subservient to 
the Vargas administration. Instead, they hold that the Second National Congress 
in 1938 marked the true beginning of the student movement, because it was there 
that students staked out a position independent of Vargas or any other political 
party as well as calling themselves UNE.  Whatever the official founding date, 
UNE quickly came to play a prominent role in national politics.   
                                                 
58  See Poerner, O Poder Jovem, Ch. 6; Maria Paula Araújo, Memórias Estudantis: Da 
Fundação da UNE aos Nossos Dias, (Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro Publicações S.A., 2007),  pp. 25-27; 
and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Irum Sant’Anna, p. 6. 
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along with professors and even a representative from MEC. There, they discussed 
a variety of issues ranging from illiteracy to the national steel industry. UNE 
established its first official Directory and provided a Plan for Educational Reform. 
The Plan focused on both political and pedagogical problems, including 
modernization of the university system, promotion and development of research, a 
meritocratic system for student admissions, and students’ participation in the 
election of rectors.59
 Although these demands indicated an early concern with the condition of 
education in Brazil, and especially university education, they remained relatively 
generalized. Indeed, a focus on educational reform quickly fell to the wayside as 
students shifted their efforts to broader political and social issues. By the 1940s, 
students were increasingly active and present on the national stage. They were at 
the front of successful efforts to pressure the Vargas administration, which had 
fascist sympathizers in its administration, to enter World War II on the side of the 
allies.
 
60 In 1948, students protested the increase of public transportation rates in 
Rio, resulting in the official foundation of the Brazilian Union of Secondary 
Students (UBES) and in a police invasion of UNE’s headquarters.61
                                                 
 
 By the late 
1940s, student leaders in UNE pushed for the “economic and territorial 
59 The “Plano de sugestões para reforma educational aprovado no II Congresso nacional de 
estudantes” laid out UNE’s objectives, including struggles for educational reform, and was re-
printed in the 1970s in student journals..  Arquivo Público do estado do Rio de Janeiro (herein, 
APERJ), Coleção Jean Marc van der Weid, Pasta 6, “Revista do DCE Livre Alexandre Vanucci 
Leme,” pp. 9-11.  See also Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, pp. 17-19. 
 
60  For students and World War II, see Poerner, O Poder Jovem, Ch. 7;  Araújo, Memórias 
Estudantis, pp. 31-46; Cunha, A Universidade Crítica, pp. 285-289.  For more on fascist 
sympathizers in  the Estado Novo, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, pp. 38-39. 
 
61  For the police invasion, see Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, p. 23, and 
Poerner, O Poder Jovem, pp. 188-189.  For UBES, see Araújo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 68-69.  
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patrimony” of Brazil, including the O Petróleo é Nosso (“It’s Our Oil”) campaign 
in the late-1940s and early-1950s that led to the formation of the state-run 
industry Petrobrás.62
Although the oil campaign did not focus on education, students played a 
notable role in the debate. The battle over oil was highly charged, and not limited 
to students or politicians. In the context of post-war world increasingly polarized 
by the onset of the Cold War, conservative members of the military viewed the 
push for nationalization as “radical.” When it became clear that opposing 
nationalization was politically costly, conservative military leaders re-directed 
and re-shaped the rhetoric of nationalizing oil to fit their own ideological vision of 
the path Brazil should take, reframing nationalization as a matter of national 
security.
   
63 In so doing, they re-formulated and re-shaped students’ demands to fit 
their own developmentalist agendas, a strategy that they would repeat in the 
coming decades.64
While UNE focused on national issues in the 1940s and 1950s, students in 
both high schools and universities continued to address educational policy. In 
1950, the leadership of UBES, claiming to represent 300,000 students throughout 
Brazil, demanded a National Convention of Secondary Students explicitly to 
resist “the increase of taxes and annual fees” in their schools. UBES also called 
   
                                                 
 
62  See Araújo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 63-67 
 
63  See Shawn C. Smallman, Fear & Memory in the Brazilian Army & Society, 1889-1954, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), Ch. 5. 
 
64  See Chapter 3. 
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for “more funding for education!”65 In the mid-1950s high school students in 
Brasília also called for reforms in the public schooling system at all levels.66 
University students at the Fluminense School of Philosophy in Rio de Janeiro 
state recalled fighting for improvements and for the school’s incorporation into a 
federally funded university.67
 By the late-1950s, UNE shifted its focus to the conditions of the 
universities themselves. In the late-1940s, the organization had divided between 
groups from the left and from the right. Between 1950 and 1956, conservative 
students controlled UNE.
 Ultimately, the Philosophy School would be a part 
of the newly-created Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UFERJ), 
which would later be re-named the Fluminense Federal University (UFF). 
However, these struggles remained isolated from any sustained national push for 
educational reform. Throughout the 1940s and early-1950s, UNE focused more 
on national issues and supporting student culture than on the conditions in 
Brazil’s universities. 
68
                                                 
 
 However, by the mid-1950s, the progressive wave had 
begun to win out among students as groups like the Catholic University Youth 
(JUC) and the Catholic Student Youth (JEC) emerged. As a result, leftists again 
returned to power in UNE in 1956. Under this new leadership, UNE sponsored 
65  Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea, Rio de Janeiro (herein 
CPDOC), CMa mês ce 1947.03.10, “Manifesto aos estudantes e ao povo brasileiro!”, 9 February 
1950. 
 
66  Published interview with Cláudio Fonteles, p. 3. 
 
67  Personal Interview with AP, 26 November 2007. 
 
68  The president of Rio’s Metropolitan Students’ Union, Paulo Egydio Martins, was a major 
figure behind the scenes in this period. Martins would later become General Artur Costa e Silva’s 
Minister of Industry and Commerce during the dictatorship. See Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 
78-81. 
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the First National Seminar of Educational Reform in Rio de Janeiro in 1957. This 
seminar marked the first time that UNE explicitly declared the need for national 
university reform. Although the seminar still focused on basic pedagogical issues 
without incorporating broader social and political issues, it nonetheless marked 
the “student movement’s awakening” to the need for “a more systemic fight for 
reform.”69 In spite of later criticisms that the seminar was more concerned with 
the structural issues than with expanding university education to the poorer 
sectors of society,70
 Students also participated in the ongoing struggle over the Law of 
Directives and Basic Reforms (LDB) in Congress. Originally proposed in the 
1940s, the LDB had stalled before Congress, as conservative and progressive 
politicians continued to fight over the exact extent of the reforms and where 
education fit within it. An increasingly progressive worldview on the parts of 
students provided them a juridical vehicle to criticize the conditions of 
universities and education.  Students expressed the ideological preference for 
publicly-funded universities over private universities, which were then still a 
 UNE still recognized the meeting as a shift towards 
examining the role of the university within Brazilian society. In this regard, the 
1957 seminar was a watershed; for the first time since the 1938 Conference, UNE 
considered educational reforms on the national level. In doing so, UNE laid the 
groundwork for student struggles over education for the next thirty years. 
                                                 
 
69  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, p. 13. 
 
70  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, p. 13 [original italics]. 
  
 
64 
minority. Perhaps paradoxically, students who had been admitted to the 
universities suddenly began attacking those institutions as “fields of the Brazilian 
elite.” That they themselves were part of that elite did not seem to bother them. 
They began to demand that universities expand and become more available to 
poorer sectors of society, reflecting the more progressive ideology of UNE’s 
leadership after 1956.71 By the late-1950s and early-1960s, isolated student strikes 
took place at federal universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, and 
Goiás.72
Students also protested and fought for other issues tangentially related to 
the university system, such as student discounts for public transportation and 
movie theaters and the quality of university restaurants, an issue that would 
explode in the 1970s. As one former student pointed out, student IDs were 
worthless if they did not offer benefits, and UNE derived a significant amount of 
its funding from students paying for IDs.  Thus, transportation and movie 
 In these strikes, university students began to demand administrative and 
infrastructural reforms. While these instances were not the nation-wide strikes 
that would occur in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they indicated that students were 
already using collective action to demand reform within individual universities. 
                                                 
 
71  For just a handful of examples of ex-students’ observations on the presence of elites and 
the middle-class in Brazilian universities, see published interview with Clemente Rosas in Túlio 
Velho Barreto and Laurindo Ferreira, orgs., Na trilha do golpe: 1964 revisitado (Recife: Fundação 
Joaquim Nabuco – Instituto de Pesquisas Sociais, 2004), pp. 180-81, and Projeto Memória 
Estudantil, published interviews with Arthur Poerner, p. 4; Marcelo Cerqueira, p. 17; and Marco 
Maciel, p. 4. 
 
72  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária,  p. 14. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Marco 
Maciel, p., and Sepúlveda Pertence, p. 7. 
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discounts were directly tied to UNE’s ability to raise money.73  Individual 
faculdades, or colleges, and not UNE, controlled the restaurants. Although not 
nearly as important to student struggles as they would be in the 1960s and 1970s, 
restaurants in the late-1950s nonetheless served as important physical and 
discursive sites where students tried to exert their own autonomy within higher 
education.74
Students had a history of seeking dialogue with the government prior to 
the Kubitschek administration. The demands to join the allies in World War II, 
the fight against the Estado Novo in the mid-1940s, and the campaign to 
nationalize oil production were just a handful of examples of this “dialog.” Yet 
they never pressured the government on the issue of educational reform. By the 
late-1950s, though, university reform had come to form a major centerpiece in 
students’ dialogues with and addresses to the president. Several student leaders 
recalled meetings with presidents Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart, 
remembering formal meetings and an access to the president that students had 
never had before. One former student and historian even recalled Goulart visiting 
UNE headquarters in the early-1960s, proudly pointing to the “prestige of UNE in 
those days!”
  
75
                                                 
 
 Student  dialogues with Kubitschek and with Goulart, be they face-
73  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published Interview with Pedro Simon, p. 4. 
 
74  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published Interviews with Elyseo Medeiros Pires Filho, pp. 
4-5, and Roberto Amaral, p. 8. 
 
75  Quote from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Arthur José Poerner, p. 
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of both administrations, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Luís Raul 
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to-face meetings, strikes and issuing manifestos, marked a new phase of state-
student relations, one which increasingly revolved around educational demands 
and sublimating national issues to the question of university reform. However, as 
the 1960s dawned, the national student movement identified and critiqued  
broader social problems alongside problems in the university system. They began 
to offer solutions that would both improve Brazil’s university system and lead to a 
more socially democratic and equal society.76
Student demands were not well received during the brief seven-month 
administration of President Jânio Quadros in 1961. In that year, students went on 
strike at the Federal Rural University in Pernambuco to protest the lack of classes 
in the school and to demand the removal of the university rector. Quadros’s 
Minister of Education met with the students, but instead of resolving the issue, he 
sent in the military.
   
77 After the military coup, this type of dialog continued and 
turned increasingly confrontational and heated.78
While meetings with presidents were an important means to make their 
voices heard, students did not wait for presidential action to call for reform. In 
1961, students took the initiative and held the First National Seminar on 
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University Reform in Bahia. The Seminar occurred in the wake of a student strike 
in Salvador the previous year. The semantic difference from the 1957 Seminar 
was subtle but significant; whereas the earlier seminar focused on “Educational 
Reform,” students were now solely concerned with “University Reform.” The 
1960 gathering produced the “Declaration of Bahia,” which situated the university 
in a broader matrix of social problems facing “Brazilian reality.”  The Declaration 
emphasized the university’s formative role in the creation of leaders and its 
restriction to serving the middle- and upper-classes and the broader “capitalist” 
developmentalist attitudes in Brazil. The Declaration suggested higher education 
become more available to all sectors of society. 79 When making these demands, 
students claimed that the poor conditions within the university system impeded 
the country’s ability to expand and improve national development.80
A year later, the Second National Seminar of University Reform took 
place in Curitiba, Paraná, resulting in the “Letter of Paraná.” At this meeting, 
students further expanded the Declaration of Bahia, explicitly linking social 
democracy to higher education in a way that set up “the future path for the entire 
fight for University Reform.”
 In doing so, 
they used dominant developmentalist discourse to frame their own appeals, 
criticisms, and solutions. 
81
                                                 
 
 They demanded more federal funding for 
79  Maria de Lourdes de A. Fávero reprinted the entire Declaration of Bahia as an annex in 
her work on UNE.  See A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, pp. I-XXVII.  See also APERJ, 
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education, while also criticizing the “bourgeois” development models begun in 
the Kubitschek era. At the Third National Seminar on University Reform in Belo 
Horizonte in 1963, students drafted a new LDB to send to Congress “to transform 
the very content of the University.”82  UNE also published books such as its 
Present Fight for University Reform, which outlined both the history of struggles 
dating back to the 1950s and UNE’s new educational demands.  Student 
leadership continued to make public speeches that connected university reform to 
social reform, be it at a gathering commemorating Getúlio Vargas in Cinelândia, 
Rio de Janeiro, in 1963, or president of UNE José Serra speaking before 250,000 
people at a rally in Rio’s Central Plaza in 1964.83
In these seminars, meetings, and manifestos, students’ demands remained 
similar, even as the rhetoric belied a growing progressivism among UNE’s 
leadership that reflected broader political polarizations taking place in Brazil in 
the 1960s.
  
84
                                                                                                                                                 
81  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, p. 15. 
 This growing emphasis on broad structural reforms within society 
rather than basic infrastructural issues revealed a disconnect between UNE’s 
leadership and many students who simply wanted quotidian infrastructural issues 
to be resolved. As one former student put it, UNE’s leadership saw a divide 
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between politics and universities, wondering how students could “remain worried 
about the drinking fountain, when you have the problem of imperialism!”85
While UNE increasingly targeted “imperialism,” students incresaingly 
mobilized over the conditions they confronted on campuses. At the Escola de 
Agronomia de Areia in Paraíba, students went on strike over the terrible hygienic 
conditions in student housing.
   
86 Even politically conservative critics of the 
student movement declared that university students “sincerely” desired 
infrastructural reforms in the universities; these conservatives, however, blamed 
UNE for turning the student masses away via its “political” stances.87
Filthy student housing and poor infrastructure were not the only daily 
issues students confronted on campuses in this period. The pedagogical structure 
itself came under attack. Students demanded reform of the position of the 
professor catedrático, the position many full-time professors held in Brazilian 
universities at the time. Once a professor achieved her or his status as a 
catedrático, the professor had absolute job security and no longer needed to 
 While UNE 
tried to bridge this gap in the wake of the Carta do Paraná, the joining of 
leadership and the masses would not cement itself until after 1964, when 
university reform became a vehicle for students and the UNE leadership to 
confront drinking fountains and imperialism.  
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research or publish. The catedráticos’ power went almost unchecked within 
classes, and students complained the position resembled “feudalism” and that the 
catedráticos simply passed their positions “from father to son.”88 The issue of 
catedráticos cut directly to both student experience and to a demand for a general 
re-structuring of the university system, in this case calling for a fundamental shift 
in the tenuring of professors. In a list of the “principal points” that students 
wanted to amend the LDB, abolishing the cátedra vitalícia was the first reform 
they proposed.89
Students also began to complain about the gradual introduction of annual 
fees, or anuidades. Public universities were supposedly free of cost. Students’ 
push against anuidades was fierce enough to gain the military’s attention. In a 
report titled “Loyalty to the Army,” officer Ulhoa Cintra stressed the need to 
combat growing “subversion” in Brazil, singling out UNE specifically and 
students more generally. While worried about “street riots,” he also expressed 
consternation over students’ demands for an end to the anuidades and the cátedra, 
saying these issues were part of the “Brazilian Revolution” that was threatening 
the country. Cintra declared to his colleagues that students’ activities marked 
  To fill the gap the abolition of catedráticos would create, UNE 
also called for the “departmentalization” of education. This restructuring would 
lead to professors who continued research, in turn benefiting students, professors, 
and the overall quality of scientific and technological research in Brazil.  
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nothing less than “communism” and an effort “to torpedo governmental 
measures.”90  Although Cintra’s report saw threats to Brazil everywhere, his 
characterization of students’ activities foreshadowed the ways in which the 
military government would characterize student leaders and their demands as 
“subversive.”91
Another issue that would continue to play a major role in students’ 
demands for university reform in the 1960s was the subject of vagas, or available 
positions in the university system.  By the 1950s, the still-consolidating middle-
class had begun to expect a university degree as part of their class status.
 
92 The 
growing middle-class expectation of a university degree led bureaucrats within 
the Kubitschek administration to express concern over whether Brazil’s small 
university system would be able to address the growing demand for university 
education among the middle class.93
                                                 
 
 These fears were not unfounded, as by the 
1960s, the increasing number of students eligible to enter university began to 
exceed the number of openings available within the federal university system. As 
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with D.N., 13 August 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with José 
Dirceu and José Genoíno. 
 
93  See the following section, below. 
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a result, students called for government expansion of the system in order to offer 
openings to students who had passed their entrance exams. More radical leaders 
in UNE even called for an end to the exams themselves, demanding 
“classificatory” exams that qualified students based on their abilities, rather than 
the “eliminatory” entrance exams that determined university admission.94 They 
also sought increased federal funding for the university system.95  Both of these 
issues became increasingly important as the 1960s progressed.96
Perhaps one of the most controversial demands student leadership made 
regarded university administration itself.  In order to make sure the reforms and 
structural “modernization” of the universities took place, UNE began to push for 
the right to comprise “at least” one-third of university committees. The demand 
for “one-third” was controversial enough that leftist Darcy Ribeiro and 
conservative Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda could join forces in opposing the idea. 
Ribeiro was one of the leading progressive pedagogical theorists in Brazil, and 
served as Minister of Education and Culture under João Goulart. Flávio Suplicy 
de Lacerda would gain notoriety for a law he issued that made UNE illegal while 
he was Minister of Education and Culture under General Humberto Castelo 
Branco, the first military president of the dictatorship. Yet both of these men 
signed a letter condemning the demands of the “movement for 1/3,” agreeing that 
   
                                                 
 
94  The vestibular was and remains a controversial topic. To prepare for it, it was likely that 
students would have to take preparatory classes for the exam, usually at night. These exams were 
doubly disadvantageous to the poor; they often could not afford an extra year of paid schooling, 
and night-classes eliminated many students who had to work to help support their families. 
 
95  For example, see APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual 
pela Reforma Universitária, pp. 30-31. 
 
96  See Chapter 2, below. 
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allowing students to have one-third representation was a “lamentable,” 
“ingenuous,” and “inconvenient” idea.97 In the face of this opposition, students 
went on a nation-wide strike for “one-third.” Though the strike was unsuccessful, 
it did demonstrate the degree to which university reform had become a national 
issue.98
Through the 1960s, the student movements’ visions were ever more 
“critical and creative.”
  
99 In 1962, students created the mobile Centers of Popular 
Culture (CPCs), which involved students traveling to remote parts of Brazil, 
where they performed plays, songs, and delivered speeches to educate poor rural 
people about broad basic reforms.100
                                                 
 
 Former students still debate how effective 
the CPCs were. For example, Arnaldo Jabor, who participated in the student 
movement from 1962 to 1967, said that the CPCs had a greater importance 
“symbolically” to the student movements themselves than having a “real 
97  CPDOC, AT c 62.00.00/2, Photo 261, Roll 40, CPDOC.  For student demands on the 
strike, see: APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, pp. 31-32; Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Carlos 
Peixoto, pp. 9-10; Antônio Serra, p. 6; José Serra, p. 4; and Roberto Amaral, pp. 9-10. Clemente 
Rosas also deals with the strike of 1/3 in his memoirs; see Rosas, Praia do Flamengo, 132, p. 90. 
Elio Gaspari also refers to the strike in his narrative of the dictatorship, pointing to the strike as a 
strong example of students mobilizing for greater participation in the universities before and after 
the 1964 coup. See Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 219. 
 
98  See, for example, APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual 
pela Reforma Universitária, pp. 15-20; Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with 
Antônio Carlos Peixoto, Antônio Serra, José Serra, and Roberto Amaral; Rosas, Praia do 
Flamengo, 132, p. 90; Poerner, O Jovem Poder, pp. 205-207; and Fávero, A UNE em tempos de 
autoritarismo, p. 41. 
 
99  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, p. 15. 
 
100  Theater continued to be a significant, if problematic, way for activists and leftists to 
criticize the military regime through the 1960s. For example, see Margo Milleret’s discussion of 
Consuelo de Castro’s play, À Prova de Fogo, in Margo Milleret, “Lessons from Students about the 
Brazilian Military Dictatorship,” Hispania 85:3 (Sept. 2002):658-664. 
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importance” to Brazilian culture, even while Arthur Poerner declared the CPCs 
had an “immediate repercussion on society.”101 The CPCs were not without their 
problems; as Christopher Dunn has pointed out, “paternalism and ethnocentric 
value judgments” were at the core of the students’ belief that a revolutionary 
vanguard would educate workers about the social problems confronting Brazil.102
Whatever the impact on Brazilians more generally, it is clear that 
university reform played an important part of the CPC’s message. One of the 
centerpieces was the play “Act of the 99 percent,” which referred to the fact that 
only one percent of Brazil’s population was able to attend public universities.
  
103 
In the play the students called for democratization or the university system for all 
Brazilians. Yet the play also targeted specific issues confronting the university 
system, using humor that mocked both the university system and specific 
professors to illustrate the need for reform, using what one anti-UNE conservative 
and ex-student said was little more than “cruel jokes” done in “bad taste.”104
                                                 
 
 
101  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Arnaldo Jabor, p. 7, and 
Arthur Poerner, p. 4. 
 
102  Christopher Dunn, Brutality Garden: Tropicália and the Emergence of a Brazilian 
Counterculture, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 41-42. 
 
103  An audio file of a 1963 recording of the play performed in its entirety is available at 
http://franklinmartins.com.br/som_na_caixa_gravação.php?titulo=auto-dos-99-de-cpc-da-une. 
Claiming the university students were only one percent of the country’s population was actually 
generous, as the actual numbers more closely approximated 0.1 percent. In 1963, for example, 
Brazil only had 124,214 students enrolled in universities, compared to an estimated 77,521,000 
people living in Brazil at the time. For numbers, see “Matrícula geral, segundo os ramos do 
ensino,” and “População Estimada, Segundo as Regiões Fisiográficas e as Unidades da Federação, 
1960/1970,” Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (herein, IBGE). The enrollment 
numbers from IBGE match up closely with those from the Ministry of Education and Culture; for 
these numbers, see Luis Alberto Gómez de Souza, A JUC: Os estudantes católicos e a política, 
(Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes, 1984), p. 75. 
 
104  Rosas, Praia do Flamengo, 132, p. 98. For the conservative student reaction, see 
Seganfreddo, UNE: Instrumento da Subversão, p. 126. 
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Whether or not the humor was offensive, or indeed whether the message of 
university struggles even resonated with the rural workers or not, it was clear that 
students expressed the need for university reforms beyond seminars and 
classrooms. In doing so, they attempted “to insert the fight for University reform 
among the fights for structural reforms” in Brazilian society more generally.105
Collectively, these meetings, speeches, strikes, manifestos, and public 
performances set the stage for student struggles across the next decade. As 
reflections of society, UNE’s leadership believed universities had to become more 
available to the popular classes if Brazil was to fully democratize and become 
more just. In this way, university students, who admitted they were a scant 
minority within Brazil, moved beyond a vision of university reform that merely 
criticized general patterns and structures or sought simple pedagogical reforms. 
Rather, university reform for radical students became a vital question to broad 
social reforms. Within this vision, the universities needed to be reformed not just 
to improve learning and research; they began to assume transformative power in 
the students’ minds, in which the fate of the universities was the fate of Brazilian 
society itself. 
  
 By 1964, university reform had become one of the central pillars of UNE 
and of student demands more broadly.  In 1957, the seminar on reform called for 
broad pedagogical changes, but without diagnosing possible solutions. As the 
1950s progressed, UNE’s leadership began to define and refine broader structural 
and social issues it felt were at the heart of university reform, even while students 
                                                 
 
105  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma 
Universitária, p. 25. 
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in general focused on specific issues and challenges they were facing in the 
universities. By the 1960s, these macro-structural and ideological demands and 
visions dovetailed with specific infrastructural improvements and reforms within 
the universities; the ideological and the practical had begun to converge. What 
had begun as a meeting that tried to identify issues universities were facing had 
become a formidable movement that demanded not only pedagogical and 
infrastructural reform, but that had its own prescription for the way university 
reform should be effected, all while connecting the university system to overall 
social reform in Brazil. In these years, students sowed the seeds for future battles 
over development, placing universities at the physical and discursive heart over 
national development. Yet they were not alone in giving universities a 
disproporationately large role in transforming Brazil.  
The Second Republic and Universities: The Kubitschek and Goulart 
Administrations 
 Politicians and bureaucrats within the federal government also actively 
debated university policy, viewing universities as central to Brazil’s national 
development. The administrations of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), Jânio 
Quadros (1961), and João Goulart (1961-1964) acknowledged that only a tiny 
fraction of Brazilians attended the universities. Yet they also emphasized that 
universities specifically and education more generally had to become more 
available to Brazilian citizens if the economy were to grow and society were to 
progress. 
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The first proposal for detailed university reform originated not with 
students, but with the government of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra in 1948, 
when the debate over the LDB began. Although Dutra’s Minister of Education, 
Clemente Mariani, hoped the law would transform Brazilian education at all 
levels, it quickly stalled on the floor of Congress. In the meantime, students in the 
late-1950s began to adopt it as part of their platform for educational and social 
reforms, even while politicians continued to debate and re-shape the law.106
Juscelino Kubitschek’s administration (1955-1960) picked up on the need 
for reform originally expressed in the LDB, highlighting universities in particular. 
Kubitschek  is known primarily for the creation of Brasília and for its emphasis on 
industrial development, and some scholars have even somewhat implausibly 
suggested that Kubitschek used a focus on these areas to “ignore” and to “divert 
attention” from university reform.
 
Dissatisfied with the LDB’s final form, the UNE leadership even printed a 
“substitution” to the LDB. 
107 However, the Kubitschek administration was 
also well aware of the importance of universities in leading Brazilian 
development forward “fifty years in five.”108
                                                 
 
 Kubitschek’s top advisers and 
106  For the role the discussion had in the 1960s and the various permutations that the law 
assumed over time, see, for example, Arquivo Nacional (herein, AN), Coleção Paulo de Assis 
Ribeiro, Caixa 46, “Esboço Inicial do Plano de Restruturação da Universidade do Brasil,” and AN, 
Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 49,  “Estudo Sobre Organização Universitária.” See also 
AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 243, “Projeto de Lei da Camara No. 13 de 1960 – Fixa 
as Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional,” and APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias 
Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma Universitária, pp. 30-32.  
 
107  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, pp. 166 and 168. 
 
108  For a general narrative of the Kubitschek years and the emphasis on development in that 
time, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, Ch. V; for a historically critical analysis of the 
Kubitschek vision of development, see Lúcio Flávio de Almeida, Uma Ilusão de 
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cabinet members in the administration were extremely concerned with higher 
education, hoping the University of Brasília (UnB) would serve “as a model for 
educational reform throughout the country.”109 Roberto Campos, who occupied 
various posts under Kubitschek, declared that all schools in Brazil, from primary 
education through the universities, were “incapable of attending to the demands” 
of the growing Brazilian population. While Campos believed all levels needed to 
be improved if Brazil was to “reach the elevated and urgent productivity” needed 
for the “economic emancipation of the country,”110 he particularly emphasized 
university education. In Campos’s vision, university-trained white-collar 
technicians and scientists would lead Brazil’s industrial development.111
Even before Kubitschek had officially taken office, universities began to 
receive added attention. The Ministry of Education reminded university rectors, 
most of whom were federal employees, that increasing the university system 
would not only aid Brazil’s national economy and development, but would lead to 
“social elevation” as well.
 
112
                                                                                                                                                 
Desenvolvimento: Nacionalismo e Dominação Burguesa nos Anos JK (Florianópolis: Editora da 
UFSC, 2006). 
 Almost all of the universities in Brazil in the 1950s 
were public universities that the government ran, with the federal government 
often appointing or approving rectors at these schools. There were only a small 
number of private schools that lay outside of the federal government’s direct 
 
109  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, p. 168. 
 
110 CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Educação e Desenvolvimento,” 26 April 1957, p. 3. 
 
111  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Educação e Desenvolvimento,” 26 April 1957. 
 
112  CPDOC, AT pi MES 1951/1955.00.00, Roll 2, Photos 215-225, “Discurso pronunciado 
na reunião de reitores na Universidade do Paraná com considerações gerais sobre educação, 
destacando-se discussão sobre o papel da universidade.” 
  
 
79 
jurisdiction, including the Catholic Universities in several states, as well as 
Mackenzie University in São Paulo. In a 1959 interview, M.B. Lourenço Filho 
called for an increase in federal spending, an expansion of the university system, 
and the creation of more post-graduate programs in order to provide the doctors, 
pharmacists, agronomists, nurses, and engineers who would lead Brazilian 
development.113 Kubitschek also appointed a group of technocrats and officials, 
including the Minister of Education and Culture, to study the issue of education. 
Their findings demonstrated the ways in which the universities were becoming 
increasingly important to the governmental vision of national development, 
declaring that the “educational ideal” would be a system that revolved around 
“education for development.”114
Among its comments and findings, the group highlighted university 
education as needing to be flexible and integrated in order to meet the “demands 
of society.”
   
115
                                                 
 
 In framing the need for educational reforms generally, the work-
group directly tied national development not only to economic growth, but to 
humanistic improvement of the Brazilian citizenry in general. The study viewed 
education for development as a nearly-holistic experience.  It would offer to the 
Brazilian citizenry the “intellectual preparation of the individual, with its moral 
formation, the dominion of the self, the sense of the collective well-being, the 
113  CPDOC, LF pi Lourenço Filho 1959.00.00/2, Roll 3, Photos 53-57, “Entrevista sobre a 
situação do ensino primário, secundário e superior no Brasil.” 
 
114  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo dos Problemas da 
Educação para o Desenvolvimento,” p. 2.  
 
115  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo dos Problemas da 
Educação para o Desenvolvimento,” p. 2. 
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austerity in consumption, the formation of the range of virtues of the enterprising 
individual, which are no less than Christian virtues” on which modern education 
had “entirely turned its back.” Only by focusing on education for development 
could Brazil improve its economy and return to its moral roots, making 
individuals  “protagonist[s] of [their] epoch.”116
While the work group took a particularly spiritual path in defining the 
types of educational reforms necessary, other studies during the Kubitschek were 
more specific in their diagnoses. One study pointed to the need for universities to 
improve in order to supply Brazil with the “engineers (of various types), chemists, 
geologists, agronomists, veterinarians, doctors, [and] pharmacists” the country 
needed. For the first time, the federal government was explicitly relying on a new 
wave of university-trained white-collar professionals from the middle class, and 
not agricultural and industrial elites or the masses of workers, to lead the country 
into a golden era of prosperity. However, for this process to take place, the 
obstacles confronting Brazilian universities had to be overcome. The same study 
pointed to the “incomplete autonomy of the Universities,” the lack of 
organization, the inefficiency and repetition between programs, the absence of 
graduate programs, and the dearth of laboratories as impeding social and national 
progress.
 
117
                                                 
 
 The report highlighted the need to increase the number of openings 
and of enrolled students in Brazilian universities from 13,000 in 1958 to 25,000 in 
116  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo dos Problemas da 
Educação para o Desenvolvimento,” p. 4. 
 
117  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Grupo de Trabalho para Estudo dos Problemas da 
Educação para o Desenvolvimento,” p. 3. 
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1965, as well as the need to dramatically increase federal spending on higher 
education. Once again, engineering schools received particular notice in the 
report, again tying Brazilian development to a workforce that could provide 
technical and scientific advancement.118
Although Jânio Quadros, Kubitschek’s successor, was in office for only 
seven months before he resigned, his administration began to act on the calls for 
expansion that had begun under the Kubitschek government. In July 1961, 
Quadros’s government formed a commission to study the expansion of white-
collar workers in Brazil, “having in mind the needs of [Brazil’s] social and 
economic development.” Once again, the president of Brazil was directly tying 
the stake of the nation’s future to middle-class workers. The commission called 
for an increase in “material and human resources” in higher education, as well as 
infrastructural improvement and modernization of labs and an increase in the 
number of courses and enrollments in Brazil’s higher education system. The 
commission also made clear that, given the broad changes that were required, 
piecemeal improvements would not suffice. What was needed was nothing less 
than a broad reform of the entire system, both in terms of infrastructure and 
personnel.
  
119
                                                 
 
 Although Quadros did not remain in office long enough to put into 
effect these recommendations, it was clear that bureaucrats and officials within 
118  CPDOC, RC e cd 57.04.26, Pasta I, “Programa de Trabalho da Comissão de Educação e 
Cultura do C.N.D.E. – Metas” p. 2. 
 
119  CPDOC, AT pi Góes Fo, Joaquim Faria 51/56.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 635-637, “Trabalho 
sobre a Comissão encarregada de aumentar a capacidade do país para formar pessoal de nível 
superior.” 
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his administration were also concerned with the status of higher education in 
Brazil and its effects on national development. 
The administration of João Goulart went even further in his vision of 
development, emphasizing the need for university reform and incorporating the 
advice of educational experts into his own policies. These experts also stressed 
the importance of improving Brazil’s university system if it was to have the 
“qualified professionals” needed for “the rapid progress of science and technique 
in the modern world.” In this vision, the humanities and social sciences fell to the 
wayside as the emphasis fell on “engineers, doctors, scientists, planners, 
administrators, and technicians.” While these positions were essential to the 
government’s vision of development, technocrats’ arguments were similar to 
students in placing blame for Brazil’s shortcomings. Like students, these officials 
suggested that a small and outdated university system were holding Brazil back. 
For example, in terms of pedagogy, officials blamed the “unnecessary and 
onerous duplication of professors” within the cátedra system.120 An anonymous 
writer in 1964 even commented that the confusion and disorganization of the 
cátedra rendered Brazilian universities “not an ivory tower, but perhaps the 
Tower of Babel.”121
The number of openings available in universities was another issue that 
occupied technocrats and pedagogues during the Goulart years. Certainly, 
 
                                                 
 
120  CPDOC, AT pi Brito, A.O. 1961.11.29, Roll 1, Photos 97-98, “A vitalizaçào da 
Universidade Brasileira” – Discurso instaurador da Reunião de Reitores em Brasília e publicado 
na Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos, p. 1. 
 
121  CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1964.00.00/3, Roll 3, Photos 46-48, “Comentário, sem assinatura, 
sobre o artigo de Anísio Teixeira no jornal Última Hora, acerca da história da universidade.” 
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Brazilian universities had expanded dramatically in the thirty years since Getúlio 
Vargas assumed the presidency.122 Still, this growth did not match the overall 
growth of the Brazilian population, and officials and students alike continued to 
be concerned with the issue of vagas. As early as 1961, the Ministry of Education 
and Culture (MEC) demanded an “immediate increase in the number of vagas,” 
as well as for “university-cities” that would concentrate all of the schools 
(medical, engineering, law, philosophy) in one central site, rather than spread out, 
as had been the model of schools like the University of Brazil in Rio de 
Janeiro.123 Governmental agencies such as the National Improvement Campaign 
of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) recommended the government “redouble 
the production of its educational preparation” and “reinforce the importance of 
technicians and specialists and the perfection abroad of Brazilian professionals” 
until the government implemented  the reforms needed for Brazilian 
universities.124
                                                 
 
 Even Durmeval Trigueiro’s insistence that the issue of vagas was 
“largely artificial” rang hollow. Trigueiro, head of MEC’s Department of Higher 
Education (DESu) under Goulart, admitted that the number of hours professors 
taught was insufficient, leading to the perception that schools did not have enough 
openings, resulting in Brazilian universities’ “unfilled capacity.” He also pointed 
122  CPDOC, AT pi Teixeira, A. 1961/1962.00.00, Roll 5, Photos 35-40, “Uma interpretação 
do exame vestibular.” 
 
123 CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1961.09.23, Roll 2, Photos 196-199, “Programa educacional do 
governo.” Originally named the “University of Rio de Janeiro,” the school became the “University 
of Brazil” soon after its formation, and was re-baptized the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in 
1965 during the Castelo Branco regime. 
 
124  CPDOC, AT pi Capes 1961.01.10, Roll 1, Photos 171-180, “Estudo sobre a ‘distribuição 
dos profissionais de nível superior na população ativa do país.’”  
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to the “disproportion” between the number of openings and the number of 
candidates for universities to be the “crucial problem” facing universities.125
In dealing with these mounting issues, the impact of broader debates and 
discourse in society was clear. Students and others publicly complained about not 
enough vagas, abuses within the institution of the cátedra, or basic infrastructural 
problems.  Even university professors had begun to demand a departmental 
system that gave them greater access to positions and resources that only 
cátedraticos previously enjoyed.
   
126  These comments and complaints did not go 
unnoticed in the Goulart administration. The Ministry of Education and Culture 
not only favored of the expansion of schools at all levels, but was aware of the 
“new social forces” who were demanding more openings and larger schools at the 
primary, secondary, and higher levels.127 As federal employees, professors’ 
voices and complaints penetrated the bureaucratic sphere. As for students, who 
“constitute[d] a politically active and volatile group,”128
                                                 
 
 they too made their 
voices heard, as when they outlined to Paulo Sá the challenges they were facing in 
the “stupid process of admission” to universities. While it might have seemed like 
a typical case of student discontent, Sá commented on the students’ complaints in 
125  CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1961/1971.00.00/4, Roll 3, Photos 18-25, “Questionário com 
respostas sobre o concurso vestibular.” 
 
126  CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1962/1968/00/00/1, Roll 3, Photos 10-11, “Lista de questões 
relativos ao ‘Estatuto do Professor Universitário’.” 
 
127  CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1952/1964.00.00/1, Roll 2, Photo 174, “Relatório a ser apresentado 
pelo ministro por ocasião do término do 1º ano à frente do ministério, discorrendo sobre as obras 
realizadas e as dificuldades do mesmo. Rio de Janeiro,” p. 2. 
 
128  CPDOC, AT c 62.09.17/1, Roll 40, Photo 202, “Documento da Associação Universitária 
Interamericana [SP] sobre o Seminário sobre o modo de viver americano para líderes estudantis 
brasileiros.” 
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a letter to Anísio Teixiera, who was then Director of the Federal Council on 
Education (CFE).129
The University is growing agitated, the students are becoming non-conformists, 
many professors are beginning to allow themselves to be moved by the new times 
and the idea of the University of research and discovery, of the University more 
for the future than for the past is [sic] visibly gaining force.
  As Teixeira himself put it in 1964: 
130
While the left-leaning Teixeira was clearly pleased with an increasing activism 
that displeased more conservative sectors, his comment demonstrated that the 
vision of the University as leading Brazilian development was not just the domain 
of politicians, but of students, professors, and at least some pedagogical experts 
alike. 
 
By tying the need for improvements and reforms in Brazilian higher 
education to national development, these technocrats and experts also laid the 
groundwork for debates over the role of universities in Brazil for years to come. 
However, unlike their military counterparts after 1964, these officials’ visions fell 
more in line with students by envisioning higher education not only as a means to 
improve the national economy and production, but also as a vehicle to create a 
vaguely-defined “new type of life” focused on improvement of the individual as 
well. In this vision, universities not only helped science and technology, but were 
                                                 
 
129  CPDOC, AT c 1962.02.15/1, Roll 40, Photo 62, “Carta de Paulo Sá a Anísio Teixeira 
enviando-lhe trabalho feito por estudantes sobre a precariedade do concurso vestibular na 
admissão às universidades e sugerindo que seja publicado na ‘Revista Brasileira de Estudos 
Pedagógicos’.” See also CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1952/1964.00.00/1, Roll 2, Photos 174-177, 
“Relatório a ser apresentado pelo ministro por ocasião do término do 1o ano à frente do ministério, 
discorrendo sobre as obras realizadas e as dificuldades do mesmo.” 
 
130   CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1964.00.00/3, Roll 3, Photos 46-48, “Comentário, sem assinatura, 
sobre o artigo de Anísio Teixeira no jornal Última Hora, acerca da história da universidade.” 
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a means to create a culture for “the masses.”131 These officials and experts, like 
students, saw universities as being just as important to the creation of “a more 
inspired conscience”132 as they were to economic progress or scientific 
advancement. The focus on individualized, personal development as a defense of 
educational reforms faded away from official rhetoric in the wake of 1964 even 
while sustaining student calls for reform.133
Goulart did not simply rely on these experts in the formulation of his own 
policy.  He also gave the leading pedagogical experts an opportunity to put their 
ideas into practice. In the late-1950s, Darcy Ribeiro had called for the abolition of 
the cátedra, the creation of a department system similar to that in universities in 
the United States, and the “improvement of professors of higher education.” In 
what would be a bitter irony, Ribeiro, who would ultimately enter into exile 
during the dictatorship, even pointed to Brazil’s military education as “the most 
modern of our educational systems, offering a model for graduate and 
specialization courses for civil careers.”
 
134
                                                 
 
 In 1961, Ribeiro finally had his chance 
to implement these reforms, as Goulart appointed him rector of the University of 
131 See, for example: CPDOC, AT pi Teixeira, A. 1952/1964.00.00/7, Roll 3, Photos 858-
859, “Texto sobre a função social da universidade na sociedade;” AT pi Teixeira, A. 1962.11.00, 
Roll 5, Photos 90-91, “Texto de entrevista dada a ‘O Cruzeiro’ sobre o Plano Nacional de 
Educação;” and AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 46, Darcy Ribeiro, Universidade de 
Brasília, pp. 56-57. 
 
132  CPDOC, AT pi Teixeira, A. 1952/1964.00.00/7, Roll 3, Photos 858-859, “Texto sobre a 
função social da universidade na sociedade.” 
 
133  See Chapter 2. 
 
134  CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1958.02.00, Roll 2, Photos 180-195, “Realizações em 1957, 
relativas ao setor de Educação e Cultura enviado a Darcy Ribeiro para a mensagem presidencial,” 
and AT pi S. Ass. 1962/1968.00.00/1, Roll 3, Photos 10-11, “Lista de questões relativos ao 
‘Estatuto do Professor Universitário’.” 
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Brasília (UnB). At UnB, Ribeiro had a particular advantage, for it was designed to 
be one of the major flagships of the new style of university education in Brazil: an 
isolated, concentrated campus focused on the professional development of 
Brazilian students and scholars.135 When Goulart appointed Ribeiro as Minister of 
Education and Culture in 1963, Ribeiro’s mentor, Anísio Teixeira, one of the 
leading reformers of Brazilian education since the 1930s136
President Goulart also emphasized the importance of universities in his 
own rhetoric and policies in ways that Kubitschek did not, placing university 
reform alongside issues like  agrarian reforms and workers’ rights.
 and a former member 
of the National Confederation of Education (CFE), took over as the rector of 
UnB. In appointments like these, Goulart placed pedagogical experts at the 
vanguard of new systems of higher education in Brazil, demonstrating an even 
stronger commitment to university reform than Kubitschek or Quadros. 
137
                                                 
 
 Despite the 
passage of the LDB in 1961, the idea of university reform did not disappear. 
When Goulart assumed the presidency in the wake of Quadros’s resignation, 
135  For UnB’s role, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 46,  Darcy Ribeiro, 
Universidade de Brasília, and CPDOC, AT pi S.Ass. 1964.00.00/3, Roll 3, Photos 46-48, 
“Comentário, sem assinatura, sobre o artigo de Anísio Teixeira no jornal Última Hora, acerca da 
história da universidade.” 
 
136  For more on Teixeira’s educational reforms in the 1930s, see Dávila, Diploma of 
Whiteness, Chapter 4. 
 
137  Many of the individuals both within Goulart’s administration and in society more 
generally remember the furor over agrarian reform and the administration’s efforts to adddress 
workers’ rights, but few recall the fact that university reform was a part of Goulart’s agenda, as 
well.  See, for example, interviews with Raul Ryff in Gomes and Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas 
faces, pp. 198-199; for a study of Goulart’s policies with regard to agricultural reform within a 
broader historical context, and the grassroots’ relation to agrarian reform, see Cliff Welch, The 
Seed Was Planted: The São Paulo Roots of Brazil’s Rural Labor Movement, 1924-1964, 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1999), Ch. 7.  For portrayals 
of Goulart’s push for reforms in journalism as portrayed in political cartoons, see Rodrigo Patto Sá 
Motta, Jango e o golpe de 1964 na caricatura, (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), Ch. 8. 
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students found themselves with a president sympathetic to their demands for 
reform, educational and otherwise. Speaking before students at the University of 
Brazil in 1963, he acknowledged the Brazilian university system’s need for 
“renovation.” He placed the fate of Brazilian development directly upon 
improving universities, declaring that university reform would not only help 
Brazil’s economy, but would allow for a “political maturation” and 
“democratization” of society.138
Although Goulart focused on broad issues concerning development and 
universities, he was also aware of the more specific challenges facing Brazil’s 
university system. He  highlighted the issue of vagas, for example, calling it “the 
biggest problem facing the Brazilian university.” He even went so far as to boldly 
claim that his administration would “immediately” double the number of 
enrollments in Brazilian universities. To do so, his government sought to 
centralize the federal university system under the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, which would eliminate diverse conflicting and repetitive program 
demands between universities and faculdades. Goulart declared these efforts 
would ultimately help streamline and improve university education in terms of 
both access and production of research while “emancipating” Brazil by improving 
national development and technology.
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138  CPDOC, AT pi Goulart, J. 1963.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 638-640, “Discurso pronunciado 
na cerimônia de abertura dos cursos superiores da Universidade do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro.” 
 
139  CPDOC, AT pi Goulart, J. 1963.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 638-640, “Discurso pronunciado 
na cerimônia de abertura dos cursos superiores da Universidade do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro.” 
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Goulart’s language was not empty rhetoric designed to satisfy the crowd 
of students. He had already issued decrees seeking to move the process of 
university reform along. The Plano Trienal (Three-Year Plan) under Celso 
Furtado, the Minister of Planning, and San Tiago Dantas, who occupied two 
ministries in Goulart’s  
administration,140 called for the government to “substantially intensify” its efforts 
in education and scientific and technological research in the interests of 
development while increasing the population’s access “to the fruits of cultural 
progress.”141 The policies within the Plano Trienal were even more ambitious 
than some of Goulart’s rhetoric.  While the president wanted the universities to 
double their matriculation rates, the Plano Trienal said Brazil would have to 
quintuple those rates in order “to reach the structures that Argentina and Uruguay 
already enjoy.”142
The central role universities would play in Brazilian development was 
clear. The Plano Trienal identified the expansion and improvement of science 
programs and centers of applied research as a “primordial need.”
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 The 
140  Dantas was originally Goulart’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the first phase of the 
parliamentary system that the military forced in the wake of Quadros’s resignation.  Dantas served 
in the Ministry from 1961-1962 before being elected federal deputy in Congress from 1962-1964, 
with a brief stint as Treasury Minister in 1963. 
 
141  APERJ, Coleção de Folhetos Apreendidos de Polícias Política 1933-1983, F150, “Plano 
Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (1963-1965) – Como surgiu, O que é, Como 
funciona, o que pretende,” p. 9. 
 
142  CPDOC, RC 1961.09.21, Pasta IV, Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (Volume I) (1963/1965), p. 140.  See also, APERJ, Coleção de Folhetos Apreendidos de 
Polícias Políticas 1933-1983, F150, “Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(1963-1965) – Como surgiu, O que é, Como funciona, o que pretende,” p. 18. 
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government also sought to improve university and high school courses that 
provided the training “required for the workforce.”144 Nonetheless, the 
government gave particular empahsis to universities within the Plano Trienal.  
Goulart ultimately abandoned the plan in the face of opposition. On the one hand, 
the left viewed the Plano Trienal’s orthodox economic policies and negotiation 
with the International Monetary Fund as evidence of Brazil bowing to 
“imperialism;” on the other hand, the right felt the plan’s efforts towards reform 
went too far.145
Goulart also presented the Draft of the Government’s Program to his 
ministers only two weeks after taking office. While the Draft dealt primarily with 
macroeconomic questions such as wage policies and the exploitation of natural 
resources, it also noted that “education demands all our special efforts for its 
integration into […] national development.”
  Nonetheless, the Plano Trienal made clear that Brazil’s 
development depended on improving the university system. 
146
                                                                                                                                                 
143  CPDOC, RC 1961.09.21, Pasta IV, Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (Volume I) (1963/1965), p. 144. 
 The Draft commented on the poor 
quality of both secondary and higher education, which demonstrated a “distortion 
between the type of education offered and the needs of development of the 
country.” Universities were particularly important for their role in providing 
technicians for the country’s industrial development. However, as Goulart would 
 
144  CPDOC, RC 1961.09.21, Pasta IV, Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (Volume I) (1963/1965) p. 156. 
 
145  Gomes Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, p. 143. 
 
146  CPDOC, RC e ag 1961.09.21, Pasta I, “Esbôço de Programa de Govêrno – Documento 
de Trabalho para Análise e Crítica do Conselho de Ministros – Brasília,” 21 September 1961, p. 
128. 
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declare in his speech in 1963, the plan noted that “the gravest problem” facing 
universities was the small number of matriculations. In 1960, 14,000 students had 
competed for just 1,800 openings at medical schools while 12,000 students 
competed for 2,000 openings in engineering programs. The Draft also pointed out 
that Brazil lagged behind not only the United States but Argentina, Chile, and 
even India in its per capita enrollment rates.147 Even worse, of those who were 
graduating from universities, 21 percent were graduating from law schools, and 
another 29 percent graduated from Arts programs. This left the sciences and fields 
like engineering and medicine woefully underrepresented, with devastating results 
on Brazil’s development, according to the report. The only solution was to 
increase spending and dramatically expand the number of openings in 
universities, especially in engineering and medical schools, and improve the use 
of resources and research centers in universities. Only then would Brazil be able 
to “accelerate the material progress of the country.”148 As Goulart was preparing 
his list of broader administrative reforms, he asked M.B. Lourenço Filho to 
compile his own and others’ observations on Goulart’s plan for educational 
reform in 1963. The request ultimately resulted in a series of internal 
governmental studies that offered over seventy pages of recommendations, 
comments, and suggestions.149
                                                 
 
 
147  The report pointed out that 1,773 of every 100,000 individuals in the United States was a 
university student.  Other countries listed included: Japan (690 students per 100,000 habitants); 
France (410/100,000), Argentina (383/100,000), Chile (237/100,000), and India (212/100,000).  
By comparison, the report placed that ratio in Brazil as just 130 students per 100,000 habitants.  
CPDOC, RC e ag 1961.09.21, Pasta I, “Esbôço de Programa de Govêrno,” p. 129. 
 
148  CPDOC, RC e ag 1961.09.21, Pasta I, “Esbôço de Programa de Govêrno,” pp. 129-133. 
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Even the watershed moment in Goulart’s administration involved 
university reform. Most scholars and participants in the events of 1964 in Brazil 
point to Goulart’s March 13 Rally in the Central Plaza as a key moment in the 
events leading up to the military coup.150 Many saw the rally as the point of no 
return, in which Goulart made public his “radical” policies and the military began 
to consider overthrowing him.151 At the rally, Goulart did indeed take a more 
explicit stand on workers’ rights, addressing Brazil’s poor and laborers directly 
and detailing his plans for agrarian reform. However, he also declared that he 
would bring before Congress “two other reforms that the Brazilian people call for, 
demanded by our development and our democracy.  I refer to electoral reform 
[…] and to university reform.”152
                                                                                                                                                 
149  CPDOC, EAP ra 1963.04.14, “Ministro Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativo,” 
and CPDOC, LF pi Lourenço Filho 1963.06.22, Roll 3, Photos 342-346, “Reforma administrativa 
do Ministério da Educação e Cultura.” 
 He outlined specifics in his plan, including 
promising to invest 11.3 percent of the country’s gross national product in 
 
150  Scholars have generally focused on two aspects of the rally: Goulart’s emphasis on 
agrarian reform, and the (retrospective) importance of the rally in fueling the coup. Oswaldo 
Munteal Filho is one of the few to mention that Goulart’s speech also included other issues 
besides agrarian reform, including university reform, and even he does so only in passing. See 
Oswaldo Munteal Filho, “Certezas e percepções da política em 1964,” in Adriano de Freixo and 
Oswaldo Munteal Filho, eds., A Ditadura em debate: Estado e Sociedade nos anos de 
autoritarismo,  (Contraponto Editora Ltda, 2005), pp. 15-32. 
 
151  A series of events in March 1964 led to the coup, including a “revolt” of sergeants in the 
marines, and Goulart’s presence at their rally at the Automobile Club on March 30.  However, 
even those who feel the incident at the Club was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back 
point to the Comício as a major event, ushering Goulart’s following actions.  See interview with 
Augusto Amaral Peixoto, in Gomes and Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, pp. 205-208. For how 
leaders of the military who were connected to the dictatorship viewed the years of 1962-1964, 
including Goulart’s speeches at the rally at Central and at the Automobile club, see Maria Celina 
D’Araujo, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, and Celso Castro, eds., Visões do Golpe: A Memória 
Militar sobre 1964, 2nd ed., (Rio de Janeiro: Dumará Distribuidora de Publicações Ltda., 1994). 
See also Motta, Jango e o golpe de 1964 na caricatura, pp. 154-156. 
 
152  Jornal do Brasil, 14 March 1964. Also available in Gomes and Ferreira, Jango: As 
múltiplas faces, pp. 202-204. 
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education.153 The fact that Goulart mentioned university reform in a speech 
directed towards workers and their rights indicates that he did not treat the issue 
of university reform lightly. Earlier in the day, Goulart had authorized the 
foundation of the Federal University of Amazonas, bringing the total number of 
public universities created between 1955 and 1964 to seventeen.154
Goulart’s speeches, like the one he gave at the University of Brazil, also 
called for an expansion in the university system, an increase in the number of 
positions for students, and centralization of the university system, all in the name 
of national and technological development. In doing so, Goulart laid the 
groundwork for many of the arguments that the military government itself would 
make with regards to university reform later in the decade.  While the ideologies 
differed between the two governments, the ends were remarkably similar. 
 By placing 
university reform alongside agrarian and electoral reform, Goulart made it quite 
clear that universities were going to play a central role if Brazil was to develop 
and become more democratic.  
Visions from the Right: Alternative Views of Education and Development in 
Brazil 
                                                 
 
153  See Oswaldo Munteal Filho, “Certezas e percepções da política em 1964,” in Adriano de 
Freixo and Oswaldo Munteal Filho, eds., A Ditadura em debate: Estado e Sociedade nos anos de 
autoritarismo,  (Contraponto Editora Ltda, 2005), p. 21. 
 
154  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 161, “Fundação da Universidade do 
Amazonas.”. For the statistics on the number of universities formed between 1955 and 1964, see 
Cunha, A Universidade Crítica, p. 96. Cunha lists only 16 federal universities and 5 private 
universities founded in this period, but the Federal University of Amazonas remains off his list, 
probably due to the fact that it had not yet been constructed or organized at the time that Goulart 
signed the decree. 
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When it came to university reform and policy, educational experts and 
bureaucrats clearly informed the administrations of both Kubitschek and Goulart.  
However, conservative pedagogical experts, ex-bureaucrats, and politicians past, 
present, and future also actively engaged the issue of university reform, even 
while opposing the Goulart government’s policies. Many conservatives felt that 
the universities were suffering from major structural weaknesses and 
shortcomings. These individuals offered their own views on what universities 
should look like and the role they should play in national development, even 
while criticizing the government and progressive students. 
Aliomar Baleeiro was a national representative from the National 
Democratic Union (UDN) in the 1950s and 1960s, a member of the Supreme 
Court during the military dictatorship, and a strident opponent of Goulart and his 
technocrats. Yet Baleeiro, too, decried the “tardy arrival” of universities in Brazil, 
which inhibited “the demographic, political, economic, and social progress of the 
country.”155 Baleeiro described the university system of the early 1960s as 
suffering from “the inanity, stagnation, inadequacy, the poverty of its ancient 
university institutions that still smell of the dust of Coimbra-like institutions.”156
Another concern was the inability of universities to handle the growing 
number of students. Sociologist Arthur Hehl Neiva estimated that 19.2 percent of 
the Brazilian population in 1960 was between the ages of 14 and 24, and that it 
   
                                                 
 
155  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” p. 2. 
 
156  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” p. 3. Baleeiro was referring to Portugal’s University of Coimbra, 
originally founded in 1290 and one of the oldest universities in Europe. In this case, he was 
derogatorily referring to Brazilian universities as pathetically archaic. 
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was essential that Brazil rapidly expand its educational system at all levels.157 
Baleeiro also cited the inadequate number of student vacancies, commenting that 
universities “grew every year” at a rate for which their original designers had 
never planned.158 Additionally, while Baleeiro did not have a problem with the 
existence of a vestibular exam, he felt that the curricula were too “rigid,” focusing 
only on the professional career path with none of the electives common to a 
liberal arts program and tying a bloated bureaucracy to universities. Funding was 
woefully insufficient, and campus libraries were impoverished.159 While the 
structure of universities received the brunt of Baleeiro’s criticisms, students and 
parents did not escape his wrath. He blamed them for “wanting to ‘pass’ and not 
learn.” According to him, the degree was effectively being commodified, as 
students sought the honorific title of “doctor.” The degree allowed graduates 
access “to public employment, to advantageous marriage, to the galas and the 
shine of golden spoon of the privileged classes.”  Baleeiro’s vision was elitist, yet 
also critical of elite excesses.160
                                                 
 
 
157  CPDOC, AHN d 1959.10.15, “Estrutura e Dinâmica da População Brasileira,” 28 June 
1960.  Neiva’s politics were clearly anti-Goulart; he wrote to a friend about his “sensation of 
anguish” in watching the rally on March 13, and declared that Brazil’s military had saved the 
country from the “abyss.”  See CPDOC, AHN d 1959.10.15, Pasta III, Letter to Prof. Arthur Cesar 
Ferreira Reis, 16 April 1964. 
 
158  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 6-7. 
 
159  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 5, 34-35, 38, 44, 62-64. 
 
160  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 13, 22-24, 60-61. 
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Baleeiro also saw a major problem with the position of the professores 
catedráticos, but in comparison to students, his complaints were radically 
different.  Where students felt that the position led to stagnation and privilege 
within the universities, Baleeiro was critical of professores cátedras for what he 
perceived to be their lack of neutrality in the classroom. Baleeiro believed these 
professors were using their position “for ideological or doctrinal catechism or the 
distortion of theoretical concepts in terms of these ideological or doctrinal 
preferences.” He felt that “the professor should not oppose nor propose, but 
simply explain,” and he openly criticized professors who taught Marxism.161
Nor was he alone. Sonia Seganfreddo, a conservative journalist and former 
student, targeted the professors who were able to enjoy the “immunities of the 
cátedra” while “catechizing” among the students and “persecuting” conservative 
students like herself. As a student, she felt so ostracized in the National School of 
Philosophy that she transferred to another school, and upon completing, published 
an incendiary report that blasted university students and professors alike for their 
leftism.
  
162
                                                 
161  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 22-24. 
 The differences here could not be starker; where some students felt the 
system of the catedrático had to be reformed because professors were too 
 
162  Seganfreddo, UNE: Instrumento da Subversão, p. 91. Seganfreddo does little to hide her 
disdain for the progressive student movement in general, but she is particularly venomous in her 
attacks on professor Álvaro Vieira Pinto, from the National Philosophy School (FNFi), claiming 
that he had ostracized her until she was forced to transfer to another school. Indeed, she spends 
almost two full chapters going after Pinto alone. This bias actually strengthen’s Seganfreddo’s 
book as a historical document, however; not only does she draw directly from UNE documents for 
her evidence, but her clear conservative ideology serves as a powerful example of how Brazil in 
the 1960s was becoming increasingly polarized, and provides insights into some of the rhetoric 
and viewpoints that those from the right were employing. For attacks on Vieira Pinto, see Chs. VI 
and VII of UNE, Instrumento de Subversão; for Seganfreddo’s negative experience at the FNFi, 
see her Introduction. 
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conservative and out of touch, individuals like Baleeiro and Seganfreddo felt that 
it protected leftist professors who used their authority to “indoctrinate” students. 
These politically conservative commentators did not cite specific examples of this 
“doctrinal” method; nonetheless, these complaints strengthened the political 
right’s call for university reform. 
Baleeiro was not completely critical.  He praised Brazilian federal 
universities for offering free tuition and affordable food, though he remained 
silent on the quality of the food. He claimed that lunch cost less than ten cruzeiros 
(three American cents), in comparison to the U.S., where it cost between seventy-
five cents and a dollar (250 to 350 Cruzeiros).163
                                                 
 
 Still, more funding was needed. 
Baleeiro wrote that universities suffered in part because of the lack of “any initial 
support from the public coffers or from private funds.” The hiring of new 
professors, the creation of more unified, self-contained campuses, and support for 
the fine arts also could help Brazil rescue its university system from becoming 
“second-rate professional schools.” Perhaps most importantly, though, Baleeiro 
felt that adopting the U.S.’s system of a liberal arts education would solve the 
problem of rigidity within the system. Baleeiro also applauded universities in the 
U.S. for their infrastructural advancement; indeed, he felt the U.S. offered a near-
utopian vision of what universities should look like, both in infrastructure and 
culturally: 
163  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 30-31. For students’ complaints about the actual quality of food in 
university restaurants, see above, as well as Chapters Four and Five, below. 
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In these [American] universities, the libraries are always populated with scholars 
and students. There are not, there never were, strikes…the students do not 
interfere in the administration, nor did the overthrow of a rector ever pass through 
their heads, as has just happened in one of the most venerable universities of 
Brazil. One does not see graffiti on the walls, nor do students protest the 
precocious vocations of electoral captains or of stubborn agitators. Everything is 
immensely diverse. Everything of a humiliating difference for those who are 
familiar with certain realities of Brazilian educational life.164
For Baleeiro, students should study, and not become politically active or 
challenge authority figures of any type. His was not an isolated view. The 
Institute of Social Research and Study (IPÊS), a conservative organization of 
businessmen, pedagogues, and military leaders, produced films that emphasized 
the need for students to study and not become involved in “base political 
maneuvers.”
 
165
While Baleeiro agreed with students on many of the main issues facing the 
university system, it was clear that his motivation for reform was quite different.  
Students wanted better opportunities and better experiences, while pedagogue-
technocrats like Teixeira wanted a more egalitarian system. Baleeiro wanted 
reforms that he felt would cut down on student activism and effectively put 
students in their place.  
 
                                                 
 
164  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp 5, 40, 51-52, and 72-75. 
 
165  See Victoria Langland, “Il est Interdit d’Interdire: The Transnational Experience of 1968 
in Brazil,” Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe 17:1 (2006): 61-81. For 
more on IPES’s involvement in the debate on education, see Chapter 3. 
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Although all of these problems pertained to a very small part of Brazilian 
society, Baleeiro, like Teixeira and others, feared for the results on Brazilian 
society more generally.  Baleeiro argued that, in terms of national development, 
the universities’ role was “primarily economic.”166
Clemente Mariani joined Baleeiro in these concerns.
 He, too, felt that universities’ 
main functions were to serve as “centers of professional formation” that would 
create the political, professional, social, and, ironically, military leaders who 
would “inevitably” lead the country in its path towards development.   
167 Like Baleeiro, 
Mariani, in spite of his political conservatism, frequently agreed with students on 
the conditions of higher education in Brazil, and as Minister of Education and 
Health in under President Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951), Mariani had been 
one of the original proponents of the LDB.  Like Baleeiro, Anísio Teixeira, and 
others, Mariani held universities to be central to the formation of professionals 
and elites who would direct the political and intellectual development of Brazil, 
declaring this to be the “primary function” of higher education.168
                                                 
 
 Juarez Távora, 
the former military leader, 1955 presidential candidate, and federal deputy for the 
UDN, held a top-down vision in which it was the “fundamental duty of Brazilian 
rulers to accelerate the national development process,” from primary schooling 
onward. Távora argued that university students would serve as “renovating agents 
166  CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 68-69. 
 
167  Education and Health remained lumped together under the same ministry until 1953, 
when Health was give its own Ministry, and Education was re-organized and re-named the 
Ministry of Education and Culture. 
 
168  CPDOC, CMa pi Mariani, C. 1964.03.02, “Aula inaugural proferida na Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade da Bahia,” p. 31. 
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in the effort of transforming the social structures that impede the development 
process.”169  Additionally, universities would be the centers of “formation of 
political, scientific, and technical leaders indispensible to the national 
acceleration” of Brazilian socio-economic development.170
Clearly, students and presidential administrations were not the only ones 
who felt that Brazil’s future development hinged on the question of universities. 
Even conservatives were not immune to calls for reforms. Yet their visions 
differed greatly from those of students or of Goulart’s technocrats. Where the 
latter sought broad social leveling, individuals like Baleeiro, Neiva, Mariani, and 
Távora felt that students were to study, and that student activism was not to be 
tolerated. To them, UNE was a “subversive” instrument, one that “asphyxiated” 
everyday students.
 
171
The Struggle for University Reform in an Increasingly Polarized Society: The 
Federal University of Bahia, March 1964 
 Certainly, these men and students disagreed on the 
particulars for reform; yet all also agreed that universities would play a central 
role in Brazilian development and thus required reform. 
This chapter has argued that students were far from the only participants in 
the debate over university reform. Presidents, technocrats, bureaucrats, 
pedagogical experts, and even private citizens also entered the discussion, 
creating new visions of national development that placed white-collar 
                                                 
 
169  CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A Mocidade e o Desenvolvimento (Algumas 
teses a debater, a respeito),” n. pag. 
 
170  CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A Mocidade e o Desenvolvimento (Algumas 
teses a debater, a respeito),” n. pag. 
 
171  CPDOC, CMa pi Franco, O. 1961.05.13, “Manifesto à consciência estudantil brasileiro.” 
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professionals at the heart of national development. As the 1960s progressed and 
Brazil became politically polarized, university reform, student activism, and the 
fear of the effects of “subversion” in Brazil only added to the struggles in the 
months leading up to the dictatorship.  One particular protest at the Federal 
University of Bahia perfectly demonstrates the ways in which these many groups 
placed universities near the center of the political fight over Brazil’s future, 
bringing together students, police, politicians, pedagogues, and private civilians. 
 On March 2, 1964, Clemente Mariani gave the opening annual address at 
the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).  In his address, Mariani focused on the 
themes of “liberalism and democracy, the principal accomplishments in his term 
as Minister of Education and Health, and the directives of higher education in 
Brazil.”  He pointed to his own efforts to improve Brazil’s system when he 
proposed the LDB in the 1940s.  He also commented on the Brazilian 
universities’ importance in training political leaders. Mariani even commented on 
the “grand theses and problems that deeply interest national life” at that moment, 
and declared that nobody could pretend that young Brazilians would just 
withdraw from these debates and issues.172
 Unfortunately for Mariani, these latter words were prophetic. During the 
address, a protest broke out as students who supported Goulart broke into the 
auditorium, shouting out to interrupt Mariani’s speech and carrying banners 
against Carlos Lacerda, the figurehead of the conservative UDN and the governor 
 
                                                 
 
172  CPDOC, CMa pi Mariani, C. 1964.03.02, “Aula inaugural proferida na Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade da Bahia, discorrendo sobre os temas liberalismo e democracia, as 
principais realizações de sua gestão no Ministério da Educação e Saúde e as diretrizes do ensino 
superior no Brasil.” 
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of the state of Guanabara state, which included the metropolitan area of Rio de 
Janeiro.173  They also threw eggs, tomatoes, and limes at the stage, covering 
several officials in culinary detritus. The incident was embarrassing enough that 
officials from UFBA, the state government, and the police all quickly tried to shift 
responsibility for the disastrous opening of the academic year.174
 The outrage was immediate. Many private citizens wrote to Mariani, 
expressing their concern over the act of these “communists” who were 
manipulating students.  The emotions ranged from fatalistic humor to outrage.  
Alexandre Lobes Bittencourt told Mariani in a telegram that, upon hearing what 
had happened, he “smiled at the piety of the mediocre, unpatriotic children.” 
Others were not so calm about the events. One man wrote to Mariani in the wake 
of the failed address, expressing his concern for the health of both Mariani and 
Brazil itself.  The attack, he wrote, demonstrated how “known agitators” and 
“agents of disorder” who were “masquerading as students” threatened not only 
the  government, but democracy itself through their actions.
 
175
                                                 
 
 While the 
173  After the relocation of Brazil’s capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960, the city of 
Rio de Janeiro became the state of Guanabara, composed of only Rio de Janeiro as its own city-
state, independent of the much-larger surrounding Rio de Janeiro state, whose capital was Niterói, 
opposite the city of Rio on Guanabara Bay.  Only in 1975 were the two states fused into one state, 
the current state of Rio de Janeiro, with the city of Rio as its capital.  For information on this 
fusion, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 210, “A Fusão da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 
com o Estado do Rio” and “A Fusão dos Estados da Guanabara e do Rio de Janeiro,” Vols. I and 
III. 
 
174  CPDOC, CMa pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04, “Entrevista concedida, enquanto reitor da 
Universidade da Bahia sobre a manifestação estudantil contra Carlos Lacerda, ocorrida nessa 
Universidade, quando da aula inaugural proferida por Clemente Mariani,” and CMa cg 
1964.02.18, “Correspondência entre Clemente Mariani e diversas personalidades sobre os 
acontecimentos políticos de 1964 e seus desdobramentos, destacando-se a invasão da reitoria da 
Universidade da Bahia por estudantes na aula inaugural proferida por Clemente Mariani. 
 
175  CPDOC, CMa cg 1964.02.18, “Correspondência entre Clemente Mariani e diversas 
personalidades sobre os acontecimentos políticos de 1964 e seus desdobramentos, destacando-se a 
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students’ outburst may have seemed like little more than a momentary ruckus, the 
highly-charged political climate had turned their act of protest into yet another 
battle between progressives dissatisfied with the right’s obstructionism and 
conservatives who saw a Communist threat in every public mobilization. 
 The event quickly took on national proportions, as representative Lourival 
Batista took the floor of the Congress in Brasília to speak out against the 
perpetrators.  He refused to believe the agitators had been students, instead 
suggesting that the protest had been part “of the subversive plans of communists 
who claim to be and pass for students” and declaring that UFBA had been 
“occupied by professional communists.” Members of the military repeated the 
belief that the actions could not have been perpetrated by students. Colonel João 
Adolfo da Silva of the Military Police wrote that the military had filed reports on 
the actions of the protestors, who he insisted were not led by students but by “a 
communist leader – trained in Czechoslovakia.”176 In the eyes of civilians and 
members of the military, any students who had become active were nothing less 
than “agitators” and “communists” who represented the broader left.  There was 
no way “real” students could possibly participate in these mobilizations. Some 
even used student mobilizations, along with events like the rally on March 13 or 
the Sergeants’ revolt later in March 1964, to argue that Goulart was losing control 
of the country and that something had to be done.177
                                                                                                                                                 
invasão da reitoria da Universidade da Bahia por estudantes na aula inaugural proferida por 
Clemente Mariani.” 
   
 
176  CPDOC, CMa cg 1964.02.18, Letter from Cel. João Adolfo da Silva, Quartel do 
Comando Geral da Polícia Militar do Estado da Bahia. 
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These commentators clearly had a particular vision of what constituted 
“proper” behavior on the part of the students and the exact role of the universities 
should assume in educating these students. In their estimation, the protest at 
UFBA revealed how the universities had failed. While these letter-writers and 
others may not have been present at the opening class, their letters demonstrated 
that they too were involved in the debate over students’ and universities’ roles in 
Brazil. Students were to study and remain silent; they did not express themselves 
in public via protests, the way these “agitators” had. Like Baleeiro’s notion of 
good students not striking, this public blaming of “agitators” rather than 
“students” belied a belief that true students would not or should not participate in 
this type of activity while also creating a dichotomous vision of universities as 
home to studious youths and foreign-trained radicals. 
 Although private citizens, politicians, and military leaders saw the 
communist threat lurking everywhere and were certain that students could not 
have been involved with the events of March 2, some students remembered the 
events differently. The president of the Central Student Directory (DCE) at 
UFBA, Pedro Castro, recalled not only being present at the opening ceremony, 
but presenting “six or eight proposals for modification of the university statute,” 
including a better distribution of funding, an end to the cátedra, and greater 
student participation in the university.178
                                                                                                                                                 
177  CPDOC, AHN d 1959.10.15, Pasta III, Letter to Prof. Arthur Cesar Ferreira Reis, 16 
April 1964,  and D’Araújo, Soares, and Castro, Visões do Golpe: A Memória Militar sobre 1964. 
 In this framing, the students’ protest at 
UFBA was not an instance of “communist” agitation, but part of a broader fight 
 
178  Personal interview, P.C.S., 17 October 2007, and CPDOC, CMA pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04. 
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for university reform that had been going on for months. As UFBA’s rector, 
Algérico Fraga, himself admitted, student leaders had been trying to achieve 
reforms and to make their demands heard since November of 1963. Their 
measured attempts, in contrast to the violent outburst on March 2, just reinforced 
the belief that only “communists,” and not students, could be responsible for 
ruining the inaugural address. While the rector insisted in 1964 that students’ 
demands for university reform were completely isolated from the “agitation” of 
March 2, Castro’s comments demonstrated that student protests over educational 
conditions in Brazil still remained unresolved when Mariani spoke. Indeed, 
Fraga’s own apparent need to stress the difference between anti-Lacerda 
demands, which in his eyes were illegitimate and “subversive,” and the 
“legitimate” demands for university reform by students, indicates that the issue of 
university reform and the need for more funding remained vital.179
The incident at UFBA reminds us that universities were not simply sites of 
discursive struggles; they could and did often serve as spatial arenas where fights 
for reforms and struggles between students, police, politicians, and private 
citizens took place. Even if some protestors at UFBA did launch very vocal 
attacks against Carlos Lacerda, it did not necessarily matter that Lacerda had little 
to do with reforming UFBA specifically or Brazil’s universities generally. What 
mattered was that the university offered students the physical space in which they 
could publicly make their demands heard. 
 
                                                 
 
179  Personal interview with P.C.S., 17 October 2007, and CPDOC, CMA pi Fraga, A. 
64.03.04.  
  
 
106 
 While the incident at UFBA may seem isolated, it reflected the ways in 
which the role of the universities in Brazil had come to take on national 
dimensions that went well beyond student movements or state policy.  The 
incidents at UFBA revealed the multiple ways in which universities had become a 
part of the discussion over the direction Brazil was heading. A small number of 
Brazilians may have been enrolled in the universities, but the institutions 
themselves had come to take on national importance, as multiple groups fought 
discursively and physically over the role of universities, and students, in Brazilian 
progress. 
Conclusion 
The events at UFBA demonstrate how the debate over university reform in 
Brazil grew and changed in just seven years. While students were perhaps the 
most-studied actors in this struggle in the late-1950s and early-1960s, university 
reform was not simply the concern of the student movements. Both Kubitschek 
and Goulart, as well as technocrats and bureaucrats within their administrations, 
also placed university reforms at the center of their own visions of Brazilian 
development. These individuals turned to  models in which university-trained 
students would form the new professionals to lead Brazil to greater industrial, 
scientific, and technological productivity. Progressive pedagogues worked within 
these administrations to improve universities, hoping to expand the infrastructure 
and improve not just Brazil’s economic production, but the intellectual 
development of Brazilians themselves. Even conservative politicians and 
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business-leaders expressed the overriding need for university reforms, even if 
they did not necessarily agree with students or the government upon the solutions.   
Certainly, university education itself only touched a tiny number of 
Brazilians’ lives.  However, universities were important to many more than just 
the students attending them. Professors, politicians, and business leaders were 
also concerned about  university reform and the role the universities and the 
students would play in the development of Brazil. In the process, the debate over 
university education had moved  beyond simple calls for pedagogical 
improvements from students and university expansion from politicians. Students 
cemented the importance of both quotidian issues and demands for social justice 
in calls for university reform.  Likewise, politicians like Kubitschek and Goulart 
had placed universities at the center of Brazilian development, and even 
conservative opponents agreed that universities had to be reformed if Brazil was 
to take its place as a leader within the global economy. Yet the ongoing political 
polarization of the 1960s made it increasingly harder for these groups to agree on 
the particulars of those  reforms. At the end of March 1964, the military 
intervened, overthrowing Goulart and entering into the fray on the role of both 
universities and students within the nation.  Democracy in Brazil might have 
come to an end, but the fight over universities was only beginning.
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Chapter Two – Laying the Groundwork for Reform and Development: 
Military Educational Visions and Policy, 1964-1968 
Less than three months after taking office, president Humberto de Alencar 
Castelo Branco gave an address at the University of Ceará. Accepting an honorary 
degree, he used the opportunity to outline the value of the university system to the 
new military government’s vision of development. He declared universities would 
“directly influence” the economic recovery the dictatorship hoped to accomplish.1 
Under the military regime’s guiding hand, they would provide the nation with 
scientific and technological improvements. The universities’ contributions were 
not going to be one-sided, however. If the country truly was to progress, 
universities would have to become “modern,” and Castelo Branco emphasized 
that his government was placing high priority on “revising the university 
structure” so that Brazil could finally realize its potential of “authentic and 
democratic development.” He also did not miss the opportunity to extend a 
diplomatic hand to the students, stressing that they and the government needed to 
“understand each other better” and enter into “permanent and reciprocal 
communication” with Brazilian society and the government.2
                                                 
1  As Thomas Skidmore has demonstrated, the economic situation confronting Brazil in 
1964 was bleak, with foreign governments and banks refusing to give loans to the Goulart 
government and with Brazil facing the real threat of defaulting on its three billion dollar foreign 
debt. Inflation had also hit 100 percent, furthering domestic economic instability. The causes for 
these issues ran deeper than Goulart’s particular policies, and included the Kubitschek’s policy of 
maintaining high levels of public investment even while trying to stabilize the economy. For more 
on economic policy during Kubitschek’s and Goulart’s administrations, see Skidmore, Politics in 
Brazil, 1930-1964, pp. 175-182, 234-248, and 267-273. For the military’s economic policy and its 
defense of arbitrary authority to stabilize the economy, see Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of 
Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 29-39 and 55-63. 
 
 
2  Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, (Brasília: Secretária da 
Imprensa, 1965-1967 [3 Vols.]), pp. 133-139. 
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The speech was not a simple case of the president saying what he thought 
his audience would want to hear. As the next three years of his administration 
would demonstrate, he was deadly earnest about the value universities would play 
within the government’s vision if Brazil was going to truly gain economic 
stability and achieve promised levels of development. Indeed, throughout his 
three years of governing, Castelo Branco would repeatedly return to his speech at 
Ceará in outlining the military government’s developmental plans.3
For the first five years of the military dictatorship, from 1 April 1964 to 
the end of 1968, the administrations of Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Artur 
Costa e Silva (1967-1969) tackled universities head on. Indeed, Castelo Branco’s 
June 1964 speech at Ceará succinctly outlined how the Castelo Branco and Costa 
 Nor was 
Castelo Branco an exception. Throughout Brazil’s twenty-one year military 
dictatorship, presidents focused on the universities not just as sites of 
“subversion” and resistance to military rule; they were also keystones in national 
development and major subjects and actors in the transformation and 
modernization of the Brazilian economy and society. These administrations did 
not treat education homogeneously. Yet throughout the dictatorship and beyond, 
universities were constantly present in governmental and civilian rhetoric, in 
policy-making, and in defining what Brazilian development and democracy would 
look like. 
                                                 
 
3  See, for example: “Discurso do Presidente Castelo [sic] Branco na Instalação do 
Conselho Federal de Cultura – Agência Nacional, 3º turno,” 27 February 1967, Notação 7.100; 
“Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Governo Castelo Branco;” Notação 9.95; and 
“Anotações datilografadas sobre Educação,” Notação 9.97, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Arquivo 
Nacional (NA). See also Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, p. 153, and Vol. 3, pp. 162 and 164. 
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e Silva governments would view and treat university education. They were 
determined to transform campuses that were sites of “subversion and agitation” 
under Goulart into vehicles for Brazilian development and modernization.   
Castelo Branco’s call for a “permanent and reciprocal communication” with the 
students would take on definitions and parameters that the military did not foresee 
and did not always appreciate, as students challenged and attempted to define 
their own vision of universities and development.4
The Military’s Vision of Universities: State Ideology and Universities 
 However, between 1964 and 
1968, the military  continuously tried to unilaterally control, study, improve, and 
redefine the role of universities in Brazil. Yet it unwillingly found itself  having to 
yield and respond to demands from students, parents, businessmen, diplomats, 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and others who had their own understanding of the 
function of universities in the nation.  
 Upon taking office, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco’s administration 
sought to undo the economic, political, and social turmoil of the previous two-
and-a-half years of Goulart’s administration.5
                                                 
 
 Cracking down on workers, 
opposition politicians, and UNE, the military government promoted development 
to define the new Brazil. In this vision, politics would be set aside as the military 
guided the country to its rightful place among the “developed” world. Brazil’s 
inflation rate exceeded 100 percent in 1964, and stabilizing the economy was the 
4  See Chapter 3. 
 
5  Although the coup was completed by the end of April 1, Castelo Branco was not 
inaugurated until 11 April 1964. In the interim, a military junta led the country, with General 
Arthur Costa e Silva at its head.  
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military’s first priority. Although inflation never “went away,” the economic 
policy of the Castelo Branco administration, led by Minister of Planning Roberto 
Campos and Economic Minister Octávio Gouvéia Bulhões, managed to rein in 
inflation by a third (from 61 to 41 percent) between 1965 and 1966. It did so in 
part by relying on foreign loans from the United States and, in a curious turn of 
events, the Soviet Union, the same country that the military constantly suggested 
was sponsoring “subversion” in the Goulart administration and UNE.6
The Castelo Branco administration emphasized universities’ role in 
helping Brazil to “defeat the barrier of underdevelopment” and “assuring its 
sovereignty, its progress, and its popular liberties.”
    
7 These were not mere vague 
platitudes extolling universities’ transformative role. The Castelo Branco and 
Costa e Silva governments specifically emphasized the development of “human 
resources” in public speeches.8
                                                 
 
 Costa e Silva’s Ministry of Planning again 
outlined its objectives in a program that directly tied together “Education and 
Human Resources.” It reiterated education as a key component of national 
development, and specifically cited university education’s importance in “leading 
6  See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, p. 55. For accusations of 
subversion and governmental crackdowns on “Communists,” see “DOPS – SI – SFA No. 4.058 – 
Referência: ‘Universidade do Brasil – C.I.U.B. – Oficio No. 16 – Confidencial – do Presidente da 
Comissão de Inves da U.B. Datado de 29.6.1964 – Protocolo No. 8366/64,” Coleção DOPS – 
Informações, Pasta 48, Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (APERJ), for example. 
 
7  Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, pp. 141, 149. This type of rhetoric dominates Castelo 
Branco’s public addresses. See also Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, p. 152; Discursos, Vol. 2., 
p. 172; and Discursos Vol. 3, pp. 149, 152-153, and 158. 
 
8  See Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 2, pp. 170-172, and Vol. 3., pp. 148-162; For Costa 
e Silva, “Plano de Metas da Educaçào Nacional – Plano Nacional de Cultura,” 27 July 1967, pp. 6-
7, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 299, AN, and Ministério do Planejamento e 
Coordenação Geral – Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970 – Cap. XV – 
“Fortalecimento da Infra-estrutura Social: Educação,” pp. 1, 38. Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
Caixa 299, AN 
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the formation of human resources.”9
Universities would also strengthen Brazil through the expansion of science 
and technology curricula. Castelo Branco extolled the role of science and 
technology in spurring industrial growth and development to stabilize the 
economy and resolve almost all of Brazil’s economic and social problems.
 The administrations’ definition of “human 
resources” did not involve all classes and jobs, though. University students in 
white-collar professions, particularly in private business, engineering, or 
medicine, were the backbone of the government’s definition of human resources. 
10 In 
his vision of development, prosperity was impossible “without the foundations of 
science and technology.”11 Moreover, Castelo Branco claimed that improving 
Brazil’s scientific and technological capabilities in the universities  would create a 
Brazilian “nation” and “people” whose culture and traditions could survive in the 
modern world.12 Government reports cited statistics on what they perceived to be 
the dearth of engineers, doctors, dentists, architects, and researchers, a concern 
that also pre-dated the military dictatorship.13
Although Costa e Silva was not as ebullient as his predecessor in his 
praise for science and technology’s messianic abilities, in 1967, his new cabinet 
   
                                                 
 
9  Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral – Programa Estratégico de 
Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970 – Cap. XV – “Fortalecimento da Infra-estrutura Social: Educação,” 
pp. 1, 38. Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 299, AN. 
 
10  Castelo Branco, Discursos, vol. 1, p. 134; vol. 3, pp. 158-159. 
 
11  Castelo Branco, Discursos, vol. 1., p. 141. 
 
12  Castelo Branco, Discursos, vol. 3, pp. 170-171. 
 
13  Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, pp. 136, 141, 146, and Vol. 3., p. 170. For pre-
dictatorship data, see “Estudo sobre a distribuição dos profissionais de nível superior na população 
ativa do país,” pp. 3-4. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea, Rio de 
Janeiro (CPDOC), AT pi Capes 1961.01.10 [174]. 
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also recommended boosting scientific research and production through increased  
federal spending.14 His administration also used statistics to decry the absence of 
scientists, engineers, dentists, veterinarians, and other white-collar professionals 
in the sciences, even while students in law, the social sciences, and the humanities 
were abundant.15 Perhaps not coincidentally, most student opposition came from  
these latter programs in the 1960s, possibly strengthening the government’s desire 
to focus  on the sciences all the more. Indeed, in the military’s new Constitution 
of 1967, the section on education declared that “The Public Power will give 
incentive to scientific and technological research,” while saying nothing about 
other areas of academic study.16
In order for universities to be able to provide the human resources and the 
scientific know-how to lead Brazilian development, however, the military 
governments acknowledged that a major overhaul of the university system was 
required.
 The inclusion of science in the foundation of the 
country’s legal system made clear just how important improving Brazil’s 
scientific and technological capacity was to the new military governments. 
17
                                                 
 
 Both Castelo Branco’s and Costa e Silva’s administrations regularly 
14  See, respectively, “Documentos Básicos – Plano de Metas da Educação Nacional – Plano 
Nacional de Cultura,” p. 19, Caixa 299, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN; and “Diretrizes de 
Govêrno – Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento,” July 1967, p. 96, Caixa 283, Coleção 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
15  See, for example, “Resultados iniciais da pesquisa ‘O Brasil e seus profissionais de nível 
superior’.” CPDOC, AT pi FGV 1968.00.00 [531-589], and “Ministério do Planejamento e 
Coordenação Geral – Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento 1968-1970 – Cap. XV – 
Fortalecimento da Infra-estrutura Social: Educação,” June 1968, pp. 64-69, Caixa 299, Coleção 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
16  Constitution of 1967, Article 171. Caixa 252, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
17  See, for example, Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, p. 136-137; Vol. 2, p. 110; and 
Untitled Document, NT 334, Fundo Coleções Particulares – Coleção Jair Ferreira de Sá, APERJ. 
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called for the need to “perfect” (aperfeiçoar) the university system generally,18 
language that university students also used in their own calls for reform.19 Flávio 
Suplicy de Lacerda, the first Minister of Education during the dictatorship, 20 
claimed that 11 of the 15 measures adopted by  the military government to 
transform education in Brazil dealt directly or tangentially with the university 
system.21
Visions and Praxis: Educational Policy 
 Making claims on the value of the universities was common in this 
period; both Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva continuously placed universities at 
the center of their rhetoric on national development. However, actually 
transforming universities through policy proved to be more scattershot during the 
first years of the dictatorship.  
                                                 
 
18  For example, see “MEC – Principais atividades e realizações – 1930-1967,” Notação 
9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN; “Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Diretoria de Ensino 
Superior – Convênio de Assessoria ao Planejamento do Ensino Superior – MEC/DESU-Aliança 
para o Progresso – USAID/Brasil,” May 1967, and “Declaração do Ministro da Educação Sôbre os 
Acôrdos com a USAID,”  AAP rev64.1967.05.09, CPDOC; “Agenda com registro de atos, 
encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco, 14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967,” Notação 1.72, 
Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN; and Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 2, pp. 145, 170-172, 217, and 
Vol. 3, pp. 151, 153, 185-186, 219, and 301-302. 
 
19  See Chapter 3. 
 
20  Because Castelo Branco was not inaugurated until April 11, Luiz Antônio da Gama e 
Silva served as Minister of Education from April 6 until Suplicy’s installation on April 15, at 
which point Gama e Silva relocated to his position as rector at the Universidade de São Paulo 
(USP). See “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 16-17, Notação 9.56, 
Coleção Luís Viana Filho; and Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 223. Gama e Silva would 
later become notorious as the Minister of Justice, a hardliner who according to one scholar served 
as supervisor to the paramilitary group Comando de Caça aos Comunistas (Communist-Hunting 
Command, CCC); see Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 299. While serving as Minister of 
Justice in the cabinet of Costa e Silva, Gama e Silva playing a central role in the issuance of the 
repressive Institutional Act No. 5, which would usher in the most repressive phase of Brazil’s 
twenty-one year dictatorship. See Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 317 and 332-343, and 
Ronaldo Costa Couto, História indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura – Brasil: 1964-1985, (Rio de 
Janeiro: Editora Record, 2003), p. 86. 
 
21  “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 49-51, Caixa 9, Coleção 
Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
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With his focus on economic reforms, Castelo Branco attempted to increase 
funding and attendance in the universities, but offered little in the way of a 
coherent policy. Certainly, Castelo Branco attempted to expand the university 
system, and boasted of increasing its funding. Agreements with foreign agencies 
played an important part in the Castelo Branco administration’s educational 
policy, as well. However, these attempts at reform were piecemeal and often half-
hearted, as the administration undid its previous policies and laws. Only during 
Costa e Silva’s administration did the military dictatorship begin to fully tackle 
the issue of university reform in an attempt to create a unified, coherent policy to 
transform Brazil’s higher education. 
Foremost among the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva administrations’ 
specific concerns was the issue of vagas, or positions available in the universities 
each year. Officials pointed towards the country’s “demographic explosion” and 
increasing urbanization, resulting in growing numbers of students seeking 
university education.22  Castelo Branco quickly expressed his goal of fulfilling 
1961’s Lei de Diretrizes e Bases (LDB) and expanding the number of openings in 
universities.23 Raymundo Moniz Aragão, Castelo Branco’s third Minister of 
Education, placed expanding the university system as his top priority upon taking 
office in 1966.24
                                                 
 
 Even so, progress was slow, and in early-1967, Aragão was 
22  “No Estado do Rio, a Primeira Cidade Universitária do Brasil – Iniciativa Histórica, 
1967/1970.” CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00 [Pasta III]. 
 
23  Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1., p. 137. 
 
24  “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” p. 71-72, Notação 9.56, 
Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN. Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda stepped down in the beginning of 1966, 
and Minas Gerais politician Pedro Aleixo replaced him. However, Aleixo had to step down in 
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promising students in Rio de Janeiro that all the excedentes, or those who had 
passed the entrance exams but for whom there were no positions available, would 
be placed in universities, although perhaps in other states.25 Shortly after taking 
office, Guanabara governor Francisco Negrão de Lima commented on the 
public’s worry over the lack of openings at all educational levels, particularly the 
university level.26 However, he did not offer solutions, instead dodging the issue 
by calling it a “national problem.”27
Yet the federal government under Castelo Branco was slow to solve the 
problem.  Some statistics for 1967 put the number of students eligible for 
university admission at 180,000, with only 80,000 openings that year.
 
28
                                                                                                                                                 
October of that same year when he became Costa e Silva’s vice-presidential candidate. Raymundo 
Moniz de Aragão, the Director of Higher Education at the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
stepped in to fill Aleixo’s shoes. The fact that it was the Director of Higher Education, and not the 
Director of Secondary or Primary Education (both positions in MEC), who assumed the role of 
Minister of Education and Culture in Castelo Branco’s last year, suggests how seriously the 
government took university education. 
 In 
addition to the relative smallness of universities, the military governments also 
criticized lab conditions, the quality of curricula, the archaic position of the 
professor catedrático, and the examination system. Under Castelo Branco, 
CAPES spent only five million Cruzeiros (NCr$) on re-equipping universities in 
 
25  “Cronologia do Govêrno Castelo Branco,” Notação 7.52, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 
26  Negrão de Lima’s election as governor of Guanabara state (Rio de Janeiro city) in 1965 
was one of the two factors that led to the military’s institution of AI-2, which abolished old 
political parties and opened a new round of stripping individuals of their political rights. See 
Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, pp. 60-65. 
 
27  “Governador Negrão de Lima Preside Aula Inaugural da UEG [Universidade do Estado 
de Guanabara],” Govêrno da Guanabara – Assessoria de Imprensa, 11, March 1966. CPDOC, NL 
g 66.03.11. 
 
28  See “Diretrizes de Govêrno – Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento,” July 1967, 
Caixa 283, and “Adequação da Universidade ao Mercado de Técnicos de Nível Superior,” 21 
October 1968, Caixa 317, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
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1966.29 The military government lamented the “scarcity of resources,” as well as 
poor distribution, which resulted in what one participant at a forum featuring 
Roberto Campos described as “the horrible quality of education offered in the 
majority of universities.”30
To deal with outdated infrastructure, Castelo Branco’s bureaucrats urged 
increased spending.
  
31 Fifty-eight percent of MEC’s budget in 1965 was spent on 
higher education, thus violating the law as outlined in the LDB, which dictated 
that the spending be divided equally among the three levels of education.32 
Nonetheless, the federal government boasted that spending on education was at its 
“most intense” between 1964 and 1967, and that per capita spending on 
universities had jumped from 2.9 percent in 1960 to 4.5 percent in 1967, with an 
annual growth of 16 percent.33
However, the government’s numbers could not be reconciled with student 
complaints that universities were underfunded. State governmental studies 
suggested that the federal government had failed to adjust their figures for 
  
                                                 
 
29  “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 72-73, Notação 9.56, 
Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN. The final figure given was NCr$4,756,925.00. 
 
30  Roberto Campos, “Educacão e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” 1968, pp. 17-18, Caixa 
319, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
31  Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral – Programa Estratégico de 
Desenvolvimento 1968-1970, Cap. XV – Fortalecimento da Infra-estrutura Social: Educação,” 
June 1968, pp. 33-35, Caixa 299, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN; “Governador Negrão de 
Lima Preside Aula Inaugural da UEG,” Govêrno da Guanabara – Assessoria de Imprensa, 11 
March 1966, p. 8. CPDOC, NL g 66.03.11, CPDOC. 
 
32  “Estudos Cariocas – Estado da Guanabara, Secretaria do Govêrno, Coordenação de 
Planos e Orçamento,” No. 1, 1965, p. 11-12, Caixa 298, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
33  “Recursos Públicos Aplicados em Educação, 1960/1967,” p. 6, 15, Caixa 298, Coleção 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
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inflation and that students perhaps had a legitimate complaint. The military 
claimed it had rapidly increased spending in 1964 alone. Yet a study in Rio de 
Janeiro pointed out that, while federal spending on education and culture in Rio 
had increased from Cr$588,404,000 in 1960 to Cr$3,292,879,000 in 1964, when 
inflation was taken into account, funding  actually dropped by 15.3 percent 
between 1960 and 1964.34 Likewise, Governor Negrão Lima declared that nine 
billion cruzeiros of state and federal funding would be insufficient to attend to the 
University system’s needs in Rio in 1966.35
The Castelo Branco administration did make attempts to legislate broader 
university reforms. In November 1966, it issued Decree-Law 53, followed by 
Decree-Law 252 in February 1967. Together, they hinted at the direction the 
regime would take in the 1968 University Reform. They proclaimed the need to 
streamline university administration and departmental organization while 
emphasizing the value of research.
 
36
                                                 
34  “Estudos Cariocas – Estado da Guanabara, Secretaria do Govêrno, Coordenação de 
Planos e Orçamento,” No. 2, 1965, pp. 6, 11. Caixa 298, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 However, these reforms remained 
superficial, with no diagnoses on how to implement these changes. Additionally, 
they came after Congress had elected Costa e Silva and Castelo Branco entered 
the lame-duck phase of his regime, meaning little came of them. Indeed, although 
the two laws marked the government’s most serious efforts at university reform 
 
35  “Governador Negrão de Lima Preside Aula Inaugural da UEG,” Govêrno da Guanabara – 
Assessoria de Imprensa, 11 March 1966, p. 10. CPDOC, NL g 66.03.11. 
 
36  “Decreto Lei no. 53 de 18 de novembro de 1966,” 1.107, and “Decreto Lei no. 252 de 28 
de fevereiro de 1967,” 1.108, Pasta 3, Caixa 9, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
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yet, as one scholar put it, they were still “paper reforms” that did not offer any 
real transformations in Brazilian education. 37
Perhaps the most important educational legislation during Castelo 
Branco’s administration dealt not with issues of vagas or funding, but with the 
student movement itself. In November 1964, the government issued the Lei 
Suplicy, or Suplicy de Lacerda law, named after the Minister of Education and 
Culture. With labor leaders and opposition politicians removed through the First 
Institutional Act, the Lei Suplicy was the government’s first concentrated salvo 
against student movements. The law outlawed UNE, as well as the State Student 
Unions (UEEs) and Rio de Janeiro’s Metropolitan Student Union (União 
Metropolitano dos Estudantes, UME). In their stead, the government created the 
National Directory of Students (Diretório Nacional de Estudantes, DNE) and 
State Directories of Students (Diretórios Estaduais dos Estudantes, DEE). The 
new DNE and DEEs fell under the direct jurisdiction of the state, providing the 
military with a better way to control student organizations. The Lei Suplicy also 
sought to control on-campus organizing by establishing the Students’ Central 
Directories (DCEs). The intention was to strip the student movements of all 
“subversive” voices and relegate student organizations to the authority of the 
executive branch. However, the dictatorship never fully enforced the law, forcing 
UNE into “semi-legality,” as it continued to hold elections and congresses 
through 1968.  
 
                                                 
 
37  Florestan Fernandes, Universidade brasileira: reforma ou revolução?, (São Paulo: 
Editora Alfa Omega Ltda., 1975), p. 203 
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The law spurred immediate outrage among students. They bashed Suplicy 
de Lacerda for his incompetence and for his namesake law. One scholar called 
him “the most catastrophic Minister of Education in the history of national 
pedagogy.”38 A former student went so far as to say that the only good thing 
Suplicy had accomplished as rector of the University of Paraná (prior to becoming 
Minister of Education) was installing a bust of himself on the campus, one which 
the student bragged students later destroyed.39 Students also took over the DCEs 
on many campuses in an attempt to seize control from the government. While 
UNE continued to meet semi-clandestinely and students mobilized against the 
law, the DEEs and DNEs proved ineffectual. By 1966, the government repealed 
the Lei Suplicy (though UNE remained illegal); yet that did not stop the law from 
providing students with a powerful symbol in protesting the military regime well 
into the Costa e Silva administration.40
Under Costa e Silva, many of the issues that plagued higher education 
under Castelo Branco continued to occupy the new president. Prior to taking 
office, the general had already decreed 1967 to be “The Year of Education,” 
pledging improvements and reform.
 
41
                                                 
 
 A preoccupation with vagas continued in 
the first years of the Costa e Silva administration. Arlindo Lopes Corrêa, a high-
ranking official in the Ministry of Planning and General Coordination, took 
38  Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 225. 
 
39  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Dirceu, pp. 4-5.  
 
40  See Ch. 3, below. 
 
41  Untitled Document, NT 334, Fundo Coleções Particulares – Coleção Jair Ferreira de Sá, 
APERJ. 
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seriously a Universidade do Brasil professor’s claims that doubling the number of 
openings in the university system was viable, and presented a governmental report 
based on the professor’s argument.42 Although Castelo Branco had sought 
expansion, Costa e Silva’s administration went even further, acting on the 
professor’s study. While Costa e Silva’s administration proposed doubling the 
number of openings, Castelo Branco had denigrated João Goulart’s Decree 53.642 
of February 1964, which doubled the number of openings in universities. It was 
not that Castelo Branco was opposed to the expansion of universities. However, 
he suggested that Goulart’s decree was “simple” and disorderly, and even blamed 
it for students’ “dissatisfaction.”43 Although Castelo Branco also sought to 
expand the university system, he deemed Goulart’s educational policies 
“erroneous”44 and, in a statement seemingly free of irony, even accused Goulart 
of using the expansion in order “to dominate the University via terror.”45
The entrance exams were another point of increasing concern under Costa 
e Silva. In the 1960s, students took different exams for different fields. Thus, 
students in engineering were not tested on subjects like literature or anthropology. 
 Yet four 
years after assuming power, the military government was exploring the exact 
same policy to address the issues of vagas and excedentes.    
                                                 
 
42  “Uso Intensivo do Espaço Escolar no Ensino Superior – Setor da Educação Mão-de-Obra 
do IPEA – Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral,” March 1968. CPDOC,  EUG pi 
Corrêa, A. 1968.03.00. 
 
43  “Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Governo Castelo Branco,” 
Anotações 9.94-9.95, Caixa 9, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 
44  Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 2, p. 172. 
 
45  “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” p. 48. Notação 9.56, Coleção 
Luis Viana Filho, AN. 
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Consequently, students applying to more than one program had to take multiple 
exams, which slowed down the admissions process. The government suggested 
the exams could be adapted to measure “not only the basic essential knowledge 
needed for entrance into the university, but the potentiality of the future university 
students and of the adaptation of their qualities with regards to the career paths 
they have selected.”46
In spite of his efforts, Costa e Silva ran into some of the same problems 
his predecessor had. In 1967, he cut university budgets, half-heartedly defending 
the measure as part of “a reduction only in the spending of the [federal] Union.”
 This approach would simultaneously test students on a 
broad range of subjects while streamlining the process by providing one unified 
exam for all students, regardless of their proposed field of study. 
47 
Although this did not impact primary or secondary education as much, it hit 
higher education hard.48 Federal universities matriculated as much as 81 percent 
of Brazil’s total university population in 1964, meaning universities suffered 
disproportionately from these budget cuts.49
                                                 
 
 Thus, it was not so surprising when 
46  Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral – Programa Estratégico de 
Desenvolvimento 1968-1970, Cap. XV – Fortalecimento da Infra-estrutura Social: Educação,” 
June 1968, p. 40, Caixa 299, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
47  “Recursos Públicos Aplicados em Educação – 1960/67,” p. 5, Caixa 298, Coleção Paulo 
de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
48  For the prevalence of higher education over secondary or primary educatino, see, 
“Documentos Básicos – Plano de Metas da Educação Nacional – Plano Nacional de Cultura,” 27 
July 1967, pp. 8 and 18, and “Ministério de Planejamento e coordenação Geral – Programa 
Estratégico de Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970 – Cap. XV – Fortalecimento da Infraestrutura Social: 
Educação,” June 1968, pp. 5-6, 24-45,Caixa 299, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. In the 
“Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento,” Costa e Silva’s Ministry of Planning devoted seven 
pages to primary education, five pages to secondary education, and twenty-one pages to higher 
education, indicating the emphasis the federal government gave to universities.  
 
49  Maria das Graças M. Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira: Reforma e Diversificação 
Institucional,” (Ph.D. diss., Universidade de São Francisco, 2002), p. 18. 
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the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) complained of funding cuts due to 
inflation when on paper, their budget had actually increased.50
The government’s turn to foreign agencies to intervene in university 
reform was even more ideologically outrageous to students. Paradoxically, this 
strategy actually predated the military dictatorship. Prior to the coup, Goulart 
entered into an agreement with the Inter-American Bank of Development (Banco 
Interamericano do Desenvolvimento, BID). The agreement secured foreign loans 
to help Brazil improve the educational system. Brazil’s National Bank of 
Development (BNDES), which oversaw the spending of the funds, learned that 
the government hoped to use the money for education and attempted to block the 
use of the funds, claiming that education was not a “basic investment for national 
economic development.” The BNDES did eventually free up the money when 
professor and Institute of Social Research and Studies (Instituto de Pesquisa e 
Estudos Sociais, IPES) member Paulo de Assis Ribeiro argued that “education is 
a primordial investment for the economic development of any country.” When the 
military overthrew Goulart, the MEC-BID agreements were one of the few 
Goulart-era policies that the military continued, gaining Castelo Branco’s seal of 
 Additionally, 
although primary and secondary education was funded primarily by municipal 
and state governments, the federal government was responsible for funding 
universities. Consequently, while the government could point to misleading data 
suggesting it had improved educational spending, students and state governments 
could legitimately claim that the system remained woefully under-funded. 
                                                 
 
50  “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense.” CPDOC, EAP erj 
1945/1965.00.00 [Pasta III]. 
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approval as long as the agreements were vaguely and reassuringly amended to 
“remove the wrong and continue with the right.”51 Although the Goulart 
administration had established the loan, Castelo Branco took credit for it, and 
between 1964 and 1967, BID gave US$172 million in aid to Brazil.52
Only eleven days after the coup, a group of government officials, 
including Minister of Planning Roberto Campos, Raymundo Moniz de Aragão, 
Paulo Novais from the National Service of Industrial Training (SENAI), and 
others gathered to discuss the possibility of getting a loan from the Banco 
Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, BIRD) to finance “projects for secondary and 
higher education, associated with the economic development of the country.”  The 
group earmarked the money for two main projects: to create a labor service to 
address the need for “human resources” and to complete a new building at the 
National Engineering School (a part of the University of Brazil), allowing for 
better training for engineers.
 
53
While the MEC-BID and MEC-BIRD agreements set the precedent for 
financial and diplomatic foreign aid in reforming Brazilian education, an 
agreement between MEC and the United States Agency for International 
Development, or USAID, was the most infamous of these foreign agreements. 
 
                                                 
 
51  See “Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Govêrno Castelo Branco,” 
Notação 9.93, Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN, and “Atividades do MEC – Raymundo Moniz de 
Aragão,” 10 April 1972, p. 1, Notação 9.74, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
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Originally established in 1965 under Castelo Branco and renewed in 1967 under 
Costa e Silva, the MEC-USAID accords (as they came to be known) sought to 
research, reorganize, and reform Brazil’s universities, in what Victoria Langland 
calls an “economic developmentalist model.”54 The accords looked to the United 
States’ university system as a potential model.55 They attempted to streamline the 
university system, making it a key part of Brazilian development, particularly 
with its focus on science and technology and on professional training, especially 
for teachers. The agreements also pledged to investigate possible methods of 
university expansion and “perfection.”56
In reality, the MEC-USAID accords were part of a broader aid package 
from USAID in areas that included “agrarian reform, fish production, malaria 
eradication, textbook production, training of labor union leaders, and expansion of 
capital markets.”
  
57 Although USAID contributed US$488 million to Brazil 
between 1964 and 1967 (with $147 million in 1965 alone),58
                                                 
 
 government officials 
insisted that in terms of education, collaboration with USAID never went beyond 
54  “Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Diretoria de Ensino Superior – Convênio de 
Assessoria ao Planejamento do Ensino Superior.” CPDOC, AAP rev64 1967.05.09; “MEC – 
Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” p. 50, Notação 9.56, and “Atividades do MEC 
– Raymundo Moniz de Aragão,” 10 April 1972, p. 1, Notação 9.74, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, 
AN; and Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” pp. 62-63. 
 
55  For example, see letter from Juracy Magalhães to Jutay Magalhães, item IV-11, Pasta IV, 
Coleção Juracy Magalhães, CPDOC. The MEC-USAID agreements were never fully completed, 
but the governments findings would ultimately form the Reforma Universitária (University 
Reform) of December 1968. See the Reportagem do Grupo de Trabalho sobre a Reforma 
Universitária, Caixa 309, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
56  AAP rev64 1967.05.09, CPDOC. See Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira: Reforma e 
Diversificação Institucional,” pp. 23-24. 
 
57  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, p. 39. 
 
58  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, p. 38. 
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“analysis” and suggestions for reforming the curricula, entrance exams, and other 
reforms, changes the government itself had been investigating. 59 Indeed, in terms 
of education, the accords were largely symbolic. While the agreements included 
financial aid for education, Castelo Branco used that money to pay off foreign 
debts, and USAID’s impact seemed to fall further on the side of “analysis” than 
on funding, although this distinction would make little difference to students.60 
Though the United States government had expressed concern over Castelo 
Branco’s use of USAID funds to reduce foreign debt, that did not stop the U.S. 
government from renewing the agreements with Costa e Silva and USAID 
pledging another $100 million in 1967.61 Moreover, the government occasionally 
sought student participation in the committee overseeing educational reform in 
1967 debates, an offer which university students turned down in protest of the 
agreements.62
The government also sought the outside aid of Rudolph Atcon, an 
American professor and ex-member of USAID who had been involved with 
CAPES in the 1950s. In 1966, the Department of Higher Education (DESu) in 
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MEC contracted Atcon to return to Brazil in order to help transform the Brazilian 
university system.63 Ultimately, Atcon published four different studies on the 
issue, conveniently emphasizing the value of an apolitical campus, administrative 
reform, a core curriculum, and reforming professors’ pay scale.64 In November 
1967, professor Frank Tiller, the director of the Center of Higher Education 
Studies of Latin America at the University of Houston, visited the Universidade 
de Santa Catarina in Florianópolis and recommended the adoption of an 
Americanized system based on credit hours, student advisors, increased 
“professorial remuneration,” and campus reorganization and modernization.65 Ten 
months later, professor Robert B. Howsam from the University of Houston visited 
UFRJ. On his visit, he submitted a report from Tiller. The report also 
recommended expanding the university system, emphasizing the production of 
“professional educators,” creating a stronger graduate school network in Brazil, 
and greater institutional control by both professors and students.66 Even private 
universities pursued this strategy. In December 1968, PUC-RJ received a report 
from Douglas G. Maclean, also from the University of Houston.67
                                                 
 
 He 
63  Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira,” p. 21; Vieira, O (Dis)curso da (Re)forma 
Universitária, pp. 17 and 27. 
 
64  Vieira, O (Dis)curso da (Re)forma Universitária, pp. 136-137. 
 
65  “Fourth Report – Visit of Frank M. Tiller, M.D. Anderson Professor of Chemical 
Engineering, Director of Center for Study of Higher Education in Latin America, University of 
Houston, November 7-10, 1967.” CPDOC, JT pi tt Tiller, F.M. 1967.11.07. 
 
66  “Relatório da visita técnica de Robert B. Howsam,” 20 September 1968. CPDOC, JT pi tt 
Howsam, R.B. 1968.08.00. 
 
67  It is unclear why only the University of Houston was involved, or how it became 
involved in reports for divergent schools. However, it is worth noting that of the visits mentioned, 
each gave a report from Tiller, who was an M.D. in chemical engineering, once again suggesting 
  
 
128 
recommended PUC-RJ adopt “a strong academic chain of command” and 
administrative reform, streamlining the financial and social administration of the 
campus.68
The dictatorship also established its own domestic groups to study higher 
education. One of these was headed by colonel Carlos Meira Matos, from the 
Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and counted among its members the director of 
the National Law School at the University of Rio de Janeiro and the general 
director of the National Department of Education.
 Foreign participation in studying university reforms in Brazil clearly 
went beyond the MEC-USAID agreements, and extended to sectors outside of the 
federal university system.  
69 The formation of the Meira 
Matos commission suggested that students were getting under the military 
government’s skin. Meira Matos was an ardent anti-Communist who allegedly 
said that there were “three [Communist] red centers in the world: Russia, China, 
and the University of Brasília.”70
                                                                                                                                                 
the credibility and emphasis the dictatorship and university administrators gave to sciences over 
humanities.  
 Perhaps because of this political stance, Costa e 
Silva appointed him to investigate student demands and complaints, and to offer 
solutions should they be valid. In the first months of 1968, the commission met, 
ultimately issuing a report which encouraged a stronger role among authorities on 
campuses, the president’s direct nomination of rectors, new criteria and better pay 
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for professors, increased available positions for incoming students, and the 
participation of students in university administration.71
The Meira Matos report spurred the creation of another study group, the 
Grupo de Trabalho (Work Group, GT), assigned “to study the issue of university 
reform” in July 1968. The GT originally was to be composed of eight 
government-appointed officials and two student representatives, though no 
students volunteered for the GT as a sign of protest against the military’s rule.
   
72 
Once again stressing universities’ role in leading national development through 
scientific production, the GT recommended the government should expand 
university education. This included federalizing more schools, abandoning the 
catedrático system, developing a strong post-graduate programs, particularly in 
the sciences, and creating a single entrance exam for all students regardless of 
academic field.73
In proposing all of these studies and reforms, a systematic reform of the 
university system was not the only issue on officials’ minds. Leaders in the 
military government and their allies also viewed university reform as a means to 
control student resistance and subversion. Coup participant Antônio Carlos 
Muricy commented that university reform “in the shortest term possible” would 
help remove “‘true’ student agitators” and reorient university activity to “studious 
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youth.”74 Castelo Branco pointed to the value of reform “above all to modify the 
atmosphere of continued agitation” and to combat “subversion and inefficiency” 
on campuses.75 Roberto Campos commented at a roundtable that Congress was 
moving towards university reform rapidly due in no small part “to the extent and 
ferocity of student protest.”76
Yet to implement change, the military governments of the 1960s found 
themselves in a bit of a paradox. They extolled in theory the virtues of 
decentralizing authority with regards to education, frequently appealing to the 
LDB of 1961, which had called for redistributing authority over schooling to 
states and municipalities. In practice, this was a far more tenuous position. While 
discursively proclaiming the value of decentralization, the Castelo Branco and 
Costa e Silva administrations were simultaneously strengthening and centralizing 
oversight of the educational system at all levels through MEC. The military 
quickly reorganized MEC in order to better control the educational institution at 
all levels.
  
77
                                                 
 
 In practice the military made clear its preference for top-down 
management even while it rhetorically extolled the merits of decentralization. 
Ceratinly, the heavy hand of the military was obvious in the police invasions of 
campuses and increasing crackdowns on protesting students. Yet even programs 
74  CPDOC, ACM pm 1964.10.00, Rolo 1, photos 693-696, 734-738. 
 
75  “Discurso do Presidente Castelo Branco na Instalação do Conselho Federal de Cultura – 
Agência Nacional, 3o turno,” 27 February 1967. Notação 7.100, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 
76  Roberto Campos, “Educacão e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” 1968, p. 12, Caixa 319, 
Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN. 
 
77  See, for example, “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” Notação 
9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN; Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 2, pp. 91-92 and 172. 
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like the MEC-USAID accords, the Plano Atcon, and the Meira Matos group 
emphasized the need to centralize and increase the executive’s control over the 
universities. Even while states and municipalities had more control over the 
primary and secondary schools themselves, the military government strengthened 
its control over the pedagogical content of schooling nationwide, and reserved and 
executed the right to dismiss “subversive” faculty at all levels.78
In spite of their efforts to completely control the process of reform, 
however, the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva educational policies were 
influenced by student strikes on campuses, street protests, and clashes with the 
police.
 It also 
streamlined the administrative side of education, creating a leaner hierarchy that 
placed MEC at the top of the chain of command. Thus, the military discursively 
extolled its efforts to “decentralize,” pointing to its fulfillment of the LDB’s 
requirement that municipal and state governments have more control over local 
education, even while it increased real control over content and power in the 
federal government. Having condemned the Goulart administration for moving 
towards a dictatorship and a strong, centralized government, the military then 
further strengthened the executive branch’s power and the federal government’s 
hierarchical control over education. 
79
                                                 
 
 Sometimes students directly confronted government officials, even the 
78  Nor was this right an idle threat; immediately after the coup, the dictatorship fired 
“subversive” professors throughout the country, and many more resigned in protest or in fear of 
their own futures. See, for example “Do Diretor Álvaro Sardinha aos Professores, Alunos e 
Funcionários da Faculdade de Direito.”  CPDOC: EAP 1945/1965.00.00 [Pasta II]. 
 
 
79  “Agenda com Recursos de atos, encontros, decisòes, articulações entre Castelo Branco, 
14.08.64 a 15.03.1967,” Notação 1.72; “Cronologia do Govêrno Castelo Branco,” Notação 7.52 
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president. When Castelo Branco attended the 1965 academic year’s inaugural 
class at the University of Rio de Janeiro, several students protested, jeering the 
president and walking out, at which point they were arrested. While one witness 
claimed that Castelo Branco opposed their expulsion, their conspicuous act of 
protest nonetheless made an impression and generated separate secret police 
files.80 The military government also heard complaints from students loyal to the 
government. Castelo Branco’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Juracy Magalhães 
received a letter from a pro-military student clamoring for university reform. He, 
in turn, forwarded the letter to the Ministry of Education.81 In a separate incident, 
Minister of Education Raymundo Moniz de Aragão reflected on decree-laws 53 
and 252, saying they “opened the path for a full reform of the University, called 
for for so long.”82
                                                                                                                                                 
Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN; and “Cronologia do Govêrno Castelo Branco,” Notação 7.52, 
Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 The former Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, commented 
that Congress was certainly aware of students’ educational demands and activism, 
while ex-foreign minister Juracy Magalhães wrote to his son Jutahy, the vice-
 
80  For Castelo Branco’s concerns, see “Texto datilografado ‘Agitação estudentil,’ Notação 
9.99, Caixa 9, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. For the police files, see “Mem. No. 178-T.G. – Ref 
– Luta intestina na F.N.D. entre facções ideológicas – A.L.A. e Reforma,” 10 March 1965, DOPS 
Pasta 43; and “Resultado de sindicâncias (transmite) Ref: Prot. 09/398.860/65,” DOPS Pasta 59, 
Coleção Polícias Políticas, APERJ. 
 
81  Letter from Paulo Nunes Alves, 1966. CPDOC, JM c mre 66.03.15. Even if the letter did 
not make it to the Minister of Education’s desk (the outcome of the case is unclear), Magalhães 
did receive the letter and respond, again indicating that government officials even outside of the 
direct administration of eduactional matters were aware of the calls for university reform. 
 
82  “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 74-75 (emphasis added), 
Notação 9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. Sociologist Florestan Fernandes suggested that 
these two decree-laws were the real university reform, rather than the 1968 Reform, because the 
latter was based largely on the laws established in Decree-Laws 53 and 252. Thus, he claimed, 
university reform in Brazil had actually begun under Castelo Branco, rather than Costa e Silva. 
See Florestan Fernandes, Universidade Brasileira: reforma ou revolução?, (São Paulo: Editora 
Alfa-Omega, 1975), p. 203. 
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governor of Bahia, describing student street protests calling for university 
reform.83 Students also made their voices heard by marching or rallying directly 
in front of the MEC building in Rio de Janeiro, intentionally choosing the site to 
make their demands clear to the dictatorship.84
Moreover, the military government periodically entered into direct 
dialogue with students. When the government outlawed UNE via the Lei Suplicy, 
a group of students from Recife asked Castelo Branco to allow UNE’s continued 
existence. Castelo Branco countered that he would only reexamine UNE’s 
situation once students accepted the federally-controlled DEEs and the DNE.
  
85 
While it is unclear whether that dialog took place face-to-face, other such 
meetings did occur. In August 1965, Castelo Branco had a “long meeting” with 
six university students,86 and although details are lacking, Castelo Branco’s 
official activities recorded six audiences and meetings with “student 
representation” in 1964, twenty-nine in 1965, and thirty-nine in 1966.87
                                                 
 
 It is 
possible that the government initiated these meetings to try to gain student allies 
in order to counteract the anti-dictatorship currents within the student movements. 
One of Castelo Branco’s security advisers even suggested trying to recruit 
83  Roberto Campos, “Educação e Desenvolvimento Econômcio,” 1968, Caixa 319, Coleção 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN; letter from Juracy Magalhães to Jutahy Magalhães, CPDOC, JM c c 
Magalhães, J. 
 
84  See, for example, “Universidade Popular,” p. 3. Dossie 9, Fundo Coleções Particulares – 
Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, APERJ. 
 
85  CPDOC, ACM pm 1964.10.00, Rolo 1, photos 693-696, 734-738. 
 
86  “Agenda com Registro de atos, encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco – 
14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967,” Notação 1.72, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 
87  “Resumo das atividades de Castelo Branco, 1964-67,” Notação 7.53, Coleção Luis Viana 
Filho, AN. 
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students into working for the National Security Institute, one of the major cogs in 
the state’s growing security apparatus.88 In a particularly high-profile instance, 
Costa e Silva requested to meet with student leaders in 1968. Several student 
leaders did meet with Costa e Silva, using the opportunity to demand more funds, 
vagas, and the release of arrested student leaders, among other issues. Costa e 
Silva delayed or refused to meet their demands, but the fact that he invited 
students to meet with him in the Guanabara Palace in Rio de Janeiro made clear 
that the relationship between students and the state was more complicated than of 
mere protest and repression, and that the military was actively aware of students’ 
demands.89
 Between 1964 and 1968, the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva 
governments launched numerous efforts to examine the problems and potential 
solutions to Brazil’s university problem. Some of these programs, like the Plano 
Atcon and the agreements between MEC and BID, BIRD, and USAID, turned to 
outside agencies for help, while other studies, such as the Meira Matos report and 
the Grupo de Trabalho, were domestic enterprises. In each instance, the federal 
government assumed a central role in administering the plans and acting upon 
their findings. Universities and reform were a central part of the military’s 
developmental plan almost from the moment it overthrew Goulart, and the 
 
                                                 
 
88  Who suggested this is open to debate; the document merely suggests it was “G.” This 
could have been Ernesto Geisel, Castelo Branco’s military chief of staff, though Golbery do Couto 
seems like a more likely candidate, as he was the founder and head of the SNI under Castelo 
Branco. See “Agenda com registro de atos, encontros, decisões, aritculações entre Castselo Branco 
– 14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967,” Caixa 1, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. 
 
89  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Franklin Martins, p. 17; Bernardo 
Joffily, pp. 4-5; and Jean Marc von der Weid, pp. 13-14. See also Chapter 2, above. 
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military dictatorship was determined to exercise final authority, even as students, 
conservative business leaders, pedagogues, and politicians also shaped the debate 
over the role universities would play in the Brazilian development under the new 
regime.90
The Result of Years’ Worth of Efforts: 1968’s Reforma Universitária 
 
Towards the end of 1968, as political and social tensions reached their 
apex, the military government finally issued its Reforma Universitária (University 
Reform). Four years in the making, the Reforma marked the first major university 
policy in over thirty-five years, born out of more than a decade of demands from 
students, professors, business leaders, and politicians both before and after the 
military coup.91 The Reforma established the university’s role as a center of 
scientific research and development and gave the university greater autonomy 
with the federal government’s approval. It replaced the catedrático system with a 
departmental system, something students had demanded in the early 1960s.92
                                                 
90   See Ch. 3, below. 
 It 
outlined how future universities were to be formed in order to address the need for 
more openings. It centralized internal administration in individual universities, 
giving rectors greater control over the schools. It also strengthened the federal 
government’s control over public universities, giving the executive the right to 
nominate rectors and vice-rectors, who in turn nominated their administrators, 
 
91  Getúlio Vargas’s administration was responsible for the previous broad reform, the 
Estatuto das Universidades Brasileiras, in 1931.  See Vieira, O (Dis)curso da (Re)forma 
Universitária, p. 108, and  Luiz Antônio Cunha, A Universidade Temporã: O ensino superior da 
colônia à era de Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves Editora, 1982), pp. 250-290. 
 
92  See Chapter 1. 
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effectively making university administration run by officials sympathetic to the 
military dictatorship.  It was a sweeping reform that transformed not only the role 
of universities in Brazilian society, but their administration and organization as 
well.93
The Reforma Universitária was not the product of a single study, or a 
single group’s interest; rather, it was the synthesis of both domestic studies and 
international accords and funding.
 
94
                                                 
93  Lei 5.540, 28 November 1968. For a copy of the law, see Caixa 07-4674, Coleção DSI, 
AN. 
 Additionally many of the military 
government’s concerns, be they modern facilities, more openings, or transforming 
the catedrático, overlapped with students’ demands, even if they did not agree 
ideologically. Nor could the state under military rule ignore those demands, 
occasionally entering into willing (or unwilling) dialog with students. Elements 
from each of these projects and sectors were present in the final reform. 
Sometimes, they coincided, as when reports suggested increasing the number of 
openings or reforming the pay structure and administration of universities. Other 
times, certain recommendations, such as the Meira Matos group’s suggestion that 
students participate in administration, fell in line with students’ demands even 
while contradicting the military government’s vision of a successful university. In 
these recommendations, it was clear that the state had not acted alone; business 
leaders, foreign diplomats, Brazilian pedagogical experts, and students had all 
shaped and structured the debate. Indeed, many of the recommendations 
addressed issues and solutions first raised in the 1940s, including the abolition of 
 
94  Vieira, O (Dis)Curso da Reforma Universitária, pp. 136-137. 
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the catedrático and the institution of departments.95
Yet in forming these policies and reforms, the government did not operate 
in a vacuum. While it bore responsibility for the decree and execution of the first 
major overhaul of the university system since the 1930s, it also incorporated  
demands from diverse sectors. Students, parents, progressive pedagogues, and 
conservative business leaders all actively influenced the debate over university 
reform in the 1960s, shaping the government’s own policies and goals. It is to 
their voices that we now turn.
 Nonetheless, only the military 
government could issue federal policy and it did. The 1968 Reforma Universitária 
was the result. 
                                                 
 
95  See Ch. 1. For the origins of these demands in the 1940s, see Luiz Antônio Cunha, A 
universidade reformanda: O golpe de 1964 e a modernização do Ensino, (Rio de Janeiro: 
Francisco Alves, 1988), p. 22. 
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Chapter Three – Of Drinking Fountains and Imperialism: Students, 
Civilians, and Visions of the University in Brazil, 1964-1968 
 The debate over universities’ roles in development, and students’ roles in 
those debates, predated the dictatorship by several years. Nonetheless, the military 
government that emerged from the overthrow of João Goulart on 1 April 1964 
changed the dynamic of those struggles. The new political context transformed the 
fight for university reform. By highlighting issues like infrastructural problems, a 
lack of funding, and broader educational policies under the new regime, students 
simultaneously tried to pressure the government to reform the universities while 
undermining the military’s authority. Additionally, student movements continued 
to use the universities to shape the debate over the nature of Brazilian 
development. As the 1960s progressed, students used both informal and formal 
forms of dialog with the government in order to influence this debate. Yet the 
struggle over educational reform was not limited to students and the military 
regime. Parents, conservative organizations, business leaders, and pedagogues all 
contributed to the discourse over the role of Brazil’s universities in national 
development. In this regard, universities increasingly served as physical and 
discursive sites in which various social sectors with widely varying ideologies 
resisted and reshaped the military governments’ efforts to shape universities and 
higher education’s role in social and economic development.  
Demands Old and New: Students and Universities, 1964-1968 
In the immediate wake of the coup, students’ focus on university reform 
temporarily faded as the country waited to see what would be the results of the 
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military’s seventh political intervention in 34 years.1 Many from the middle class 
were originally grateful for the coup, feeling that it had prevented Brazil from 
further careening towards chaos.2 While a small number of students protested the 
coup on April 1, many more supported it. Some students who would later become 
leaders against the dictatorship even rushed to physically defend Guanabara’s 
right-wing governor, Carlos Lacerda, when the military first moved on Rio.3
Even while many students supported the coup, the new regime moved 
quickly to immobilize UNE. On April 1, the military burned down the UNE 
headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. A small number of students tried to rise up against 
the military coup at the National Law School, but the police quickly arrested 
some, and the remainder dispersed as organized support of Goulart collapsed. As 
the military cracked down on “subversive” forces, UNE’s leadership was 
effectively gutted. Some pre-coup leaders voluntarily left, while the military 
politically persecuted others that it had identified as “communists.”
 
4
                                                 
1  The military was involved in Getúlio Vargas’s successful ascension in 1930; the 
establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937; the overthrow of Vargas in 1945; the establishment of 
a parliamentary system in the wake of Jânio Quadros’s resignation in 1961; and the coup of 1964. 
Additionally, it had moved behind the scenes upon Vargas’s 1954 suicide, and attempted but 
failed to mobilize military involvement after Juscelino Kubitschek was elected in 1955, leading to 
no fewer than seven incidents in which the military attempted to influence national politics in 
Brazil since 1930. 
 Some student 
 
2  See Daniel Aarão Reis, Ditadura militar, esquerdas e sociedade, (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge 
Zahar Editor, 2000). 
 
3  Personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007; Projeto Memória Estudantil, published 
interview with Jean Marc von der Weid. Some students did mobilize, most notably at the Candido 
Oliveira Academic Center (CACO), of the Law School at University of Brazil. However, such 
resistance was short-lived. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Daniel 
Aarão Reis, p. 4. 
 
4  See APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Informações, Pasta 48, “DOPS – SI – SFA No. 4.058 
– Referência: ‘Universidade do Brasil – C.I.U.B. – Oficio No. 16 – Confidencial – do Presidente 
da Comissão de Inves da U.B. Datado de 29.6.1964 – Protocolo No. 8366/64.” The police file lists 
a network of alleged communists at the National Philosophy School (FNFi) in Rio, as well as their 
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groups did try to reorient themselves to the new political context. The Popular 
Action (Ação Popular, AP) movement, which had been born out of progressive 
Catholic student organizations in the late-1950s and early-1960s, sought to 
arrange a “counter-revolutionary” movement to combat the “revolutionary” 
coup.5 However, the AP’s leadership floundered, and its members often found 
themselves imprisoned and interrogated.6 The Communist Party was even more 
ineffective as the military arrested its leadership and Party members divided over 
strategy. Thus, student leaders in groups like UNE or AP were left to “lick their 
wounds” while many other students breathed a sigh of relief that Brazil had been 
“saved.”7
 While most students did not initially mobilize against the dictatorship, the 
regime’s obvious antipathy towards student movements, best symbolized by the 
burning down of UNE headquarters and the Suplicy Law of November 1964, led 
 Demands for university reform dropped off temporarily. 
                                                                                                                                                 
addresses, many of which are in middle-class neighborhoods like Botafogo, Copacabana, 
Laranjeiras, and Urca. Whether or not these students were communists is unclear; what is clear is 
that the military quickly pursued and persecuted them for their political beliefs in an effort to 
remove them from the university system. Certainly, their neighborhoods reflect the middle-class 
status of many university students at this time. For more on students being persecuted or opting to 
leave universities and even enter into exile, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews 
with Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 7, and Franklin Martins, p. 13. 
 
5  Quickly after taking over, the military leaders categorized their movement as a 
“revolution” that was going to transform and save Brazil, and throughout the twenty-one years of 
the dictatorship, military officers as well as coup supporters referred to the “Revolution of ’64.” 
To this day, some still call it a “revolution.” Personal Interview, F.G., 10 September 2007. 
 
6  See APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Comunismo, Pasta 63, “Ação Popular – GB – 
Departamento Estadual de Segurança Pública – Superintendência Executiva – Departamento de 
Ordem Política e Social – Serviço de Operações – 16 junho 1964.” For the arrests and 
interrogations, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5684-05250, Ministério da Marinha – Centro de 
Informações da Marinha, Informe No. 1937, 11 September 1965, p. 2. 
 
7  The quote comes from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin 
Martins, p. 12. For initial support for the coup, personal interviews with F.G. and D.N. See also 
Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 4, and Luís Raul 
Machado, p. 7. 
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to student organizations quickly reconstituting themselves and challenging the 
dictatorship. Although technically illegal, UNE continued to meet regularly in a 
state of “semi-clandestinity.” Students also used organizations like the state-
sponsored DCEs on campuses to further mobilize. By 1966, students were taking 
to the streets, protesting the military’s crackdown on UNE, the conditions on 
campuses, and the increasing use of repression, be it through police brutality or 
the invasion of campuses in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Brasília. Where 
students had been relatively disorganized in the wake of the 1964 coup, by 1966 
they were again directly challenging the military government. In that year, police 
invaded UFRJ’s medical school, beating any and all students they could get their 
hands on while journalists and photographers recorded what came to be known as 
the “Massacre at Praia Vermelha.”8 For the next two years, images of police 
beating and arresting protesting students became increasingly common, giving 
strength to students who protested a regime that was growing ever more 
authoritarian.9
Although the increasingly repressive atmosphere of the dictatorship fueled 
student movements, it was far from the sole contributor to youthful organization. 
University reform continued to play a major part in students’ rallies, marches, and 
 
                                                 
 
8  Praia Vermelha was the beach area in the bairro of Urca in Rio de Janeiro, where the 
medical school of Universidade do Brasil (later UFRJ) was located. Several student leaders were 
present at the crackdown and the police specifically sought them out. Wladimir Palmeira joked 
that while they had targeted him, he was clean-shaven, and they were looking for the stereotypical 
“hippie” with a beard, and so he was able to sneak by security. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, 
published interview with Wladimir Palmeira. While he may have escaped, the crackdown 
effectively eliminated the medical school at the university for the next few years, as most students 
decided the risks were not worth the rewards. Personal interviews with D.N., 27 August 2007, and 
F.G, 10 September 2007. 
 
9  For a detailed narrative and analysis of these mobilizations, see Victoria Langland, 
“Speaking of Flowers,” Ch. 1. 
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demands. Students increasingly mobilized over a variety of issues that generally 
fell into three categories: conditions students faced within the universities; the 
government’s educational policy more generally; and broader national and 
international issues, particularly the government’s openness to American 
“imperialism.” Yet these demands and complaints were not limited to social and 
educational reform. Rather, the new political context and increasing military 
repression led to students challenging the government’s legitimacy through the 
lens of university policy. In doing so, students were able to influence the national 
debate on both educational policy and on development more generally. 
If the student masses had begun to express concern over the conditions 
they faced daily in the universities in the 1950s and early-1960s, such demands 
dramatically increased after the coup as the problems only worsened. Foremost 
among students’ complaints after 1964 were the “three v’s” of vagas (positions), 
verbas (federal educational funding), and vestibulares (entrance exams). Although 
the lack of positions for those who had passed their exams dated back to the 
previous decade, by the 1960s, the disparity between the number of eligible 
students and available positions only worsened. For example, in 1965, the 
government claimed that there were 125,406 eligible candidates who had passed 
the entrance exams, yet there were only 58,929 openings available throughout the 
country.10
                                                 
 
 Even non-students recognized the need for openings, and plans to 
10  Plano Decenal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, Tomo VI, Volume I, I-II: 
Educação e Mão-de-Obra (Versão Preliminar), Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação 
Econômica, (Brasília, 1967), p. 99. 
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expand universities placed the issue of vagas front and center.11 As the number of 
students who passed their entrance exams increased each year, the number of 
available positions at individual universities remained fairly steady, resulting in 
an increasing number of excedentes, or surplus students. These qualified 
excedentes began to turn against the military government because they were 
unable to attend the state-run federal universities. They declared the government 
was “prejudiced” against their needs, and chastised the regime for “the small 
number of openings and large number of applicants.”12
While complaints about vagas and the vestibular could be traced back to 
the 1950s, demands for funding (verbas) were recent. Shortly after Castelo 
Branco took office, reigning in inflation became his top priority. In order to 
stabilize the Brazilian economy and gain economic support from the United States 
and others, the government had to cut federal spending. Education was one of the 
first areas that saw reductions, and what educational spending remained 
increasingly went to administrative positions rather than educational programs.
 Eligible students who 
were kept out of university due to the lack of vagas took to the streets en masse, 
criticizing the government for failing to meet their cultural and material 
expectations. 
13
                                                 
 
 
11  CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade 
Federal de Fluminense,” 1967. 
 
12  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Colegas 
Vestibulandos,” and Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ, 23 September 1968. See also Projeto Memória 
Estudantil, published interviews with José Genoíno, p. 3, and Paulo Tarso de Venceslau, p. 7. 
 
13  See David S. Brown, “Democracy, Authoritarianism and Education Finance in Brazil,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 34:1. Education was not the only area in which the military 
government sought to save money in the first years of the coup. Among other new fiscal policies, 
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As the military readjusted its economic and fiscal policies, federal universities 
increasingly felt the pinch, witnessing cuts of billions of cruzeiros from individual 
schools.14 Students described the lack of funding as the “root of ills” in the 
schools, and repeatedly demanded more support.15 They even took to the streets 
with banners that demanded “More Funding for Universities,”16 belying the 
notion that all street protests simply called for an end to repression. The issue 
continued to occupy students’ rhetoric throughout the first four years of the 
dictatorship. Some student leaders even met with president Costa e Silva to 
demand more funding, placing it ahead of demands regarding vagas, the release of 
student prisoners, and reopening a popular student restaurant in Rio de Janeiro.17
 While the “three v’s” occupied an important space in student calls for 
university reform, they were not the sole challenges students faced. Indeed, if the 
lack of funding affected students through the poorer quality of education, new 
anuidades, or annual fees,  directly hit students in their wallets. Beginning in 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the government also discontinued its practice of buying surplus coffee at a profit for Brazilian 
coffee-growers. See Skidmore. 
 
14  CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade 
Federal de Fluminense,” 1967, and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, 
“Manifesto dos Estudantes da E.N. Química,” 29 May 1968. 
 
15  Quote from APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Manifesto dos 
Estudantes da E.N. Química,” 29 May 1968. See also APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, 
Pasta 30/31, Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ – Serviço de Cadastro e Documentação, 23 September 
1968; Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME;”  APERJ, Coleção Daniel 
Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do 
Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1, Oct. 1968, pp. 5-6; and  Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, 
Dossie 6, “Análise do Movimento Estudantil a partir de 1964.”. 
 
16  For examples of these images, see  the online photo archive of the Projeto Memória 
Estudantil at 
http://www.mme.org.br/main.asp?Team=%7B6CB6B3C4%2DB6BF%2D4D56%2D8B2E%2D28
6CD15F2893%7D. See also Aarujo, Memória Estudantil, pp. 160, 178, 181, and 204. 
 
17  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 17. 
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1965, first private and then public universities began charging fees. These fees 
were originally small, and most students could easily afford them. The insult was 
more ideological than financial. The federal university system had been 
completely free, and students felt that the government would continue to raise the 
fees yearly, until students were paying for their education. Additionally, they felt 
such fees would exclude the working class from the universities, making 
education more restricted, rather than more open. Thus, they once again called for 
“free education” for all Brazilians, though eliminating the fees would obviously 
aid those middle-class students in universities more immediately than the working 
class majority who did not attend university.18
The result was a broad mobilization against these fees in public and 
private schools alike. A general assembly of over 3,000 students in Pernambuco 
issued a manifesto that complained about the effect of anuidades not just on 
university students, but on high-school students as well.
  
19 Some students called 
the fees “the first major attack of the dictatorship” in turning universities into 
diploma factories that would prepare technocrats.20
                                                 
 
 Others in state schools 
declared the government used anuidades to cover the government’s spending cuts 
18  For example, see APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, “Informe estudantil 
nacional de política operária,” pp. 2, 6, and Dossie 9, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor 
Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1, Oct. 1968, pp. 5-6.; and APERJ, 
Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem No. 1022 – “Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos 
Estudantis,” 29 November 1966. For the role of universities in creating a “democratic society” in 
the 1950s and 1960s, see Ch. 1. 
 
19  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Ofício No. 891-DOS/66 Reservado, Departamento 
de Ordem Social, 14 October 1966. 
 
20  For example, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem No. 1022 – 
“Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis,” 29 November 1966, and CPDOC, EAP erj 
1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III,  “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” 
1967. 
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in education.21 Meanwhile, students in private schools particularly felt the pinch, 
as they were already paying for school; what was more, the fees at private schools 
were often higher, as the government had less control there.22
Improvements to university infrastructure were another demand that 
students had been making since the 1950s but that increased in the 1960s. Earlier 
demands for better labs, curricula, restaurants, and an end to the institution of the 
professor catedrático continued after the coup. Students continued to condemn 
the “archaic” and “deficient” nature of the university system, targeting the 
catedráticos specifically. They also directly connected poor infrastructure to a 
lack of funding.
 Student outrage was 
general, as every student had to pay these fees, whether they were politically 
active or not.  
23
                                                 
 
 They bemoaned the absence of laboratories needed for 
professional development within the universities. They complained that 
universities were understaffed, and the professors were “generally terrible,” a fact 
that the low pay did not help. They commented on the absence of drinking 
fountains and declared that “the bathrooms, when they exist, are filthy and 
21  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Análise do Movimento Estudantil a 
partir de 1964,” p. 2. 
 
22  For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Dirceu, pp. 
6, 15. Although the federal government could regulate the general operations of private 
universities and grant licenture to such institutions, it could not control internal decisions like the 
rate of fees in the 1960s. This would change by the 1980s, as fees became so exorbitant that the 
government began to crack down. For more on the 1980s, see Ch. 6. For more on the 
government’s relation to private universities in the 1960s, see Cunha, A Universidade 
Reformanda. 
 
23  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, DPPS Informação No. 
271/DPPS/RJ, 23 September 1968; CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de 
Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” 1967; and AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 
5684-05250, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, “A Formação da Universidade de Brasília,” 
Informação Elaborada – Secreta, p. 7. 
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unhygienic.”24 Likewise, by 1968 student newspapers cited the government’s 
inability to accommodate all students who passed their entrance exams as just one 
more example of the regime’s failed educational policies.25
Even quotidian issues as mundane as food became major battlefields 
against the dictatorship. Prior to the coup, student organizations had been 
responsible for the functioning of their own restaurants. After 1964, the military 
assumed control of the restaurants and began to crack down on them as sites of 
“subversion” where students gathered. In the most famous example, the 
government shut down the Calabouço restaurant in Rio de Janeiro, ostensibly to 
pave a new road. Not only had the restaurant provided cheap food for all students; 
it also served as a meeting place for progressives who discussed the weaknesses 
of the dictatorship. Thus, students perceived the military’s efforts as a double-
offense against both the poorer students who ate at the restaurant as well as 
against the more radical students who used the restaurant as a meeting place. They 
protested the closing, and at one protest in early 1968, police killed a poor high 
school student, Edson Luís de Lima Souto, who worked at the restaurant. Edson 
Luis’s murder unleashed a massive wave of protests throughout the country as 
hundreds of thousands took to the streets to condemn the regime’s brutality. UNE 
was particularly effective in using Edson Luis’s murder as a rallying cry, taking 
his body to the Legislative Assembly in Rio de Janeiro and draping it in a flag, 
    
                                                 
 
24  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, DPPS Informação No. 
271/DPPS/RJ, 23 September 1968. See also APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, 
Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, 
Ano 1, Oct. 1968, pp. 5-6. 
 
25  APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Universidade Popular, p. 3. 
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surrounded by signs that read “Here is the body of a student, killed by the 
dictatorship” and “This is a corrupt democracy.”26 Although events quickly spun 
out of the regime’s control, it is worth recalling that the original issue that led to 
this political turmoil rested in the struggle over the government’s closing of a 
single restaurant. Even an issue as simple and mundane as food became a major 
way to challenge the military dictatorship, and reasserting control over the price 
and quality of food in restaurants would be one of the main issues that students 
would continue to raise well into the 1970s.27
Students used complaints about the shortcomings of the Brazilian 
universities to directly challenge and undermine the dictatorship. They pointed to 
these multiple failures as yet “one more aspect of the Educational Policy of the 
Dictatorship.”
  
28 Certainly, police violence and campus invasions only 
strengthened the anti-dictatorship sentiment. 29
                                                 
 
 However, protests and street 
marches that called for an end to repressive actions against students also clamored 
for an end to fees, an increase in openings, and better food in university 
26  For the photo of Luis’s body in repose, see Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, p. 175. See 
Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Ch. 1., for a detailed analysis of the events behind Calabouço 
and the importance of Edson Luis’s death in constructing memories of 1968 as a watershed year. 
 
27  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo, César Maia, 
Daniel Aarão Reis, José Luís Guedes, Wladimir Palmeira. See also Ch. 5, below. 
 
28  APERJ, Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Universidade Popular, p. 3. 
 
29  From the beginning of the dictatorship, the military had not hesitated to invade campuses 
that it felt were causing problems or housing “subversives.” It invaded the University of Brasília 
(UnB) alone three times between 1964 and 1968, and also sparked outrage among the student 
body for invasions of campuses in Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais. See 
Pimenta, Universidade: A destruição de uma experiência democrática, Salmeron, A universidade 
interrompida, and Gurgel, A Rebelião dos Estudantes. 
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restaurants.30
Who Defines Reform? Challenging Specific Educational Policies 
 Student opposition did not boil down to an either/or proposition 
between basic university problems and an end to the dictatorship’s repression; 
rather, quotidian demands became central to anti-dictatorship rhetoric more 
generally.  
If the immediate burning of UNE’s headquarters and the opening of 
criminal and political proceedings against student leaders in 1964 had not made 
clear the military’s antipathy towards existing student movements, new laws 
would soon drive home the point. The most incendiary of these acts came in 
November 1964, when the regime issued the Suplicy Law, which explicitly 
targeted the students’ representative organizations and led to widespread student 
indignation. One study even claimed that 98 percent of students nationwide 
supported the continuation of UNE.31 While that number seems high and may not 
have represented every student’s voice, it is clear that many students who had 
previously remained outside of UNE were outraged at the abolition of “their” 
organization. After all, students generally were proud of the role that UNE had 
played in Brazil since its founding in 1938, pointing to the demonstrations to join 
the Allies in World War II, the end of the Estado Novo dictatorship in 1945, and 
the marches to nationalize Brazil’s oil in the 1950s.32
                                                 
 
 Regardless of their 
30  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 585-05251, Ministério da Guerra, Gabinete do Ministro, 
Informação No. 32/66, 5 April 1966. 
 
31  Moreira Alves, State Opposition in Military Brazil, p. 45. 
 
32  For the history of UNE from its inception in 1937 up to 1964, see: Luiz Antonio Cunha, 
A Universidade Temporã, Chapter 3; Roberto Martin da Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle: The 
Idea of a Brazilian University and Its History, (Ph.D. diss.: Southern Illinois University at 
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involvement with UNE, a majority of students saw the new law as a major affront 
to their own interests. 
These students rallied against the Lei Suplicy and began to enter the 
movement in order to protest the new law.33 Students circulated pamphlets that 
called the law “cultural terrorism.”34 Even secondary students rallied against the 
law, which was extended to outlaw UBES.35 A minority of students did 
participate in and support the DNE, but an overwhelming majority of students 
continued to view UNE as the official student organization, even if they did not 
participate in it directly; as one student put it, “I wasn’t an active part of the 
student movement, but I ran from the police.”36 Without support from more 
students or with necessary government financing, the DNEs and DEEs were 
extinct by 1967, when the Lei Suplicy was also revoked. Even then, UNE 
remained illegal, and students used the law to continue to mobilize against the 
dictatorship. They marched carrying banners that read “the Lei Suplicy went away 
but the suffering continues.”37
                                                                                                                                                 
Carbondale, 1982),” Chapter V; Arthur José Poerner, O Poder Jovem: História da Participação 
Política dos Estudantes Brasileiros, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S.A., 1968), 
pp. 129-267; 
 The law became one of the first and most enduring 
 
33  APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Caixa 10, Doc. 52, “Projeto de Programa 
Revolucionário para o Movimento Estudantil,” December 1967. See also Projeto Memória 
Estudantil, published interveiws with Antônio Serra, p. 8; Jean Marc von der Weid, pp. 5-6; José 
Dirceu, p. 4; José Luís Guedes, p. 14; Vladimir Palmeira, p. 5; and Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, 
p. 3 
 
34  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Oficio No. 891-DOS/66 Reservado, Secretaria de 
Segurança Pública de Pernambuco, 14 October 1966. 
 
35  NA, Coleção DSI, Caixa 585-05251, CENIMAR Informação No. 309, 2 September 1966. 
 
36  Quote from personal interview with J.A., 27 December 2007. See also, personal 
interviews with D.N., 13 and 27 August 2007, and F.G., 10 September 2007. 
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symbols of the new dictatorship. From the moment of its declaration in 1964, it 
served as a catalyst for launching other demands, and students would continue to 
use it to protest the government more generally throughout the 1960s.38
In terms of actual educational policies, the initiative that prompted the 
greatest student ire was the MEC-USAID accords. For Brazilian students, the 
agreement represented the worst kind of imperialism, as the military was simply 
delivering the university system to American capital and control.
  
39 Some 
government officials suggested students had not even read the agreements.40 A 
number of student leaders had  read them, however, and they provided detailed 
critiques of them.41 Others had a vaguer notion of their content, but that did not 
stop them from using the agreements to more generally criticize the government. 
They claimed that the accords planned the “ideological domination” of students, 
the “elite-ization” of universities, a turn towards “neocolonialism,” and 
“subordination” by capital.42 Calls for the abolition of MEC-USAID prompted 
street protests from students throughout Brazil.43
                                                                                                                                                 
37  Ministério da Guerra, Gabinete do Ministro, Informação No. 32/66, 5 April 1966. 
Coleção DSI, Caixa 585, AN. The original slogan was a play on words, playing off the similarities 
between “Suplicy,” the Minister of Education and Culture and the namesake of the law, and the 
word “suffering,” (suplício). 
  
 
38  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 585-05251, CENIMAR Informação No. 187, 12 July 1966. 
 
39  For example, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 
October 1966. 
 
40  Jarbas Passarinho, Um híbrido fértil, Ch. XXVIII. Passarinho was the Minister of Labor 
in the Costa e Silva administration, and became the Minister of Education and Culture during 
Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s administration (1969-1974). 
 
41  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, O Metropolitano, 19 November 1966. 
See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 7, and 
Maria Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro, p. 6. 
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 Although MEC-USAID bore the brunt of protests, studies like the Meira 
Matos Commission were not exempt from the students’ wrath. Students felt that 
the Meira Matos Commission served the same function as MEC-USAID by 
“delivering” Brazilian universities to “foreign investment and control.”44 
However, agreements like the Meira Matos Commission or the Atcon study did 
not garner anywhere near the same amount of student outrage as MEC-USAID, 
which was connected to the symbol of imperialism, the United States. While 
students could and did declare that other domestic studies were also “imperialist,” 
the United States’ involvement in the MEC-USAID accords made it the most 
obvious target.45
                                                                                                                                                 
42  For example, see: APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Análise do 
Movimento Estudantil a partir de 1964;”; APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, 
Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, 
Ano 1 (Oct. 1968) and Ano 2 (Jan. 1969); APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, O 
Metropolitano, O Metropolitano, 19 November 1966; and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published 
interviews with Adriano Diogo, César Maia, José Genoíno, José Luís Guedes, Juca Ferreira, Luís 
Raul Machado, Maria Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro, and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau. 
 This anti-imperialist sentiment had been growing among student 
leadership since the Cuban revolution in 1959. However, the military’s 
 
43  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.” See also 
Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 7; José 
Genoíno, p. 3; José Luís Guedes, p. 7; and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau, pp. 6-7; and Passarinho, Um 
Híbrido Fértil, p. 285. 
  
44  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, Manifesto dos Estudantes da E.N. 
Química, 29 May 1968. 
 
45  Indeed, MEC-USAID was but one of several plans, studies, and agreements the military 
dictatorship established to explore the possibility of university reform between 1965 and the 
Reforma Universitária of late-1968. However, MEC-USAID dominated students’ rhetoric, from 
manifestos to banners protesting the agreements in street protests. The accords occupied such a 
major space in student rhetoric at the time that many students have forgotten about their 
opposition to the other plans; MEC-USAID has come to symbolize all of the military’s 
educational policy in the wake of 1968. For just some examples of those who focus solely on 
MEC-USAID, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with César Maia, José 
Genoíno, Juca Ferreira, Luís Raul Machado, Maria Austua Carneiro Ribeiro, and Paulo de Tarso 
Venceslau. For exceptions who remember and contextualize MEC-USAID with other government 
programs, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo and José 
Luís Guedes. 
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collaboration with USAID accelerated and heightened the issue even further, 
placing student struggles in the broader Cold War context. 
University Reform as Political Reform 
In the new context of a military government, students began to recast their 
struggle for university reform as part of a broader fight for political reform. They 
suggested that their own vision of university reform dating back to the 1950s was 
the “true” one, thereby delegitimizing the government’s own efforts for reform. In 
this framework, students used university reform to counter the government’s 
vision of development based on scientific know-how, instead promoting an 
inclusive educational system that focused on social problems and would benefit 
all of Brazil. 
Paradoxically, while a majority of students came from a middle-class 
background defined by white-collar work,46 students in the 1960s criticized the 
government’s emphasis on white-collar professionalization in the service of 
Brazilian development. They worried about the alliances the government 
encouraged between education and private business, which they claimed only 
“subordinated the university to the immediate demands of capital,” particularly 
North American capital.47
                                                 
 
 They blamed MEC for the woes facing universities, 
declaring that the ministry prevented the “collaboration” between students and 
professors and, consequently, impeded their ability to combat “our educational 
46  See Owensby, Intimate Ironies. 
 
47  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Análise do Movimento Estudantil a 
partir de 1964,” p. 2; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME,”. 
See also APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Informe – Jornal ‘O Metropolitano’ 
contendo as teses do seminário da ex-UNE,” 16 June 1967, and Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, 
Pasta 5, “Informação No. 1388/SNI/ARJ/55,” 11 November 1966. 
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problems.”48 Even as the dictatorship sought to use universities to increase the 
number of white-collar workers in Brazil, students sought “greater government 
resources with the goal of modernizing and expanding university education.”49  
Additionally, as with the case with verbas, anuidades, and MEC-USAID, students 
placed criticisms of educational policy as “one of the aspects of the fight against 
the dictatorship itself.”50 They also blasted the government for intentionally 
shutting out the working class. Paradoxically, they were not opposed to 
professional development; far from it. They too wanted “to complete studies 
within the specific field of professional formation” and to attain “development of 
technical knowledge related to the profession.”51
The difference between the students’ vision and the dictatorship’s rested 
not in goals, but in ideology. For this reason, students could assert that they found 
themselves “frontally opposed to all of the perspectives of the dictatorship.” 
 Their desire for white-collar 
jobs appeared similar to the dictatorship’s goal of training more engineers, 
doctors, and scientists.  
52
                                                 
 
 
While white-collar development was the end for military policy, it was only the 
48  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022, Ref: Encaminha 
Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 November 1966. 
 
49  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022, Ref: Encaminha 
Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 November 1966. 
 
50  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Seminário da União Nacional dos 
Estudantes – Infiltração Imperialista no Ensino Brasileiro,” March 1967. See also APERJ, Coleçào 
DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Informe – Jornal ‘O Metropolitano’ contendo as teses do 
seminário da ex-UNE,” 16 June 1967. 
 
51  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de 
Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966. 
 
52  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem No. 1022 – “Encaminha 
Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis,” 29 November 1966. 
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beginning for students. They drew on the language of the Carta do Paraná and 
other pre-coup platforms for university reform, viewing professional development 
as a means to combat the “anachronistic structure of the Brazilian University.”53 
Students had been battling for University Reform for years; as such, theirs was the 
authentic reform. They insisted that the military was merely “demagogically” 
offering its reform in order “to confuse the university students  and public 
opinion” and “to smother the student movement.”54
This subtle ideological shift made a difference. Students pushed a 
“humanist” vision of university reform by which universities would be the 
engines for social justice in Brazil. They rejected the military dictatorship’s 
“economic” emphasis on the universities as the sources of “human capital” that 
would create the doctors, economists, businessmen, and engineers who would 
lead Brazilian development.
 
55 Where the government hoped universities would 
strengthen the Brazilian professional classes, students hoped the universities 
would offer a “critical” education that would contribute to social equality in 
Brazil. Thus, while the government and students could agree on the need for 
better professional development, the justifications were different. In this way, the 
military’s policy became the anti-policy of the students.56
                                                 
 
 They vowed “to fight 
53  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de 
Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966. 
 
54  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, O Metropolitano, 19 November 1966,  
and APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do 
Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1 (Oct. 1968) and Ano 2 (Jan. 
1969). 
 
55  See Cunha, A Universidade Reformanda, p. 71. 
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for true university reform, as well as to denounce, concomitantly, the university 
reform of the dictatorship.”57 When they took to the streets, they carried banners 
that demanded not only an end to the dictatorship, but “Down with MEC-
USAID.” While some officials believed the 1968 protests had “disguised 
themselves as subversive,” they also could not deny that the student protesters, 
“activists or not,” placed university reform at the top of their demands.58
While scholars have suggested that the struggles of 1968 of the 
dictatorship hinged on violence and resistance,
 
59
                                                                                                                                                 
56   Brian Loveman has commented on the “antipolitics” of military regimes in South 
America in the second half of the twentieth century. According to Loveman, this “antipolitics” 
focused on abolishing extant political parties, imposing censorship, closing state institutions, 
particularly the legislative branch, and purging public officials. See Brian Loveman, For La 
Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
1999), p. 189. My understanding of anti-policy differs slightly from Loveman’s for two reasons: 
first, whereas Loveman uses “antipolitics” in reference to military governments, here, I use “anti-
policy” to refer to students’ politics. This student “anti-policy” was often inconsistent with pre-
dictatorship goals; for example, prior to the coup, students called for the institution of a 
department system, yet when the military governments of the 1960s in Brazil began to investigate 
the use of a department system in the MEC-USAID accords, students became adamantly opposed 
to these changes. Thus, where Loveman’s antipolitics was a vision of political governance stripped 
of traditional forms of partisan politics, here “anti-policy” refers to a contrarian vision of policy 
that students adopted in direct resistance to military policy. While students’ “anti-policy” could be 
ideologically driven, it was also often subject to reactive stances against military policies. 
 the banners, slogans, and 
pamphlets demanding more funding, university reform, better infrastructure, and 
numerous other changes to the university system suggest otherwise. Moreover, 
 
57  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14, October 1966. 
 
58  See CPDOC, NL g 1968.06.23, letters from Francisco Negrão de Lima to Artur Costa e 
Silva (I and II – 23 June 1968 and July 1968, respectively). Negrão de Lima, the governor of 
Guanabara [greater Rio de Janeiro], was one of the two opposition governors (along with Israel 
Pinheiro in Minas Gerais) who won elections in 1965, leading to the government’s establishment 
of Institutional Act No. 2. Although far from radical, the hard-liners viewed Negrão Lima 
suspiciously, and he may have found himself under scrutiny as protests erupted in Rio in 1968. 
However, he remained in office for his term, and was in close contact with the federal 
government. For more on Negrão Lima’s 1965 election and the fallout, see Skidmore, Military 
Politics in Brazil, and Alves, State and Opposition, pp. 56-66. 
 
59  Maria Ribeiro do Valle, 1968: O diálogo é a violência – movimento estudantil e ditadura 
militar no Brasil, (Campinas, SP: Editora Unicamp, 2008). 
  
 
157 
after the coup, university reform had become the vehicle to challenge the 
dictatorship for many students. As one pamphlet that circulated among social 
service students throughout Brazil in 1965 put it, “the fight against the 
dictatorship is based on the fight for University Reform.”60
 Some of these demands, such as the issue of vagas, the opposition to the 
professores catedráticos, and the call for general university reform, pre-dated the 
dictatorship. However, the ideological undercurrent that challenged the 
dictatorship’s rule was a new element in many students’ rhetoric and 
mobilizations. Certainly, the political shift after 1964  caused a growing number 
of students to challenge the dictatorship and adopt increasingly ideological 
demands. Yet students did not limit themselves to a contrarian stance with regards 
to educational policy; instead, they used their own vision of university reform to 
shape the debate over national development and to construct their own vision of 
development. 
  
The Debate over Development 
Students did not raise pragmatic and ideological concerns in an “ivory 
tower” that isolated universities from Brazilian society more generally. They also 
addressed economic development but proposed a nationalist alternative to the 
military government’s  gradualist approach, which was more open to foreign 
investment and the use of loans.  Through policies such as the MEC-USAID 
accords and the issuing of fees, students viewed the military’s educational policy 
as just another example of the broader “selling out” of the dictatorship. Thus, 
                                                 
 
60  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de 
Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966. 
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while students called for reform, they simultaneously challenged the military’s 
openness to outside influences to accomplish it. 
Students demonstrated some of the nationalist ideological tendencies that 
had been a part of their vision of development since the “O petróleo é nosso” 
campaign of the early-1950s. This view of development was based on the 
understanding that improvements in Brazilian society and technology had to come 
from within, and that Brazil had to break its dependency upon foreign powers like 
the United States. This nationalism informed their criticism of agreements like 
MEC-USAID as just an extension of American imperialism.61 They railed against 
the military’s development policy, which they claimed “only benefited 
international monopolies and privileged and retrograde” elites.62 Fighting against 
the policies like MEC-USAID meant fighting for “the people” and for Brazilian 
sovereignty in the face of “imperialism” and “cultural colonialism.”63 Students 
even went so far as to protest the imposition of “the ‘American way of life’” and 
the idea of the “self-made man” in universities within this system.64
                                                 
 
 Claims that 
61  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 October 1966. 
 
62  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, “O Metropolitano,” 19 October 1966. 
 
63  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da 
UME,” and Jornal do Brasil, 25 May 1967, p. 15. 
 
64  The document even switches to English to emphasize the foreign infiltration of the 
United States in the universities. The passages in their original forms comment, “no caso, o 
‘american way of life,’ com seus focos na concorrência, no individualismo, no desejo de ‘vencer 
na vida’, no lucro a todo custo, consubstanciados no ‘self made man.’” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, 
Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022 – Ref: Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 
November 1966. 
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students would have to learn English before attending universities in Brazil 
pointedly mocked the pro-U.S. bias of federal development plans.65
But how was development to take place? The answer was not so clear-cut 
in the 1960s. Certainly, students disapproved of the military’s “sell-out” 
policies.
 
66 They also challenged partnerships with the United States and 
collaborations between the military government and private enterprises.67 They 
lamented Brazil’s “underdevelopment,” hosting conferences on the topic at 
schools and universities throughout the country.   Students at a law school in 
Minas Gerais went so far as to hold a mock-trial of Castelo Branco “for 
ignominious crimes committed by this mediocre dictator of an underdeveloped 
country.”68 Some supported a vaguely-defined “technical and scientific progress 
allied to moral evolution” and the ability “to lend any type of useful service to 
mankind!”69 And they occasionally linked development to ideals like “liberty” 
and “freedom.”70
                                                 
 
   
65  Jornal do Brasil, 25 May 1967, p. 15. 
 
66  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5684-05250, Ministério da Educação e Cultura – Informação 
Elaborada – Secreta, “A Formação da Universidade de Brasília,” Caixa 5684-05250, Coleção DSI, 
AN. 
 
67  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Manifesto dos Estudantes da 
E.N. Química,” 29 May 1968. 
 
68  See, for example, AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5685-05250, “Informação No. 
1057/SNI/ARJ,” 22 Nov 1965. For the mock-trial of Castelo Branco, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 
586-05252, CENIMAR Informe No. 7341, 23 September 1966. 
 
69  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, Unnamed document (folha 184). 
 
70  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Ofício No. 891-DOA/66, 14 October 1966. 
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However vaguely stated, student attitudes fit broadly within the framework of 
“economic nationalism” articulated by technocrats and activists alike.71 They 
strategically adapted and appropriated the government’s developmental rhetoric in 
their demands for university reform. Nationalism and the centrality of the 
universities in development often were closely linked. Brazilian development 
depended on technological and scientific progress that could only happen in the 
universities, even while offering improvements to “the people” and tackling 
“national problems.”72
Clearly, students employed educational struggles in multiple ways in order 
to contest the regime’s authority. Some of these issue, such as the issue of vagas, 
the opposition to the professores catedráticos, and the call for general university 
reform, pre-dated the dictatorship. However, the ideological undercurrent that 
challenged the dictatorship’s rule was a new element in many students’ rhetoric 
and mobilizations. Certainly, the political shift after 1964  caused a growing 
number of students to challenge the dictatorship and adopt increasingly 
 Vague developmental nationalism and improvements in 
the universities were inextricably bound up in students’ definitions of  university 
reform, anti-dictatorship sentiment, and Brazilian development. Students in the 
1960s successfully challenged the government’s hegemonic definition of 
Brazilian development; they adapted messages from the 1950s to the political 
context of the 1960s and laid further groundwork for the debate as it would occur 
in the 1970s. 
                                                 
 
71  See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 30 and passim. 
 
72  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Documento sobre as diretrizes das 
reformas na Universidade do Brasil,” p. 5. 
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ideological demands. Yet this shift also marked a closer approximation between 
UNE’s leadership and the student masses, one worth examining in greater detail. 
 “A Movement of the Students”: The approximation of UNE and Brazilian 
students  
Prior to 1964, the student masses who rallied around quotidian demands 
and the progressive leadership that focused on broader ideological struggles 
shared little common ground. After the coup, this dynamic changed. As students 
increasingly mobilized for more positions in universities or against the Lei 
Suplicy and MEC-USAID accords, the student leadership itself moved closer to 
the masses’ demands. Disenchanted by students’ failure to mobilize against the 
coup on April 1, the new student leaders in UNE made a concerted effort to focus 
on quotidian demands. As Franklin Martins, who was a radical in the student 
movement and who was involved in the kidnapping of U.S. ambassador Charles 
Elbrick in 1969, retrospectively commented, “the student movement is not a 
movement of the left…it is a movement of the students, to defend their own 
interests.”73
The shift began in late-1965. By that year, the students had “semi-legally” 
reconstituted UNE and began trying to take over the government’s new Academic 
Directories and Students’ Central Directories on each campus. New leaders of 
UNE emerged and sought to overcome a prior lack of cohesion in the student 
movement in the years leading up to 1964, including the near-total student apathy 
 UNE’s new leadership was determined to represent those interests. 
                                                 
 
73  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 14 
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towards the coup itself. To bridge the gap with the “masses,” student leaders 
addressed both “drinking fountains” and “imperialism.”  
Due to these efforts, more students were increasingly turning to UNE as a 
useful means to create a national voice that pushed for reforms and improvements 
on the national level. By 1967, students had begun using UNE call for an end to 
fees and more federal funding for public universities.74 High school students 
joined their university counterparts,  protesting the process of entrance exams for 
admission to universities.75 They demanded more openings in the university 
system for qualified students.76
 Student leaders had not abandoned ideological objections to 
“imperialism.” The MEC-USAID agreements provided the catalyst for student 
 The familiar refrain of infrastructural 
improvements returned, demanding better laboratories and libraries and 
classrooms large enough so students would not have to stand in the aisles or in the 
hallways. By 1967, all of these issues had coalesced into a call for university 
reform that both leadership and the masses could agree upon.   
                                                 
 
74  See: APERJ, Coleção Jair Ferreira de Sá, NT 334, Untitled Document; CPDOC, EAP erj 
1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense;” 
APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Plano de Radicalização,” Estado da 
Guanabara – Secretaria de Segurança Pública –DOPS – Divisão de Operações – Serviço de Buscas 
– Seção de Buscas Especiais, Pasta 30/31; and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews 
with Jean Marc von der Weid, pp. 11, 15, and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau, p. 7 
 
75   APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Movimento Estudantil – RJ,” 
DPPS – Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ – Serviço de Cadastro e Dcouemtação (SCD), 23 
September 1968. 
 
76  The issue of openings, or “vagas,” dated back to the late-1950s. See Ch. 1. For 
documents on the demand for openings in the 1960s, see CPDOC, EUG pi Corrêa, A., 1968.03.00, 
“Uso Intensivo do Espaço Escolar no Ensino Superior,” Setor de Educação Mão-de-Obra do 
IPEA, Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, 
Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” EAP erj 
1945/1965.00.00. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Arthur José 
Poerner, p. 5, and Daniel Aarão Reis, pp. 14, 19. 
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leadership in UNE and on campuses to weld the quotidian demands for university 
reform with the leftist leadership’s broader Cold War ideologies. The agreements 
simultaneously addressed both university reform and imperialism. Students 
accused the Brazilian dictatorship of selling out Brazil’s interests to foreign 
powers, undermining and destroying the university system itself, sacrificing 
Brazilian development, and demonstrating a moral capitulation in the face of what 
student leaders perceived to be an ideologically bankrupt foreign power.77
What resulted was a mutually beneficial shift in the student movement in 
the 1960s. Students finally had an organization that placed their quotidian and 
ideological demands front and center. When military police began to attack 
student protestors, the sentiment towards the dictatorship, which had been 
favorable in 1964, quickly turned. Students who were beaten and imprisoned 
lashed out against the violence, and even their parents began to question the 
nature of the regime they imagined they had “saved” Brazil in 1964.
 
78 This shift 
fell exactly in line with what the more radical student leadership had hoped and 
wanted – a broader movement against the military government.79
                                                 
 
 Thus, under a 
77  See, for example: APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 
October, 1966; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022 – Ref: 
Encaminha Exempláres de Órgãos Estudantes, 1966; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor 
Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.” See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published 
interviews with César Maia, pp. 6-8; Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 5; José Luís Guedes, p. 25; Juca 
Ferreira, p. 2; and Maria Augusto Carneiro Ribeiro, p. 6. 
 
78  See personal interview with D.N., 27 August 2007 and 3 September 2007; personal 
interview with F.G., 10 September 2007; personal interview with J.A., 27 December 2007; and 
APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, “Bossa Nova – Ano II, No. 4 – Colégio Pedro 
II,” September 1966. 
 
79  See APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, “Guerra Popular (Órgão 
Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha) – No. 1, Ano I,” October 1968, 
and Caixa 10, Dossie 11, “Informe estudantil nacional de política operária,” 5 August 1967. See 
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more inclusive and representative UNE, leftist leaders and more moderate student 
masses were able to amalgamate their interests into one broad platform. 
More Fluid Forms of Dialog: Students’ Efforts to Shape State Policy 
Between 1964 and 1968, students increasingly gained public visibility as 
they held rallies and protests throughout the country. The violent “Massacre at 
Praia Vermelha” in Rio de Janeiro in 1966, the marches of 1966, 1967, and 
especially 1968, and national meetings, including the unsuccessful UNE Congress 
in 1968, where hundreds of student leaders were arrested, made student discontent 
clear to the government and the nation. By employing these methods, students 
were attempting to influence the dialog over education and development 
indirectly. The government did not respond immediately in terms of policy; rather 
it used police repression to exert its authority.  
Yet students’ efforts to shape the state’s policy were more nuanced than a 
mere reliance on street protests that provoked police violence would indicate. 
Students were aware they were but one actor in the ongoing debate over education 
and development in Brazil. While they felt that the dictatorship was taking the 
wrong path, as their numerous demands and complaints made clear, they also 
tacitly acknowledged the government’s own role in shaping debate over the future 
of the country. For example, when the government announced the MEC-USAID 
accords, students did not just brand them as instruments of “imperialism” or “neo-
colonialism;” they believed it was their duty to “respond” to the policy and to 
                                                                                                                                                 
also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 18; Jean Marc von 
der Weid, p. 8; José Dirceu, pp. 9, 12; Daniel Aarão Reis, pp. 3-5, 12-13; and Vladimir Palmeira, 
pp. 13-14. 
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shape the debate with their own counter-proposals of the function of Brazilian 
universities in society.80
Marches and rallies offered the most visible examples of students’ efforts 
to shape public dialog over education, development, and the dictatorship. 
Numerous demonstrations called for more openings, an end to the MEC-USAID 
accords, or more funding. Indeed, students sometimes refused to abandon these 
specific demands for more “radical” demands. One radical student recalled 
participating in a march where students shouted “Funding! Funding!” When he 
failed to get the marching students to shout “more radical slogans,” he began to 
shout “Shits! Shits!”
 
81
Students also planned these marches in order to appeal directly to the 
public. They  often marched during rush hour in metropolitan centers like Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo. Catching traffic, students handed out leaflets outlining 
 Even when protesting police repression, students also 
carried banners condemning the MEC-USAID agreements or calling for funding. 
With the government increasingly calling in the police between 1966 and 1968, it 
was clear that, even if the government did not like the tactics the students used, it 
was more than aware of their demands and methods.  
                                                 
 
80  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, “Informe estudantil 
nacional de política operária,” 5 August 1967; APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, 
Caixa 5, Guerra Popular No. 1, Ano I, Oct. 1968; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, 
Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.” 
 
81  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Alfredo Sirkis, p. 5. In 
Portuguese, the words “verbas” (funding) and “merdas” (shits) sound similar, making Sirkis’s 
frustration at the moment humorous while also demonstrating that, while basic quotidian issues 
such as funding were important to them, they were not always so eager to adopt more radical 
political stances. 
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their demands.82 Additionally, traffic jams made it harder for police to arrive to 
break up the marches and easier for students to slip away when the police did 
arrive. Stories of marches and photos of banners plastering the front pages of 
newspapers throughout the country made government officials and the public in 
general “hear” the students’ demands, even if not at the rallies themselves. These 
efforts helped students gain sympathy for their movement among the Brazilian 
population; even Castelo Branco admitted that some of the students’ educational 
demands were justified.83
Students frequently attempted to present their demands to any government 
official they could reach. Sometimes they were able to reach the highest levels of 
government. In 1964, Castelo Branco gave the opening address at the University 
of Brazil, where students interrupted his speech and made demands for university 
reform. Although the students were arrested, Castelo Branco could not avoid 
hearing their demands. 
   
84 And in the highest-profile meeting, student leaders met 
with General Costa e Silva himself after the president allegedly expressed his 
desire to meet and discuss conditions in the universities. Some students feared a 
meeting would legitimize the president in the eyes of the student body and the 
public,85
                                                 
 
 while others felt it was a good platform to make their demands. Franklin 
82  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Alfredo Sirkis, p. 3, and 
Wladimir Palmeira, pp. 16-17. 
 
83  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5684-05250, Jornal do Brasil, 14 September 1966; Ministério 
da Educação e Cultura – Informação Elaborada – Secreta – “A Formação da Universidade de 
Brasília,” p. 8. 
 
84  AN, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Notação 9.99, “Texto datilografado ‘Agitação 
estudentil.’” 
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Martins recalled going to the Guanabara Palace in Rio de Janeiro and demanding 
“more funding, more openings, the release of arrested students, and the re-
opening of the Calabouço restaurant.” 86
When unable to meet with presidents, students attempted to dialog with 
other state officials.
 It is worth noting that  the release of 
student prisoners was the third issue Martins recalled, with funding and openings 
being foremost, revealing just how central university reforms were to students’ 
demands. While Costa e Silva dodged or refused to meet their demands, the fact 
that students had been granted a direct audience with the president made clear that 
the government was paying attention to their protests and pamphlets. The dialog 
between students and the state over the issue of universities and educational 
reform went beyond protests and police repression. 
87 They actively tried to gain an audience with the Minister of 
Education.88
                                                                                                                                                 
85  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Bernardo Joffily, pp. 4-5. 
 The MEC headquarters in Rio de Janeiro also became a major site of 
protest, as students began or ended their marches there and held rallies there. In so 
doing they hoped they might encounter government officials face-to-face. 
Students actively sought these encounters but were often disappointed, as in one 
 
86  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Franklin Martins, Jean Marc 
von der Weid. See also Document 6 (“Untitled”), p. 5, Fundo Coleções Particulares – Coleção Jair 
Ferreira de Sá, APERJ; and Jarbas Passarinho, Um híbrido Fértil, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 
Expressão e Cultura, 1996), p. 285. Passarinho was Minister of Labor under Costa e Silva and 
Minister of Education and Culture under General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1973). 
 
87  For a study of a similarly complex dialogue between members of the Catholic clergy and 
the military regime, see Serbin, Secret Dialogues. 
 
88  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 14. 
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meeting with the Minister of Education, who defended the unpopular entrance 
exam as “serving Brazilian development.” 89
These efforts to gain an audience were not always successful. Government 
officials often cancelled meetings with students at the last minute, or simply did 
not show up. Perhaps they feared granting students too much legitimacy or 
appearing weak in the public’s eye.
 
90
a patently absurd prerequisite.
 Other times, the government was “open” to 
dialog, but only under extreme limitations, as when Castelo Branco’s final 
Minister of Education and Culture, Raimundo Moniz de Aragão, agreed to talk 
with students but only “without demands” on their part,  
91
 By late-1968, students had become one of the most vocal and visible 
groups challenging the dictatorship’s rule. Certainly, events like the murder of 
Edson Luís and  public images of police repression helped student movements 
 Even if students did not always achieve face-to-
face meetings under conditions of their own choosing, their efforts went well 
beyond street rallies and marches. Their relationship with the state under military 
rule was more complex than many scholars have allowed, as students turned to 
more nuanced forms of discussion and entered into dialog directly with the state. 
Protests and repression were a major part of this student-state relationship, but not 
the sole component. 
                                                 
 
89  APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, “Universidade Popular,” p. 3. 
 
90  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Estado de Guanabara, Secretária de 
Segurança Pública, Informes (S.O.-S.A.A.), 22/6/67.” 
 
91  Jornal do Brasil 17 September 1966. See also APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, 
Dossie 6, Revista do DCE Livre Alexandre Vanucci Leme. 
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earn sympathy among the middle-class, artists, and others.92
 In short, educational reforms were not disconnected from student 
opposition to the government; they were a major component of it. Continuing to 
argue for the need for educational reform after 1964 allowed students to add to 
and shape broader debates over development in Brazil, much as they had in the 
1950s. However, the coup of 1964 and the different political context transformed 
these demands into a vehicle to challenge the dictatorship itself. Although 
contesting the dictatorship was certainly a major component of the student 
movements, it was not the sole goal. Additionally, there was much more contact 
between students and the state than police crackdowns on campuses and marches. 
 The ongoing 
repression and invasion of campuses certainly strengthened students’ calls for an 
end to the repression and the dictatorship. However, even in what is arguably the 
most turbulent year of Brazil’s military dictatorship, students never lost sight of 
the importance of universities, not just as physical sites of resistance, but as a 
major discursive platform in challenging the dictatorship and defining the 
question of development in Brazil. Students placed chants for an end to the 
dictatorship alongside demands for more funding and an end to MEC-USAID in 
their street marches. They continued to propose their own vision of university 
reform while challenging the military’s rule and policy-making. Leftist leaders 
accommodated quotidian demands for better conditions in the universities in order 
to broaden support of UNE. 
                                                 
 
92  For artists’ and musicians’ participation, see Flora Süssekind, “Coro, Contrários, Massa: 
A experiência tropicalista e o Brasil de fins dos anos 60,” in Carlos Busaldo, ed., Tropicália: Uma 
revolução na cultura brasileira, (Rio de Janeiro: Museu de Arte Moderno, 2007), pp. 31-58, and 
Dunn, Brutality Garden, pp. 111-112. 
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Students often turned to various forms of “dialog,” formal and informal, in 
incidents like the interruption of Castelo Branco at UFRJ in 1965; the various 
efforts to meet with government officials in MEC and elsewhere; and the meeting 
with Costa e Silva in 1968. In doing so, students simultaneously contested the 
regime’s power even while trying to influence the rhetoric and policy regarding 
education, development, and democracy. Yet they were not alone in challenging 
and swaying the military regime’s educational policies. Civilian actors of a 
variety of ideological persuasions also participated in the debate over Brazil’s 
future and the role of universities in that future, and it is to their ideas and actions 
that we now turn. 
Conservative Views on Education – IPÊS and Brazilian Business Leaders 
 Elite conservative business leaders, technocrats, and white-collar 
professionals were as concerned as the military government regarding the 
relationship of university reform to the nation’s modernization and economic 
progress. These sectors had joined together in 1961, forming the Institute of 
Social Research and Studies (Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais, IPÊS), to 
try to co-opt issues of reform and undermine the Goulart government.93
                                                 
93 For a comprehensive study of IPÊS’s activities and the organizations ties to the military 
government, see René Armand Dreifus, 1964: A Conquista do Estado – Ação Política, Poder e 
Golpe de Classe, 6th ed., (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, 2006). 
 Prior to 
1964, the organization had focused more on politics than on issues like education, 
though the latter did appear occasionally in the group’s bulletins and internal 
memoranda. However, with the overthrow of Goulart, one of IPÊS’s major goals 
disappeared, and it was able to spend much more time focusing on social issues. 
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 Education and university reform were at the forefront of IPÊS’s concerns 
in the wake of the coup. Prior to the coup, IPÊS’s monthly bulletins had included 
articles on Communism, subversion, and democracy; after 1964, the bulletin 
emphasized education as an investment, its relationship to development and 
business, and the different educational and university systems throughout the 
world, including the Soviet Union.94 It also published its own version of a 
University Reform in 1965. The author, A. C. Pacheco e Silva, ascribed to 
universities not only a “spiritual renovation through scientific and technological 
progress,” but a vital role in spreading a nation’s culture and improving its 
economic and social landscape.95 Student accusations of “elitism” in educational 
policy certainly applied to IPÊS. The organization promoted its own class as the 
most important to any type of development, going so far as to declare that the 
“modern world is essentially bourgeois.” The middle-class’s importance in IPÊS’s 
vision was far from subtle; the group sustained that the Brazilian middle class 
would be responsible for “extraordinary economic, scientific, and educational 
progress.”96
IPÊS also offered comprehensive analyses and suggestions for 
improvements to the university system. In 1964, it hosted a “Symposium on 
education reform,” which addressed national development and education. 
 
                                                 
 
94  See, for example, IPÊS Boletim Mensal No. 28 (Nov. 1964); No. 30/31 (Jan/Feb 1965); 
No. 32/33 (Mar/Apr 1965); 34/35 (May/June 1965), Caixa 138, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
AN. 
 
95  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 282, “Reforma Universitária,” 1965, pp. 1-3. 
 
96  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 282, Roberto Pinto de Souza and José de 
Barros Pinto, “Temas de Hora Presente: A Burguesia,” pp. 11-12, Caixa 282. 
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Although the symposium also examined primary and secondary education, the 
emphasis fell on universities, which were to play a central role in the “scientific 
contribution to economic and cultural development.”97
The issues that the symposium raised overlapped with student and 
government concerns about general conditions in the universities, and transcended 
ideological differences by advocating university expansion, more federal funding, 
better infrastructure, and improvements in faculty and curricula.
  
98 Like the 
government, IPÊS was concerned that the lack of openings would lead to a 
shortage of trained professionals in the labor market. The organization also sought 
foreign assistance in expanding universities and improving the quality of 
education; it emphasized science’s centrality in national development, particularly 
“in the areas of medicine, engineering, architecture, exploration of natural 
resources, etc.”99
IPÊS diverged from students and the government in its openly elitist 
vision of university education. It chastised middle class families “with the most 
modest of incomes” for trying to send their children to school to attain social 
mobility and the prestige of a university degree rather than abstract “intellectual” 
motives. The white-collar professionals and business leaders of the symposium 
 Within this vision, there was little room for lawyers, social 
scientists, and the humanities in Brazil’s development. 
                                                 
 
97  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da 
educação,” p. 27. 
 
98  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da 
educação,” pp. 28, 38, 40-41. 
 
99  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da 
educação,” pp. 1, 41-42, 52-53. 
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stressed that universities were vital “not only for the satisfaction of our demand 
for specialized labor,” but also for the formation of leaders who would use their 
knowledge to lead Brazil to its unspecified destiny.100  The Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas also pointed out in 1968 that one of the main functions of the university 
was “to form that professional elite capable of bringing to fruition all of the 
innumerable conquests of science and technology that benefit the collective 
whole.”101
For many members of IPÊS, their own entrepreneurial success depended 
on qualified white-collar workers for their professional and financial survival. 
Thus, the calls for “specialized labor” at the symposium were not unselfish. IPÊS 
repeatedly emphasized the role of universities in providing trained 
professionals.
 Nonetheless, IPÊS was motivated by class interest more than 
government entities or student organizations.  
102
                                                 
 
 The organization also moved beyond mere rhetoric, offering to 
its members as well as to students, businessmen, and university administrators a 
series of courses that linked universities and private businesses. Titled “University 
in Business,” IPÊS offered classes on “Capital Markets,” “Techniques for 
Directing a Company,” “Marketing: Essential Knowledge for your Business,” 
“Economy and Business Administration,” and “General Management,” among 
100  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da 
educação,” pp. 33, 38. 
 
101  CPDOC, AT pi FGV 1968.00.00, Roll 1, Photo 531, “Resultados iniciais da pesquisa ‘O 
Brasil e seus profissionais de nível superior,’” p. 1. 
 
102  In addition to the “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da educação,” see also AN, Coleção Paulo 
de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 317, “Incompletos,” p. 19. 
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others.103 In this vision, university-trained businessmen would use their education 
not only to improve private business in a capitalist society, but would also employ 
their degrees to lead the nation in “cultural diffusion, exchange of ideas and of 
knowledge, and the perfection of specialized techniques.”104
These publications, conferences, and pamphlets may not have been 
representative of the entire organization’s attitudes. However, they regularly 
presented these ideas and visions to members who also likely shared their 
ideological sympathies. Clearly, IPÊS, like students, the government, and others, 
viewed the university system and its problems as essential to Brazilian 
development. Yet IPÊS was not operating in a bubble, preaching only to its 
members. The organization published numerous documents on business, 
development, democracy, education, and other subjects for a more general 
audience.
 
105 It even declared that it would publish the Symposium on Education 
“throughout the national territory” in order to demonstrate that “education is an 
indispensable instrument” to Brazilian development, and to “mobilize public 
opinion in favor of an ample educational reform.”106
                                                 
 
 Additionally, as other 
scholars have shown, IPÊS had numerous connections to the federal government. 
The founder and first head of the National Service of Information (Serviço 
Nacional de Informações, SNI), Golbery do Couto e Silva, was a dues-paying 
103  AN, Coleção IPÊS, Caixa 21, “Universidade na Emprêsa,” n. pag. 
 
104  NA, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 282, A.C. Pacheco e Silva, “Reforma 
Universitária,” (IPÊS, 1965), pp. 2-3. 
 
105  AN, Coleção IPÊS, Caixa 21, “Relação das publicações em estoque no almoxarifado.” 
 
106  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da educação 
- Regulamento,” p. 1. 
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member of IPÊS at least up through 1969.107 IPÊS members were in contact with 
the government and even made up parts of the cabinet under Castelo Branco.108 
Other members, including Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, had periodic meetings with 
Castelo Branco and members of his staff.109
However, to suggest that IPÊS was directly responsible for the 
government’s formulation of university reform is an overstatement.
 It seems likely that many of the 
suggestions and issues IPÊS raised reached the ears of the military government, 
particularly during the Castelo Branco administration. 
110 By 1967, 
with the rise of Costa e Silva and the “hard-liners” within the military rule and the 
marginalization of the moderate “Sorbonne” school of Castelo Branco, Golbery, 
and Ernesto Geisel,111
                                                 
 
 IPÊS became isolated within the Brazilian government. 
Although its members continued to have the ear of the military dictatorship, their 
role was greatly reduced between Castelo Branco’s exit in 1967 and the 
inauguration of Geisel in 1974. Additionally, the university reform of 1968 was 
107  AN, Coleção IPÊS, Caixa 10, Pacote 1, “Declarações de rendimentos do IPÊS-GB, 1969-
1970.” 
 
108  Dreifus, 1964: A Conquista do Estado, and Maria Inêz Salgado de Souza, Os 
empresários e a educação: O IPÊS e a politica educacional apôs 1964, (Petrópolis, RJ: Editora 
Vozes, 1981). 
 
109  AN, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Notação, 1.72, “Agenda com registro de atos, encontros, 
decisões, articulaçòes entre Castelo Branco – 14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967.” Ribeiro also argued for 
the government that education was an investment in national development before the BNDES in 
the debate over how to spend the money from MEC-BID. See above, and AN, Coleção Luís Viana 
Filho, Notação 9.93, “Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Govêrno Castelo 
Branco.” 
 
110  Souza, Os empresários e a educação, p. 15. 
 
111  Elio Gaspari does an excellent job tracing this split across his four-volume work on the 
dictatorship. For a succinct summary of the development of these two groups within the military, 
see Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 135-136. See also Costa Couto, História indiscreta, 
pp. 34-35, 63-73. 
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the product of multiple agreements, studies, and investigations, involving both 
foreign and domestic agencies across the previous four years. The administrations 
of Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva made it clear that they had no problem in 
delegating the task of university reform to numerous individuals and groups 
simultaneously. The suggestion that IPÊS was the main motivating force behind 
university reform rings hollow when one considers the numerous efforts both 
governments established to study reform between 1964 and 1968 and  the 
participation of students, professors, and others in that debate.  
Likewise, it is clear that IPÊS’s work and students’ protests did not 
“reinvigorate” the government’s desire for university reform in 1968. Even before 
the coup, both Kubitschek and Goulart had emphasized the importance of 
university reform. The military government began examining the issue of 
university reform almost immediately upon overthrowing Goulart. This was a 
long-term governmental goal that spanned over a decade and crossed 
ideologically diverse administrations. To suggest that IPÊS influenced the 
government, which in turn only acted in 1968, is to ignore a legacy of calls for 
university reform in furthering Brazilian development that stretched back to at 
least the mid-1950s. Although IPÊS did influence government opinion on 
education, development, and reform, IPÊS was only one voice, albeit an 
important one, in that choir singing out for reform. Indeed, the importance of 
IPÊS’s voice is not that it was an isolated call for reform, but that business elites 
were joining students and military officials in calling for reforms. While the 
political backgrounds were widely varying, many students and business-leaders 
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shared similar social and cultural backgrounds, leading to a unified discursive 
field that placed universities and the middle class at the center of national 
development, regardless of ideology. 
Other conservative voices also were involved in the debate. Juárez Távora, 
the former Prestes column veteran and UDN presidential candidate, declared it the 
government’s “fundamental duty…to accelerate the process of national 
development.” At the same time, he acknowledged that university students would 
play a key role in the development, eliminating obstacles to national development 
and transforming society through their labor as university-trained professionals. 
Relying on optimistic yet vague rhetoric, Távora argued students’ main function 
in this process was to provide “indispensable scientific and technical leadership in 
the national acceleration of the process of our economic-social development.”112 
Even civilians who  supported the government got in on the act, with one 
proclaiming that, with regards to development, “education is an 
opportunity…today it is the only hope for mankind!”113
                                                 
 
Progressive pedagogical 
expert Anísio Teixeira shared Távora’s and the government’s esteem for the 
sciences and their role in national development. Even while opposing the military 
dictatorship, just after the dictatorship issued its University Reform, Teixeira 
lauded the new role universities had taken on as the “center of irradiation” and 
“scientific progress.”  He even praised the government for “giving them 
[universities] resources and means for a gigantic advancement in human 
112  CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A mocidade e o desenvolvimento (algumas 
teses a debater, a respeito),” pp. 1-5. 
 
113  CPDOC, JM c mj 1965.08.27 (IV-16), Letter to Juracy Magalhães, 22 November 1965. 
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knowledge.”114
Obviously, the military government was not the only group interested in 
university reform. Many other sectors outside of the government also placed 
educational reform at the center of Brazil’s progress regardless of their 
ideological leanings or class identity. The debate over the role of universities in  
Brazil was much more than an oppositional dialog between the government and 
students; it was a debate amongst multiple sectors in Brazil, a discursive struggle 
to shape and determine the nation’s future.   
 While he may not have cared for the military’s policies or 
ideologies, Teixeira, like students in the late-1950s and early-1960s, saw 
scientific knowledge as the key to intellectual and national development, and 
universities as the key to scientific knowledge. Perhaps more importantly, these 
voices were part of a growing chorus that placed middle-class white-collar 
professionals at the center of national development. 
Shifting Allegiances: Parents and the Struggle for University Reform  
One group has been conspicuously absent from scholarship on the 1960s 
in Brazil: the parents of university students.115
                                                 
 
 Although many middle-class 
parents had openly supported the coup of 1964, by 1968 their opinions had begun 
to waver. Whereas in previous military interventions the armed forces promptly 
returned power to civilians, it seemed that the leaders of the “revolution” of 1964 
had little interest in quickly relinquishing power. More importantly, students’ 
114  CPDOC, HL pi Teixeira, A.A. 68.12.05, “Discurso de Paraninfo da Turma de Bachareis 
em Direito da Universidade de Brasília,” 5 December 1968. 
 
115  Already in their 20s and 30s in the 1960s, many of this generation have died, making oral 
testimonies difficult to come by. While their children, who are in their 60s and 70s today, often 
recall their parents through the lens of students’ activities, they are still a useful window into the 
ways the dictatorship and the struggle over universities affected and involved an older generation. 
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ongoing protests against the dictatorship had led to increasingly violent police 
crackdowns, revealing the ugly side of the new military government. These 
incidents increased beginning in 1966, and by 1968, many parents were 
concerned at the regime’s bloody tactics of suppression. As a result, many 
middle-class parents who had initially supported the military increasingly found 
themselves drawn into the political struggles between students and the 
government.   
Most university students in the 1960s came from Brazil’s middle class,116 
and that status played a major role in the growing turbulence of the 1960s. The 
middle-class had  decisively supported the military coup of 1964. The military 
based its actions on a perceived threat of a leftist dictatorship and the need to 
stabilize the Brazilian economy.117 As the 1960s progressed, it became 
increasingly clear that turning inflation around would take longer than the 
government had planned. As popular politicians like Juscelino Kubitschek and 
Carlos Lacerda lost their political rights, support began to falter. Lacerda, 
previously a leading antagonist to João Goulart, joined forces in 1966 with the 
deposed president and Kubitschek to form the “Ample Front” to lead Brazil back 
to democracy.118
                                                 
 
 As early as 1966, it was  apparent that the dictatorship was 
116  For example, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 275,  “Estado da Guanabara 
– COCEA – Resultados por classe de renda da pesquisa sôbre consumo alimentar e orçamentos 
familiares no estado da Guanabara – Nov 1967/Oct 1968,” pp. 33-37. See also Daniel Aarão Reis, 
Ditadura militar, esquerdas e sociedade, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2000), pp. 
40-42. 
 
117  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 7, and 
Daniel Aarão Reis, pp. 10, 19. See also Daniel Aarão Reis, Ditadura militar, esquerdas e 
sociedade, 3rd ed., (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2000). 
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moving away from democracy, not towards it, with laws like the Second 
Institutional Act (AI-2), which instituted e  indirect election of governors, 
outlawed previously-existing political parties, and created two new parties, the 
National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(MDB).119 Newspapers covered heavy-handed police tactics used in invasions of 
campuses in Minas Gerais and Brasília in 1965 and Rio de Janeiro in 1966. 
Images of students handcuffed on soccer fields and of horse-mounted police 
attacking marching students further shook the foundations of support for the 
dictatorship. Many middle-class parents and their friends began to question the 
dictatorship’s harsh tactics. The middle class’s eroding support for the 
dictatorship by 1968 was similarly decisive in contributing to the increasing 
tensions of that turbulent year.120
Political disenchantment and direct, violent threats against their children 
dragged parents more closely into the struggles over university reform. Parental 
involvement had taken place prior to the coup; in 1962, parents and students in 
São Paulo demanded the federalization of the private Mackenzie University. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
118  See Costa Couto, História indiscreta, p. 80, and Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 
279, 289. 
 
119  Although there were technically two parties, they served no real opposition to the 
government. ARENA was stacked with pro-coup politicians and individuals. Although some 
MDB politicians, such as Márcio Moreira Alves, attempted to challenge the government, the threat 
of repression and the government’s ongoing policy of stripping “troublesome” politicians of their 
political rights made the MDB  oppositional in name only. The pro-government stance, coerced or 
consented upon, was severe enough that for the first decade after 1966, Brazilians referred to the 
MDB and ARENA as “the parties of ‘Yes,’ and ‘Yes, sir!’” For more on the parties, see Alves, 
State and Opposition in Military Brazil, p. 65, and Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in 
Brazil, pp. 46-49. 
 
120  For example, see Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada; Zuenir Ventura, 1968: O ano que 
não terminou, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira S/A, 1988); and Costa Couto, História 
indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura. 
  
 
181 
However, such involvement was fairly minimal.121 As repression intensified, 
though, parents (and the public more generally) became increasingly shocked at 
the methods the Brazilian state was employing against their children. This outrage 
could reach uncomfortable levels; one father went armed with a pistol to the 
prison where one of his sons was held. He threatened to  kill whoever had arrested 
his son, only to find out that the arresting officer had been his other son, who had 
joined the military and who remained the “black sheep” of the otherwise-radical 
family for years.122 While most parents' reactions were not nearly as extreme, they 
gathered around prisons when their children were arrested.123 These visits to see 
their children could be humiliating as well. One former student recalled that the 
police strip-searched his mother before she was allowed to visit him in prison, 
literally exposing her to humiliation.124 Although the experience of an arrest could 
be particularly hard on the family, some student leaders were still proud of it. As 
one student put it, when his arrest was made public, his parents were shocked, but 
he gained prestige as a leader on campus.125
Many parents also joined in protest marches throughout the country, such 
as the March of One-Hundred Thousand (Marcha dos Cem Mil) in Rio de Janeiro 
 
                                                 
 
121 CPDOC, AT c 1960.06.25, Roll 40, Photos 159-164, “Carta de Paulo de Almeida Salles a 
Anísio Teixeira, informando-lhe envio de cópia da moção aprovada pelo plenário da assembléia de 
fundação da associação de pais e alunos na Universidade Mackenzie, São Paulo.” 
 
122  Personal interview, J.F., 19 June 2007. 
 
123  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Luís Raul Machado, p. 12. 
 
124  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with César Maia, p. 17. 
 
125  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Paulo de Tarso Venceslau, p. 7. 
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to protest the increasing police brutality of 1968.126 While the Marcha dos Cem 
Mil was a particularly memorable demonstration that brought students, parents, 
artists, singers, and politicians together against the dictatorship’s repression, 
parents also joined lower-profile protests,  often hoping that their presence would 
reduce police arrests and violence.127 Even non-participants worried about what 
would happen to their children, whether they were “activists” or not.128
This interest went beyond issues of personal safety. Parents whose 
children were facing expulsion acted on their behalf. In one particular instance, 
the students at UFRJ went on strike to protest the institution of fees. However, 
many parents paid the fees without their children’s knowledge, so that their 
children could remain enrolled in the public university system.
  
129 One student 
leader who rallied against payment of fees  recalled being devastated when he 
learned his mother had paid his fees, fearing the student body would consider him 
a hypocrite.130
                                                 
 
 
126  See Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 296-98. For artists’ participation in the 
protests of 1968, see Flora Süssekind, “Coro, Contrários, Massa: A Experiência Tropicalista e o 
Brasil de Fins dos Anos 60,” in Carlos Busaldo, ed., Tropicália: Uma Revolução na Cultura 
Brasileira, (Rio de Janeiro: Museu de Arte Moderno, 2007): pp. 31-58, and Dunn, Brutality 
Garden, pp. 111-112. 
 
127  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Luís Guedes, p. 7. 
 
128 Personal interview with D.N., 13 August 2007. For the stress from the viewpoint of 
student leader’s mother, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, Published interview with Rosa Monteiro, 
the mother of Ulisses Guimarães. For more on Guimarães and his fate, see Langland, “Speaking of 
Flowers,” Chapters 1, 3, and 4. 
 
129  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 11; Daniel 
Aarão Reis, p. 19; and Vladimir Palmeira, p. 8. 
 
130  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Antônio Serra, p. 11. 
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Parents also had a stake in the universities and university reform because 
of the opportunities it provided their children. As one former student recalled, “I 
was not the son of a rich father, but I was the son of a father who wanted his son 
to become rich.”131 Others also remembered the liberation they and their families 
associated with their university education.132 The fact that middle-class university 
enrollment was increasing meant that parents had a high stake in the quality of 
Brazil’s university system. As one letter-writer pointed out to Costa e Silva, 
Brazil had “hundreds of thousands of fathers and mothers who never finished 
elementary school.”133 If Brazil’s university system improved, their children 
would have professional, economic, and social opportunities than they never had. 
On the other hand, weak curricula, poor educators, and an insufficient number of 
openings could further hurt the dictatorship’s support among the middle classes if 
their children were increasingly denied opportunities for professional 
development.134
Students were aware of their parents’ growing concern, and appealed to 
their parents’ generation as the military’s antagonism to student movements 
increased. In their marches, they approached people of all ages with their 
  
                                                 
 
131  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Arnaldo Jabor, p. 1. 
 
132  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with José Dirceu, p. 3, and José 
Genoíno, p. 1. 
 
133  CPDOC, EUG 67.12.16, “Carta de Josio Sales a Artur da Costa e Silva sobre a situação 
do ensino superior nos EUA,” 20 January 1968. 
 
134  CPDOC, EUG 67.12.16, “Carta de Josio Sales a Artur da Costa e Silva sobre a Univ. 
Fed. De México,” 15 December 1967. 
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pamphlets and arguments in favor of university reform.135 And when police killed 
Edson Luís, students quickly appealed to their parents’ paternal and maternal 
instincts, proclaiming, “It could have been your child.”136
 Political leaders also appealed to parents to encourage tranquility. In June 
1968, Guanabara governor Negrão de Lima spoke “to the students, to the parents, 
and to the people in general,” assuring them that the federal government was 
addressing their demands for university reforms, and reminding them that “it is 
now time to await the proposal of the competent authorities, which is impossible 
to formulate in an atmosphere of incomprehension and conflict.”
  
137 Nor was 
Negrão Lima alone in these appeals. An internal document at MEC expressed 
concern over the “permanent worry” present in “a great number of homes, with 
their children studying at UnB.” Although MEC also blamed students’ “agitation” 
in preventing development from occurring “normally,” the official also 
proclaimed to be “conscious” of his responsibility to guarantee “the calm and 
tranquility that Brasília’s families are lacking.”138
 To further complicate matters, some officials blamed parents for student 
mobilization. When students attacked Minister of Justice Juracy Magalhães 
 In order to counterbalance 
student activism and restore “order,” the government had to appeal to parents. 
                                                 
 
135  Projeta Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Vladimir Palmeira, p. 15, and 
Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 14. 
 
136  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Vladimir Palmeira, p. 16. 
 
137  CPDOC, NL g 1968.06.23, “Pronunciamento da noite de 21 de junho de 1968,” and 
Letter from Francisco Negrão de Lima to Costa e Silva, 23 Jun 1968. 
 
138  NA, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5684-05250, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Informação 
Elaborada – Secreta – “A Formação da Universidade de Brasília.” 
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outside of the University of Bahia, he received a mountain of letters expressing 
support and blaming the students. Some individuals were more willing to blame 
“communists,” “foreigners,” and “subversives” for taking advantage of the 
“useful innocence” of students.139 This rhetoric was common throughout the 
dictatorship in an uneasy rhetorical relationship that simultaneously chastised 
students for their activism while at the same time insisting that they were 
“innocents” and were being manipulated by outside forces. Sometimes, these 
commentators resorted to extreme language, including accusing students of being 
“insane,” “maladjusted,” or “pseudo-students.” As a result, in this instance, many 
felt students were not responsible. Yet the burden did not fall simply on 
“Communists;” some also directly blamed the parents for students’ poor 
upbringing and activism.140
 Whether they wanted to or not, parents were increasingly drawn into the 
battles over university reform.  In so doing, they also risked exposure to violence 
and repression as well as emotional and professional stress. Such was the case 
with a father who worked for the federal government in the Attorney General's 
office in Brasília but who also helped his son hide Honestino Guimarães in his 
house for three days while police searched for him. His actions left  the father torn 
between his duties to the state and to his son.
 
141
                                                 
 
 While his case was extreme, 
many parents found they increasingly had to take a side in the battle between the 
139  CPDOC, JM c mre 1966.06.05. Of course, many student activists strongly disagreed with 
this assessment. See, for example, Projeto Memória Estudantil, Paulo de Tarso Veceslau, p. 7. 
 
140  CPDOC, JM c mre 1966.06.05, Letter from Paulo Santos Silva and anonymous letter. 
CPDOC. 
 
141  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Cláudio Fonteles, p. 9. 
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state they supported and the children they loved. In this way, many parents 
became engaged in the debates over the use of repression, student mobilization, 
and university reform. 
Conclusion 
 While educational policy and university administration may have fallen 
under the purview of the state, it is clear that various social sectors had a vested 
interest in the future of Brazil’s higher education system and actively participated 
in and shaped the debate over the role of universities in national development and 
politics. Students pointed to the infrastructural shortcomings and pedagogical and 
financial inadequacies of the universities as a means to challenge the regime’s 
power. In doing so, the student movement finally found a way to bridge the gap 
between the radical leadership and the more moderate masses in the process. Even 
those students who supported the dictatorship clamored for improvements in the 
system. Collectively, these efforts shaped the regime’s policies. Likewise, 
business-leaders and others who had a financial interest in the nation’s economic 
and social development used their own institutions and their contacts with the 
government to try to sway the military’s educational policies. Even parents 
became involved in the battle over reform as the university system’s shortcomings 
failed to address the material hopes they held for their children, even while the 
regime increasingly resorted to violence to attack their children. 
 In spite of the differing political backgrounds of these groups and the 
heterogeneity within them, the universities were central to each group’s hopes for 
Brazil’s future, just as they were to the state’s vision of development. As 
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members of Brazil’s middle class (or individuals with hopes of becoming a part of 
the middle class), they all shared a discursive vision of development that hinged 
on university education and the middle class’s centrality to national growth. In 
this regard, they were not so different from the military regime. 
At the end of November of 1968, the military issued its University 
Reform, transforming higher education in Brazil. However, that policy did not 
emerge from bureaucratic ether. Between 1964 and 1968, students, parents, 
pedagogues, businessmen, and others shaped the military’s policy, be it through 
protests, meetings, rallies, private classes, pamphlets, or other forms of dialogue 
with the state. Although the establishment of the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 
(AI-5) just two weeks later would overshadow the University Reform, the new 
educational policy was a major watershed that simultaneously revealed the depth 
of the military’s intention to transform society while also demonstrating the 
complex ways in which state and society were bound together in these 
transformations. However, declaring reform and actually implementing it were 
two different issues. Throughout the 1970s, the military governments continued to 
try to renovate the university system even as Brazil went through periods of 
economic growth and decline, growing social opposition, and internal 
contradictions within the military regime itself. It is to those efforts to implement 
university reform that we now turn.
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Chapter Four – “Planning Is a Continuous Process”: Military Educational 
Policy and the Middle Class, 1969-1979 
 In many ways, the Reforma Universitária, issued just two weeks prior to 
Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5), marked a new period in the military government 
and in Brazilian education more generally. With the Reforma Universitária, the 
military directly staked Brazil’s future to higher education. It created a new 
administrative hierarchy to govern the federal university system, while also 
reorganizing universities’ internal structure. It consolidated and built upon the 
reforms established in Decree-Laws 53 and 252. It established a plan to increase 
the number of admissions in universities in an attempt to expand the education of 
the middle class and to improve Brazil’s quality of life and international standing. 
It brought an end to the numerous studies and scattered laws dealing with 
universities, establishing a detailed program designed to resolve the structural 
problems of universities. It outlined a specific vision for the direction of national 
development, one that hinged on the sciences and medicine in place of the 
humanities and arts. In doing so, the new decree acknowledged both the students’ 
demands and reiterated a vision of national development that hinged on white-
collar middle-class professionals who would lead the country’s scientific and 
commercial progress. The Reforma’s publication immediately established a 
“before” and “after” divide in Brazilian higher education. 
 Yet the Reforma was far from the final say on the role or organization of 
universities in Brazil. As Edson Machado de Sousa pointed out just two weeks 
after the government passed the Reforma, reforming the university system would 
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be a “continuous process.”1 The administrations of Costa e Silva, Emílio 
Garrastazu Médici (1970-1974), and Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) continued to 
reshape, reformulate, and redirect educational policy. In the short term, the 
government concentrated its efforts on preventing “another 1968” while rapidly 
transforming the university system. As time passed, though, unforeseen problems 
arose. In the ten years following the Reforma Universitária, the military 
government oversaw Brazil’s “economic miracle” and confronted inflation and 
recession as the decade progressed. Consequently, military governments found 
themselves forced to create new policies in response not only to the ongoing 
transformation of Brazilian universities and the shortcomings of educational 
policies, but also to social changes and responses from the Brazilian population 
itself.2
Preventing Another 1968: Universities and Political Reform  
 
When the Costa e Silva government announced the Reforma in late 
November 1968, it was clear that the military government was no longer going to 
offer half-hearted attempts to fix the university system. Costa e Silva’s 
administration had incorporated numerous studies and laws from the previous 
four years to offer a comprehensive policy for the university system’s 
organization. Moreover, as the tumultuous year of 1968 came to a close, the issue 
of student activism on campuses was one of the most immediate concerns 
confronting the military dictatorship, and remained so throughout 1969. Certainly, 
                                                 
1  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 298, Edson Machado de Sousa, “Diagnóstico 
para o Planejamento Educacional – Documento exposto em Conferência de Educadores do 
Distrito Federal,” Brasília, 16-18 December 1968. 
 
2  These civilian responses are further detailed and analyzed in the following chapter. 
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the military government and its allies hoped that the Reforma would reduce 
student opposition.3 However, the Costa e Silva administration quickly 
acknowledged that neither the Reforma nor the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 
(Ato Institucional No. 5, AI-5) would immediately eliminate student 
mobilization.4 Even Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s son Roberto, a university 
professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, recalled his father being 
concerned about the ongoing activism of students when he assumed office late in 
1969 after a stroke left Costa e Silva incapacitated.5 As Victoria Langland 
commented, given the progress the student movements had made in the previous 
four years, “1969 beckoned as the future of their movement.”6
                                                 
 
 The military 
regime sought to ensure that that would not be the case. 
3  See Passarinho, Um Híbrido Fértil, pp. 308-309; CPDOC, ACM pm 1964.10.00, Roll 1, 
Photos 693-696, 734-738; AN, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Notação 7.100, “Discurso do Presidente 
Castelo Branco na Instalação do Conselho Federal de Cultura – Agência Nacional, 3o turno,” 27 
February 1967.; and  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 319, Roberto Campos, 
“Educação e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” p. 12. 
 
4  AI-5 came to be the symbol of the new repressive phase of the dictatorship, commonly 
referred to as the “Years of Lead” (Anos de Chumbo). Among other things, AI-5 gave the military 
the power to indefinitely close Congress and ushered in a new wave of repression that witnessed 
heightened use of torture and other forms of police repression to clamp down on resistance and 
consolidate the military’s so-called “Revolution of 1964.” See Gaspari, A Ditadura 
Envergonhada, pp. 333-343. For a good contextualization of the events leading up to and 
decision-making process behind AI-5, see Hélio Contreiras, AI-5: A opressão no Brasil – Um 
repórter nos bastidores políticos das ditaduras do Cone Sul, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 
2005). 
 
5  Roberto Nogueira Médici, Médici: O Depoimento, (Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD Consultoria 
e Planejamento Editorial Ltda, 1995), p. 42. For more on Costa e Silva’s stroke, the political 
intrigue that led to the establishment of a one-month junta made up of the heads of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, and the eventual selection of Médici for president, see Gaspari, A ditadura 
escancarada, pp. 77-86 and 115-124; Costa Couto, História indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura, 
pp. 101-107; and Ronaldo Costa Couto, Memória viva do regime militar – Brasil: 1964-1985, 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1999), pp. 81-86. 
 
6  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 133. 
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 The Costa e Silva regime wasted no time in addressing the issue. As 
Carnaval came to a close and students prepared to return to school in February 
1969, the administration issued several decrees designed to further clamp down 
on student mobilizations. The most infamous of these was Decree-Law 477, 
which made a concerted effort to outlaw any student political activity on 
campuses. Those involved in vaguely defined “political activity” faced expulsion, 
the revocation of any and all future scholarships for a period of five years, and the 
inability to enroll in any university, public or private, in Brazil for a three year 
period.7 The law seemed superfluous to some since, as one newspaper pointed out 
years later, there was nothing in 477 that was not also covered in the broader Law 
of National Security.8 However, by reiterating restrictions on student activism in 
multiple laws simultaneously, the military revealed just how serious a threat it 
viewed student movements, even as it perhaps unintentionally gave them even 
greater symbolic weight. Because it specifically singled out students for 
repression, 477 soon became the symbol on campuses of the military’s new 
repressive phase, and students quickly placed “477” side-by-side with AI-5 when 
pointing to the most authoritarian acts of the dictatorship.9
                                                 
 
 
7  Decreto-Lei 477. Senado Federal – Subsecretaria de Informações. 
http://www6.senado.gov.br/sicon/ExecutaPesquisaLegislacao.action Accessed on 12 August 2007. 
 
8  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Fernando Nobre Filho, “O Decreto 
477,” O Diário de São Paulo [unspecified date]. Included in “Estado do Rio de Janeiro – 
Secretária de Segurança Pública/DPPS/INT/RJ, Encaminhamento 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ,” 22 
August 1975. 
 
9  For example, see: APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Ministério do 
Exército – I Exército, “Relatório Especial de Informações No. 4/75 – VII ECEM [Encontro 
Nacional de Estudantes de Medicnia do Brasil], 28 July 1975; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor 
Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 043 – 17 de Junho de 1975 – “DCE/Universidade 
Federal Fluminense”; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento 
  
 
192 
Decree-law 477 was not the only new regulation designed to deny students 
an oppositional voice. Throughout the 1960s, the military had been concerned 
with “professional students” whose extended programs of studies made them vital 
to a student movement that was vulnerable to quick turnover due to graduation.10 
To prevent these long-term activists from remaining involved in the student 
movement, the Médici administration issued law 5.789/72 in 1972, establishing 
jubilação, or “retirement,” of students. The military mandated more regimented 
timelines for students to finish their studies at federal universities. Students who 
did not complete courses within the government’s new timeline faced expulsion. 
Although the law also helped to shunt students into the workforce as those ever-
precious “human resources,” the law’s primary motivation was much simpler. By 
establishing a timeline, the military could “impede the permanency of the 
‘professional student,’” thereby hopefully reducing the presence of leftist student 
leaders on university campuses.11
 Although these decrees directly targeted students and student activism, the 
military also repressed faculty nationwide. Throughout 1969, the military used its 
power as the head of the executive branch to purge all federal universities of 
professors whose ideas were “subversive.” One scholar has suggested that this 
 Though nowhere near as draconian as 477, it 
was yet another means to minimize political dissent on campus and reduce  
“subversion.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
No. 051 – 27 June 1975. For more on student responses to the dictatorship’s educational policy in 
the 1970s, see Chapter 5, below. 
 
10  Personal interview, F.G., 10 September 2007. See also, Projeto Memória Estudantil, 
published interview with Elyseo Medeiros Pires Filho, p. 5. 
 
11  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78,” 
p. 3. 
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definition included those whose politics did not fit with the hard-liners’, as well as 
any professors who might oppose the government’s vision of reform.12 Dozens of 
professors were removed from campuses that were already witnessing a rapidly-
growing student-professor ratio, in an effort to eliminate opposition politics and 
“ideology” on campuses.13 By 1971, a popular magazine was suggesting that it 
would not be long before Brazilians had to go to the United States to learn about 
Brazilian history.14 Not all of the professors who exited the workforce were 
forced out; some moved into the private sector.15
This immediate post-1968 attempt to purge the campuses of all political 
activity was a source of friction between students and the military dictatorship for 
the next ten years. Even in the most repressive phase of the regime, students and 
their supporters continued to speak out against 477 in the press, in public, and in 
meetings with officials from MEC and from the universities.
 However, it is also highly likely 
that the forced removal or voluntary exile of some professors influenced the 
departure of others. 
16
                                                 
 
 Likewise, 
12  Marilena Chauí, Escritos sobre a universidade, (São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2000), p. 
161. 
 
13  Personal interviews with, A.P., 26 November 2007, and S.C., 10 September 2007. For 
presence of Communist faculty members, personal interview, J.F., 19 June 2007. See also James 
N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the 
United States, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 124-129, and Gaspari, A ditadura 
encurralada, p. 229. 
 
14  “A História do Brasil,” Veja, no. 168 (24 November 1971), pp. 32-38. 
 
15  The study found that 70 percent of Brazilians who had earned their degrees in the 
sciences in another country worked in universities, yet still expressed concern that “the fact that 30 
percent of these people with the title of doctor or with graduate study are working outside of the 
universities.” CPDOC, LSL pi Lopes, L.S. 1971.10.00, “Objetivos de uma política científica e 
tecnológica – Adequação da Administração Pública à melhoria da qualidade da vida,” p. 73. 
 
16  “O diálogo do Ministro,” Veja no. 68 (24 Dec. 1969), pp. 38-39. 
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jubilação inspired student opposition, not just from open leftists, but from other 
students whose friends were forced out in what they viewed as an unfair process. 
The removal of many professors who were opposed to the military regime gave 
the universities a new tenor as pro-government institutions throughout the 1970s. 
Moreover, the military government’s declaration in 1972 that UNE was extinct 
did not prevent new forms of student activism from appearing on campuses. 
Certainly, political engagement became much more limited during the regime’s 
most repressive years. Yet the military’s laws, designed to make universities 
completely apolitical sites, actually stoked opposition and increased political 
engagement on campuses throughout the 1970s. In spite of its best efforts, the 
military’s efforts to depoliticize campuses only gave students new political causes 
around which they could rally.17
New Problems, New Reforms: Universities, Society, and Military Policy, 1970-
1979 
 
 While laws like Decreto-Lei 477 and the establishment of jubilação 
provided high-profile flashpoints that spurred protest for years, such overtly 
political reforms in the universities were relatively few in the wake of 1968. 
Together with 477 and jubilação, the rise of a broad repressive apparatus via AI-
5, and the ascendance of the “hard line” within the military government, best 
personified in the administration of Médici, rendered superfluous any further 
efforts to rid campuses of political activity.18
                                                 
 
 Although Médici continuously 
17  See Chapter 5 for an analysis of the shifts in issues and forms of mobilization among 
students. 
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insisted that any instances of torture, human rights violations, or repression were 
isolated, at best many saw him as a hands-off president who was more interested 
in soccer than in curbing the abuses the military committed during his 
administration.19
 The University Reform initially seemed to resolve many of the problems 
universities confronted in the 1960s. The military pointed to the university 
system’s rapid expansion, and growth rates were indeed remarkable. The number 
 With a strong repressive apparatus that employed torture and 
“disappearances” firmly in place to curb further popular mobilizations, the 
military regime turned towards more mundane and quotidian reforms of the 
university system that consumed most of the space within educational policy in 
the post-1968 context. With the Reforma Universitária as its benchmark, the 
military set about focusing on the expansion, funding, and improvement of 
universities. Yet the reforms often failed to quickly address the shifting economic 
and political context of the 1970s. Consequently, military leaders found 
themselves forced to address the growing inadequacies of their educational 
policies while responding to increasing social pressure over the shortcomings of 
Brazil’s “new” university system. 
                                                                                                                                                 
18  For a comprehensive narrative of this “moderate”/“hard-liner” division and its 
developments between 1964 and 1977, see Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, A Ditadura 
Escancarada, A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2003), and A Ditadura 
Encurralada, (São Paulo: Editora Schwarz, 2002). For a fascinating and excellent analysis that 
questions the division of the military dictatorship into the “moderates” of the Castelo Branco years 
and the “hard-liners” of the Costa e Silva years, see João Roberto Martins Filho, O Palácio e a 
Caserna: A dinâmica militar das crises políticas na ditadura (1964-1969), (São Carlos, SP: 
Editora da Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 1995). 
 
19  For this portrayal, see Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule, Ch. 5; Alves, State and 
Opposition in Military Brazil, Ch. 6; and Gaspari, A ditadura escancarada. James Green suggests 
that Médici knew of the systematic use of torture under his watch, and only insisted that they were 
isolated incidents when opposition movements in the United States began to pressure the Brazilian 
government over its use of torture. See Green, We Cannot Remain Silent. 
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of students had already grown by 135,909 between 1964 and 1968, yet between 
1968 and 1972, it increased by another 409,763 students.20 Private schools in 
particular fueled this expansion. While in 1960 public schools educated about 55 
percent of the student body, by 1973 that number had dropped to 42 percent. 
Indeed, as part of the regime’s transformation of higher education, the number of 
schools under private administration skyrocketed. Private universities were 
already 50.5 percent of the total number of higher education institutions in 1970, 
and by 1974 they had ballooned to 63.01 percent of the total.21 Thus, the military 
was quickly able to address the need for more positions available for students, 
although it did so while reducing its responsibility to provide free higher 
education.22 Although the number of Brazilians who attended university remained 
a minority,23
                                                 
 
 the number of students nonetheless incresaed by over 500,000 in just 
ten years, allowing many more from the burgeoning middle class to attend 
universities, even if they were private institutions. It was clear that while the 
dictatorship was serious about expanding the university system, it was not as 
serious about expanding the federal university system. Rather, it promoted private 
universities whose accreditation still depended upon the federal government, but 
whose funding did not. This shift changed the landscape of higher education, 
20  In 1964, the total number of students enrolled in public and private colleges and 
universities was 142,386. In 1968, that number reached 278,295, and then leapt to an estimated  
688,058 students in 1972. COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, Relatório Annual – 
1972,” n. pag. 
 
21  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag. 
 
22  Private schools were responsible for the other 58 percent. The total numbers estimated 
were 350,000 students in public schools and 475,000 in private schools in 1973. COREG, Coleção 
MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag. 
 
23  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag. 
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leading to the prevalence of private universities and colleges, a condition that 
continues to this day.24
Although the military encouraged a rapid increase in the number of private 
universities, it did not ignore expanding the federal system. It continued to try to 
establish federal universities in every state in the union. Part of the 1968 Reform 
drew on the U.S. model of universities by constructing new centralized campuses 
that more closely reflected the structure of their American counterparts, rather 
than allowing them to be spread across a city, as was the case with older Brazilian 
schools. While the scientific compound on the Ilha do Governador at the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro was the most notable of these campuses, centralized 
campuses also appeared at new federal universities throughout the country. 
  
The military gave particular emphasis on science and technology within 
this expansion. Ever since the Kubitschek administration, Brazilian governments 
both civilian and military had rhetorically emphasized applied sciences as central 
to Brazilian development.25 Beginning with the Reforma, however, the military 
dictatorship promoted these fields through policy. The dictatorship emphasized 
the need to improve courses oriented towards scientific and technological 
development via curricular reforms, modernization of facilities, and more training 
and research opportunities for professors.26
                                                 
 
 Out of 1000 federal scholarships for 
graduate students in Masters and Doctoral programs, a full 644 went to basic and 
24  See Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira: Reforma e Diversificação Institucional,” 
Chapters 1 and 2. For criticisms of this shift, see Chauí, Escritos sobre a universidade. 
 
25  See Chapters 1 and 3. 
 
26  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Diretrizes para a Elaboração do 
Plano Setorial 1975/79 – MEC, 1 November 1973,” pp. 19-20. 
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applied sciences, while “Literature and Linguistics” received only 69 and the Arts 
received none at all.27 The growth of engineering schools alone reflected this 
emphasis. The number of public and private engineering colleges nearly doubled 
between 1967 and 1974.28 Likewise, by 1972, there were 74 medical schools with 
nearly 43,000 students enrolled.29
The emphasis on the transformative power of university degrees in white-
collar professions, particularly the exact and applied sciences, seemed to have a 
direct impact on middle-class career choices themselves. Between 1964 and 1979, 
students increasingly began to choose professions in engineering, medicine, 
biological sciences, physics, geology, and architecture, all fields the military 
presidents had promoted.
  
30 Administrations could claim they supported the arts 
and culture,31
                                                 
 
 but such claims rang hollow when the military’s Ministry of 
Education provided over 500 post-graduate scholarships for the sciences, and 
27  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.4, “Programas de Auxílios e Bolsas no 
País,” n. pag. The other fields receiving scholarships were education (56), social sciences (133), 
and “social professions” (such as law, business, architecture, library sciences, etc.), which received 
98 scholarships. 
 
28  There were 45 engineering schools in 1965, and only 58 in 1967, yet by 1972 that 
number had grown to 104. In addition to engineering departments at federal universities, these 
numbers also include private universities and private engineering colleges, which would have had 
to gain government approval to function. See COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.6, 
“Appendix 1 – Model for the implementation of a national postgraduate program in engineering, 
for Brazil,” p. I.6. 
 
29  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Anual – 1972,” n. pag. Not 
surprisingly, over half (39) of these schools were in the states of São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro/Guanabara, and Minas Gerais, and a full 55 of these schools were located in the 
geographically-small but demographically-large South and Southeast, which consisted of the 
states of Rio de Janeiro (and Guanabara prior to the 1975 merger between the two), Minas Gerais, 
São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. 
 
30  COREG, Coleção MEC, Gabinete do Ministério Caixa 1, M.3, Aparecida Joly Gouveia, 
“Democratização do Ensino Superior,” pp. 235-239. 
 
31  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Diretrizes para a elaboração do 
Plano Setorial 1975/79 – MEC, 1 November 1973.” 
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exactly zero for the fine arts.32 The popular musician Chico Buarque even raised 
this criticism, commenting to Minister of Education Ney Braga that universities 
were going through a cultural crisis. Where the previous generation of composers 
like Buarque, Edu Lobo, Milton Nascimento, and Caetano Veloso was “born in 
the universities,” such artistic and cultural creation was virtually absent from 
campuses in the 1970s.33
The government also implemented other reforms. It regulated and 
approved increases in annual student fees, which became a major source of 
student contention by the 1970s.
 Certainly, many university students would have chosen 
their professions based on a number of factors. However, the emphasis the 
government gave to scientific fields, often bolstered by scholarships and even 
greater rates of expansion than other areas of study, probably played a role in 
those decisions. 
34  Decree-law 464, which followed the Reforma 
Universitária by just two weeks, restructured and unified the entrance exams so 
that all students entering university took the same exam, regardless of the 
profession they sought to enter.35
                                                 
 
 Given that students, pedagogues, and military 
32  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.4, “Distribuição de Quotas de Bolsas no 
País da CAPES,” n. pag. 
 
33  CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photo 1392, “Despacho com o Excelentíssimo Senhor 
Presidente da República em 24 de Dezembro de 1974.” 
 
34  The fees were important enough that a list of laws and decrees regulating them took up 
three pages of an educational report from Rio de Janeiro, with another six pages devoted to 
discussion of the fees. See COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC Caixa 1, M.2, “Ministério da 
Educação e Cultura – Secretária de Apoio – Coordenação de Órgãos Regionais – Delegacia 
Regional do Rio de Janeiro – DR-3,” Ch. 19. For student responses to the annual fees, see Chapter 
5, below. 
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leaders alike had complained about the structure of the exams throughout the 
1960s, the fact that the Costa e Silva administration neglected to address the issue 
initially in the Reforma Universitária suggested immediate shortcomings and 
demonstrated that reforms to the Reforma were already needed. Additionally, in 
an effort to increase a sense of patriotism and to co-opt students into the military’s 
imagined community of the Brazilian nation, the government began to require 
university students to take courses in “Moral and Civic Education.”36 The 
government also published a series of decrees and laws between 1969 and 1972, 
establishing physical education in the universities to “stimulate students”37 and to 
create a more vigorous and robust student body that would better represent 
Brazilian development.38
                                                                                                                                                 
35  CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photos 1124-1148, “Despacho com o Senhor 
Presidente da República em 25 de Abril” and Photos 1484-1487, “Despecho com o Senhor 
Presidente da República em 4 de março de 1975.” 
 Indeed, the new Federal University of Alagoas had 
20,000 square meters dedicated to sporting facilities, while the philosophy 
department had only 15,000 square meters and the medical school, 18,000 square 
 
36  COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC Caixa 1, M.2, “Ministério da Educação e Cultura – 
Secretária de Apoio – Coordenação de Órgãos Regionais – Delegacia Regional do Rio de Janeiro 
– DR-3,” p. 28. 
 
37  CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photos 1327-1354, “Despacho com o Senhor 
Presidente da República em 12 de novembro de 1974.” 
 
38  See: COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.3, “DAU – COMCRETIDE 
Protocolo 0240/73/BSB,” 2 April 1973, n. pag.; COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, 
M.3, “Relatório Anual – 1972,” p. 10; COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, 
“Diretrizes para a Elaboração de um Plano Setorial, 1975/79, MEC – 1 November 1973,” p. 21; 
COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC Caixa 1, M.2,  “Ministério da Educação e Cultura – Secretária 
de Apoio – Coordenação de Órgãos Regionais – Delegacia Regional do Rio de Janeiro – DR-3,” 
p. 28; and COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.4, “FNDE – Dotação.” FNDE, M.4, MEC, COREG. 
For concern in the 1960s over the lack of physical education in schools from the pro-government 
private sectors, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sobre a reforma da 
educação – IPES,” p. 9. 
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meters.39 While the connection between physical health of students and the health 
of the nation was nothing new among political elites in Brazil,40
Collectively, these policies marked a significant shift in higher education 
in Brazil. For the first time, the military dictatorship was implementing broad 
changes and transformations within the university system, increasing its size, 
reorganizing its structure, and shifting the emphasis away from traditional fields 
like law and literature towards more “modern” fields in the sciences. Instead of 
the piecemeal reforms and empty speeches of the 1960s, by the 1970s that the 
government was actually backing up rhetoric with policies that sought to improve 
Brazil’s economy, reduce political turmoil, further development, and even 
transform the physical bodies of Brazilian students.  
 these efforts 
marked the first time that a Brazilian government extended such concerns into the 
realm of higher education.  
The economic success of Brazil’s “economic miracle” of 1969-1974, 
when the country’s growth averaged ten percent per year, led to broad support for 
the regime, with Médici’s approval ratings exceeding 70 percent.41
                                                 
 
 The 1970 
World Cup victory, Brazil’s third, only solidified the sense that Brazil had finally 
begun to meet its full potential. However, trouble was already brewing on 
39  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 114, “MEC – Universidade Federal de 
Alagoas,” p. 9. 
 
40  See Jerry Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social Policy in Brazil, 1917-1945, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
 
41  Costa Couto, Hisória indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura, pp. 115-116 While radical 
efforts to overthrow the regime continued, most notably in the guerrilla war in the Araguaia river 
valley, most Brazilians were satisfied with the growth, and a 1970 World Cup victory only 
strengthened the regime’s popularity. See As eventual president Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva 
himself put it, had there been a democratic election, Médici would have won in a landslide. See 
Costa Couto, Memória Viva do Regime Militar, pp. 250-251. 
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multiple fronts. Although Médici publicly boasted of the universities’ 
expansion,42 just one year later officials in Geisel’s administration complained 
behind closed doors that the this expansion, particularly as it regarded private 
schools, had happened so quickly that the military government was rapidly losing 
its ability to accredit and approve private schools.43 Certainly, this concern may 
have stemmed in part from Geisel’s broader tendencies to micromanage.44 Unlike 
its predecessors, Geisel’s administration wanted to administer nearly all aspects of 
education, from materials available for research and scientific studies of education 
in Brazil to even greater control over the programs in schools, the number of 
scholarships available, and systematization of the Brazilian education from top to 
bottom.45 Yet his concerns were not without basis. The rapid expansion of private 
schools was further diluting the qualtiy of professors, as many who were teaching 
at this time did not have a doctorate or even a graduate degree. In 1975, students 
at the PUC in Rio de Janeiro published an article on the problems facing Brazilian 
universities, highlighting the plight of Brazilian professors, of which only eight 
percent had a masters’ degree and nine percent a doctorate, while 61 percent only 
had a bachelors’ degree.46
                                                 
 
  
42  Emílio Garrastazu Médici, 1973 message to congress, in Câmara dos Deputados – 
Diretoria Legislativa, Mensagens Presidenciais, 1965-1979, (Brasília: Centro de Documentação e 
Informação, Coordenação de Publicações, 1979), pp. 150-151. 
 
43  CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photo 1298, “Despacho com o Senhor Presidente da 
República em 17 de setembro de 1974.” 
 
44  For the portrayal of Geisel as a micro-manager, see Skidmore, Military Politics in Brazil. 
 
45  II Plano Setorial, 43. 
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In spite of complaints that schools were expanding too quickly, the 
expansion could not keep up with the demand as more people turned to private 
and public universities to either fulfill the material expectations of their middle-
class backgrounds or, in the case of the lower-middle and working classes, to seek 
social mobility for their children. Unsurprisingly, the issue was particularly 
pressing in areas that the government had been pushing. Thus, although the 
military had increased the number of positions in universities significantly, in 
1975 students complained that there were still 160,000 more engineering 
candidates than there were positions in the university system even after the 
government’s emphasis and expansion of engineering programs.47 In 1977, 4537 
people applied for 500 positions at an isolated (and not particularly renowned) 
engineering college in Mauá, Rio de Janeiro. Even though roughly 1250 people 
did not pass the entrance exam, that still left 3286 candidates for those 500 
positions.48
Moreover, near the end of the 1970s, the job market itself was becoming 
increasingly glutted with university graduates, and many who finished in fields 
like medicine or education were having a hard time finding jobs.
  
49
                                                                                                                                                 
46  The other 22 percent had only “cursos de aperfeiçoamento,” or professional training 
courses that went beyond a bachelors but did not terminate with a degree. APERJ, Coleção DOPS, 
Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 051 – 27 June 1975. 
 As one 
commentator pointedly observed, “the social pressure for enrollment in the 
 
47  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, “As queixas contra o ensino,” 
Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, 22 August 1975. 
 
48  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPS-MEC Caixa 10, M.6,  “Relatório Concurso Vestibular da 
Escola de Engenharia Mauá – 1977,” n. pag. 
 
49  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Encaminhamento No. 088/79/DSI/MJ – “Jornal 
‘Em Tempo’.” 
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University does not correspond […] to the job market.”50 The military 
government was unquestionably a major factor in this social pressure, having 
called for universities to provide more “human resources” since the 1960s. Yet 
the system expanded beyond Brazilian society’s capacity to employ these 
university graduates. This led to increased social unrest and protest on the part of 
those whom the dictatorship had encouraged to seek higher education but who 
could not find jobs upon graduating.51
Professional dissatisfaction also spread among faculty. Prior to the 1970s, 
university professors had not been a unified group when it came to defending 
their interests. However, throughout that decade, they became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the problems that directly resulted from the dictatorship’s 
Reforma Universitária. The Reforma Universitária itself was near-sighted. While 
it focused heavily on increasing the number of students and the size of campuses 
in Brazil’s higher education system, it did not expand the number of faculty 
accordingly. In some departments, the number of professors actually declined in 
the immediate post-Reforma context.
 
52
                                                 
 
 Purging the universities while expanding 
the number of students only aggravated what was literally a growing problem. As 
50  CPDOC, EUG pi Hermeto, R. 1978.10.00, Roberto Hermeto Corrêa da Costa, 
“Habilitações Básicas – Seminário para o Ensino Particular,” October 1978, p. 3. 
 
51  See Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
52  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.6, “Appendix 1 – Model for the 
implementation of a national postgraduate progrmam in engineering, for Brazil – January 1971,” 
p. I.7. The report tries to deflect the gross disparity between the number of professors in the 1960s 
and 1970s by pointing out that the counting methodology shifted in 1969, and “only the 
engineering professors teaching in the professional cycle are taken into account,” yet this does 
nothing to explain why there is such a major drop from 1969 to 1971. 
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a result, the quality of education declined enough that students would once again 
raise the banner of terrible education within the university system.53
It did not take long for the military government to experience backlash 
from the unintended consequences of professorial purges and an emphasis on 
expanding the student body while neglecting the faculty. As early as October 
1969, the director of the Faculdade de Letras at UFRJ asked the Ministry of 
Education for an increase in funding to pay for faculty, where the student 
population had jumped from 300 in January 1968 to 1200 in 1969.
 
54  In 1973, a 
similar letter from the President of the Federation of Federal Isolated Schools in 
Guanabara asked for emergency aid to provide more lab monitors and assistants 
for the Biomedical Institute because the current number of faculty could not 
satisfy the number of classes the schools offered or the number of students 
enrolled.55  Throughout Brazil, the rate of growth for students between 1965 and 
1970 was 173 percent, while the number of professors only increased by 63 
percent in the same period.  In 1964 the student-professor ratio was 4.72:1; by 
1971 students’ numbers had nearly quadrupled, while professors’ numbers barely 
doubled, leaving a student-professor ratio of 9.19:1 (although by today’s 
standards, these ratios are quite low).56
                                                 
 
 Schools scrambled to employ qualified 
53  See Chapter 5. 
 
54  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.1, “Protocolo 665119, MEC-DESu-
Serviço Auxiliar,” 3 October 1969. 
 
55  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.3, “DAU-COMCRETIDE Protocolo 
0240/73/BSB,” 2 April 1973. 
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professors. In one extreme case, one professor was teaching at seven different 
institutions simultaneously.57
The salaries of professors remained low enough that many who could gain 
better-paying work in the private sector, particularly in fields like engineering, did 
so. This situation left the university system even more depleted. Many faculty 
who remained in the schools were underprepared or under-educated. Professors’ 
lack of training did not escape the notice of students (or of the police apparatuses 
monitoring them).  Overstretched and underpaid, professors became increasingly 
dissatisfied as a class, and by the end of the decade, they began rallying around 
their shared professional intetests. In 1978, private college and university 
professors in Rio de Janeiro mobilized over the “grave” isssue of salaries, 
“destabilizing” private education throughout the country and leading students to 
ask the Minister of Educaction, Ney Braga, to act on their behalf.
  
58  With inflation 
rapidly increasing, university professors who were already stretched thin and 
underpaid began to organize in new ways, and their discontent would play an 
important role in anti-dictatorship sentiment after 1979.59
 By Geisel’s inauguration in March 1974, it had become apparent that yet 
another major overhaul of the university system was needed in order to address 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
56  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Reltório Anual – 1972,” n. pag. The 
total numbers were 30,162 professors and 142,386 students in 1964, and 61,111 professors and 
561,397 students in 1971. 
 
57  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.6, “Appendix 1 – Model for the 
implementation of a national postgraduate program in engineering in Brazil – January 1971,” p. 
I.9. 
 
58  NL d 78.10.17, CPDOC. 
 
59  See Chapter 6. 
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these problems. Hoping again to solve the universities’ problems in one 
comprehensive law, the Geisel administration issued its National Post-Graduate 
Plan (Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, PNPG). Proclaiming “a new phase of 
the university system,” the PNPG sought to increase and improve post-graduate 
opportunities in Brazil in order “to train […] researchers, university professors, 
and professionals.”60 However, it was also clear that the PNPG aimed to fix the 
problems that had arisen out of 1968’s reform. It hoped that the emphasis on 
professors would lead to an improvement in the quality of higher education in 
Brazil.61 Indeed, the PNPG’s “fundamental objective” was “to transform the 
universities into true centers of permanent, creative activities.”62 Although 
professorial salaries were not explicitly mentioned, the PNPG did seek to 
“stabilize” the “financial, economic, and organizational rationale of the 
university” in all of its functions.63 Building on the rhetoric of the 1960s, it again 
reiterated the value of the sciences to national develompent. Although the 
administration paid attention to all levels of education, from primary school 
through post-graduate work, the university system received particular attention.64
                                                 
 
 
60  Ministério da Educação – Conselho Nacional de Pós-Graduação,Plano Nacional de Pós-
Graduação, (Brasília: Departamento de Documentação e Divulgação, 1975),  p. 12. See also 
CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photos 1278-1279, “Despacho com o Senhor Presidente da 
República em 3 de setembro 1974.” 
 
61  Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 17. 
 
62  Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 17. 
 
63  Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, pp. 20, 26. 
 
64 For analysis and statistical data that demonstrate how Geisel’s administration 
focused upon and to some degrees improved education throughout Brazil, 
including attendance to primary and secondary schools, adult literacy, special 
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Geisel placed universities, particularly those with graduate programs, at the center 
of Brazil’s “social and economic development.”65 It tried to create new incentives 
for professors and students finishing their Masters’ or Doctoral degrees to remain 
in the university system, rather than turning to the private sector.66
In spite of the PNPG’s attempts to address the growing problems 
stemming from the 1968 Reform, unrest on campuses became increasingly 
present as the decade progressed. A simple look at Geisel’s weekly meetings with 
his Minister of Education, Ney Braga, demonstrates how quickly things had 
shifted within the student body. In the first few years of the Geisel administration, 
student movements were mentioned fleetingly; yet as the decade progressed, 
student discontent became an increasingly common theme in these weekly 
meetings.
 Together, 
these goals implicitly suggested that the Reforma Universitária of 1968 had 
failed. 
67 Certainly, these mobilizations increased in part due to ongoing abuses 
on the part of the dictatorship, beginning with the murder of journalist Vladimir 
Herzog while in police custody in 1975.68
                                                                                                                                                 
education, and university infrastructure, see Instituto de Planejamento Econômico 
e Social – IPEA, Realizações do Governo Geisel (1974-78): II – A Concepção e 
Execução da Estratégia Social (Brasília: 1979), pp. 7-96. 
 But students also reiterated the 
perennial complaints about excessive fees, bad food, and poor job prospects upon 
 
65  Quote from Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 30.  See also pp. 31-33. 
 
66  Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, pp. 13, 25. 
 
67  For example, see CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 2, Photos 001-616. 
 
68  For a detailed account of Herzog’s background, his death, and the public’s response, see 
Fernando Jordão, Dossiê Herzog: prisão, tortura e morte no Brasil, (São Paulo: Global Editora, 
1979). See also Gaspari, A Ditadura Encurralada, pp. 159-187. 
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graduation.69 Likewise, professors’ salaries declined in value in the face of 
inflation as Brazil’s “economic miracle” came to a grinding halt in the latter half 
of the decade.70
The Cornerstone of the Future: The Military’s Vision of Middle Class Labor 
and Development 
  Although the PNPG was able to improve the educational levels 
of research and expand post-graduate research, it could not expand the number of 
jobs available to graduating students. 
The military’s educational policies were at best a mixed success as the 
1970s came to a close. Policies focused on short-term progress proved inadequate 
in the face of economic decline and growing political turmoil in the armed forces 
and Brazilian society more generally.71
                                                 
 
 Yet these policies represented more than a 
shift from rhetoric to action. By expanding the university system in the name of 
69  Other issues included the slow implementation of the department system, as outlined in 
the Reforma Universitária and the increasing fees. For more on how students’ demands shifted in 
the 1970s, see Chapter 5. 
 
70  Inflation between 1974-78 was 37.9 percent on average, compared to the 19.3 percent 
average between 1968 and 1973. What is more, inflation  increased more rapidly towards the end 
of the Geisel administration, reaching 38.8 percent in 1977 and 40.8 percent. As Thomas 
Skidmore points out, inflation is not the only way to measure a country’s economy, and the GDP 
grew during Geisel’s administration, though it slowed down towards the end of his term. Brazil’s 
foreign debt also rapidly inflated to 43.5 billion in 1978, “more than double the level of only three 
years earlier.” Thus, while the economy seemed to be still healthy on the exterior, cracks were 
beginning to emerge; the inflation rate for 1979 hit 77 percent, and by 1980, inflation would hit a 
then-record high of 110 percent. See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 206-
207, 214, and 230. The economic troubles that began to bubble to the surface during the Geisel 
years would continue to destabilize Brazil’s economy throughout the 1980s and well into the 
1990s. Comparing 1980 to 1995, inflation in Brazil was an astronomical 20,759,903,275,651 
percent, and in cities like São Paulo, inflation rose to 2703 percent. The fifteen-year inflation rate 
comes from Gustavo H. B. Franco, “Auge e Declínio do Inflacionismo no Brasil,” in Fabio 
Giambiagi, André Villela, Lavínia Barros de Castro and Jennifer Hermann, eds., Economia 
Brasileira Contemporânea (1945-2004), (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier Editora Ltda., 2005), pp. 258-
283. Data on São Paulo comes from Maureen O’Dougherty, Consumption Intensified, p. 63. 
 
71  In October 1977, Geisel had to move quickly agains his Minister of the Army, Sílvio 
Frota, a hard-liner who Geisel suspected of trying to launch another “coup within the coup” in the 
vein of Costa e Silva. See Gaspari, A ditadura Encurralada. For his side of the story, see Frota, 
Ideais Traídos. 
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national development, the military government played a major, if often unseen, 
role in shaping the still-malleable middle-class identity. Its focus on white-collar 
labor not only provided more opportunities for the middle class to gain a 
university degree, thereby strengthening the bond between identity and education; 
it also emphasized the centrality of the middle-class to improving all of Brazil. In 
this way, the dictatorship itself was strengthening the growing social, political, 
and economic importance of the middle class in Brazilian society. 
By its very nature, university enrollment in Brazil was the domain of the 
middle sectors of society.72 Given the scant number of wealthy in Brazil, and the 
numerous obstacles facing the poor, middle-class students were in the majority. 
While statistical data directly linking income levels to university attendance is not 
available, the rarity with which Brazilians received university education is clear. 
In Brazil’s largest urban centers, only a small number of citizens completed 
university education, ranging in 1970 from just 2.1 percent in Belém to 4.0 
percent in Curitiba, while Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 3.8 percent and 3.0 
percent of the total urban populations over the age of 25 respectively had 
completed university education. 73 Students themselves admitted to their middle-
class background,74
                                                 
 
 and structural obstacles, including the need to finish high 
72  Owensby, Intimate Ironies, pp. 88-91. 
 
73  For statistics, see Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísitca (herein IGBE), 
Vol. 37, 1976, “Tabela extraída de: Anuário estaístico do Brasil 1976. Rio de Janeiro.”  
 
74  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, interviews with Arthur José Poerner, p. 5; Daniel Aarão 
Reis, p. 19; and Franklin Martins, p. 11. Very few former student leaders self-identified as coming 
from poorer families, and most leaders’ parents exercised roles in white-collar professions like 
chemical engineering, law, and politics. For two exceptions, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, 
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school and, increasingly, take private cursinhos to pass the entrance exams, 
virtually eliminated many of the still-illiterate poor from university education. 
The military’s desire to expand university education and bring universities into 
poor areas where residents were lacking education just strengthened the 
understanding of university education as essentially a middle-class enterprise. As 
Maria Fávero pointed out, in spite of their best efforts, many radical students in 
the 1960s could not escape their financial and cultural backgrounds, and although 
they rebelled against the “status quo,” they also acted as “agent[s] of their 
class.”75 This trend continued into the 1970s. A study in São Paulo found that a 
majority of the state’s university students were from the middle class.76 Even at 
one of the  lower-ranked federal universities, a majority of students admitted in 
1975 came from families with a middle-class income.77
Perhaps one of the best examples of how these policies directly brought 
middle-class labor, politics, and culture into all of Brazilian society were the 
Rural University Centers for Training and Community Action (CRUTACs). The 
 Thus, when the military 
government placed university-trained professionals at the center of its vision of 
national development, it gave the middle class a central role in this process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
published interviews with José Dirceu and José Genoíno. See also, personal interviews with S.C., 
10 September 2007; F.G., 10 September 2007; and R.A.P., 26 December 2007. 
 
75  Fávero, A UNE em tempos de autoritarismo, pp. 16-17. 
 
76  COREG, Coleção MEC, Gabinete do Ministério Caixa 1, M.3, Aparecida Joly Gouveia, 
“Democratização do Ensino Superior,” pp. 235-239. 
 
77  These numbers are for the Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), in Minas Gerais, 
where 61 percent of the students came from the middle income brackets. See COREG, Coleção 
MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.15, “Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto – Vestibular, Julho 1975,” 
p. 13. For UFOP’s low ranking, see COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.6, “Relatório 
do Grupo de Trabalho DAU/PREMESU – Sept./Nov. 1974,” p. 8. Of the 29 Federal universities, 
UFOP finished in 25th in one ranking and 29th in the other, with the disparity due to differing 
parameters of evaluation. 
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government established eight Centers across six states, all in the poor North and 
Northeast.78 Reaching a total of over 1.2 million residents in these areas, the 
CRUTACS offered services that included training over 10,000 university students 
to go out to rural areas to administer medical and other social and cultural services 
to the rural poor. Through the CRUTACs, the Ministry of Education was 
addressing the “need for an effective position of the Universities in the process of 
national development,” and the rural Northeast was to be a major front in that 
process. Thus, the CRUTACs fulfilled the “social mission” that the government 
tried to instill in universities.79
Although the CRUTACs were designed to uplift Brazil’s poorer regions, it 
was not difficult to see that the program still hinged on the white-collar 
professionals of the present and the future. By and large, the program trained 
university students and professors, not rural residents who could not attend 
university and who often were illiterate. This training was to provide the 
university students with a transformative role in Brazilian development, even 
while the rural poor were to passively accept these services. The military 
government, perhaps still fearing association with the Vargas administration,
 
80 
denied that its practices were paternalistic.81
                                                 
 
 Yet by bestowing university-trained 
78  The states were Rio Grande do Norte, Maranhão, Pernambuco, Ceará, Sergipe, and 
Alagoas. Rio Grande do Norte and Pernambuco had two CRUTACs each. 
 
79  COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.1, “Programa de Ação para os CRUTACs em 1976,” 
p. 1. 
 
80  For example, see Castelo Branco, Discursos, p. 113. 
 
81  COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.1, “Programa de Ação para os CRUTACs em 1976,” 
p. 2.  
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students and professionals with the ability “to elevate the socio-economic and 
cultural structures of the region,” it was clear that the government perceived the 
CRUTACs and their middle-class acolytes as top-down forms of aid that left little 
room for rural citizens to influence and shape the programs. 
The CRUTACs may have been helpful to the military government in more 
ways than one. Beginning in 1969, a handful of leftists gathered in the Araguaia 
river valley, near where the states of Pará, Goiás, and Maranhão met.82 These 
guerrillas, mostly members of the Maoist Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), 
tried to launch a guerrilla war, drawing on the tenents of foquismo, in the hopes of 
fomenting rural unrest and overthrowing the dictatorship.83 In 1966, a handful of 
laborers had attempted a similar war in the Minas Gerais/São Paulo border region. 
Both efforts at guerrilla war failed: Araguaia, due to the military’s intense 
campaign of repression and “disappearing” victims, and Caparaó, due to generally 
poor organization on the part of the would-be rebels.84
                                                 
 
 In both cases, however, the 
guerrillas sought to gain the support of the local population, generally poor rural 
laborers, in the hopes that they could spur the people to rise up against the 
military. Given that the dictatorship had viewed its educational policy as a 
possible means to undermine student activism, it also seems probable here that 
82  The region is now in the state of Tocantins. However, Tocantins was a part of the state of 
Goiás until 1988, when Tocantins gained autonomy and became the 27th and newest state in 
Brazil. 
 
83  For more on the guerrilla war in Araguaia, see Fernando Portela, Guerra de Guerrilhas 
no Brasil: A saga do Araguaia, (São Paulo: Editora Terceiro Nome, 2002), and Gaspari, A 
Ditadura Escanarada, (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 399-464. 
 
84  See José Caldas da Costa, Caparaó: a primeira guerrilha contra a ditadura, (São Paulo: 
Boitempo Editorial, 2007). 
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extending the state’s presence into rural areas by improving the infrastructure of 
rural areas provided rural residents with material reasons to support (or at least 
not oppose) the military government. Additionally, the CRUTACS provided state-
led paths for students to help the poor in Brazil without resorting to leftist political 
movements. Indeed, when the government probed students’ responses to the 
program, it found that students found the CRUTACs to be “good” and that there 
was “great receptivity” to participation in the program.85 What is more, the 
government established all but one of the CRUTACs while the Araguaia guerrilla 
war was taking place.86
University students also approached the poor in favelas, or urban slums, as 
graduate education expanded. The proximity of many universities to favelas 
faciliated research about them, and the number of studies on favelas (and favelas 
studied) ballooned in the 1970s. These university-based studies helped Brazilians 
learn more about the social, cultural, and economic conditions in the favelas, and 
many of the university students and professors who studied the favelas joined 
NGOs and helped forge social policy. 
 While the CRUTACs fit within the broader goal of 
addressing regional inequalities, it probably did not hurt to establish a stronger 
government presence in the regions specifically targeted by leftist guerrillas. 
87
                                                 
 
 University reform also directly helped 
85  COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.1, Programa de Ação para os CRUTACs em 1976,” p. 
2. 
 
86  The exception was one of the two CRUTACs in Rio Grande do Norte. 
 
87  See Licia do Prado Valladares, A invenção da favela: Do mito de origem a favela.com, 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005), Ch. 3. Rather than providing an 
ethnography of favelas per se, Valladares’ work instead traces the ways favelas have occupied 
space in the intellectual and research community in Brazil throughout the twentieth century, 
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non-academic communities by etablishing and expanding university hospitals on 
campuses in the 1970s and providing health care to nearby communities.88 When 
Geisel came into office, he pushed programs that focused on the “Integration of 
Universities into Communities” in order to bridge the gap between Brazil’s 
richest and poorest, a gap that had rapidly grown during the military dictatorship. 
While the government focused on these efforts to address the income gap in 
Brazil, economic inequality in Brazil actually grew during the military 
dictatorship. In 1970, the richest 10 percent of the country made 18.6 times the 
income of the poorest 40 percent, and by 1980, that number had risen to 19.7 
times.89
Although the personalities, governing styles, and ideologies of the hands-
off hardliner Médici and the micromanaging moderate Geisel could not have been 
more different, the policies that they put into effect in the 1970s were clearly 
designed with the intent that universities transform Brazilian society at all levels, 
be it through the CRUTACS, hospitals, or other programs. In each of these cases, 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
including tracing the ways that these studies helped formulate governmental policy, particularly in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
88  For example, see COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.1, “Informação No. 
/76GSS/DAU/BSB,” 24 May 1976. 
 
89  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Annual – 1972,” p. 15. See 
also COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 4, M.1, “Estimativa de Dispendios 
Governamentais – Projetos Prioritários, 1974-79,” p. 1. Another way economists measure income 
inequality is through the Gini coefficient. Taking in a number of factors relating to income, the 
Gini coefficient is measured on a scale of zero to one; zero would represent a society with 
completely equal incomes across the board. The closer to the number one that a Gini coefficient 
approaches, the more inequal the income distribution. In 1960, Brazil’s Gini coefficient sat at .50; 
by 1970, it had risen to .57, and was .59 in 1980, indicating an exaggerated gap in income levels 
that only intensified during military dictatorship.  See Lauro Ramos and Rosane Mendonça, 
“Pobreza e Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil,” in Fabio Giambiagi, André Villela, Lavínia Barros 
de Castro and Jennifer Hermann, eds., Economia Brasileira Contemporânea (1945-2004), (Rio de 
Janeiro: Elsevier Editora Ltda., 2005), pp. 355-377. 
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the visions of development hinged upon middle-class involvement. The expansion 
of the university system was a part of this vision. The new policies and 
educational reforms of the 1970s transformed white-collar technicians and 
professionals into catalyzing agents who would make Brazil a more equitable and 
technologically capable nation. 
With these reforms, the military claimed it was “democratizing” Brazil by 
improving the living conditions for all.90 Yet despite the emphasis on the poor 
areas, and especially the North and the Northeast, the policies of the 1970s were 
also contradictory. Even while promoting programs like the CRUTACS or the 
Educational Credit program, designed to help poor students better afford a 
university education,91 the military’s educational focus often ended up reinforcing 
the strength of universities in the South and Southeast, which  had graduate 
programs in place since the 1950s.92
                                                 
 
 Thus, much of the funding that the 
government spent on improving Brazil’s university system went to the parts of the 
country that were already richest. This was particularly the case during Geisel’s 
administration, when graduate schools gained an even greater importance to 
visions of national development. Yet even under Médici, the imbalance was clear. 
In 1971, CAPES provided 27 universities and institutes with small grants 
exceeding Cr$50,000 for infrastructure, faculty, and books; all but four of the 
90  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Diretrizes para a elaboração do 
Plano Setorial 1975/79 – MEC, 1 November 1973,” p. 9. See also COREG, Coleção MEC, 
Gabinete do Ministério Caixa 2, M.4, “Parte E – Política Educacional e Cultural (Minuta),” p. 4. 
 
91  See, for example, CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Rolls 1 and 2. 
 
92  AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 298, “Tipologia dos Estados Brasileiros – 
Uma análise das desigualdades (Ministério de Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, Instituto de 
Planejamento Econômico e Social – IPEA),” pp. 6-7. 
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schools that received funding were in states located in the South and Southeast.93 
Of the five major graduate centers that Médici’s Ministry of Education planned, 
four were in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul; 
only the Federal University in Pernambuco was outside of the economic center of 
the country.94 MEC identified the Federal Universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, 
Espírito Santo, Pará, and Sergipe as having the “most intense” needs. 95 And in a 
ranking of the 29 federal universities, six of the top ten were in four southern and 
southeastern states, while 7 of the bottom 10 were in the North and Northeast.96
This is not to say that the military completely ignored the schools in the 
North and Northeast. Yet even when the Department of University Subjects 
(DAU) launched a program to aid federal universities in rural Minas Gerais, 
Bahia, Amazonas, and Mato Grosso, it used more privileged schools in Santa 
Catarina and São Paulo to provide the models.
 
97
                                                 
 
 Institutionally, the military 
government was again exporting urban and middle class systems and models to 
the Northeast, in order to address educational and professional inequalities.  The 
93  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.7, “MEC-CAPES – Programa de 
Auxílios a Centros e Cursos de Pós-Graduação – Relatórios dos coordenadores de Cursos – 1972.” 
The four schools outside of the South/Southeast that received aid were the Federal Universities in 
Bahia, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Brasília. The other 23 schools were in Rio de Janeiro, 
Guanabara, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná, historically 
the wealthiest states in Brazil. 
 
94  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Annual – 1972,” January 
1973, p. 11. 
 
95  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Annual – 1972,” January 
1973, p. 12. 
 
96  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.6, “Relatório do Grupo de Trabalho 
DAU/PREMESU – Sept./Nov. 1974,” p. 8. 
 
97  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Programa de Assistência Inter-
Universitária de Ensino de Engenharia – PRAENGE.” 
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military dictatorship was effectively exporting the standard of an urban middle 
class as the paradigm for “development” in traditionally poor, rural parts of the 
country. 
 This was not the only contradiction that arose out of the dictatorship’s 
claims of “democratizing” the country (to say nothing of the contradiction of a 
military regime that randomly stripped citizens of their political rights and closed 
Congress while claiming to be “democratic”). Whether it was through its 
expansion of the university system, increased scholarships, or programs like the 
CRUTACs, the military proclaimed that it was making higher education in Brazil 
genuinely “democratic,” rather than the playground of the wealthy and upper-
middle classes.98 The military government defended the use of fees and the rapid 
expansion of the university system by saying these programs would allow for 
programs like the Educational Credit, ensuring that the poorer sectors of Brazil 
have “not only access to education, but to the benefits of it.”99  However, full 
access to the university system remained elusive. In order to enter university, 
candidates had to fulfill numerous requirements that included a high school 
diploma or its equivalent, something beyond the economic reach of most poor 
families.100
                                                 
 
  
98  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Diretrizes para elaboração do Plano 
Setorial 1975/1979 – MEC,” 1 November 1973, pp. 13-14. 
 
99  COREG, Coleção MEC, Gabinete do Ministério Caixa 2, M.4, “Parte E – Política 
Educacional e Cultural (Minuta),” p. 4. 
 
100  COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC Caixa 1, M.2, “Ministério da Educação e Cultura – 
Secretária de Apoio – Coordenação de Órgãos Regionais – Delegacia Regional do Rio de 
Janeiro,” 26 August 1976, pp. 38-39. 
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Facing these limitations, the poorer sectors turned towards traditional 
patronage networks to gain favor and further their children’s social mobility. 
Scholars have tended to associate patronage with 19th- and early-20th century 
politics,101 while 20th-century patronage politics remain understudied among 
historians.102 Certainly, the military’s stranglehold on the institutions of political 
power made patronage more difficult, but that did not stop civilians from trying to 
seek rewards from national politicians in return for political loyalty. Both the 
government and opposition politicians fielded requests for patronage, requests 
that sometimes revolved around the universities. Thus, while members of the 
middle class generally prided themselves on their non-involvement with 
patronage, believing that they had earned their status through their own hard 
work,103
                                                 
 
 it is clear that those in the lower-middle class or working class did not 
make such distinctions. If political connections and patronage could help them 
101  See Judy Bieber, Power, Patronage, and Political Violence: State Building on a 
Brazilian Frontier, 1822-1889, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), and Richard 
Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1990). 
 
102  Political sociologist Kurt von Mettenheim has provided a useful study on Brazilian 
electoral politics that looks in part at how patronage took on new forms in the 1970s and 1980s as 
Brazil returned to a democracy. See Kurt von Mettenheim, The Brazilian Voter: Democratic 
Transition 1974-1986, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), pp. 137-153. Regarding 
the earlier twentieth century, Brian Owensby’s work is one of the few historical studies that gets 
into how patronage functioned. See Brian P. Owensby, Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the 
Making of Middle-Class Lives in Brazil, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 82-87. 
However, historians have tended to overlook patronage politics in Brazil in the latter-half of the 
twentieth century. 
 
103  Owensby, Intimate Ironies, pp. 135-137, 180. As middle-class identity formed during the 
first half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the idea of a meritocracy free of political 
connections was appealing to many white-collar professionals. Yet even with the ideal of a 
meritocracy, the reality of Brazilian political and social life was not so clean-cut, and these white-
collar professionals still saw themselves turning to patronage when it suited their political, social, 
or material interests. See Owensby, Intimate Ironies, pp. 82-87, passim. 
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and their children further their station in life, they were more than willing to 
pursue them.104
A series of letters sent to Ernâni Amaral Peixoto, a senator from the 
opposition MDB during the 1970s, sheds light on how the economically 
disadvantaged tried to parlay patronage into access to university education, as 
well as revealing the material expectations and promises that came with a 
university education. Between 1971 and 1975, Peixoto received dozens of letters 
from his constituents, who sought federal scholarships for their children for 
primary, secondary, and university education. Usually, these pleas came from 
lower-middle class and working class families who could not afford their 
children’s education and who desperately sought aid so that they could complete 
their schooling and improve their social standing, particularly with regards to 
university education. The desperation in some of these letters was almost heart-
breaking, as in the case of a widow who was trying to get her four children 
through school, or the small-business owner who was forced to choose between 
paying for his eldest son’s medical schooling or his youngest son’s epilepsy 
treatments.
  
105
                                                 
 
 Many of these letters reveal people of modest means at the end of 
their rope, seeking aid from any political benefactor they could find in order to 
help their children benefit from the fruits of social mobility. 
104  This is not to say that middle-class families did not also pursue these options, even if they 
did rhetorically condemn patronage.  However, my own research did not find documents that 
adequately proved or disproved middle-class involvement in patronage networks during the 
dictatorship.  
 
105  CPDOC,  EAP 71.03.10, documents 9 and 20, respectively. 
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 Political patronage and networking motivated many of these requests. One 
letter-writer, Eduardo Ribeiro, said that his son had not won one of the admission 
openings at a faculdade in Teresópolis, and asked his “old and dear friend” 
Peixoto if he could help Ribeiro’s son gain entrance through some “jeitinho.”106 
Another woman asked Peixoto for a scholarship for her daughter to attend college 
in biological sciences, saying her father-in-law, a vice-president of the MDB, 
suggested the she ask Peixoto for help.107 Other letters also mentioned having 
voted for Peixoto regularly or being affiliated with the MDB when asking for 
financial aid, be it for colleges or high schools.108
When facing trouble within the university system, Brazilians also did not 
hesitate to turn towards the military government itself. The Ministry of Education 
and Culture received hundreds of requests seeking financial aid, help in 
navigating mundane bureaucratic roadblocks, or even the validation of their 
schooling or degrees. 
 While Peixoto did not help 
many of these people, the fact that they had turned to him for patronage 
nonetheless demonstrated how the government’s promise to increase access to 
universities had fallen well short. 
109
                                                 
 
 The outcome of these requests is unknown; nevertheless 
106  CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, document 10. The word jeitinho does not have a direct English 
translation. It generally implies the navigation of some political, social, or economic problem via 
one’s personal connections to navigate the complex legal or bureaucratic obstacles one confronts, 
generally by exploiting legal loopholes or taking advantage of a patron’s personal connections. 
For a simple definition and explanation of how the jeitinho generally works in practice, see 
Roberto da Matta, O que faz o brasil, Brasil?, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rocco Ltda, 1984), pp. 99-
101. 
 
107  CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, document 12. 
 
108  For example, see CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, documents 17, 25. 
 
109  COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC M.5, Untitled documents 
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everyday Brazilians continued to seek aid from agents within the government to 
complete their university education. 
Together, these appeals to Peixoto and to MEC itself reveal yet another 
contradiction within the military’s educational policy. By expanding the 
university system, more people hoped to gain access to the schools; yet 
“democratization” of education did not translate into greater affordability for the 
mass of the population. The public federal schools, the gem of the higher 
education system, were a shrinking proportion of the overall university 
educational system, and entrance typically depended upon attending a private 
high school and taking expensive courses to pass the entrance exams. The 
expansion of private universities did make it more possible for the poorer students 
to still attend university, but tuition at these schools cost much more than the 
federal schools, where students only had to pay fees. Thus, in spite of the 
government’s claims that education was more available to all Brazilians, the 
lower-middle and working classes found themselves facing greater economic 
obstacles than their wealthier counterparts, particularly as the economy worsened 
in the latter half of the 1970s.  Turning towards politicians in positions of 
authority, therefore, was a reasonable step for the poor. For lower-class parents 
who aspired to send their children to university and witness the material gains that 
came from such an education, patronage had not died with the Brazilian empire or 
the Vargas administration,110
                                                 
 
 but was still alive and well in the late-20th century. 
The willingness to plead with politicians and the state bureaucracy so that their 
110  See Wolfe, Working Men, Working Women, and Levine, Father of the Poor?, for 
analyses of patronage during the Estado Novo. 
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children could attend school indicated just how strongly the ties between social 
mobility and a university education had become during the years of the military 
regime. 
Conclusion 
 With the Reforma Universitária, the military regime put rhetoric into 
action. For the next ten years, the military governments of Costa e Silva, Médici, 
and Geisel launched programs that reorganized, restructured, and redesigned the 
university system and its role in society. They hoped for campuses that were 
neither hotbeds of activism nor isolated ivory towers separated from national 
development. These policies envisioned a new Brazil in which university 
education was open to all and brought national renovation. Universities would 
provide new engineers, doctors, scientists, and architects, and their expansion into  
rural and poor areas would contribute to a “democratized” system that would 
create more white-collar professionals.111
 As is often the case, however, the theory of how these reforms would play 
out diverged from the realities. Military leaders expected these reforms to solve 
 Within this vision, both the the 
Brazilian nation and individual citizens would benefit: the former, through 
technological, scientific, and infrastructural improvements; the latter, through 
greater material expectations that came with white-collar professions. Thus, the 
state’s vision made universities the catalyst for both national and personal 
betterment. This emphasis gave that middle class a coherent social and political 
importance in governmental policy that it had never had before. 
                                                 
 
111  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Diretrizes para a elaboração do 
Plano Setorial 1975/79 – MEC, 1 November 1973,” p. 9. 
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Brazil’s educational and developmental problems, yet the expansion of 
universities left the schools inadequately staffed with unqualified professors, even 
while private education spiraled out of the government’s control. Likewise, the 
failure to include the faculty in the reforms led to professors growing increasingly 
intransigent as they faced growing burdens in the university system and 
decreasing material benefits in an inflationary economy. Similarly, expanding 
universities opened up educational and material expectations among the lower 
classes, even while the government’s claims for a social “democratization” were 
not accompanied by funding for the very groups it was encouraging to enroll. And 
the government’s push for certain professions in the sciences over the humanities 
and arts resulted in a saturated job market, leaving university graduates in fields 
like engineering and medicine with high material and professional expectations 
that went unsatisfied. As a result, criticisms that the government “not attended to 
the demands of the middle classes.”112
 Additionally, other reforms were by their very nature repressive and 
stifling to students. Laws like 477 and the creation of jubilação directly tried to 
suppress students’ voices on campuses. Although UNE had been effectively 
neutralized, by the mid-1970s the government was once again monitoring  student 
 Programs like the PNPG, itself an 
acknowledgment of the shortcomings of 1968’s Reforma, tried to address these 
issues, but by the late 1970s, the scenario was looking increasingly bleak. 
                                                 
 
112  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB – Seção de 
Buscas Especiais – Encaminhamento No. 049 – 23 de junho de 1975 – Assunto: Movimento 
Estudantil, Ref. – jornal “Jornal da Engenharia,” p. 9. 
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groups on campuses, constantly fearing another 1968113
The government’s concern with the rising voice of student movements 
was not unwarranted. Even while student organizations went underground or were 
declared “extinct,” students continued to respond to and influence state policies. 
Indeed, official organizations could disappear, but so long as there were students, 
they would continue to voice their own concerns about Brazil’s universities. 
Throughout the 1970s, they challenged the regime’s new reforms, adopting 
components of the reform while criticizing it for its failures in other regards. 
However, in the post-AI-5 context, UNE was no longer the best option to voice 
their complaints and demands. As the next chapter demonstrates, students would 
adjust to the post-1968 context by mobilizing in new ways and along issues both 
old and new.
 and reflecting the 
regime’s concern that, far from having been silenced or repressed, students were 
once again becoming a legitimate concern for the administration. 
                                                 
 
113  See, for example, Roll I, Photo 970, “Apreciação Sumária No 08/75 – 13 de outubro de 
1975 – Período de 10/17 Out 75;” Roll I, Photo 1005, “Apreciação Sumária No. 11/GAB/75 – 3 
de novembro de 1976 – Período de 24/31 Out 75;” Roll I, Photo 1649, “Informação para o Sr. 
Presidente – Agitação na Área Estudantil (Brasília, DF-6 Jun 77);” and Roll II, Photo 0039, 
“Síntese da Infáo 03/19/AC/78 – Movimento Estudantil – Retrospecto de 1977.” 
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Chapter Five: “There Isn’t a Process of Terror that Quiets the Voice of the 
Youth”1
From the standpoint of policy, university reform had only begun with 
1968’s Reforma Universitária. From 1969 to 1979, members of the Brazilian 
state, from the lowest levels of the educational bureaucracy to presidents Médici 
and Geisel, continued to refine and redefine the role of the university system in 
Brazil. The state under military rule continued to propagate its own visions of 
both development and “appropriate” student behavior in Brazil, drawing on the 
experiences of the 1960s to bolster a university system that addressed Brazil’s 
economic development as the military governments envisioned it while trying to 
depoliticize students. 
: New Demands, and New Visions from Students, 1972-1979 
 Yet students would not be silenced. Scholars have frequently commented 
on the “extinction” of UNE in the wake of 1968, as government crackdowns 
forced many students into hiding or exile and many more left the student 
movement to join guerrilla movements. In some regards, this narrative is accurate. 
As a national movement, UNE was in shambles by 1972, and many student 
leaders did abandon their studies and join guerrilla movements.2
                                                 
1  Minister of Education and Culture Jarbas Passarinho, quoted in an address to the House 
of Deputies.  Quoted in APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativas,  Opinião No. 52 (3-10 
November 1973), “O ministro no Congresso.” 
 However, this 
narrative has overlooked the ways in which students continued to be active on a 
 
2  See, for example, Gaspari, A Ditadura Escancarada; Langland,  “Speaking of Flowers,” 
pp. 163-168; Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 191-203; and the memories of those involved in 
the 1969 kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador Charles Elbrick in Silvio Da-Rin, Hercules 56: O 
seqüestro do embaixador americano em 1969 (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2008), pp. 287-
331.  While Araujo’s collection does point out that student activism did continue beyond the 
armed struggle, she offers few examples other than of UNE’s leadership trying to keep the 
movement going in the post-AI-5 context, relying only on the narratives of UNE leadership and 
focusing on the death of Alexander Vanucchi Leme in 1973; nowhere does the possibility of local 
struggles or the struggle for educational reform appear in her narrative. 
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smaller, more local scale as they adjusted to the new climate of political 
repression. Complaints about the university system did not disappear just because 
UNE temporarily faded away; nor did the absence of mass protests and 
mobilizations mean that students quit fighting for reforms in the university 
system. As the national student movements broke down in the wake of 1968, 
students continued to struggle for reforms within the educational system, as well 
as within Brazilian society more generally, directly (if anonymously) contesting 
the educational policies of Médici and Geisel.   
In their efforts, students challenged the state over issues both tactical and 
strategic. In the former, they sought broader political and social transformations, 
while the latter focused on specific needs that students confronted on campuses, 
such as underequipped libraries or outdated curricula. These approaches both set 
the stage for the issues that UNE would incorporate as it re-constituted itself at the 
end of the 1970s, while also struggling with the military government over the role 
the university should play in Brazilian development and democracy.   
Students did not simply employ these tactics and strategies in a vacuum. 
Their complaints and protests through the 1970s continued to respond to the 
military’s policies in a complex nexus of discursive struggle between students and 
the state under military rule. As had been the case in the 1960s both the military 
governments and students were aware of the others’ demands, actions, and 
rhetoric. Just as the Brazilian military continued to use the state to mold 
educational policy to visions of development and to prevent “another 1968,” 
students continued to challenge the state’s policies and the conditions at 
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individual universities, federal and private, throughout the country. In this regard, 
students were involved in a constant dialogue with state policies, adapting to and 
shaping the new political and educational landscape of the decade. As students in 
the 1970s expressed their concern over issues as diverse as torture, amnesty, 
campus restaurants, and high expulsion rates, they contested the state’s definitions 
of the universities’ roles and how democracy and economic development in Brazil 
functioned.  Students’ efforts in turn impacted and reshaped the military’s visions, 
influencing policies as much as state policies affected students’ concerns. This 
process could and did include coercion, in the form of arrests, torture, and even 
deaths of students, but it could also include limited consent, as when students 
framed their arguments with reference to some of the military government’s new 
educational policies in the 1970s while reshaping them to their own expectations 
and interests. In acknowledging some of the government’s reforms and rejecting 
others, students engaged in a “dialectic of culture”3  with technocrats, politicians, 
and the state under military rule in the 1970s.4
Thus, student resistance did not disappear in the wake of AI-5 only to re-
emerge with UNE at the end of the decade. It continued throughout the 1970s. 
 
                                                 
 
3  E.P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?” 
Social History 3:2 (1978): 133-165.  William Roseberry was rightly critical of the simple 
polarization inherent in Thompson’s original “field of force,” which, as Roseberry put it, “is 
bipolar, and most of the social situations with which we are familiar are  infinitely more complex.”  
In the case of Brazil, Roseberry’s critique is accurate; students were far too heterogeneous to 
completely oppose the state or its policies in the bipolar manner that Thompson suggested.  
However, the fact that various groups were struggling with the state over the cultural, social, and 
political role of universities, in a complex process that continued to influence and be influenced by 
state policy, makes Thompson’s understanding of a cultural dialectic germane. See William 
Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel 
Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in 
Modern Mexico, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 355-366. 
 
4  Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” p. 358. 
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Students throughout Brazil employed both old and new methods and 
organizations in their struggles. In the process, they moved from mobilization and 
resistance at the local level to develop regional and even national connections that 
allowed for unification and helped strengthen their case against the military 
regime and its educational policies. In so doing, students came to adjust their own 
understandings of democracy and development in Brazil in the post-1968 
educational landscape. In the process, they set the agenda for a re-emerging 
national student movement and other sectors of society for the final six years of 
the dictatorship and beyond. 
Resisting Repression on Campuses: Students, 477, and AI-5 in the 1970s 
 As the 1970s dawned, students tactically combated the repressive policies 
of the dictatorship in the universities and in Brazilian society more generally. In 
the wake of the authoritarian measures the military issued in the late-1960s and 
early-1970s, the question of repression in the universities was one of the most 
obvious issues that students confronted. If the Reforma Universitária had been 
slow in restructuring University departments, AI-5 was remarkably quick in 
transforming the political atmosphere on campuses around the country, giving the 
military an unprecedented amount of control over defining “subversive” activity 
and launching arrests, many of which occurred on  university campuses “in order 
to assure the end of mass student protest.”5
In many regards, Decreto-Lei 477, issued in February 1969, was even 
more odious to students than AI-5.  Whereas the intent of AI-5 was to combat the 
   
                                                 
 
5  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 132. 
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kinds of broad social and political unrest that intensified in 1968, Decreto-Lei 477 
specifically and solely targeted university campuses, outlawing any kind of 
“politicization” or “political” activity from students or faculty. Any students 
expelled under 477 were unable to enroll in universities for three years, and they 
were ineligible for publicly-funded scholarships for five years. Decreto-lei 477 
was as vital as the Reforma Universitária in the government’s efforts to redefine 
the role of universities as places that existed strictly for students to learn what was 
needed to prepare them professionally. Indeed, the Decreto-Lei was so notorious 
that simply mentioning the three numbers consecutively became a codeword for 
repressive policies at universities; when the alternative newspaper O Pasquim 
reached edition 477, rather than just including the edition number in the banner, it 
read “This is number (ARGH!) 477 – There is no way to avoid it.”6
Even as the military dictatorship declared UNE extinct in 1972, students 
were already beginning to publicly reconstitute their opposition to the military 
dictatorship, and 477 was one of the major sites of tactical mobilization. One of 
the earlier salvos came in an Opinião article surveying the landscape of higher 
education in Brazil in 1973. The author, Bernardo Mendonça, discussed the 
difficult situations students were facing in universities as 1973 began. He singled 
out 477 as a major source of universities’ woes, as it marked “the end of the 
prerogatives conceded to universities” by involving MEC in decisions relating to 
individual student bodies on campuses. Mendonça also decried the abuse of 477 
in universities with humor, saying that it was being applied not only “to contain 
  
                                                 
 
6   APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativos, O Pasquim No. 477, 18-24 August 1978. 
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political student activities, [but] against unusual crimes such as bad behavior in 
the classroom or fighting at recess.”7
If Mendonça’s article pointed to general criticisms of 477, an incident at 
the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) that year offered a more 
concrete example. In March, UFMG’s rector, Marcello de Vasconcellos Coelho, 
proposed to the school’s DCE that the university hold a series of debates based on 
the theme “The Reforma Universitária and Its Introduction.” Vasconcellos 
initially felt such a forum on the subject would interest not just students and the 
university’s administration, but the “Minister of Education himself, who wishes to 
better know the thinking of students.” The DCE agreed to participate based on the 
condition that everybody present would be free to express their opinions. Even 
though the students acknowledged that total freedom of opinion would be 
impossible due to the existence of 477, they were willing to go along with 
Vasconcellos’ plan. Ultimately, that plan was put to the test after Vasconcellos 
had two pamphlets that had been published around campus taken down, 
prompting students to ask whether the debates would be a “serious discussion or 
parody? Open discussion or [one] restricted to the rectory and the directory of the 
DCE? An important discussion or the most mild and convenient?”
 
8
                                                 
 
 Despite the 
veiled accusations from students outside of the DCE that Vasconcellos was trying 
to limit the conversation to the rectory and the DCE only, even the DCE was 
7  APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativos, “O ano da lei Newton depravada,” Opinião No. 
9 (1-8 January 1973), p. 7. 
 
8  APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativos, “Universidade: que é o debate proposto?” 
Opinião No. 23 (9-16 April 1973). 
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critical of 477 and the effect it might have on the debate.  These criticisms were 
well-founded given that Vasconcellos had already taken down the pamphlets and 
restricted the expression of opinions among students at UFMG before the debates 
could even begin 
In 1975, newspaper articles and pamphlets that circulated at the Second 
National Seminar of Engineering Students found their way into the police files. 
Among the articles was one pro-government statement that tried to 
simultaneously placate and ridicule students who disliked 477. The author 
declared that 477 “reflected much more the shift in students’ behavior than the 
magnanimity of the Minister [of Education]. But the simple existence of the 
decree startles students.” The article tried to defend the government by arguing 
that, in each case in which 477 had been applied, it was not “authorized by MEC.” 
Regardless of whether or not MEC had been involved with the expulsions, 
students would have certainly noticed that they took place. Another justificatory 
article took a more sarcastic tone, saying that, if the students made a new law to 
replace 477, it would guarantee the rights of students, professors, and staff “to 
paralyze school activities; to make an attempt against people or goods or against 
buildings and installations, damaging them at their pleasure,” and to “organiz[e] 
subversive movements,” among other things. Students inverted the pro-
government article’s message, circulating it with “Would you be fooled?” 
handwritten at the top of the article in an effort to inform their colleagues of what 
the government’s supporters were saying about students and 477. The circulation 
of these articles at the Seminar offered students plenty of ammunition against 477 
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when they returned to their own schools. Whether or not universities or MEC 
itself were misusing 477 had little bearing on the fact that 477 existed. Articles 
like these could and did inflame and embolden students who read the article while 
at the national conference.9 Additionally, the national professional conference 
provided students with an arena outside of UNE where they could interact and 
discuss their issues in a national setting; that it happened at an engineering 
conference was all the more ironic, given the status of engineering as apolitical 
and vital to development in the military’s rhetoric.10
 There was no doubt that students nationwide were increasingly compelled 
to speak out against 477. That same August, engineering students at the 
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) published the first issue of a new student 
newspaper. The opening editorial criticized “the lack of freedom of expression 
and association in our school” and “administrative censorship” that 477 
fostered.
 
11
                                                 
 
 The engineering students  were not alone. That June, the campus’s 
DCE published its platform for 1975, blaming 477 and AI-5 not just for 
“impeding the political participation of students,” but for preventing the 
participation of “the majority of the Brazilian people, in the defense of democratic 
prerogatives of all citizens.” For these reasons, UFF’s student leadership 
announced its support “for all the sectors that fight for the extinction of measures 
that restrict democracy in the country and in the university, such as AI-5 and 
9  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, 22 August 1975. 
 
10  See Chapter 4. 
 
11  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 1093/75, 19 August 
1975. 
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477.” Indeed, the DCE went so far as to stress that 477 and its effects were “not 
mere isolated problems of each university or faculty,” but directly tied to the 
military government’s entire economic and development model, “which cannot 
exist without discretionary instruments like AI-5 and Decreto-Lei 477.”12 And in 
1976, students at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ) 
viewed 477 as a means “to understand better that the Educational Policy of the 
Government and the repressive policies” that tried to “silence and contain 
students.”13
In challenging Decreto-Lei 477, students simultaneously engaged in both 
strategic and tactical struggles.
 
14
                                                 
 
 Students originally had no direct control over the 
military’s proclamation of 477 in February 1969 beyond the mobilization of the 
1960s that framed the military’s general concern with student activism.  
Throughout the 1970s, students’ discursive struggles against 477 were temporal, 
responding to the military’s issuance and universities’ application of the law.  In 
their complaints and protests, students were reacting to 477 and seeking its 
abolition, rather than proposing new reforms or issues.  At the same time, 477’s 
sole focus on universities meant that the policy had a physical space to which it 
was directly connected. The law’s physical presence was felt on campuses 
12  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 043, 
“DCE/Universidade Federal Fluminense,” 17 June 1975. 
 
13  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Departamento Geral de Investigações 
Gerais, DPPS, DO, Seção de Buscas Especiais. 
 
14  For de Certeau, methods of resistance can only be either temporal or spatial; that is, they 
can only be either tactics or strategies.  However, this separation of space and time does not allow 
for the possibility of complex relations that embrace both temporal and spatial struggles, as the 
case of 477 demonstrates.  
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through absence: the physical absence of students expelled under its prosecution, 
as well as the absence of legal political activity and organization. Efforts to 
combat 477 had the potential to result in both abstract discursive openings and the 
opening of physical sites of resistance. Tactically, the struggle for the abolition of 
477 would undo one of the regime’s more repressive measures against students, 
opening up broader discursive space for students; strategically, it would lead to 
more open campuses on which students could further mobilize against the 
government and its policies, educational and otherwise.  Decree-Law 477 shows 
the ways in which students’ specific, proactive strategic struggles and broader 
discursive, reactive tactical struggles could blur together. 
As the decade progressed, non-student sectors joined the struggle against 
477. As the imperative for a new constitution gained momentum in the late-1970s, 
the oppositional MDB sought to appeal to students by placing the “Revocation of 
AI-5 and Decreto-Lei 477” alongside broader political demands like “human 
rights,” “direct elections,” “full amnesty,” “defense of national resources,” and 
taking a stance “against the decentralization of the Brazilian economy.” Of all 
these platforms, only one, the revocation of 477, targeted a specific social group, 
students, leading the military’s Division of Security and Information (DSI) to 
declare that the MDB had become a victim of “leftist” infiltration.15
                                                 
 
 Nor was this 
an isolated incident. In 1978, Senator Lázaro Barbosa of Goiás equated 477 and 
Decree-Law 228 to “tear-gas bombs,” and said that only a national constitutional 
15  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 612-5278, Ministério da Justiça, Documento Sigiloso No. 
100475. 
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convention would free students from those laws.16 At a conference focusing on a 
new constitution in Espírito Santo, a manual defending constitutional change that 
circulated among the participants included a section dealing with Brazilian 
universities. Among the top priorities for a new constitution was the need to fight 
“against the laws, acts and exceptional decrees and among these, 228, 477 and 
Law 5.540 [Reforma Universitária], which hinder student organization and the 
liberty and the participation of the student, the professor, and the functionary.”17
The MDB’s repudiation of 477 made political sense. In previous years, 
students had mobilized heavily in favor of the “voto nulo,” or “blank vote.” In 
these elections, the MDB was the obvious loser, as students who cast blank votes 
were far more likely to vote for MDB than the government’s party, ARENA, if 
forced to pick between the two.  The MDB needed students to vote for its 
candidates and not cast blank votes if it was to challenge the dictatorship’s control 
of Congress. As a result, it was not unreasonable for the MDB to start targeting 
some of the issues that directly affected students in an attempt to win support 
among the population. Additionally, many in the MDB had grown tired of the 
dictatorship and the one-sided control the military government and  the pro-
military ARENA exercised in Brazilian politics. In this regard, they saw the 
Institutional Acts and Decree-Laws, including 477, as particularly burdensome 
institutions that were perpetuating the military regime. Although the MDB’s 
discussion of the end of 477 was only a small part of the broader debate for a new 
   
                                                 
 
16  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Informação No. 043/78, 24 January 1978. 
 
17  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3408-08075, Informação No. 262/78/DSI/MJ, 31 March 1978. 
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constitution, it marked the beginning of a broad political trend of looking towards 
the student movements for both platforms and support as the dictatorship neared 
its end.18
Resisting Repression in National Politics: Students Push for Democracy in the 
1970s 
 
 In addition to 477 and AI-5, students adopted a broad set of democratic 
demands and tactical struggles. They used pamphlets, student newspapers, and, as 
the decade progressed, marches and protests to call for an end to torture and 
arbitrary arrests, an end to censorship, an amnesty for all political prisoners and 
exiles, and a return to direct elections and civilian governments. Students and 
other sectors increasingly pushed for these changes after 1974, when Ernesto 
Geisel’s election marked a return of the moderate military leaders and the policy 
of a “gradual, slow, and controlled” re-opening of Brazilian politics. 
 Basic human rights constituted one of the major discursive arenas in 
which students challenged the dictatorship. A series of high-profile deaths 
galvanized students to contest the repressive policies of the military government.  
In March 1973, a geology student at the University of São Paulo (USP), 
Alexandre Vanucci Leme, died after several intense torture sessions, prompting 
outrage among students and clergy in São Paulo, an outrage that only grew as the 
government issued conflicting and unbelievable explanations of Leme’s death.19
                                                 
 
 
18  See Chapter 6. 
 
19  For the case of Leme, see Kenneth Serbin, Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, 
Torture, and Social Justice in Authoritarian Brazil, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2000), Chapter 10; see also, Araújo, Memórias Estudantis, p. 202, for how some students 
remembered the effects Leme’s death had on them and their mobilizations. 
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In October of that same year, police arrested Honestino Guimarães, the last 
official president of UNE until its reemergence in 1979; Guimarães was never 
seen again. Guimarães became another figure around whom students rallied, 
together with Leme and Edson Luis, as students pushed for amnesty and a return 
to democracy in the mid-1970s.20 And in October 1975, journalist Vladimir 
Herzog died while in police custody. As in the case of Leme, the military’s 
explanation that Herzog had also committed suicide (in this case, by allegedly 
hanging himself) rang hollow in the face of the military’s photographic evidence 
and eyewitness accounts of prisoners in the jail at the time of Herzog’s death.21 
These deaths, together with those of men like worker Manoel Fiel Filho in 197622 
and politician Rubens Paiva in 1971,23
These figures remained central in students’ demands for democracy and an 
end to the dictatorship throughout the decade. In 1978, Radio Jornal do Brasil 
reported that one thousand Bahian students had gathered publicly and peacefully 
to “offer tribute to Edson Luiz and Alexandre Vanucchi [Leme],”
 stirred up protests not just from students, 
but from journalists, lawyers, and other members of Brazilian society who had 
begun fighting for an end to the dictatorship’s repression. 
24
                                                 
 
 one 
representing the student movement of 1968 and the other representing the 
20  For more on Guimarães and his place in student memory in the 1970s, see Langland, 
“Speaking of Flowers,” pp. 213-220. 
 
21  See Gaspari, A Ditadura Encurralada, pp. 172-184. 
 
22  See Gaspari, A Ditadura Encurralada, pp. 212-214. 
 
23  See Gaspari, A Ditadura Escancarada, pp. 324-327. 
 
24  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3408-08075, Informação No. 422/78/DSI/MJ, 18 May 1978. 
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students’ struggles against repression in the 1970s. As Victoria Langland has 
demonstrated, these types of connections played a major role in students’ use of 
memory to re-construct the student movement in the 1970s and 1980s and to 
create connections between two moments of student activism that had been 
broken up by repression and the turn to guerrilla movements.25
 Demands for political amnesty were another major tactic students and 
others employed to contest the dictatorship in the 1970s. Calls for “full and 
unrestricted amnesty,” like the one found in UFMG’s Philosophy Department 
newspaper in 1977,
 These meetings 
not only helped students to re-constitute the memory and history of UNE; figures 
like Leme also helped to put a face to the broader pattern of  torture and 
imprisonment of many of their friends and families. 
26 were not uncommon, and students were increasingly 
involved in private and public meetings with groups such as the Brazilian 
Committee for Amnesty. They also formed their own commissions on campuses 
to discuss how to fight for and obtain a full amnesty.27
                                                 
 
 In doing so, students were 
reacting to military policies (in this case, the imprisonment and/or exile of 
“political prisoners”), yet these issues provided a means for students to 
proactively challenge the government. The absence of political prisoners and 
exiles on university campuses was manifest both in the arrest and/or 
25  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Chapter 4. 
 
26  For UFMG, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 614-05280, Documento Sigiloso No. 100714, 
26 September 1977.  For other examples of students demanding amnesty on campuses, see AN, 
Coleção DSI, Caixa 610-05276, “Jornal ‘DCE’,” UFF, 4 May 1977, and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, 
Setor Estudantil, Caixa 53, Informação No. 02403-DARQ/DGIE, 21 August 1978. 
 
27  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Informação No. 1058/77/DSI/MJ, 25 November 
1977. 
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disappearance of students like Honestino Guimarães, as well as the removal of 
professors deemed “subversive” in the wake of 1968. From 1977 onward, the 
struggle for amnesty grew and took on national dimensions,28 and as João 
Figueiredo “campaigned” for president in 1978, he made amnesty a campaign 
promise. Students played an active role in forcing the state’s hand.29
 Although these issues were often rhetorically disconnected from the 
universities, students in the 1970s were just as likely to strategically frame these 
struggles in the context of their own campus experiences as they were to appeal to 
the broader political situation. Students at UnB went on strike at the end of 1977 
to protest the potential failing of 1500 students through the rector’s application of 
jubilação. However, they quickly reframed their protests in terms of democracy 
after police invaded the campus, and blamed the poor quality of education on 
budget increases for military spending that came at the cost of educational 
spending.
 
30 Students linked the military government’s repression to an 
authoritarian atmosphere on university campuses, where “everything is decided 
from above,” creating “the greatest paradise for mediocre professors” who were 
protected from student criticisms.31
                                                 
 
 As president Ernesto Geisel was leaving 
28  See, for example, Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, p. 226, and  Flamarion Maués and Zilah 
Wendel Abramo organizers, Pela democracia, contra o arbítrio: A oposição democrática do 
golpe de 1964 à campanha das Diretas Já, (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006), 
pp. 209-303, for testimonials of the struggle for amnesty.   
 
29  See Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, 226. 
 
30  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Documento Sigiloso No. 100840, 16 Nov. 1977. 
 
31  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de 
Buscas Especiais – “Relatório”, 31 March 1976. Although the 1968 University Reform made 
professors more accountable for their professional performance, it did not provide room for 
sanctioned student voices or criticisms in the process. 
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office in 1979, a newspaper article in O Tempo commented that “fifteen years of 
repression of the university and the schools,” coupled with rapid expansion, had 
left the Brazilian educational system disorganized and professionals unable to find 
work in their fields.32
Students had a vested interest in seeing an end to the use of torture and 
arbitrary arrest that affected their friends and families.
 
33 They reframed broader 
repressive measures as laws that directly affected the quality of life and education 
within the universities. In this way, struggles for broader political goals like 
amnesty and an end to repression became explicitly tied to life on campuses. 
However, these struggles did not replace students’ educational demands in the 
1970s, as some have argued.34
The Other Side of Mobilizations: Students and Educational Demands in the 
1970s 
 Rather, the fight for improvements in the 
universities would continue to occupy a central locus in students’ discourses and 
mobilizations in the mid-1970s and beyond.  
In criticizing the military government’s policies, students embraced a 
broad range of issues without ever focusing on one issue over the others. They 
                                                 
 
32  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Encaminhamento No. 088/79/DSI/MJ, 9 March 
1979. 
 
33  Although Leme was one of the highest-profile student deaths of the 1970s, he was far 
from the only one.  Dozens and perhaps hundreds of former and current students were disappeared 
in the guerrilla movement in Araguaia between 1970 and 1974, and students from other 
universities died in prisons after intense torture sessions as well. For Araguaia, see Gaspari, A 
Ditadura Escancarada, pp. 399-464, and Portela, Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil.  For the deaths 
of other students, see Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 208.  
 
34  For the argument that students shifted their focus and abandoned educational demands 
after the 1960s, see Maria Aparecida de Aquino, “‘Nós que amávamos tanto a revolução’,” in 
Memória do Movimento Estudantil, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Museu da República, 2005): 31-39. 
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were equally critical of the government’s fiscal policies for education as they 
were of the educational policies and reforms that had begun with the Reforma 
Universitária. Students employed a variety of rhetorical tacks to challenge the 
government, ranging from disapproval of the overall spending on the university 
system to specific policies designed to help fund the broad expansion of schools, 
in addition to broader political struggles like anti-477 or amnesty movements. 
Without question, one of the biggest issues that students raised in their 
struggle was “the question of increasing annual fees,” (anuidades)35 or “paid 
education” (ensino pago) as it came to be called. As seen in Chapter One, students 
first protested the imposition of annual fees in the late-1950s.36 Fees once again 
became an issue in 1967, when President Costa e Silva’s Ministry of Planning 
declared that universities could charge students an “annual quota.” This fee would 
“represent the total value of the expenses and installments of the investments of 
the schools”37
However, only in the 1970s did the question of “paid education” really 
come to the forefront of students’ mobilizations as rates dramatically increased. 
At UFRJ, a pamphlet reported that while the “symbolic” fee of Cr$28 had 
  
                                                 
 
35  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria de Segurança Pública/DPPS/INT/RJ, 25 
August 1975, p. 50. 
 
36  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4706, Unidade 137, “Politização da Classe Estudantil.”  
Although no date is explicitly mentioned, the document refers to the Raimundo Eirado’s 
presidency “last year.”  Given that Eirado was president of UNE from 1958-1959, this puts the 
document somewhere around 1959-1960, well before the military took control of the government 
in 1964. 
 
37  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 44, Encaminhamento No. 
130/76/DPPS/RJ/Interior, “Festa Junina Promovido pelo Diretorio Central dos Estudantes,” 21 
June 1976. 
  243 
remained steady for the first five years after Costa e Silva’s declaration, it had 
increased from Cr$28 to Cr$435 between 1972 and 1976.38 At UFF, another 
student pamphlet expressed outrage over the fact that the annual fees there had 
gone up by 200 percent, “aggravated by the establishment of more than thirty 
fees, which range from 7.5 to 1200 cruzeiros.”39 Not only did the rates go up, but 
at UFRJ, for example, there was an increase in the “number of fees paid for the 
use of services (beyond the matriculation fee, growing each year),” including fees 
for “the payment of study packets, student ID card, putting one’s studies on hold, 
etc.”40 Students at UFRJ even called these rates “illegal” for going beyond the 
ceiling MEC had set for annual fees.41 These complaints could and did lead to the 
reduction of fees at some schools, and student organizations and groups pointed to 
these successes as the students’ first “important victory” since 1969.42
The increase in anuidades hit students at private universities even harder. 
Students at the Faculdade de Engenharia Industrial e Civil of Itatiba, in São Paulo, 
claimed that the Educational Credit system that the government had launched to 
help students attend university only “masked the high rates of fees” and did 
nothing to actually ameliorate the high cost of education for students.
 
43
                                                 
 
 At a rally 
38  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Relatório”, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-
Seção de Buscas Especiais, DPPS Gabinete Reservado No. S-490/1976, Livro 4, p. 113. 
 
39  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Unnamed document, p. 320. 
40  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Jornal da Química No. 1, June 1975. 
 
41  In making this claim in 1976, students pointed to an article from 11 July 1975 in O 
Globo.  See APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Relatório”, DGIE-DPPS-DO-
SB-Seção de Buscas Especiais, DPPS Gabinete Reservado No. S-490/1976, Livro 4. 
 
42  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Jornal da Engenharia, Ano IV, No. 9 
(November 1975).  
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of over 300 people protesting the merger of the independent federal schools in 
Rio de Janeiro into UNIRIO in April 1979, “various speakers criticized the 
adoption of paid education” calling it a mechanism through which “the 
government imposes curricula without the students having a say.”44 The issues of 
ensino pago and anuidades continued into the 1980s, when a newly-reborn 
national student movement, politicians, and others would pick up the cause.45
Fees were not the only fiscal issue that caused outrage among students. 
Although some studies suggest that military spending on education increased after 
1972,
 
46 that did not stop students from arguing for more budgeting for education, 
especially higher education. In 1975, engineering students at UFRJ complained 
not only about the anuidades,47 but also lamented “the terrible conditions of 
education, due principally to the lack of funding that dominates not just UFRJ, but 
Brazilian Education in general.”48  Meanwhile, in São Paulo, students and 
professors at USP took to the streets in 1978 to demand more funding, along with 
other political demands.49
                                                                                                                                                 
43  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 618-04284, Informação No. 066/78/DSI/MJ – “Faculdade de 
Engenharia Industrial e Civil de Itatiba/SP – Jornaleco Alvorada,” p. 4. 
 These complaints were not limited to the major 
 
44  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Informe No. 101-20/79/PM-2/PMERJ – 07 May 1979. 
 
45  See Chapter 6. 
 
46  Brown, “Democracy, Authoritarianism and Education Finance in Brazil,” p. 125. 
 
47  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Unnamed document, p. 320. 
 
48  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, “Jornal da Engenharia,” Ano IV No. 
8 (June 1975), p. 1, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB – Seção de Buscas Especiais – Encaminhamento No. 
049, 23 June 1975. 
 
49  CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 2, Photo 0099, and AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3410-
08077, Ministério da Justiça, Documento Sigiloso No. 100368 – “Jornal ‘O Trabalho’”, 10 May 
1978. 
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university centers in Rio and São Paulo, the traditional hotbeds of student 
activism.50 In 1976, students at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) 
and Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (UFES) both pointed to data that 
showed that federal funding for education had dropped from 11 percent of the 
total federal budget in 1965 to 4.7 percent for 1976. According to these students, 
the government was shifting the costs of education from the state to the students 
themselves, leading to a decline in the quality of education in Brazil and in turn 
demonstrating broader failings on the part of the government in helping Brazil to 
develop,51 a refrain that politicians also began to echo as the decade progressed.52
Students’ educational concerns went beyond fiscal matters. One of their 
biggest targets in the 1970s was the military government’s new program of 
jubilação. Initially established in 1972, jubilação was “the true technique 
intended to impede the permanency of the ‘professional student’,” who the 
military felt was responsible for much of the student activism of the 1960s.
  
53
                                                 
 
 By 
the mid-1970s, students at individual campuses protested the broad use of 
jubilação, complaining that rectors were applying the rule far too liberally for 
50  Scholars have tended to focus on USP and universities in Rio de Janeiro in studying the 
“revival” of the student movement in the 1970s and 1980s.  It is undeniable that USP, UFRJ, and 
UFF witnessed a disproportionate number of high-publicity mobilizations in the Brazilian 
university system.  However, these two cities were not the only loci of major mobilizations, as the 
case of UFRRJ makes clear.  Another area whose importance in student mobilizations remains 
understudies is the role of Universidade Federal da Bahia in the 1970s and 1980s.  See, for 
example, CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 1, Photo 989, 1009, 1077, 1274, passim. 
 
51  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Manifesto sobre o crédito 
educativo,” 27 March 1976.  Annexed to Encaminhamento No. 63/76/DPPS/RJ/Interior, Serviço 
Público Estadual, Secretaria de Estado de Segurança Pública, DPPS/RJ/Interior, 5 April 1976. 
 
52  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3408-08075, Informação No. 262/78/DSI/MJ, 31 March 1978. 
 
53  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78, 
p. 3. 
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“political” purposes, and that the system facilitated extreme cases of university 
crackdowns. Students at UFF claimed that “more than 50 percent” of the student 
body had been held back due to jubilação, and blamed this rate on the “deficient 
character of education,” declaring that students who were expelled should not 
“shoulder the onus” of the burden for poor curricula and instruction.54 Later that 
year, UFF’s students readjusted that number to 20 percent, but that did not 
diminish their sense of alarm.55 In 1976, the rector of UFBA expelled 900 
students under the policy of jubilação, prompting a strike of UFBA’s 14,000 
students. The case garnered national attention among university student bodies.56 
Even Minister of Education and Culture Ney Braga took notice. A student 
newspaper at PUC-RJ pointed out that “General Ney Braga himself recognized 
the elevated rates [of jubilação] when he asked the rectory for a report justifying 
the high indices” in Bahia and organized meetings “with all of the rectors of 
public and private universities of the country.”57 These meetings addressed all 
student complaints, including jubilação.58
                                                 
 
   
54  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975 – “Falta de Vagas na Engenharia – UFE [sic].” 
 
55  For the figure of 20 percent, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, 
Encaminhamento No. 165/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 23 October 1975 – “Cancelamento de Matrícula 
na UFF.” For the figure of 50 percent, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, 
Encaminhamento No. 74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975 – “Falta de Vagas na Engenharia – 
UFE [sic].” 
 
56  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Quilombo dos Palmares Ano II, No. 
3 (March 1976). 
 
57  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Vai Chover Canivete – Jornal do 
Diretório Central dos Estudantes da PUC – Ano 1, No. 1, Maio de 1976.” 
 
58  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Vai Chover Canivete – Jornal do 
Diretório Central dos Estudantes da PUC – Ano 1, No. 1, Maio de 1976.” 
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 Braga’s meeting seemed to have little effect. When students at UnB went 
on strike in 1977 after 1500 of their colleagues had been failed under jubilação, 
the rector called for the military police to occupy the campus, claiming students’ 
demands were political and not educational. Countering the rector’s comment that 
“the students do not complain about academic questions,” students pointed to 
their opposition to the rector’s initiation of more than 1500 processes of jubilação 
to argue that their concerns were indeed “academic.”59 Once again, MEC and the 
rectory of a particular university seemed at odds. Braga sent a “questionnaire” to 
UnB. The message “questioned the criteria adopted by UnB for the jubilação of 
students,” implying that the university had failed to follow the letter of the law.60 
Additionally, MEC requested specific data about the percentage of students 
jubilados who had not met their degree requirements, as well as asking for further 
data on the rates of failure or suspension at the school.61
                                                 
 
 MEC was also concerned 
that such a  high number of jubilações could send the signal of expecting 
“perfectionism” from the students in their courses. Finally, MEC was dissatisfied 
with UnB’s practice of expelling students via jubilação and then allowing them to 
re-enter the program in the following year, as it undermined MEC’s efforts to 
offer more openings to students after 1968. Holding back so many students for 
59  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Documento Sigiloso No. 100840, 16 November 
1977 – “Greve de Estudantes da UnB.”  
 
60  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila 
os alunos.” 
 
61  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila 
os alunos.” 
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another year would negatively impact the total number of openings available the 
following year. 
The reentry of expelled students was doubly troubling to MEC. First, it 
seemed to counteract the purpose of jubilação, which was designed to prevent the 
existence of “professional” students who became leaders in the student 
movements. Not only was UnB giving students the chance to return to school; it 
allowed them to return with the credits they had earned previously. While 
allowing them their credits seemed to preclude the possibility of having 
“professional” students, MEC expressed concern that this practice rewarded 
students who had been punished in accordance with national educational 
standards.62
                                                 
 
 Secondly, MEC seemed concerned how UnB’s readmission of 
jubilados might be affecting the overall admission rates at UnB. The 
questionnaire MEC sent to the school also asked how UnB was treating the issues 
of jubilações and students admitted through the vestibular. Reportedly, the 
ministry was concerned that students who passed their entrance exams would be 
denied admittance because a student that had been expelled under the law would 
take their place. MEC juridical consultant Alvaro Alvares da Silva Campos sent a 
letter to the Minister of Education in 1979, asserting that “the experience of [the 
University of] Brasília really punishes the student who, while approved in all of 
the disciplines, does not reach an overall average above 3.2.” While Campos 
admitted that, “within the concept of university autonomy, within the professional 
capacity of the professor, it is true that the methods and criteria for evaluation of 
62  COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila 
os alunos.” 
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school productivity cannot be discussed,” he felt the problems ran deeper. The 
nationally-decreed system of jubilação on the one hand and the “internal 
parameters” of coursework, timeframes, and academic work established within 
individual universities on the other hand led to a “contradictory system.”  The 
only solution, according to Campos, was for MEC to “exercise Federal Public 
Power in educational material” and rely on the “hierarchical resources that rest on 
constitutional principles” to give MEC, and not individual universities like UnB, 
the final say on how jubilação was to be applied. Once this was done, individual 
schools like UnB “cannot surpass certain parameters” that MEC established.63
 Student antagonism to jubilação was not restricted to federal university 
students.  The case of UFBA in 1976 had captured the attention and opposition of 
students at the private PUC-RJ.
 
Although the ruling seemed to favor the students’ concern over rectories’ abuses 
of jubilação, it was also clear that only the government could determine what 
those parameters were. The decision-making process would be top-down, and 
students’ voices were not welcomed. 
64
                                                 
 
 A year later, students at the Faculdade de 
Engenharia Industrial e Civil de Itatiba/SP (Industrial and Civil Engineering 
School of Itatiba, São Paulo) criticized jubilação for its inherent classism and, like 
their colleagues at UFF, condemned the system’s failure to deal with broader 
teaching deficiencies, saying that jubilação was just another mechanism to keep 
63  COREC, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78, p. 
5. 
 
64  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Vai Chover Canivete – Jornal do 
Diretório Central dos Estudantes da PUC – Ano 1, No. 1, Maio de 1976.” 
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poor students out of universities and did nothing to address broader structural 
deficiencies in the university system.65 Of particular concern was the fact that 
many students were increasingly working days and taking classes at night, while 
the courses they needed were only offered during the day, making it difficult to 
finish in the timeframe jubilação mandated.66
Nor was jubilação the only policy that offered these types of strategies to 
challenge the military governments in the 1970s. The Reforma Universitária itself 
became a major target of student ire in the 1970s. Within a few years of its 
publication, students began questioning the Reforma. In 1972, the Academic 
Directory (DA) of the medical school at the Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ) published in its bulletin a play that “took on the Reforma 
Universitária in general and specific terms” and was critical of its 
implementation. In the play, the characters of “Fundão” (the newest campus for 
UFRJ, on the Ilha do Governador), “D. Historia da Silva Xavier,” and a new 
student discussed the opening of the new campus in 1972, which “Fundão” itself, 
representing the voice of the government’s policy, admitted was merely 
 With jubilação serving as a very 
real threat to students who could not finish courses on a timeline imposed from 
above, and with even MEC wavering on the application of the federal policy, 
students took advantage of the strategic value jubilação offered in challenging the 
dictatorship.   
                                                 
 
65  Informação No. 066/78/DSI/MJ – “Faculdade de Engenharia Industrial e Civil de 
Itatiba/SP,” 26 January 1978.  Caixa 618-05284, DSI, AN. 
 
66  For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário 
Rebelo, p. 3 
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“ceremonial,” declaring that there was much infrastructural work still to be done. 
In an interesting shift in tone, when Fundão explained that the acceleration of the 
university system began in 1968 as a response to the March of 100,000, the 
student confessed that “I don’t know what happened in previous years […] and 
what do I have to do with this?  What interests me is that the hospital [where 
medical students studied] is opened and that the department improves.”67
 This exchange is particularly revealing into how students in the early 
1970s perceived both 1968 and the expansion of universities. The fact that the 
student (in a play written by a student, for other students) was inattentive to and 
unconcerned about 1968, spoke to a shift among some students in the 1970s as 
they became more concerned with their education. Students were divided. Some 
had yet to incorporate an understanding of 1968 as a major turning point in 
student mobilizations.
  
68
                                                 
 
 Others enshrined that year in historical memory, as 
Victoria Langland argues. After all, the author equated 1968 to the year of the 
March of 100,000, the largest mobilization of students and others under the 
dictatorship until the 1980s. At the same time, the student author of the play 
suggested that the students’ mobilizations of 1968 had led the government to 
remedy the university system’s problems. What emerged was a contradictory 
understanding of students’ historical role in society, as students acknowledged the 
events of 1968, even while they felt disconnected from that year, concerned less 
with past activism than with their own educational experiences. The efforts to 
67  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Boletim do Diretório Acadêmico 
da Faculdade de Medicina da UFRJ, Ano II, No. 3 (May/June 1972),  p. 4. 
 
68  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Chapters 3-4. 
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connect individual experiences on campuses to broader processes of 
democratization and development still remained tenuous in the early 1970s. 
Nonetheless, an understanding of educational reform’s connection to 
national politics was beginning to take hold on campuses. At UFRJ, a student 
newspaper listed twenty items on the agenda for discussion at a meeting of the 
Council of Representatives from the Engineering School, including the desire to 
hold seminars discussing the Reforma itself the new post-Reforma curricula.69 
Similarly, students in the Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia at UFF 
suggested discussing the Reforma in small groups, particularly as it regarded the 
“specific problematic of the school.” In particular, the students at UFF were 
concerned that the rates of anuidades would go up each time the minimum salary 
in Brazil was changed. The article rhetorically asked, “until when will we 
passively accept the escalation of paid education?” a paid education that the 
students tied directly to the Reforma Universitária.70
                                                 
 
 Meanwhile, these students’ 
colleagues in UFF’s engineering department criticized the Reforma and the 
military’s educational policy since the 1960s more generally. They lambasted the 
military’s economic policies and claimed the educational landscape was 
completely disconnected from Brazil’s economic realities. They also suggested 
that the military’s professorial purges and efforts to strip campuses of any 
political activity rendered universities little more than “a prop for its [the 
69  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, Jornal do Conselho de 
Representantes da Escola de Engenharia da UFRJ (No. 1, Ano 1). 
 
70  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 44, Encaminhamento No. 
130/76/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 21 June 1976. 
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dictatorship’s] own maintenance.”71
Even private schools that lay outside of the Reforma’s jurisdiction were 
critical of the government’s policy. At PUC-RJ, students complained that theirs 
was the “first university in Brazil to apply the Reforma Universitária,” and second 
only to UFRJ’s engineering and architecture school in terms of graduate theses 
defended. Until 1972, the article went on, PUC had “sought to apply the Reforma 
Universitária” by hiring more professors and directing its program towards 
teaching and research, in an effort “to respond to the governmental policy.” Yet 
by 1973, this program “revealed itself to be impractical, and […] PUC entered 
into great crisis,” asking for a four million dollar loan from abroad just to be able 
to pay its faculty.
 By voicing these complaints, students were 
able to challenge to the government, using the physical sites of universities as a 
vehicle for broader undermining of the military’s authority. 
72
 By the early 1970s, it became clear that the Reforma Universitária had 
only temporarily addressed the issues of excedentes and vagas. In 1975, students 
again noted  that there were not enough openings nationwide for the number of 
matriculating students.  A pamphlet passed around at the Second National 
 Students raised numerous criticisms of the Reforma 
Universitária, ranging from the failure to provide improvements to the 
consequences of implementing the Reforma in their own schools to challenge the 
dictatorship’s educational policies and its consequences. 
                                                 
 
71  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 49, 23 June 
1975. 
 
72  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Quilombo dos Palmares, Ano II, No. 
3 (March 1976). 
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Seminar of Engineering Students pointed out that, across the 848 universities, 
faculdades, and private schools in Brazil, there were only 940,000 openings for 
over one million students, leading to a deficit of “160,000 vagas in relation to the 
demand – nearly three times the capacity of the University of São Paulo, the 
country’s largest” university73 and exceeding the number of students enrolled in 
all universities and colleges in 1964.74 Some students pointed to the termination 
of the Astronomy and Architecture programs at UFF for overcrowding; the 
military police placed the blame elsewhere, declaring that “the greater problem is 
created by repeating students.” The police report cited an administrative report 
from within UFF that indicated a failure rate of 80 percent out of a group of 120 
students; the number of students repeating the courses was thereby responsible for 
insufficient vagas for the next incoming class.75 Psychology students in Belo 
Horizonte satirically reported on the new “novelties” students could expect in 
1977: “the number of lines increased and the number of vagas decreased!!!” The 
results, the pamphlet went on, were that “many students cannot matriculate in 
obligatory disciplines, [and] a greater number did not pass classes outside of their 
program.”76
                                                 
 
 Newer students were finding it harder to enroll in courses where 
73  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, “As queixas contra o ensino,” 
Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, 22 August 1975. To understand the rapid expansion of 
higher education in Brazil after 1968, it is worth recalling that student enrollment in all 
universities in 1964 was about 120,000. 
 
74  Estimates put the 1964 enrollment at about 120,000-140,000 for the entire country. See 
Chapters 1-3, above. 
 
75  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975. 
 
76  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 614-05280, Documento Sigiloso No. 100714, 26 September 
1976. 
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older students were being “held back,” leading to a bottleneck effect that further 
clogged the university system and left fewer openings available to incoming 
university students. 
Students also complained that rapid expansion led to the hiring of under-
qualified professors. The Association of Graduate Students at PUC-RJ reported 
that higher education had increased by 131 percent from 1969 to 1973 by hiring 
67,904 professors. Of them, “61 percent only have a Bachelors’ degree, and 22 
percent of these only have technical courses, only eight percent have a Master’s 
degree and nine percent a doctoral degree.”77
Students felt that the government, in its rush to expand the university 
system, had left the faculty at federal universities woefully unprepared and 
unqualified. Echoing the ideology of the 1960s, the DCE at UFMG declared that  
 Although private universities lay 
outside of the regulations of the Reforma Universitária, these schools still felt the 
effects of the Reforma’s incomplete implementation. Due to expenses and federal 
spending, the military government could not expand the federal university system 
fast enough; consequently, private universities increasingly saw their schools fill 
up with the students who could not be accommodated in public universities. This 
in turn led to rapid growth and overcrowding in the private universities. As 
overcrowding spilled into the private universities, they joined their colleagues in 
the federal universities in complaining about the Reforma. 
the University today, instrumentalized to serve the dominant sectors in accord 
with this phase of capitalist development, reduces higher education to fragmented, 
                                                 
 
77  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 51, 27 June 
1975. 
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super-specialized, and non-integrating professionalization. The transmission of 
broad scientific knowledge and learning has been completely abandoned in favor 
of alienated professional training that serves the interest of business.78
Students also criticized private businesses for their failure to invest in the 
development of technology on campuses, accusing business elites and the 
government of viewing the universities only as vehicles for the “formation of 
cheap and technical labor with the capacity to use and adapt imported 
technologies.”
  
79
Students throughout Brazil lamented the complete absence of sufficient 
faculty, something that was in part a legacy of AI-5, which had suspended 
“subversive” professors.
 
80 At the Second National Seminar of Engineering 
Students in 1975, an article that circulated at the conference condemned the 
“failings in the curricula, the low level of professors and students, elevated fees, 
deficient installations and, principally, the lack of an opportunity to participate 
more in the solutions of the problems of the school.”81 Students at UFF, UFRJ, 
and UFPE echoed similar sentiments, going so far as to call higher education “a 
public calamity.”82
                                                 
 
 Students not only decried the quality of education in 
78  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, Informe No. 500/80-
SI/SR/DPF/RJ, 31 July 1980, original emphasis. 
 
79  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de 
Buscas Especiais – “Relatório.”. 
 
80  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 158-159. 
 
81  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ (22 August 1975). 
 
82  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 610-05276, “Jornal ‘DCE’ – Universidade Federal Fluminense,” 
4 May 1977; AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 610-05276, “Jornal ‘Momento’ – Órgão Oficial do MDB 
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universities; they used the universities to chastise the government for its failings 
both in improving the federal universities and for its failings in helping Brazil 
achieve a more general “progress.”  
 Students also felt that the military government’s state-led efforts to 
increase the number of white-collar professionals to accelerate national 
development was having a negative effect on their education. Their training had 
become too narrow for them to  understand their broader place in Brazilian 
society as university-trained professionals.  Where Aliomar Baleeiro accused 
students of viewing degrees as commodities in the 1960s, in the 1970s students 
turned the rhetoric around, saying the emphasis on technical know-how 
commodified and devalued university degrees to serve the narrow-minded and 
self-serving goals of the Brazilian state.83 One student newspaper article 
condemned the government for “dangerously pushing students for the exclusive 
search for a diploma at whatever cost.”84 A pamphlet found on UFRJ’s campus 
commented that, “as the number of graduates increased at an accelerated rhythm, 
the value of the graduation diploma fell.”85
                                                                                                                                                 
em Pernambuco”, 27 June 1977; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, 
Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ (22 August 1975); and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor 
Estudantil, Pasta 43, Relatório, 31 March 1976. 
 An article in Opinião declared that the 
commodification of degrees expanded “the market of those who have a high 
 
83  See CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo 
reformas modernizantes,” pp. 13, 22-24, 60-61, in Chapter 1. 
 
84  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 
73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ (22 August 1975).  
 
85  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, Livro 4, DPPS Gabinete Reservado 
No. 2-490/1976. 
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school diploma [who] were eager to consume higher education.”86  Students at a 
Faculdade in São Paulo published an article bluntly titled “Faculdade or Diploma 
Factory?” in the student newspaper.87 At PUC-RJ, students  produced a pamphlet 
featuring the stories of four fictional students who, “although created by us, are 
not imaginary people. Any similarity between them and hundreds of students at 
PUC/RJ, in 1975, is not a mere coincidence.” The case of “Jorge,” a banker from 
a poor family in the outskirts of Rio, highlighted the issue of commodification. 
Jorge was anxious about the value of his college education for professional 
mobility and economic security his family.  Using Jorge’s made-up narrative, the 
sutdents criticized the quality of education, with professors who saw students as 
“empty boxes in which they deposit all of the knowledge they should acquire” for 
students to regurgitate on exams. They also condemned “the preoccupation with 
tests and exams and the need to work.” These activities “impede[d] Jorge from 
participating in other activities. He only learns the techniques of work, without a 
general vision, without a perspective.” As a result,  Jorge would become obsessed 
with good grades, all so he might obtain a better job.88
These examples revealed the ways students used the government’s rapid 
expansion and reform of the university system to undermine the effectiveness of 
the state under military rule. Students decried narrow professionalization that led 
to a degree stripped of any of their broader philosophical or social concerns, such 
  
                                                 
 
86  APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativas, Opinião No. 42 (27 August-3 September 1973) 
“O negócio do ensino superior,”, p. 6. 
 
87  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 618-05284, Informação No. 066/78/DSI/MJ, 26 January 1978. 
 
88  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, DPPS-DO-SB-SBE, 24 February 
1976. 
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as the student’s role in the University and in society, issues that would be 
increasingly common towards the end of the decade. What was worse, this 
emphasis on college degrees for professionalization led to an increasingly glutted 
job market as the 1970s went on.  When the press commented that “today we 
produce medical doctors who are unable to find work as doctors, journalists who 
cannot be journalists, professors who do not learn,”89
Students also vociferously complained about the “physically deficient 
conditions” of campuses that were “inadequate” compared to the number of 
students entering the university system.
 it was simply echoing a 
growing frustration among many students that rapid university expansion had left 
university graduates under-educated and the job-market over-saturated. 
90 In 1975, medical students who had 
come from around the country to attend the National Medical Students’ Meeting 
drafted a resolution that complained that universities in Brazil “did not have even 
the minimum number of books required for courses,” suffered from an “absence 
of laboratories” and “didactic books for free consultation,” and demanded 
“improvements in the material conditions of education.”91
                                                 
 
  Once again, an area 
that the military had praised for its apolitical nature and its importance in national 
development had begun turning on the regime, much as engineering students had. 
Although the government had focused on improving medical schools, medical 
89  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Encaminhamento No. 088/79/DSI/MJ – “Jornal 
‘Em Tempo’”, 9 March 1979. 
 
90  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 1093/75, 19 August 
1975. 
 
91  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Relatório Especial de Informações 
No. 4/75 – VII ECEM [Encontro Nacional de Estudantes de Medicina do Brasil], 28 July 1975. 
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students were increasingly dissatisfied with their education, and used the regime’s 
failures to mobilize. At these national meetings, students from schools from 
throughout Brazil were able to meet and learn that these deficiencies were not 
isolated to certain campuses, but were a major issue confronting “Brazilian 
education in general.”92
Another point of contention for students in the 1970s was one of the most 
basic items possible: food. Complaints about the prices and quality of food at 
university restaurants were nothing new, dating back at least to the early 
dictatorship period.
   
93 In April 1969, thousands of students at UFRJ gathered to 
protest the rising prices of food at the university’s restaurant in clear defiance of 
AI-5 and 477.94
                                                 
 
 Complaints continued to surface throughout the 1970s. One 
student writing for the student newspaper in UFRJ’s engineering school was 
memorably sarcastic in dealing with the question of food quality on campus. The 
student composed a mock interview with a fundãonista (a student at UFRJ’s new 
Fundão campus) who commented that he “received two invitations from abroad, 
one from North Vietnam and the other from South Vietnam, and they both said 
the same thing: ‘We would very much like to have you on the front lines for us.  
92  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 049, 23 June 
1975.  
 
93  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31,  Informação No. 
271/DPPS/RJ – Serviço de Cadastro e Documentação (SCD) – 23 September 1968, and CPDOC, 
CMa pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04, p. 7. 
 
94  See Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” pp. 152-153 for this specific case.  Langland 
excels in  chronicling the complexities involved in bringing an end to large student mobilizations 
in the wake of AI-5.  As she demonstrates, the declaration of AI-5 did not lead to a sudden end to 
mass mobilizations; rather, such mobilizations continued throughout 1969 and early 1970 as both 
students and the military government adapted to a post-AI-5 context.   Langland, “Speaking of 
Flowers,” Chapter 3. 
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After eating at the bandejão (university restaurant) for more than a year and not 
dying, you will be invincible on the battlefront.’”95 Another pamphlet found on 
UFRJ’s campus called the food service on campus “one of the most explosive 
points of complaints,” due in no small part to “the constant worsening of the 
quality of the food” even as prices increased from Cr$0.05 to Cr$5.00 between 
1967 and 1975.96  Students at UFRJ also pointed to similar fights against the 
quality and price of food at both PUC-RJ and the Universidade Federal de Ouro 
Preto (UFOP) in Minas Gerais. Students at UFF were even more emphatic, 
insisting that the need for cheaper subsidized food was as essential to forming a 
“democratic university” as the rights to free education and assembly were.97
                                                 
 
  And 
at PUC-RJ, the student newspaper commented on leaflets “that spoke about ‘the 
absurd increases in the University Restaurant’.” Lacking alternatives to the 
expensive campus restaurant, where lunch cost Cr$8.50, many poorer students, 
like “Jorge” at PUC-RJ, could not afford to eat between classes. While the fight 
for better quality food may seem inconsequential compared to the struggles 
against 477 and AI-5, or the fight for better quality education in Brazil, it was 
clear that the campus restaurants played an important role in student activism in 
the 1970s. Student willingness to make it a central part of their demands for a 
“democratic university” reveals that students’ quotidian experiences on campuses 
95  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Entrevista com o fundãonista,” 
Jornal do Conselho de Representantes da Escola de Engenharia da UFRJ, No. 1, Ano 1. 
 
96  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, Livro 4, “Relatório,” 31 March 1976, 
DPPS Gabinete Reservado No. 2-490/1976. 
 
97  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 1316/D.Arq/DGIE, 
10 June 1975. 
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played just as important a role in contesting the policies of the dictatorship as did 
broader political struggles for democracy. 
Reinventing Development and Democracy in the 1970s 
In 1975, Minister of Education Ney Braga commented in a letter that “the 
basic objective [of universities] is the promotion of the student by means of 
preparing him for the full and useful exercise of citizenship in the democratic 
society in which we live.”98
Decreto-Lei 477 and AI-5 made for easy targets. Students directly tied the 
repressive nature of 477 to the military’s overall repression and the lack of 
democracy in Brazil.
  Braga’s praise of the “democratic society” in Brazil 
was nothing new; the military had insisted that its project was “democratic” since 
the 1960s, defining “democracy” as the fight against “subversion” and 
“communism.”  However, students saw things differently, and began to redefine 
their vision of democracy through the lens of university education in the 1970s. In 
all of their struggles, students challenged the dictatorship’s hegemony in defining 
democracy and development in Brazil. They formulated their own visions of 
democracy and development that were connected both to improved quality of 
education and broader political freedoms.   
99
                                                 
 
 They pushed for greater freedom of speech and an end to 
censorship, and hoped that the overturning of the regime’s decree-laws would 
decentralize the university administration and give students and faculty more 
98  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 2452/75-B, 6 
September 1975. 
 
99  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Quilombo dos Palmares, Ano II, No. 
3 (March 1976). See also APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 
1093/75-SI/SR/DPF/RJ, 19 August 1975, and Relatório Especial de Informações no. 4/75, 28 July 
1975. 
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autonomy.100 Likewise, they gathered to commemorate the deaths of citizens 
killed under the military’s supervision, with the deaths of Alexandre Leme 
Vanucchi and Vladimir Herzog bringing thousands of students to the streets.101 
Students simultaneously incorporated both specific educational and broader 
political demands, as when students in São Paulo took to the streets in 1977 to 
demand “more funding for Education, full Amnesty, [and] against the regime.”102 
These demands mirrored the generalized political opposition increasingly raised 
in the 1970s.103
However, students were just as likely to frame democracy through more 
specific educational demands, such as the desire to have students more actively 
participate in the decision-making processes of the universities, a demand they 
had been making since the 1960s.
 
104 With greater participation, they could help 
bring an end to the top-down “authoritarianism” in universities.105
                                                 
 
 Additionally, 
they called for social leveling by  opening admission to student applicants from 
100  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 44, Informação no. 
152-C/75, 27 April 1976, and AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 610-05276, “Jornal ‘DCE’ – Universidade 
Federal Fluminense,” 4 May 1977. 
 
101  See Serbin, Secret Dialogues, Chapter 10, and Gaspari, A Ditadura Escancarada, pp. 
159-188. 
 
102  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3410-08077, Documento Sigiloso No. 100368 – “Jornal ‘O 
Trabalho’”, 10 May 1978. See also APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 63, 
Informação No. 446/78-B13. 
 
103  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 612-05278, Ministério da Justiça, Documento Sigiloso No. 
100475, and AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3408-08075, Informação No. 262/78/DSI/MJ, 31 March 
1978. 
 
104  For evidence on this in the pre-dictatorship period, see Chapter 1; for the 1970s, see 
APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 53, Informação No. 446/78-B13. 
 
105  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de 
Buscas Especiais – “Relatório”, 31 March 1976. 
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all social classes, particularly the “popular classes.” Only by extending free higher 
education to all would Brazil achieve “the creation of a just and democratic 
society.”106 Students also critiqued the rising income gap between rich and poor 
in the wake of the “economic miracle,” thereby introducing a sense of social 
justice into their definition of democracy that was absent in state officials’ 
rhetoric.107
This theme of social justice also dominated students’ discussions of 
development. Students accused the government of holding Brazilian development 
back by failing to understand the university’s role “as an efficient instrument for 
the country’s economic and more socially just development.”
 
108 Discontent with 
the growing stratification of Brazilian society and the increasing difficulties the 
poor had in obtaining free public education, student groups called for “an end to 
the privatization and elitization of education” and the opening of higher education 
and culture for all socio-economic classes.109 Students insisted that “true 
development” would only happen in Brazil when all groups and social classes 
could participate “in solving socio-economic and political problems.”110
                                                 
 
 Students 
106  Quotation from AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 614-05280, Ministério da Justiça No. 103712 – 
Seminário “O São Paulo,” 1977. See also APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43,  
DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de Buscas Especiais – “Relatório”, 31 March 1976. 
 
107  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, DPPS-DO-SB-SBE, 24 February 
1976. 
 
108  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Relatório Especial de Informações 
No. 4/75 – VII ECEM, 28 July 1975. 
 
109  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de 
Buscas Especiais – “Relatório”, 31 March 1976. 
 
110  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Relatório Especial de Informações 
No. 4/75 – VII ECEM, 28 July 1975. 
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at UFRJ perhaps put it most succinctly in their definition of a university: “the 
university is not a ‘social position,’ but a contract with society.”111
This vision had its paradoxes. On the one hand, students insisted that the 
universities become more open to all socio-economic classes. On the other hand, a 
lack of openings in universities and the commodification of degrees were a 
constant flashpoint for protest against the dictatorship’s policies. Student 
publications never dealt with these two conflicting positions simultaneously, nor 
did they offer any specifics on exactly how universities were to be more inclusive 
and not overcrowded. Even as students were mobilizing throughout the 1970s 
over educational isssues, there was no unified “student voice” with a cohesive 
message or vision for Brazilian development, and internal differences could and 
did emerge. 
 Campuses, as 
sites for development and social justice, demanded inclusion of other socio-
economic groups.   
Students at different universities increasingly worked together as the 
1970s progressed. At meetings like the engineering students’ and medical 
students’ national meetings, students exchanged experiences and ideas, leading to 
the development of collaborative pamphlets and agendas. Networking could be 
professionally or regionally based, as in 1976, when students from twenty-five 
departments in Rio de Janeiro’s four largest universities (UFF, UFRJ, PUC-RJ, 
and the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [UERJ]), gathered at UFF to 
protest the repressive measures of the dictatorship, including the firing of two 
                                                 
 
111  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estuantil, Pasta 40, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de Buscas 
em 16 de Junho de 1975. Original Emphasis. 
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professors at UFF and UFRJ.112
Conclusion 
 At these gatherings, students were better able to 
coordinate their tactics and strategies of resistance and articulate the issues they 
were facing in the university system and with respect to national political 
agendas. As UNE began its official (albeit still-illegal) return in the late 1970s, it 
would adopt many of these platforms. Clearly, student mobilization and activism 
continued throughout the 1970s and debates continued about the role of 
universities and higher education in democracy and development in Brazil. As a 
result, students offered alternate discursive visions about education and politics 
than those offered by the state. The national movement may have faded away in 
the wake of AI-5 and the shift towards guerrilla movements, but students at 
individual campuses and departments continued to press for what they considered 
meaningful university reform.  
The 1970s in Brazil were in many ways a transitional period. The country 
went from the “economic miracle” and intense repression of the early-1970s to 
increasing inflation, debt, and uncertainty at the end of the decade, even as the 
government gradually “opened up.” When examining state-society relations, the 
traditional narrative has focused on repression and resistance, emphasizing on the 
one hand the state’s increased use of torture after 1968 and, on the other, the 
virtual extinction of UNE, the rise of urban and rural guerrilla movements, and 
the increasingly broad opposition to the use of torture in Brazil. These narratives 
obscure the complexities of state-society relations in authoritarian Brazil. The 
                                                 
 
112  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, DGIE/DPPS/DO, Seção de Buscas 
Especiais. 
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debate over university education and reform in the 1970s points to broader 
avenues that may help scholars reconsider the Brazilian dictatorship and state-
society relations in modern Brazil more generally. 
 In spite of the atmosphere of heightened repression and the near-
disappearance of UNE, students’ activism continued in the wake of AI-5. 
Although UNE was indeed virtually extinct by 1972 as its leaders fled the 
country, went underground, or joined guerrilla movements, new forms of student 
mobilization arose to take their place. These protests started small, were usually 
concentrated in individual universities or departments throughout Brazil, and 
focused on the particular issues confronting students on individual campuses. Yet 
as the 1970s progressed, these students increasingly came into contact with one 
another, be it through regional meetings in states like Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, 
or through professional meetings like the national engineering or medical 
students’ conferences. In these meetings, they found students elsewhere were 
facing the same issues. Additionally, many of the students who led the activism of 
the 1970s were in the very fields that the military had promoted not only for their 
scientific production but for their apolitical nature.113
                                                 
 
 When the military could not 
fulfill its promises, they too became major actors in challenging the military’s 
policies in ways that had not taken place in the 1960s. As a result of these new 
forms of mobilization, students were able to establish the regional and national 
113  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Transcrição dos debates sobre o 
Estado, sociedade, democracia, e universidade,” “Exposição sobre as tendências da democracia 
contemporânea,” and “Conferencia para o SBPC sobre o desenvolvimento científico-acadêmico.”. 
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networks and consolidate the issues they faced, laying the groundwork for UNE’s 
eventual return at the end of the decade. 
 This discursive mobilization among students in the 1970s, which enabled 
them to  reconstitute their struggle and their organizations, marks an important 
and understudied period of student-state relations during the dictatorship. Even 
more significant, students used their specific educational demands to develop 
their own vision of the role of universities in Brazil and what constituted 
democracy and development in Brazil. In forming their visions, they used the 
same policies and practices that the government used to come to very different 
conclusions. Where the government saw democracy in the reduction of 
subversion on campuses and students’ abilities to attend “apolitical” universities, 
students living and studying in these conditions saw democracy as something that 
allowed students to meet and discuss whatever they wanted freely. They viewed 
education as a source of technical knowledge, and as a platform to champion  
issues of social justice. By condemning the commodification of their degrees, the 
poor quality of education, and the restrictions facing them as they entered the job 
market, they articulated their own notion of Brazilian development, one that relied 
not only on economic and professional advancement, but also on critical analysis 
and a broader understanding of each profession’s role in society. Where the 
government wanted acquiescent white-collar workers who helped push Brazil 
“pra frente,” students wanted conscientious white-collar workers. Where the 
government defined democracy as students fulfilling their professional roles for 
Brazil, students defined it as greater social mobility for the lower classes and the 
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opportunity for graduates to use their degrees and professions to make Brazil a 
more equal and just society. 
Students had been mobilizing around educational issues since the 
beginning of the decade, even as more radical student leaders who had been 
connected to UNE joined guerrilla groups, went underground, or were exiled. 
These efforts would grow and ultimately play a part in the national return to 
democracy in the 1980s. Beginning at the local level of the individual campus, 
students focused on repression via 477 and AI-5, poor university facilities, 
inadequate curricula, and awful food. However, as the decade progressed, 
students collaborated first at the regional and increasingly at the national level, 
with national seminars and professional meetings taking the place of the old UNE 
congresses. At the same time, as they redefined their struggles in response to the 
educational and political context of the 1970s, students implicitly acdopted some 
of the government’s policies. In acknowledging some of the government’s 
reforms and rejecting others, students and the military governments engaged in a 
“dialectic of culture” that shaped educational policy and debates over national 
development and focused on issues outside of torture and repression.  
At the end of Geisel’s administration in 1979, the political, economic, and 
social landscape of Brazil was radically different than it had been seven or even 
five years earlier. Geisel declared an end to AI-5, and a few months into his term, 
Figueiredo announced a full amnesty that not only allowed many exiles back into 
the country, but conveniently left torturers and other military leaders immune to 
prosecution or punishment. As the 1980s dawned, workers, professors, bankers, 
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politicians, and numerous other groups that had remained relatively quiet during 
the dictatorship suddenly began pushing for reforms and challenging the 
dictatorship as Brazil moved towards a return to democracy. The university 
system would continue to be a major center for dialogue, contestation, and 
collaboration between the students, the state, and civil sectors as the dictatorship 
entered its twilight.
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Chapter Six: Making Middle-Class Mobilization – Students, White-Collar 
Workers, and the Return to Democracy, 1979-1985 
When João Figueiredo took office in March 1979, he faced a radically 
different political and economic context than his predecessor, Ernesto Geisel, had 
confronted in 1974.  Efforts to control the process of abertura, or the political 
opening of military rule, led to increasing criticisms from an impatient society. 
The economic “miracle” of 1968-1973 was clearly over. The second oil crisis 
ravaged Brazilian industry and transportation More importantly, inflation had 
begun to spiral out of control, reducing the value of salaries and the purchasing 
power of Brazilians. Already in 1979, millions of workers in São Paulo had 
successfully gone on strike and negotiated directly with factory owners to 
improve their salary conditions, in turn bypassing the official state-controlled 
labor organizations in place since the Vargas years. Although the paulista 
metalworkers were the most visible group protesting against the worsening 
economy, doctors, engineers, architects, professors, teachers, bankers, and 
students also protested the worsening conditions and top-down democratization. 
As a result, Figueiredo spent much of his administration contending with workers, 
students, and opposition politicians on the one hand and intransigent military 
hardliners on the other. Not surprisingly, Figueiredo did not make university 
education his top priority in ways that his predecessors had. 
The process of abertura gave various social movements new opportunities 
to mobilize after a decade of repression.  In 1979, UNE finally began to 
reconstitute itself after more than ten years of persecution. Although it remained 
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an illegal organization, the  Figueiredo administration’s approach to the student 
union was “more a boycott than repression,” as one student put it.1 The 
scholarship on UNE’s internal operations as it returned is exhaustive, yet overly 
simplified, focusing only on the activists who led the reinvigorated UNE and 
providing triumphalist narratives that imply unity and inevitability.2
Additionally, for the first time since the 1964 coup, students were not the 
only ones affiliated with university campuses who were directly and broadly 
challenging the military regime. For all the attention that emerging social groups 
receive in their role during the dictatorship's final phase, mobilization by white-
collar workers is strangely underrepresented.
 My research 
shows that UNE’s return was bumpy, as it dealt with numerous internal struggles 
and external challenges. Even while UNE gradually returned, students drew on 
the lessons of the 1970s, employing successful alternatives to mobilization that 
did not depend on UNE. While student unity was far from a political reality, 
students from diverse ideologies continued to use the universities to discursively 
challenge the Figueiredo government. 
3
                                                 
1  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, p. 12. 
 Yet worsening economic 
 
2  For example, see Luis Henrique Romagnoli and Tânia Gonçalves, A volta da UNE: de 
Ibiúna a Salvador, (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega Ltda., 1979); Flamarion Maués and Zilah 
Wendel Abramo, organizers, Pela democracia, contra o arbítrio: A oposição democrática do 
golpe de 1964 à campanha de Diretas Já, (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006); 
and Araujo, Memórias Estudantis. In general, these narratives fall into two categories, either 
treating students as a homogeneous group forming a small part of broader mobilizations for 
democracy, most notably the Diretas Já! (“Direct Elections Now!”) campaign, or else involved 
with insular struggles pertaining to UNE’s return. While neither of these narratives is wrong, they 
overlook the nuanced matrix of struggles that students in the 1980s faced, failing to explore or 
analyze the complexities within the student movements or their relations to other sectors of society 
and the ways in which their quotidian demands formed part of the broader democratization 
processes in the 1980s. 
 
  273 
conditions began to directly affect the material lives of ex-students who had 
entered into the professional world. As the distensão and abertura continued, 
politicians, lawyers, journalists, doctors, workers, and others increasingly 
challenged the dictatorship’s power, drawing on the worsening economic 
conditions and blaming shortcomings in the military’s fiscal and educational 
policies for their woes. White-collar professionals drew on the worsening 
economic context to challenge a military dictatorship that had consistently told 
them a university education would be the key to improving Brazilians’ lives and 
national development.  
Opposition politicians were not blind to the opportunities these political 
activists both old and new could provide. They saw the opportunity to finally gain 
control of the government for the first time in over twenty years and began to 
appeal to university education and material expectations to gain support among 
students and disenchanted white-collar professionals. Even more moderate 
politicians took advantage of the new political climate to appeal to students, 
proclaiming the vitality and importance of the university system that Figueiredo 
seemed to be marginalizing. As a result, even while the regime tried to reduce its 
emphasis on universities and control the process of democratization, new actors 
affiliated with the university system rose up, joining students and guiding the 
regime to its end. 
Redirecting Attention, Reducing Responsibility: Figueiredo and the University 
System 
                                                                                                                                                 
3  Alfred Stepan, ed., Democratizing Brazil.  This collection of essays looks at studies into 
the participation of workers’ unions, community-based organizations, and the Catholic Church in 
the democratizing process, yet not one essay focuses on university students. 
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 When General João Baptista Figueiredo, the former head of the National 
Information Service (SNI) under Médici and vice-president under Geisel, took 
office in March 1979, economic troubles were already on the horizon. While 
Brazil’s GDP had continued to grow under Geisel, so had its foreign debt, which 
was already at $43.5 billion US dollars in 1979. Perhaps worse for many 
Brazilians, growing inflation had returned after the years of the economic 
“miracle.” By the end of 1979, inflation was at 77 percent, and by 1980, it hit 110 
percent, the highest it had ever been in Brazil, surpassing the inflation rates that 
had helped to bring down the Goulart administration in 1964. Simultaneously, the 
second global petroleum crisis hit Brazil particularly hard, as it was importing 
85.7 percent of its petroleum at a time when oil had jumped nearly seventeen US 
dollars in just one year.4
Figueiredo announced new economic and social measures designed to 
prevent the economy from spiraling out of control and provide greater 
opportunities to the poor in Brazil. In the social arena, he emphasized the need to 
aid poor and rural workers; Figueiredo must have also known that improving the 
income for the poorer sectors of society could only help the Brazilian economy by 
providing new consumers, although he did not argue this point explicitly. In his 
 As a result, the Figueiredo administration was left 
scrambling to address the growing economic crisis on multiple fronts as it came 
into office. 
                                                 
 
4  Inflation statistics from Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 206-207, 
214, and 230. Petroleum data from Jennifer Hermann, “Auge e Declínio do Modelo de 
Crescimento com Endividamento: O II PND e a Crise da Dívida Externa (1974-1984)” in Fabio 
Giambiagi, André Villela, Lavínia Barros de Castro and Jennifer Hermann, eds., Economia 
Brasileira Contemporânea (1945-2004), (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier Editora Ltda., 2005), pp. 258-
283. 
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efforts to reduce inequalities, Figueiredo unsurprisingly turned towards education. 
However, unlike his predecessors, university education would not be the vehicle 
for development. Where the previous four presidents of the federal government 
focused on university education and let states and municipalities worry more 
about primary and secondary education, the Figueiredo administration gave new 
rhetorical and financial aid to primary and secondary education. He condemned 
the gap between the high quality and organization of universities and public 
schools. The inequalities between higher education and primary education were 
indeed stark. Although 1.5 million Brazilians were enrolled in college in 1980, 
they were still a minority in a country where 80 percent of the population did not 
finish elementary school.5 Figueiredo’s Third National Development Plan (III 
PND) announced that the government’s focus would fall on “basic education and 
cultural promotion.”6 In discussing the problems “afflicting” Brazil, he declared 
children’s education to be “in first place”7 and deserving “special attention.”8
When the Figueiredo administration published the III PND in 1979, 
university education was all but absent. Médici’s I PND had emphasized the 
importance of the alliance between universities, industries, and research 
institutions, while Geisel’s II PND stressed the central role of universities, and 
especially graduate programs, in helping Brazilian development. By contrast, 
 
                                                 
 
5  “O Vestibular da Crise,” Veja 632 (15 October 1980), p. 28. 
 
6  III Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 1980/85, (herein, III PND), (Brasília: 
Secretária de Planejamento, 1981), pp. 48-49. 
 
7  João Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. III (5 vols.), (Brasília: Presidência da República, 1980-
1984), p. 307. 
 
8  Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. IV, Tomo I, p. 46. 
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Figueiredo’s III Plano instead saw Brazilian “progress” as hinging on primary and 
secondary education.9  This emphasis marked a broader shift in Figueiredo’s 
vision of how development was to proceed in Brazil. Figueiredo placed social 
equality at the center of his rhetoric and his goals, and made clear through his 
Plano that his government would extend primary and secondary education in rural 
areas, especially in the Amazonian basin and the Northeast, as well as in the 
favelas that surrounded urban centers like Rio and São Paulo. It was his 
administration’s hope that this extension would lead to “the reduction of social 
inequalities” by aiding “the population with the lowest income.”10  Universities, 
which had been the vehicle for development under previous plans and 
administrations, now saw their role restricted to one that would “strengthen and 
amplify the realm of scientific knowledge” via post-graduate programs and 
research, but little else.11 As the III PND made clear, Figueiredo’s government 
held that Brazil needed to seek “a structure of development compatible with better 
income distribution.”12
This was not empty rhetoric. Throughout 1982, Figueiredo used radio and 
television in each individual state, pledging money for primary and secondary 
education. He transferred 2.4 billion cruzeiros to Bahia for pre-school, 
 There was little room for universities within this particular 
vision of development.   
                                                 
 
9  For Médici, see I Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, pp. 58-59.  For Geisel, see II 
Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, pp. 73 and 99. 
 
10  III PND, 48.  
 
11  III PND, 71. 
 
12  III PND, 12. 
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elementary, and high school education, while Piauí saw 1.8 billion cruzeiros 
pledged for primary and secondary education.13
This is not to say that universities were left completely out in the cold 
when it came to federal funding or rhetoric; far from it. Figueiredo expressed 
concern over universities becoming “factories of frustrated professionals” who 
were unable to find jobs.
 Even smaller states like Acre 
received 70 million cruzeiros for secondary education alone. Additionally, this 
funding was directed solely towards states in the North and Northeast, where 
evasion rates and illiteracy were at their highest. 
14 Certainly, higher education in some states continued to 
receive the greatest amount of funding. In Ceará, he pledged one billion cruzeiros 
for primary education and 345 million for secondary, but he still pledged two 
billion cruzeiros (or roughly US$10 million) to the Federal University of Ceará.15 
Still, it was clear that elementary education would receive unprecedented 
attention from the federal government at the expense of higher education. In 1980 
alone, the National Fund for Educational Development, a branch of MEC, spent 
nearly 1.8 billion cruzeiros on primary education projects and only 284 million 
cruzeiros on higher education. Even then, the primary education spending was 
only 62% of what the government budgeted for projects for elementary schools 
that year.16
                                                 
 
 Making matters worse for the universities, the government’s education 
13  See Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. IV, Tomo I, pp. 46, 80, and 164, respectively. 
 
14  Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. I, p. 274. 
 
15  Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. IV, Tomo II, p. 417. For exchange values, see Coes, 
Macroeconomic Crises, Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964-1990, p. 197. 
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spending on education overall had already dropped precipitously, from 11.7% of 
the federal budget in 1967 to 4.28% of the budget in 1980, according to one 
report.17 The outlook was bleaker for universities than it had been in years. The 
worsening economy only guaranteed that greater cuts to educational spending 
would take place. Figueiredo himself admitted as much, blaming the downturn for 
the government’s need to redirect funds away from education, health, and 
housing.18 He was not even apologetic about it, proclaiming that education “[is] 
not, nor should [it] be, the responsibility of the government alone.”19
Figueiredo continued to pay lip service to the importance of universities in 
terms of training professionals and improving development. Yet he rarely backed 
up his rhetoric with concentrated political efforts to address the challenges facing 
universities. For the first time since the 1950s, the Brazilian executive was not 
placing universities at the center of its educational vision of national development. 
Students would not only use this shift to continue their push for university 
improvements; the new political context allowed for UNE’s return for the first 
time in eleven years, giving student politics a new dynamic as the 1980s dawned. 
 
Educational Issues and Re-Union: Student Demands and the Return of UN 
                                                                                                                                                 
16  COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.6, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Fundo Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento da Educação, “Execução Financeira – 1980,” n. pag. 
 
17  “UNE vai tratar da crise na universidade,” Veja 632 (15 October 1980), p. 30. Other 
scholars point to Brazil having one of the lowest percentages of government educational spending 
as well. The percentage of spending did not improve under the Figueiredo regime; in the mid-
1980s, education still received only 4.8% of the federal budget. See Coes, Macroeconomic Crises, 
Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90, p. 211 (fn. 2). Even though Brazil’s budget had actually 
increased during the dictatorship, education was seeing diminishing investment from the federal 
government.  
 
18  Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. II, p. 315-316. 
 
19  Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. II, p. 335. See also Discursos, Vol. III., p. 189. 
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 Many of the demands that students had adopted in the 1960s or 1970s 
continued into the 1980s. Yet the repressive atmosphere of the 1970s had 
transformed the ways in which students mobilized. The virtual extinction of UNE, 
the departure of many of the most radical leaders for armed guerrilla movements 
or exile, the increased presence of police on campuses, and the threat of the 
regime’s new widespread use of torture during Brazil’s “economic miracle” 
forced students to find new ways to voice their complaints.20
UNE’s path to reconstitution was anything but smooth, as it faced internal 
struggles between leadership groups, the presence of many students who actively 
participated but who continued to operate at the margins of partisan political 
struggles, and external pressures from the military. The push to bring UNE back 
began in 1976, when students held the first National Students’ Meeting (Encontro 
Nacional dos Estudantes, ENE). As Geisel isolated the hardliners in the military 
and made clear that he intended to continue his push to the eventual 
democratization of political society, students began to test the limits of their 
abilities to organize. While the regime tried to prevent these ENEs,
 Even though Geisel 
abruptly ended AI-5 in 1979, UNE did not immediately return as the major voice 
in student politics. Rather, UNE’s leadership found itself in a unique position; in 
order to reconstitute itself, it had to simultaneously appeal to its activist past while 
incorporating the more quotidian demands that students had made via alternate 
means of mobilization in the 1970s. 
21
                                                 
 
 they were 
20   See Chapter 5, above. 
 
21  For example, see CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Rolls I and II. 
  280 
unable to do so, and students began to discuss the return of UNE. Figueiredo’s 
general amnesty in 1979 allowed many activists to return to Brazil and many 
others to come out from hiding.22
Even so, roadblocks and setbacks marked UNE’s return. In 1980, the 
military regime tore down the former UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. 
Despite having been set on fire on April 1, 1964, the building remained standing, 
vacated for many years. Eventually, the government gave the building to the 
growing Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UniRio); however, the 
building’s continued presence also provided an important symbol to students, one 
which they quickly adopted.
 That year, students met and revived UNE, 
electing Rui César Costa Silva as their first president since the disappeared 
Honestino Guimarães. Although the regime continued to insist that UNE was 
illegal, it did little to directly stop these meetings, turning solely to surveillance 
instead of direct repression. 
23
                                                 
 
 Students decided they would re-take the building in 
April 1980, commemorating the date when they had been expelled from it sixteen 
years earlier. In response, military police suddenly occupied the building, 
evacuated UniRio students attending class, and declared the building 
“condemned.” In spite of widespread opposition from students, professors, 
22  The amnesty was quite controversial; rather than simply amnestying political prisoners, 
workers, or exiles, Figueiredo provided a general amnesty that also pardoned those in the military 
regime who were involved in torturing prisoners. The amnesty stirred deep feelings of ambiguity 
and anger that continue to this day, as Brazil remains one of the few Latin American dictatorships 
that has failed to hold responsible those military members who ordered or committed torture or 
disappearances. For the way the amnesty affected workers (an often-overlooked subject) and how 
the 1979 general amnsety fit within Brazil’s broader legacy of amnesties, see Ann M. Schneider, 
“Amnestied in Brazil, 1895-1985.” Ph.D diss., University of Chicago, 2008. 
 
23  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 251. 
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architects, and others, the mililtary police tore down the remnants of the building 
in order to strip the site of its symbolic importance. Victoria Langland 
convincingly argues that the move actually strengthened the student movement, 
giving it a major cause as it was reforming and providing it with “a huge wave of 
positive publicity and popular support.”24 However, the demolition also left 
students without a site for the organization until Leonel Brizola, João Goulart’s 
brother-in-law and the recently-elected governor of Rio de Janeiro state, gave the 
students a site in the city of Rio in 1983.25
The administration’s opposition to UNE became more persistent in 1981-
1982. That year, the organization elected twenty-five-year-old Francisco Javier 
Alfaya as its president. Alfaya’s family had moved from Spain to Brazil when he 
was just seven, and he was a naturalized citizen. However, the military regime 
immediately took steps to persecute him, threatening him with deportation for 
being a “foreigner” engaging in political activities. Police files outlining Alfaya’s 
political activism spread across multiple security agencies.
  
26
                                                 
 
 As a result, Alfaya’s 
mobility was limited, and other leaders within UNE suddenly found themselves 
24  Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 251. 
 
25  Find out when they were able to re-occupy 132 Praia do Flamengo later. 
 
26  For example, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3575-00045, Unidade 35, “Francisco Javier 
Alfaya;”  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3575-0045, Unidade 34, “Descumprimento das Leis,” 24 
March 1982; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 69-B, “Informe No. 1271/82-
SI/01/II/SR/DPF/RJ;” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 69-B, “Governo do Estado 
da Bahia, Secretaria da Segurança Pública, Gabinete do Secretário, S.I. – Serviço de Informações 
– Informação No. 0010/82-SSSI/SSP/BA – XIa Reunião do Conselho Nacional de entidades 
Gerais – CONEG-UNE;” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 75, SPE-DGIE-Pedido 
de Busca No. 0804 DI/DGIE – “Francisco Javier Alfaya,” 20 May 1982. For Alfaya’s account, see 
Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Javier Alfaya, pp. 15-18. 
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thrust into leadership roles they had not expected to assume.27 While UNE 
persevered and even used Alfaya’s persecution to further unify much in the way it 
had during the 1980 battle over its building,28
In order to overcome these obstacles and regain its status as a “national” 
movement, UNE’s leadership had to find ways to incorporate a broad swath of 
student support. In spite of the popular successes of rallying against the 
demolition of the UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and, to a lesser extent, the 
Alfaya presidency, building support was slow. Radicals’ efforts to appeal to 
students along partisan lines were not successful; given UNE’s absence and the 
crackdown on leftist political parties, an increasing number of students identified 
themselves as “independents,” free from  particular political groups.
 it also made for a turbulent year in 
which UNE effectively lacked a strong leader to lead the organization. 
29 Nor did 
such a position isolate individuals from leadership positions; ex-UNE president 
Aldo Rebelo recalled the presence of several independents on the UNE directorate 
and estimated that 90% of all UNE members were “independents.”30
Given this new context, appealing to partisan politics or abstract 
ideologies would not be enough to get radicals elected or to meet their agendas, a 
fact the newly reconstituted UNE leadership quickly learned. A 1979 secret police 
  
                                                 
 
27  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Clara Araújo, pp. 6-7. Araújo 
would be elected president of UNE in 1982-83, becoming the organization’s first woman 
president; to this date, there have only been two other woman presidents since Araujo’s term. 
 
28  See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Cara Araújo, p. 7 
 
29  For example, Renildo Calheiros, who eventually represented the PCdoB as the president 
of UNE from 1984 to 1986, ran for UNE as an independent. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, 
published interview with Renildo Calheiros, pp. 3-4. 
 
30  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, pp. 12-13. 
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report commented that “not even 30% of Brazilian university students” voted for 
the main candidates for UNE’s presidency;31
A comrade from MR-8 arrived and said: “The university assembly was a success, 
a major success, with eleven thousand students. It demonstrates the great 
mobilization of the students, their combativeness, their ability to fight.” And I 
said, “but what was the result of the assembly?” And he said, “Well, they voted 
against the strike.” 
 whether or not the 30% figure was 
accurate, the report indicated that university students were participating, even if 
not voting for the main candidates. Students proved this point more dramatically 
in 1981, when UNE’s leadership, headed by members of the left-wing 
Revolutionary Movement 8 of October (MR-8), decided that the time was right 
for a national strike. They held meetings throughout the country in order to 
present the argument for a strike and to let all students vote on the issue in an 
attempt to democratize the process. On campuses and in auditoriums throughout 
the country, thousands of students packed auditoriums to participate in the 
discussion and cast their votes. UNE’s president at the time, Aldo Rebelo, 
recalled the event well: 
32
Students were clearly willing to mobilize, but the majority were not interested in 
supporting radical agendas. UNE would have to modify its program if it was 
going to gain long-term support from students. 
 
                                                 
 
31  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4706, Unidade 137, “Protocolo No. 684,” 16 October 1979. 
 
32  For the anecdote, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, 
p. 12. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Amâncio Paulino de 
Carvalho, p. 20. 
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UNE found its answer in the educational demands that students were 
making throughout the country, regardless of ideological or political affiliation. 
Indeed, UNE’s revival depended in no small part in co-opting demands that 
students had been making since the 1970s. These demands accelerated in the 
1980s as Figueiredo’s administration reduced funding for and emphasis on higher 
education. Issues like funds, fees, and infrastructure appealed to a broader number 
of students than did more radical stances, once again making the quality and cost 
of education important issues to connect UNE’s leadership and its masses.  
Foremost among these demands was the ongoing issue of university fees. 
Students at the Federal Universities of Viçosa, Santa Catarina, and Ceará, as well 
as at Catholic universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Minas Gerais had all gone 
on strike in 1980 over increasing fees. Students at the Faculdade de Medicina de 
Barbacena also went on strike, outraged at the 68% increase in fees they had to 
pay,33 while students at PUC-RJ protested the monthly payments reaching a 63% 
increase, with over 1500 of the school’s 7000 students gathering at a meeting,34 
something that had never occurred in the 1970s.35
                                                 
 
 In Campos, students from 
multiple faculdades and universities joined with a newly-reconstituted UEE/RJ to 
complain that their monthly fees had gone up by 100% in 1980, and that many of 
33   “Estudante faz greve em Minas,” Jornal do Brasil, 26 March 1980. 
 
34  Jornal do Brasil, 19 March 1980. 
 
35  “MEC prevê redução nos protestos,” Jornal do Brasil, 2 April 1980, and “MEC revê 
cálculo das anuidades escolares,” Jornal do Brasil, 18 March 1980. 
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their colleagues were “quitting their studies, being unable to pay the absurd 
increases to which we are being submitted.”36
Even schools that were not striking were outraged over rising fees as the 
new academic year began in March 1980. In spite of Minister of Education 
Eduardo Portella’s insistence that he would not allow increases to supersede 38%, 
“a majority of the universities in Rio are covering fees registered up to 50%.”
  
37 
How were these contradictory figures possible? Students at the private 
Universidade Gama Filho in Rio de Janeiro insisted that their fees had gone up by 
50%, while the rectory insisted it was only 33%.  Both the rectory and the 
students were right; the students based their calculations on what they had paid in 
the previous academic year, while the rectory was making its calculation about 
the fees it could have charged in 1979 but did not.38
The high number of student mobilizations against fees led UNE to hold its 
Third National Seminar, where fees topped the agenda on student demands. UNE 
President Rui César defended the Seminar, saying it was necessary “for us to form 
unified actions for students throughout the country in order to prevent the increase 
in annuities.”
 Thus, Portella’s insistence 
that the fees never rise by more than 38% was based upon mathematical 
gymnastics. 
39
                                                 
 
 In its plan of action for 1982, UNE even insisted on “not allowing 
36  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, Mem. 03/80, DGIE – Serviço 
Regional de Investigações Especiais, Campos, 14 Jan 1981. 
 
37  “Universidade: usa a lei para burlar Ministro,” Jornal do Brasil, 16 March 1980. 
 
38  “Universidade: usa a lei para burlar Ministro,” Jornal do Brasil, 16 March 1980. 
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any increase in annuities beyond 25%.”40 UNE also adopted the issue of 
university restaurants, incorporating students’ complaints about the increase in the 
price of food even as fees went up and funding for universities dropped.41 In spite 
of secret police reports’ best efforts to insist that leftist leaders in UNE had 
“almost completely abandoned educational struggles to dedicate themselves to 
political-ideological proselytization,”42
 Old issues also gained a new urgency in the context of the Figueiredo 
administration. Funding was at the top of this list. Students had lamented the 
decline in education’s total percentage of federal spending for years, and 
Figueiredo in no way hid the fact that he was reducing spending on education 
even further in the face of Brazil’s economic crisis. Students responded by 
increasing the intensity of their own demands. For example, in 1980, nearly 
120,000 students in the city of Rio de Janeiro and another 10,000 from the interior 
part of the state, composing 90% of the student body in the entire state of Rio de 
Janeiro, went on a 24-hour strike to demand that 12% of the federal budget be 
 the opposite was taking place; leftists 
were once again incorporating long-standing quotidian demands into their 
platforms in order to gain broader support for UNE and its leaders. 
                                                                                                                                                 
39  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3577-00077, Unidade 41, “Análise de Propganda Adversa – 
Jornal Voz da Unidade [São Paulo] no. 14, 10-16 Jul, 1980,” 21 July 1980, p. 12. 
 
40  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 74, Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Secretaria 
de Estado de Segurança Pública, Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais, Departamento 
de Polícia Política e Social – Resenha Diária No. 207/81, 9 November 1981, p. 7. 
 
41  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, “Pedido de Busca No. 0351 DI/DGIE 
– Manifestações Estudantis,” 9 March 1982. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published 
interview with Clara Araújo, pp. 4, 7-8. 
 
42  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3576-00046, Unidade 36, “XXXIV Congresso da União 
Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE),” 8 October 1982. 
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spent on education.43 Students marched by Figueiredo’s dais during an 
Independence Day parade and unfurled a banner that read “Down with the 
dictatorship, funding for education!”44 showing the ways in which students 
continued to equate educational issues to the broader repressive context of 
military rule. Funding was so central to student demands that another student later 
felt it was important to emphasize that students did not “agitate only over 
funding,” a confession that reveals how dominant the issue had been in students’ 
struggles in the 1980s.45 Once again, in what was an effort to gain support among 
a wide number of students, UNE quickly adopted the 12% demand into its own 
platform.46 In 1981, UNE attempted to go straight to the new Minister of 
Education and Culture, Gen. Rubem Carlos Ludwig,47 in Brasília, to deliver a list 
of immediate demands from the students, including the twelve percent figure, 
while also calling for subsidies for private universities that the government did not 
control and a cap on fees.48
                                                 
 
  
43  In addition to the demands for verbas, they also demanded that anuidades not increase 
more than 35% per year.  Jornal do Brasil 11 September 1980. 
 
44  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário Rebelo, pp. 12-13. 
 
45  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário Rebelo, p. 15. 
 
46  For example, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3577-00077, Unidade 41, “Análise de 
Propaganda Adversa – Hora do Povo – 11/07 a 18/07/1980, No. 44;” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, 
Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, “Pedido de Busca No. 0115 DI/DGIE – Reunião do Conselho Geral 
de Entidades Gerais da UNE,” 27 January 1981;  and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, 
Pasta 69-A, “Informe No. 500/80-SI/SR/DPF/RJ  - “Seminário Nacional da UNE,” 31 July 1980. 
See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Aldo Rebelo, pp. 10, 12; 
Apolinário Rebelo, p. 6; and Gisela Mendonça, pp. 2, 8. 
 
47  Portella had stepped down in 1980, and Figueiredo appointed Ludwig as his second of 
what would ultimately be three Ministers of Education. 
 
48  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, DGIE, Pedido de Busca No. 0115 
DI/DGIE, 27 January 1981, p. 1-2. 
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Students also expressed increasing discontent with the quality of education 
they were receiving, something the government itself acknowledged was a 
problem.49 Students debated these issues at the XXXII Congress of UNE in 
Piricicaba, São Paulo, in October, 1980.50 It seems unlikely that this was some 
disingenuous move on UNE’s part; as students themselves, the leaders and the 
constituents they represented had plenty to lose or gain depending on the funding 
higher education received. However, given the large number of moderates and 
“independents” that UNE’s leadership had to confront and its failure in 
mobilizing students around ideas like general strikes, adopting funding as a major 
platform also provided UNE’s leadership with practical political benefits.51
Not all demands were carryovers from the 1970s. New issues arose in 
response to the military’s rhetoric and appropriated official terminology in order 
to give students’ demands legitimacy. Perhaps the best example of this is their use 
of “security” in their struggles. In 1981, students from nearly every federal 
university in Brazil gathered to discuss the issue of “security on the university 
campuses.”
 
52
                                                 
 
 In another rally in defense of Alfaya, students declared that the 
naturalized Brazilian president of UNE was not a threat; rather the real threat to 
49  For example, see “Verdade Amarga,” Jornal do Brasil, 3 January 1981, and “Pais já não 
querem filho médico,” Jornal do Brasil, 9 December 1981; for the government’s 
acknowledgement, see “Ludwig vai mudar sistema,” Jornal do Brasil, 17 January 1981. 
 
50  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, Informe No. 1028/80-
SI/SR/DPF/RJ, Ministro da Justiça, Dept. de Polícia Federal, Superintendência Regional no 
Estado do RJ, Serviço de Informações, 20 October 1980, p. 1. 
 
51  For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, pp. 
10, 12. 
 
52  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 74, SSP-RJ-DGIE-DPPS-Divisão de 
Operações, Resenha Diária No. 083, 12 May, 1981. 
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“national security” was Brazil’s “monstrous foreign debt.”53 When military police 
were sent to the campus of the Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
(UFRRJ) to ensure classes continued during a strike, students again turned the 
rhetoric of the state on its head, putting up a banner sarcastically thanking the 
police who had arrived “to protect us from the Rectory.”54 Rather than viewing 
the police’s arrival as another violation of campus autonomy, students co-opted 
the military’s own language of security to criticize both the police’s presence and 
the rector’s authoritarian practices. Students flipped the rhetoric of “security” that 
the military itself had used since the establishment of the National Security Law 
in order to critique the very regime designed to “secure” Brazil.55 And where the 
regime and its allies once characterized “real” students as those who only wanted 
to study, students also co-opted this rhetoric in the early 1980s, when they 
protested against annual fees by saying “We want to study, we don’t want to 
pay.”56
At the same time, students also exploited the military’s expansion of the 
university to their own ends. Where past governments wanted more universities 
and more students to further national development, more and larger campuses 
  
                                                 
 
53  In a curious stream of logic, students also cited Ronald Reagan as a threat to national 
security, saying the American president “attacks a nation that has resolved to defend its 
sovereignty, as he [Reagan] has done with the Malvinas Islands in Argentina.” See APERJ, 
Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75,  Pedido de Busca No. 0804 DI/DGIE – “Francisco 
Javier Alfaya,” 20 May 1982. 
 
54  “Polícia garante as aulas na Rural mas a greve continua,” Jornal do Brasil, 28 June 1980. 
 
55  For origins of the National Security Law, see Shawn C. Smallman, Fear and Memory in 
the Brazilian Military, 1889-1954.  
 
 
56  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 74, Ministério da Justiça – Informe No. 
501/81-SI/SR/DPF/RJ – “Assembléia de Estudantes,” 2 July 1981. 
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gave students more spaces where they could gather to discuss their issues and 
made government regulation and spying more challenging. As one student leader 
recalled, the regime’s emphasis on the need for centralized campuses and 
dormitories on new campuses provided students with a site “maintained by 
government funding,” yet providing students “another center for articulating” 
their demands.57
 Radical demands were not the binding fabric of student movements in the 
early 1980s. Certainly, UNE’s leadership continued to affiliate with more radical 
politics and ideologies; various leadership factions that contended for power 
continued to align themselves with the PCdoB, MR-8, and AP. Yet the majority 
of students only mobilized over more quotidian demands. Indeed, a student strike 
at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (Universidade Federal Rural do 
Rio de Janeiro, UFRRJ) reveals the ways in which a small personal tragedy could 
turn into a major movement that revealed deep-seated discontent among students 
and laid bare the divisions in and weaknesses of the state under military rule. 
  
From an Inconspicuous Accident to a National Cause: The 1980 UFRRJ Strike 
 In September 1979, George Ricardo Abdala, a student at the Federal Rural 
University of Rio de Janeiro, died when a speeding car struck the motorbike he 
was riding near UFRRJ’s campus. While tragic, Abdala’s death was not 
particularly notable in any political sense, marking yet another traffic fatality. 
Nonetheless, Abdala’s death sparked what some considered “the gravest impasse” 
58
                                                 
57  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, p. 5. 
 to face Figueiredo’s government and Minister of Education and Culture 
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Eduardo Portella during his brief tenure (1979-1981), offering a major test of the 
policy of abertura, demonstrating the importance of education in student demands 
and the new alternative ways students could and did mobilize outside of UNE’s 
structure. 
 Students at UFRRJ were “stunned by the violence of the loss of a 
colleague,” and held an assembly “to discuss internal problems,” including safer 
roads and “other improvements.”59 In their efforts, the students won the aid of 
professor Walter Motta Ferreira, who helped them schedule times and arrange 
locations for small meetings to discuss their relatively modest demands. These 
activities carried on until November, when Rector Arthur Orlando Lopes da Costa 
fired Mota for “irregular behavior”60 without initiating a formal inquiry by which 
Mota could defend himself. Indignant at Lopes’s arbitrary move, professors at 
UFRRJ voiced their solidarity with Mota and expressed their protest by turning in 
late their final grades. The authoritarian Lopes in turn launched a police inquiry 
into eighty-three professors for “crime against Public Administration” and 
bringing the Federal Police onto UFRRJ’s campus.61
                                                                                                                                                 
58  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: Manda ou sai,” Última Hora, 
25 April 1980. 
 Students went on strike, 
though it petered out quickly as they entered their three-month summer holiday. 
 
59  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Rural x MEC,” Jornal dos Sports, 1 
May 1980; “Portella: Manda ou sai,” Última Hora, 25 April 1980. 
 
60  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, Jornal dos Sports, “Rural pode reprovar 
os alunos grevistas,” 1 May 1980. 
 
61  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137: “Portella: Manda ou sai,” Última Hora, 
25 April 1980; “Rural x MEC,” Jornal dos Sports, 1 May 1980; “Crise da Rural: Portella critica 
ação da reitoria,” O Globo 30 April 1980; “Rural pode reprovar os alunos grevistas,” Jornal dos 
Sports 1 May 1980. 
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 When school began again in March 1980, however, the students at UFRRJ 
had not forgotten Abdala’s death or Mota’s firing.  On March 19th, the students 
again went on strike, demanding Mota’s reinstatement and an end to the police 
inquiry into the eighty-three professors, and insisting they would not end the 
strike until their demands were met. The students’ movement at UFRRJ was far 
from radical.  Unlike protests in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and elsewhere, 
there were no calls for an end to the dictatorship.  Indeed, far from expressing any 
antagonism towards the government, the students at UFRRJ actively sought 
MEC’s aid. Early in the strike, they went to Brasília, hoping to meet with Portella 
and to ask him to work “together with the rector, in hopes of reestablishing a 
dialogue with the professors and students.”62
However, their demands did not stop there. While Abdala’s death and 
Mota’s firing had set off the strike, the students were “already discontented” with 
the university over issues like the “level of teaching, inadequate curricula, [and] 
lack of material conditions on campus,” while other reports stated the strike 
derived from the students’ dissatisfaction with the lack of medical assistance at 
UFRRJ.
   
63
                                                 
 
  Even the unsympathetic security apparatus report commented on the 
broader demands students raised, declaring Abdala’s death a “pretext” for 
62  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Crise da Rural: Portella critica ação da 
reitoria,” O Globo 30 April 1980; see also “Portella: manda ou sai,” Última Hora 25 April 1980. 
 
63  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Rural pode reprovar os alunos 
grevistas,” Jornal dos Sports 1 May 1980, and “Sem Mediação,” Veja No. 614 (11 June 1980), p. 
23. 
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students who were “aiming for general improvements, which ranged from roads 
to teaching, fees, refreshment, jubilação, professorial salaries, etc.”64
 The students’ demands for infrastructural improvements were not unique, 
and they were not without justification. UFRRJ had not been included in any 
broad infrastructural planning at MEC for the entire 1975-1979 period, as the 
nation-wide programs for development and improvements in the federal 
universities excluded “isolated schools, the Rural Universities, and universities 
with fewer than 2000 students.”
   
65 The government did not schedule any specific 
infrastructural improvements for UFRRJ in 1980, even while funding projects at 
federal universities in Goiás, Maranhão, Rio de Janeiro, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul, 
Minas Gerais, and elsewhere.66  Even in 1981, MEC would only budget just over 
1000 cruzeiros for “equipment, material, and furniture.”67
 For its part, the government was at least somewhat sympathetic to the 
students’ complaints, particularly as they related to Mota’s firing. Media reports 
declared that Portella had been against the rector’s actions “from the beginning,” 
 In this context, 
students’ complaints about the lack of infrastructural improvements seemed more 
than just. 
                                                 
 
64  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Resenha – Universidade Federal Rural 
do Rio de Janeiro,” p. 1, no date. 
 
65  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC Caixa 198, Encadernado 9, Ministério da 
Educação e Cultura, Secretária de Ensino Suprior, Coordenadora de Desenvolvimento das 
Instalações do Ensino Superior – Execução Físico-Financeiro do Projeto Prioritáriao “Construção 
e Instalação de Campi Universitários no Período 1975/1979,” March 1980, p. 5. 
 
66  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC, Caixa 132, Encadernado 2, “Síntese da 
Execução 1980,” Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Educação, n. pag. 
 
67  COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC Caixa 159, M.1, “Realizações do MEC no 1º 
semestre de 1981,” Vol. I. 
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and that the Minister himself indirectly chastised Lopes by declaring that “a 
university should have the autonomy to resolve internal questions without having 
to turn to external agencies” like the Federal Police.68 Backing up his stance, 
Portella had a legal consultant look into the matter, and determined that “the 
rector’s strange affirmations are in conflict with the Federal Constitution and the 
Administrative Laws of the Country.”69 Additionally, the consultant found that 
Mota’s firing was “unconstitutional” and “illegal,” and that he should at the 
minimum be restored to his position while an official inquiry was established to 
investigate the rector’s claims against him.70
 However, Portella did not go as far as some would have liked. Ultimately, 
while he could issue statements and try to pressure Lopes, Portella insisted that 
“MEC does not have the power to intervene in the crisis,” and that only the CFE 
could do so through an administrative inquiry.
 Portella signed off on the findings, 
and the secretary of Higher Education sent the report to Lopes’s office on April 
15th. 
71
                                                 
 
 Some in the press were upset by 
this position, feeling that this was Portella’s chance to prove that Figueiredo and 
his administration were serious about  the process of abertura. When Portella sent 
his April 15 message to Lopes, Lopes shut down the university for twelve days, 
68  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Crise da Rural: Portella critica ação da 
reitoria,” O Globo 30 April 1980. 
 
69  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137,  “Portella: manda ou sai,” Última Hora 
25 April 1980. 
 
70  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: manda ou sai,” Última Hora 
25 April 1980. 
 
71  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Crise da Rural: Portella critica ação da 
reitoria,” O Globo 30 April 1980 
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immediately “ordered all of the food already prepared for the day thrown into the 
garbage,” and forbade the restaurant from allowing the students to make their own 
lunch.72 In the face of this open defiance, one newspaper pondered, “does the 
decision of the minister hold worth or not?”73 While Portella supported the 
process of abertura, newspapers declared that his failure to take a strong stance 
against Lopes and the “minority that still hopes for a return of the authoritarian 
university” had put the policy of abertura “in check.” The strike at UFRRJ that 
had begun with a student’s death in an auto accident had suddenly become a 
referendum on whether or not the Figueiredo administration would be able to 
control the abertura in the face of an “authoritarianism that in recent times has 
castrated many of our universities.”74
 While national media outlets saw the students’ strike at UFRRJ as nothing 
less than a test of abertura, there is no evidence that students themselves saw their 
struggles as anything more than a peaceful effort to restore a professor they felt 
had been wrongly fired for trying to help them address perfectly legitimate 
complaints in the wake of the death of a colleague. As MEC became more 
involved in trying to mediate between the rectory and the striking students, of all 
the points and issues they raised during their strike, Mota’s firing and the inquiry 
into the 83 professors continued to be the sticking point. Neither the rector nor the 
students would back down on this issue. Only in June, after twenty days of 
 
                                                 
72  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: manda ou sai,” Última Hora 
25 April 1980. 
 
73  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: manda ou sai,” Última Hora 
25 April 1980. 
 
74  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Rural x MEC,” Jornal dos Sports, 1 
May 1980. 
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negotiations that MEC moderated, did Lopes finally agree to rehire Mota. 
However, the students rejected this concession, insisting they would only end the 
strike when the professor returned to teaching.75 Upon this rejection, MEC 
withdrew as moderator, and the students lost “the support that they had received 
from the federal government since the beginning of the movement.”76
 Lopes and his supporters in the University’s Council tried to reframe the 
question as a matter of the students violating the law. The rector defended his 
launching of an inquiry into the eighty-three professors, saying their actions 
constituted a crime because they worked for a federal university, and thus under 
the auspices of the federal government. Even while journalists declared Lopes’s 
actions were putting the policy of abertura at risk, Lopes saw himself as serving 
on the front lines in defending political opening.  He insisted that “in order to 
guarantee abertura, the first condition is to respect the Laws.”
 
77 One of his 
assessors also took this viewpoint, insisting that the return of Mota and the end of 
the inquiry into the other eighty-three professors was “practically impossible,” as 
the rector and his supporters “only want to follow the law.”78
                                                 
 
 Lopes also tried to 
re-paint the picture of his relationship with MEC, insisting it was “the best 
possible” and that they were in “perfect harmony,” even while Portella was 
75  “Sem Mediação,” Veja No. 614 (11 June 1980), p. 23. 
 
76  “Sem Mediação,” Veja No. 614 (11 June 1980), p. 23. 
 
77  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137,  “Reitor diz que abertura não está sendo 
contrariada.”  Jornal dos Sports, 1 May 1980. 
 
78  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Rural pode reprovar os alunos 
grevistas,” Jornal dos Sports 1 May 1980. 
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declaring his dissatisfaction with the way Lopes was acting “to resolve the 
crisis.”79
 Although high-ranking members of the federal government seemed to be 
against Lopes’s actions, some sections of the security apparatus sided with the 
rector. A report in the files of the DSI insisted that not only was Abdala’s death a 
mere “pretext,” but that the professors were affiliates of the “extreme left” 
seeking to “undo the government’s action.”
 
80 According to the anonymous report-
writer, the professors were the ones to blame for “putting at risk the graduation of 
163 students, holiday courses, and even matriculations,” and their postponement 
of turning in grades left the rectory with no choice but to act against the 
professors. The report’s author even put a positive spin on the rector’s closing of 
the university for twelve days at the end of May, saying that Lopes did so only to 
prevent the students from exceeding the number of absences allowed before 
students were suspended, as outlined in law 5.540/68, the University Reform.81
 The strike at UFRRJ continued successfully even as strikes in São Paulo 
and elsewhere were short-lived. As the strike entered its fourth month, professors 
also adopted some of the issues students had raised in the previous months. They 
“pointed to the dissatisfaction of the student body over the administration of the 
 
                                                 
 
79  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Reitor diz que abertura não está sendo 
contrariada.”  Jornal dos Sports, 1 May 1980. 
 
80  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Resenha – Universidade Federal Rural 
do Rio de Janeiro,” pp. 1-3. 
 
81  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Resenha – Universidade Federal Rural 
do Rio de Janeiro,” p. 3. 
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university, which is well-respected throughout the world,”82
the administration always alleges the lack of resources to purchase school 
materials, seeds, animals, animal feed, and to reactivate the Model Farm, for 
example – while the Rector and Vice-Rector abandon the official residences 
within UFRRJ’s campus to live in Rio de Janeiro.  They go and return every day 
from Rio in separate official cars. […] Who is paying for the gasoline?”
 as a major cause of 
the strike.  They reminded the public that  
83
Even while students had scaled back on the general complaints of issues touching 
upon funding, infrastructure, and administrative abuse at UFRRJ, professors 
adopted many of the same issues, criticizing both the regime’s failure in providing 
adequate infrastructure or competent administrators in the university system. 
   
 Nor were professors alone. Parents took a very active role in the strike, 
understanding their children’s future and social mobility to be at stake. In June, a 
group of parents made an attempt “to contact the MEC commission…to establish 
a form of action that could bring an end to the strike.”  Parents who were not 
originally invited to participate were offended until they were formally invited, 
suggesting that some parents actively sought to confront MEC over the issue.84 
After a judge granted habeas corpus and ordered the police to UFRRJ’s campus to 
protect students who wanted to attend class, both students and parents complained 
about the police presence on the autonomous university campus.85
                                                 
82  “Alunos da Rural apela a Figueiredo,” Jornal do Brasil, 24 June 1980. 
 And when 
 
83  “Alunos da rural apela a Figueiredo,” Jornal do Brasil, 24 June 1980. 
 
84  “MEC medeia na crise da Rural,” Jornal do Brasil, 20 May 1980. 
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students finally decided to end the strike on July 4th, they and the professors 
“applauded” parents for playing “a very important role, making gestures towards 
the different levels of government to which they had access.”86
 The 1980 UFRRJ strike had been one of the longest-lasting student strikes 
up to that time in during the sixteen years of military rule. Although a small 
campus, the students at UFRRJ captured the nation’s attention; regular reports 
appeared in newspapers and in national magazines like Veja. While strikes in São 
Paulo and Minas Gerais petered out, the students at UFRRJ continued to mobilize, 
ultimately succeeding in getting Mota re-hired and revealing the cracks in MEC’s 
ability to control its rectors. Yet students had not mobilized around radical 
demands associated with leftist ideologies, in spite of what the secret police files 
said. Rather, the rector’s harsh response to students upset by the death of a 
colleague unleashed a wave of mobilizations that revealed the government’s 
ability to control its more authoritarian rectors on campuses and exposed the 
latent issues facing Brazilian universities’ infrastructure. Lopes’s crackdown on 
students and Mota brought professors into the fray, and even parents joined in 
fighting for their children’s education. The 1980 UFRRJ strike reveals the 
complex ways in which students mobilized without UNE and revealed the 
divisions behind the “masks of state” under military rule. Additionally, 
professors’ involvement was a new factor, but it was not an isolated event. As the 
military dictatorship came to an end, professors, along with other white-collar 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
85  “Alunos da Rural voltam às aulas e polícia deixa o campus,” Jornal do Brasil, 8 July 
1980. 
 
86  “Alunos na Rural recomeçam segunda-feira,” Jornal do Brasil, 5 July 1980. 
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workers, became an increasingly powerful force in politics and society, and it is to 
their mobilizations and causes we now turn. 
A New Social Group Enters the Fray: The Mobilization of White-Collar 
Professionals 
Ever since the 1930s, universities had served as important physical and 
discursive sites for students to shape politics and society and challenge 
governments. Yet university employees had been relatively inactive as a group. 
This situation changed as the dictatorship entered its twilight. White-collar 
workers who had attended universities in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly 
frustrated by the economic turmoil and stagnant job market of the 1980s. Military 
leaders’ equating of university education to development and social mobility in 
the 1970s had led many students to believe that their degrees would lead to 
unprecedented material gains, something that the economic “miracle” of 1969-
1973 seemed to support. By 1980, these former students had grown impatient; 
they met their end of the bargain in getting degrees in fields like medicine and 
engineering, and yet here the military dictatorship under Figueiredo seemed to be 
failing to hold up its end of the deal. As a result, the 1980s witnessed the 
mobilization of unprecedented numbers of white-collar professionals. University 
professors mobilized against the government’s salary adjustments and the 
infrastructural challenges they confronted. Medical residents at university 
hospitals and university-trained doctors also lashed out against the government, 
mobilizing in protests and strikes over the same issues. Engineers, bankers, and 
even architects criticized the administration both for the economic and political 
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context. Where students had once been the sole group to use the university system 
and the benefits it offered (or was supposed to offer) to challenge the government, 
a large number of middle class professionals now joined in the growing chorus 
criticizing the government. 
In this new wave of mobilizations, university professors were at the 
forefront. Faculty discontent had begun simmering in 1978, when professors at 
private universities in Rio de Janeiro and at the University of São Paulo held a 
“day of protest” demanding better salaries and more government spending on 
education.87 Yet these remained isolated incidents until the general amnesty of 
1979, when many professors who had been removed from their positions during 
the previous fifteen years were able to return to the universities to teach, bringing 
new critical voices back into the university system. At the same time, many other 
professors grew disenchanted with the ways that the university reform had 
translated in practice, while still others objected to the ongoing and unnecessary 
use of repression against movements that questioned the dictatorship. The 
worsening economy provided the breaking point for professional inaction. In 
1979, private university professors in Rio de Janeiro launched the first professors’ 
strike in the country’s history. The origins were far from radical; as one 
participant put it, “the demands basically were about…what people generically 
called the [government’s] salary adjustment,” which consisted of what was 
effectively a “compression of our salaries” in an effort to curb inflation.88
                                                 
 
 
87  CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 2, Photo 0099, and CPDOC, NL d 78.10.17. 
 
88  Personal interview, P.C.S., 17 October 2007. 
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Although designed to help the economy, the adjustment immediately reduced the 
value of middle-class incomes. 
It was not long before public university professors joined their colleagues 
in private universities. As the government tried to cut spending, federal university 
professors, who were technically federal employees, found themselves 
increasingly under economic pressure, caught between a reduction in government 
spending and inflation rates with which their salaries could not keep up. In 1980, 
professors from nineteen federal universities and seven private universities went 
on strike to demand a salary readjustment every semester to dull the impact of 
inflation on their incomes. In Rio de Janeiro, three hundred faculty members from 
UFRJ gathered to insist the government invest in higher education. At the rally, 
engineering professor Luís Pinguelli Rosa declared that “the government has 
funds to address our demands. It is time MEC better distribute its resources.”89
These strikes led to professors gathering and forming the first nation-wide 
professors’ organization, the National Association of Higher Education Docents 
(Associação Nacional dos Docentes de Ensino Superior, ANDES). The 
organization’s function was to fight for professors’ causes, as well as to “connect 
professors’ fights to the struggles of other workers.”
  
90
                                                 
 
 Nor were these empty 
words; in 1982, ANDES sent a letter to the Organization of Brazilian Lawyers 
(Organização de Advogados do Brasil, OAB) congratulating the lawyers on the 
89  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Jornal do Brasil, 10 September 1980, 
and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Tribuna da Imprensa, 10 September 1980. 
 
90  “História - Sindicato Nacional dos Docentes das Instituições de Ensino Superior.” 
http://www.andes.org.br/historia.htm. Accessed 9 November 2009. 
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conference and presenting the professors’ demands and ideas to the lawyers.91 
Professors quickly joined ANDES, including many who had actively resisted the 
military government in the 1960s.92
In addition to salary demands, professors also began to incorporate some 
of the students’ agendas into their own professional mobilizations, creating yet 
another group within the universities that was challenging military policy on 
campuses. In 1981, ANDES made the demand that 12% of the federal budget be 
dedicated to education a central part of their platform.
 
93 Professors also demanded 
“free and public education” for Brazilians. The National Union of Education 
Workers (União Nacional os Trabalhadores em Educação, UNATE) joined their 
higher-education colleagues in these demands as well.94 Professors also called for 
a restructuring of the university system, even joining with UNE, the 
Confederation of Teachers of Brazil (Confederação dos Professores do Brasil, 
CPB) and UBES in launching a “National Campaign for Free Public 
Education.”95
                                                 
 
 University professors also called for better infrastructure in the 
91  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3588-0058, Unidade 81, “IX Conferência Nacional dos 
Advogados,” 13 May 1982. 
 
92  Personal interview, J.F., 19 June 2007. 
 
93  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45/5711, Unidade 44, “SNI – Agência Central – Apreciação 
Sumária (Campo Interno) – 9 Jan 1982.” 
 
94  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, “SNI – Agência Central – Apreciação 
Sumária (Campo Interno) – 9 Jan 1982.” This seems to be one of the few instances in which 
schoolteachers and professors shared a platform; indeed, in the police records that I came across, 
schoolteachers rarely appear in political or social mobilizations. This is not to say that they were 
not politically engaged – indeed, the fact that they had a national union indicates a political 
awareness and activism via class-based interests and organizations – but rather that they simply 
did not appear in the documents that I came across in the archives. 
 
95  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, Ministério da Justiça, “Informe No. 
922/82-SI/SR/DPJ/RJ – Campanha Nacional pelo Ensino Público e Gratuito,” 6 August 1982. 
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university system and for the “democratization” of the university system, issues 
that had occupied students since the 1950s. 96 Indeed, by 1981, the professors 
seemed to have eclipsed students as a threat to the government. The SNI predicted 
“greater mobilization” of professors in 1982, building on “a campaign that has 
already spread throughout the majority of Brazilian universities.”97 Another secret 
police report expressed concern that,  “unlike the student movements, the 
professors’ movements seemed to worsen in 1981,” a fair assessment given that 
faculty at nineteen federal universities and another ten isolated colleges went on 
strike in November 1981 alone.98
 These protests raised a new issue for the military government. The strikes 
of the late-1970s and early-1980s marked the first time that the employees of the 
federal university system had directly challenged the state via work stoppages. 
The importance of these strikes and the fact that Minister Ludwig met with them 
was not lost on observers at the time. The Jornal do Brasil pointed out that 
Ludwig’s meeting with representatives from the National Strike Command 
marked the first time “ever” that one of the military regime’s ministers had met 
with a “class-based organization” to resolve a work stoppage.
  
99
                                                 
 
 The discontent 
with military politics had spread into official state positions, making this the first 
96  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-B, Ministério da Justiça “Informe No. 
236/82-SI/SR/DPF/RJ,” and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, DGIE Informe 
No. 0875 – “Congresso de Docentes/Universidade Federal Fluminense,” 3 June 1982. 
 
97  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, “SNI – Agência Central – Apreciação 
Sumária (Campo Interno) – 9 Jan 1982.” 
 
98  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, Ministério da Justiça, “Informação 
No. 045/82-SI/SR/DPF/RJ – Greve dos docentes das Instituições de Ensino Superior Federais 
Autárquicas – Nível Nacional,” 28 January 1982. 
 
99  “Ludwig recebe grevistas e faz promessas,” Jornal do Brasil, 3 December 1980. 
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time that government bureaucrats in any capacity had directly challenged the 
military policies as a professional collective.  
 Nor were professors the only threat to the Figueiredo administration’s 
handling of the university system. As the case of Rector Lopes at UFRRJ and the 
increase of annual fees that exceeded MEC’s 25 percent cap made clear, the 
dictatorship could and did see its authority undermined by its own employees 
without resorting to protests. The internal disagreements could even reach the 
highest level of the executive branch, as when MEC and professors collaborated 
on a project to address their financial issues, only to have Figueiredo refuse to 
send the project to Congress for a vote.100
Doctors and medical residents in university hospitals also began striking in 
1979, when their salaries, like those of their teaching colleagues, began rapidly 
“deteriorating.”
 These conflicts revealed the 
weaknesses of the state under military rule in the final years of military rule; the 
fact that these groups, particularly professors, were now major actors in 
mobilizations demonstrated yet another way that universities had come to be 
important to national politics in ways that the military did not anticipate. Nor were 
they the only group of white-collar professionals who mobilized against 
Figueiredo in the 1980s when their economic expectations were not met. 
101
                                                 
 
 Resident doctors at the State and Municipal Hospital of Rio de 
Janeiro rallied in front of the Ministry of Labor, decrying the “demeaning reality 
100  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Tribuna da Imprensa, 10 September 
1980. 
 
101  Personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007. 
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of job and salary insecurity” and demanding an increase in their income.102 They 
blasted the administration’s “threat to end medical residency in university 
hospitals even without improving the chaotic conditions that one finds in 
education in this country.”103 In 1980, doctors and nurses at the university 
hospital at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro went on a semi-strike, 
attending only to “cases in which lives were at risk” or those who required 
treatment that “could not be completed at another hospital.”104 The following 
year, their counterparts in Belo Horizonte walked out, demanding a “national 
salary campaign” to improve their incomes.105
 Other members of the middle class who increasingly felt the pinch of 
inflation joined their white-collar colleagues in organizing and challenging the 
Figueiredo government. Engineers spoke out against the deteriorating conditions 
resulting from Geisel’s and Figueiredo’s policies. They demanded new categories 
to define skill level and pay for engineers.
 
106
                                                 
 
 At the VI National Seminar of 
Engineering Students, students and professors alike lamented their inability to 
find jobs; one report claimed that ten thousand of São Paulo’s sixty thousand 
engineers were unemployed, while another manifesto commented on the poor 
education that left engineers unemployed and only equipped with the ability to 
102  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, Untitled Document.  
 
103  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, Untitled Document. 
 
104  “Professores fazem ato para explicar greve à população,” Jornal do Brasil, 1 December 
1980. 
 
105  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, SNI-Agência Central, “Apreciação 
(Campo Interno),” 9 January 1982. 
 
106  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, “Resumo das Atividades Diárias no. 
69/79,” 16 April 1979. 
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“press a button.” They insisted engineering should return to basic programs like 
alternative energy, land management, and cheaper construction, all in the name of 
“liberation of the small farmers and workers,”107 revealing a cross-class agenda. 
At the same conference, professors criticized the military’s new emphasis on 
creating nuclear power plants, indicating that not every Brazilian was swept up in 
the wave of nationalist sentiment regarding nuclear energy.108
Although not as frequent, other middle-class based groups began 
mobilizing in their own financial and professional interests. In 1979, bankers in 
Rio de Janeiro began organizing, once again demanding an improvement in their 
salaries and rejecting their bosses’ counterproposal and threatening to strike if 
their demands were not met.
  
109 Even architects joined in opposing the military; 
while they did not mobilize over salaries, they did criticize the police’s decision to 
tear down the UNE headquarters in 1980.110
These various manifestations and strikes revealed the ways in which the 
military’s support among middle class sectors had eroded. Certainly, the high-
  
                                                 
 
107  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Ministério da Justiça, “Informação 
no. 203/80-SI/SR/DPF/ES – VI Seminário Nacional de Estudantes de Engenharia,” 19-23 July 
1980. 
 
108  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Ministério da Justiça, “Informação 
no. 203/80-SI/SR/DPF/ES – VI Seminário Nacional de Estudantes de Engenharia,” 19-23 July 
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Skidmore, Military Politics in Brazil, p. 195. 
 
109  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, “Resumo das Atividades Diárias no. 
68/79,” 11 April 1979. 
 
110  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3577-00077, Unidade 41,“Voz da Unidade – Ano I, No. 14,” 5-
11 June 1980. 
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profile deaths of individuals like Vladimir Herzog, Manoel Fiel Filho, and Rubens 
Paiva in the 1970s had begun that erosion. However, it was not until their fiscal 
and material status was threatened that white-collar professionals took to the 
streets to defend class interests and demand a return to democracy. Strikes that 
were designed to “increase public awareness”111
Sowing the Seeds of Oppositional Politics: Politicians and Education, 1979-
1985 
 were remarkably successful in 
giving these white-collar workers a high profile in national politics, and 
opposition politicians quickly took advantage of this dissatisfaction. They adopted 
the banners of economic troubles and broken universities to criticize the regime 
and gain support among the increasingly mobilized Brazilian electorate, students 
and workers alike. 
While formal political opposition from the MDB had accelerated since 
Ulysses Guimarães ran as a “counter-candidate” to Ernesto Geisel in 1974, 
opposition politicians finally cemented their ties to the Brazilian people in the 
final years of the military dictatorship. The economy, combined with the 1979 
general amnesty and political opening, had left Figueiredo susceptible to attacks 
from opposition politicians, and they did not let the opportunity pass to criticize 
the regime for its failings. In attempting to seek support, politicians tried to build 
their base by stressing the importance of universities in national development and 
directly appealing to university students themselves. These politicians cited the 
role that university students had played in opposing the military government and 
                                                 
 
111  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Jornal do Brasil, 10 September 1980. 
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blamed the economic turmoil on the government’s failure to fund and stimulate 
universities. As a result, for the first time since the beginning of the coup, 
universities became discursively valuable tools for the opposition to challenge the 
military’s authority. 
The political context under Figueiredo was unlike any other during the 
twenty-one years of military rule. Figueiredo was determined to complete the 
project of abertura, but he was equally determined that the military government, 
and not civilian sectors, would control the speed and methods. In 1980, 
Figueiredo launched an attempt to strengthen the military’s political platform 
while undermining opposition. Ever since 1965’s Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), 
two parties had governed Brazil: the pro-government National Renovation 
Alliance (ARENA) and the oppositional Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). 
In the mid-1970s, the MDB had gained increasing power, serving as an umbrella 
party for leftists and former communists as well as more moderate politicians who 
opposed the military regime. As a result, the MDB began to strengthen its 
presence in Congress, making legislating from the executive branch more difficult 
for Geisel. In response, shortly after taking office, Figueiredo attempted to 
weaken the opposition by fragmenting it. In 1980, he announced the dissolution of 
ARENA and MDB and allowed multiple political parties to form. As a result, 
ARENA became the Social Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Social, 
PDS), with the same membership, ideals, and platforms as ARENA.  
While the PDS provided the pro-government party continuity, the MDB 
did indeed fracture, as Figueiredo had hoped. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who 
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had played a major role in the São Paulo metalworkers’ strike in 1979, quickly 
split off and organized the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), 
based in São Paulo and organized around workers’ rights and pay. Leonel Brizola, 
the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul and brother-in-law of the late João 
Goulart (who had died in exile in 1977), tried to reassume the mantle of the 
Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB), the party that Vargas 
had created and that Brizola and Goulart had represented prior to the coup. While 
most acknowledged that Brizola was the rightful heir to the party, the electoral 
courts that determined the final eligibility of political parties (and that were 
stuffed with military appointees) decided to give the party to Vargas’s niece, Ivete 
Vargas. As a result, Brizola formed the Democratic Labor Party (Partido 
Democrático Trabalhista, PDT). The People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) 
brought together liberal members of ARENA and moderate members of the 
MDB, but by 1983, the PP was extinct, with its members joining the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). The PMDB, in a nifty rhetorical trick, 
followed the law declaring that new parties had to have “party” in their name, but 
by keeping the “MDB,” it was able to perpetuate its identity as the main historical 
opponent to the military regime, something that dissatisfied Figueiredo but that he 
could do little to stop. Nonetheless, it seemed that Figueiredo’s efforts to splinter 
the opposition had succeeded; while one pro-government party (the PDS) 
continued in the wake of ARENA’s dissolution, five oppositional parties broke 
out from the MDB’s umbrella.112
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Yet fragmentation had little effect on the opposition’s ability to criticize 
the educational policies of the military governments past and present. In a speech 
on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1979, Congressman Álvaro Valle 
expressed his concerns over Brazil’s economy and society. Drawing on his own 
definition of “Christian Democracy,” Valle voiced his worry over the mounting 
troubles facing the middle-class, whose buying power was greatly reduced thanks 
to expanding inflation and debt. In order to address these social needs, Valle 
wanted educational reform that would “democratize” society by providing 
“knowledge” to all Brazilians, rather than simply increasing the number of 
positions available in a university system that did not serve the majority of 
Brazilians. Valle declared the government’s satisfaction with the expansion of 
educational opportunities as a “false impression” that ignored the poor quality of 
education and continued to shut many Brazilians out of the highest levels of 
learning.113 Congressman Walter Silva declared that the government was run by 
“half a dozen fascists” who were using education to “impose” their ideas on the 
people.114
                                                                                                                                                 
112  The maoist Communist Party of Brazil and leninist Brazilian Communist Party remained 
illegal. Members of the PMDB and other parties continued to affiliate ideologically with these 
parties, and the PCdoB and PCB continued to function at the ground level, but they were not yet 
official electoral parties yet, meaning members running for office had to align with one of the 
legal parties. 
 Congresswoman Heloneida Studart pointedly commented that Brazil 
was spending less on education than Bolivia, a “small country recently devastated 
 
113  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, Dep. Álvaro Valle, “Democracia Cristã,” 
1979. 
 
114  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE No. 4940 – “Debate sôbre 
Ensino Pago em Universidades Federais’ em Campos RJ,” 16 May 1979. 
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by the dictatorship of cocaine.”115 Even Lula, who never finished school, much 
less attended a university, had begun speaking out, demanding free public 
education for all Brazilian students, singling out the universities specifically, 
while the PT platform criticized MEC for its “financial tightening and cultural 
manipulation” of Brazil’s universities.116 And Aurélio Cance Júnior, a mayor and 
PT member from Mato Grosso do Sul, accused Figueiredo’s second Minister of 
Education, Rubem Ludwig, of turning MEC into “just another of your security 
organs.”117
Another, more direct way that politicians used education to challenge 
Figueiredo was by going directly to students themselves. When UNE held its 
XXXIV Congress in Piracicaba, São Paulo in 1982, the PMDB mayor of the city 
not only provided them with buildings to use for the Congress; he spoke to UNE, 
“affirming that UNE is part of the city” and that the students’ resistance to 
Figueiredo was “a victory for us Brazilians.”
 In making these observations, politicians tacitly appealed to students 
by adopting some of their demands. After all, students had been protesting against 
annual fees and demanding more funding for education and a more democratized 
university system for well over a decade.  
118
                                                 
 
 A year earlier, over 400 students 
115  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE No. 4940 – “Debate sôbre 
Ensino Pago em Universidades Federais’ em Campos RJ,” 16 May 1979. Studart did not make 
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  313 
gathered at the MEC building in Rio de Janeiro in 1981 to protest the regime’s cut 
in funding for universities. Congressman Raymundo de Oliveira attended and 
received “loud applause” from students when he spoke.119 Similarly, 
representatives from the PTB, PT, and PMDB, as well as leftists from the PCdoB 
and MR-8, joined students at the Law School in Amazonas, where they discussed 
opposition to Figueiredo. Leonel Brizola, elected governor of Rio de Janeiro in 
1982, joined the campaign for legalizing the still-illegal UNE.120 And when the 
military police tore down the remnants of UNE’s headquarters in 1980, politicians 
from the PT, PP, PMDB, PDT, and PTB all spoke out against the destruction of 
the headquarters and the repression of students’ “peaceful protests.” Even joined 
by Congresswoman Djalma Bessa, a representative from the pro-government 
PDS, spoke out against the act, admitting “that there were ‘excesses’ in police 
repression of students and politicians who protested against the demolition of 
UNE’s building,” although she fell short of blaming the government for such 
repression.121
Already in 1980, the PMDB held a national seminar for those university 
students who had registered in the party. In a speech to the students, Ulisses 
Guimarães praised the students for being the “principal” actors who had 
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Delegacia do MEC no Rio de Janeiro – DEMEC/RJ – Assessoria de Segurança e Informações – 
ASI – DEMEC/RJ – Mensagem Direta No. 05.31391/ASI/DEMEC/RJ/81; Assunto – 
Concentração de estudantes no Prédio do MEC (Rio).” The police file fails to note what exactly 
was the content of de Oliveira’s speech, but it does comment on the students’ overwhelmingly 
positive support for his address, singling it out over other speakers’ comments. 
 
120  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3576-00046, Unidade 38, “Instalação da Sede da UNE no Rio 
de Janeiro/RJ,” 3 June 1983. 
 
121  AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3577-00047, Unidade 41, “Análise de Propaganda Adversa – 
Grande Imprensa 13 a 19 Jun 1980,” 20 June 1980. 
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challenged the regime, and applauded their ability to complete their studies even 
while participating in national politics. This oppositional stance seemed to fit the 
PMDB’s goals perfectly, according to Guimarães; as he put it in his speech, “the 
PMDB needs you, students of Brazil, but you need the PMDB too.” Guimarães 
envisioned a partnership in which each group helped the other: students helped 
the party by providing their youth and their history in challenging the regime and 
ushering the PMDB into power, while the PMDB would help students by creating 
more space for them to politically engage and addressing students’ demands at the 
national level. 122
Nor did politicians limit their support to students. When professors began 
demanding salary readjustments in 1980, politicians from the PDT, PT, and 
PMDB all supported the professors’ demands.
 
123 They made clear to students and 
faculty alike that they sympathized with their educational causes. It seems likely 
that this was a calculated move to gain political support in a new multi-party 
climate, yet it was also a successful one. In 1981, students representing eleven 
states gathered when UNE’s Legal Subsecretariat (SEDUNE) for the inaugural 
seminar. At the meeting, they determined that students needed “to act together 
with opposition political parties” in order to combat the regime’s social 
policies.124
                                                 
 
  
122  CPDOC, UG pmdb 1979.12.07, “Discurso do Deputado Ulisses Guimarães – como 
presidente da Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisôria do PMDB – na Reunião do Partido para 
Ingresso de Estudantes, de todo Brasil, no Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – PMDB 
em 19 de março de 1980.” 
 
123  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE No. 4940 – “Debate sôbre 
Ensino Pago em Universidades Federais’ em Campos RJ,” 16 May 1979. 
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As 1983 dawned, it became increasingly clear that the military really 
would step down. As Figueiredo prepared for the transition, two candidates 
emerged. Paulo Maluf, the governor of São Paulo, won a fiercely contested 
primary that split the PDS. Those dissatisfied with Maluf’s nomination left the 
PDS and joined the PMDB’s coalition, throwing their support behind Tancredo 
Neves, the moderate mineiro politician who had served as prime minister for a 
year during the Goulart administration and who had been the head of the failed 
PP. While Congress, and not the Brazilian people, would determine the president 
in 1985, both Maluf and Neves began to campaign, hoping that popular support 
would influence senators to represent the will of their constituents. As a result, 
both Neves and Congressman Ulysses Guimarães, the president of the PMDB 
(and the failed “anti-candidate” against Geisel in the 1974 election) traveled 
around the country drumming up support for the Neves candidacy. In doing so, 
universities played an important part in their rhetoric, providing them with a 
means to criticize the government while offering their own development plans 
and simultaneously attempting to gain the support of students, professors, and 
white-collar professionals. 
Given Figueiredo’s retreat from universities in his vision of development, 
Guimarães and Neves quickly emphasized universities’ ability to transform 
society.  Where universities had once been a central part of the national 
development plan of military leaders, they now became key to the opposition 
movement’s developmentalist rhetoric. As Figueiredo emphasized primary 
                                                                                                                                                 
124  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 69-A, “Informação No. 01/81 – I 
Seminário da SUDENE,” 14 January 1981. 
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education and admitted he would have to make cuts to educational spending, the 
PMDB called for greater investment in education at all levels, demanded free 
education for all levels of schooling, including universities, and emphasized the 
need for universities to provide scientific and technological research and output 
for national development.125
Tancredo Neves was even more blatant in his appeals to universities. By 
1984, he had emerged as the PMDB’s presidential candidate and the best bet to 
defeat Maluf and end all vestiges of pro-military politics. A consummate 
politician, Neves proclaimed just a month before the election that he had “always 
emphasized the university as a priority” in a democratic and developed Brazil.
 
126 
He acknowledged that university students and faculty were central to his 
campaign and would continue to be central to his government if he were elected, a 
message he reiterated a few months previously in a meeting with ANDES.127 Nor 
did he limit himself to public universities, pledging that even private universities 
would have the state’s support.128
                                                 
 
 He criticized the military governments of the 
125  See CPDOC, UG pmdb 1979.12.07, “Esperança e Mudança – Uma Proposta de Governo 
para o Brasil,” September/October 1982, and “Os ‘Não’ e os ‘sim’ dod PMDB,” 16 September 
1983. 
 
126  CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, Roll 17, Photo 338, “Discurso de Tancredo 
Neves em agradecimento pelo título de Professor Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto 
Universitário Cândido Mendes.” 
 
127  For his meeting with professors, see CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.10.22/3, Roll 17, 
Photo 84, “Discurso proferido no encontro com a Associação Nacional de Docentes de Ensnio 
Superior sobre a educação brasileira.” For students, see CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, 
Roll 17, Photo 338, “Discurso de Tancredo Neves em agradecimento pelo título de Professor 
Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto Universitário Cândido Mendes.” 
 
128  CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, Roll 17, Photo 341, “Discurso proferido no 
encontro com a Associação “Discurso de Tancredo Neves em agradecimento pelo título de 
Professor Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto Universitário Cândido Mendes.” 
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past, less than subtly declaring that spending cuts for the Brazilian university 
system had created “the gravest crisis in [the university system’s] history.”129  He 
called for higher education to “return to the majority interests of the country” and 
for the “reconstruction of higher education in the country, correcting its 
distortions and stimulating its advancement.”130
Neves’ efforts were successful; on January 15, he was elected Brazil’s first 
civilian president in twenty-one years, defeating Paulo Maluf by 441-179 in “an 
 He pledged better salaries to 
professors who had been hit hard by inflation, and he criticized the 1968 
University Reform for emphasizing private education over free public education. 
He adopted demands like free education, more positions, and better infrastructure 
in his own vision of a “new university,” a vision that simultaneously ran counter 
to Figueiredo’s retreat on higher education while adopting demands that students 
had been making since the 1950s. At a time when UNE was returning and Brazil 
was facing the real possibility of a civil democratic society for the first time in 
twenty-one years, Neves adopted the positions of students, professors, and white-
collar professionals alike to criticize the regime and build support for the PMDB 
generally and his own presidential campaign specifically. In just twenty years, 
students had gone from being one of the first targets of a military regime to one of 
the key pieces to the opposition’s attempts to lead Brazil’s return to democracy. 
                                                 
129  CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.10.22/3, Roll 17, Photo 85, “Discurso proferido no 
encontro com a Associação Nacional de Docentes de Ensnio Superior sobre a educação 
brasileira.” 
 
130  CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, Roll 17, Photos 343-344, “Discurso de Tancredo 
Neves em agradecimento pelo título de Professor Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto 
Universitário Cândido Mendes.” 
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authentic coalition victory.”131
Yet society had fundamentally shifted during the dictatorship. Students, 
military leaders, parents, conservative business leaders, progressive pedagogical 
experts, professors, and white-collar workers had all emphasized the importance 
of universities to national development. The ideologies varied, but the rhetorical 
and policy emphasis led the middle class to have an increasingly important role in 
the country’s political, social, and economic life. Where students had been one of 
the few voices protesting military rule in 1964, by 1985, broad swaths of society 
had mobilized against the regime over a variety of issues – poor funding for 
schools, failed material expectations, a youthful tradition of activism – that led 
directly back to the university system.  
  Yet on the eve of his inauguration, Neves went 
into surgery, and José Sarney, his vice-president (and recent defector from the 
pro-government PDS to the PMDB) was sworn in on March 15. A series of 
infections ravaged Neves’ body, and on April 21, he died at the age of 74 without 
ever being officially sworn in. The country was devastated, and its path uncertain, 
as Sarney, the former president of the pro-military ARENA, became the country’s 
first civilian president since 1964. Ongoing economic, social, and political 
struggles would make Brazil’s return to democracy rocky well into the 1990s. 
José Sarney’s assumption of the presidency may have marked the end of 
the military dictatorship, but the battles over universities’ infrastructure and their 
role in society did not fade away just because a new era in Brazilian politics had 
begun. Demands for university reform continued into the 1990s, as students, 
politicians, and others struggled to define exactly how the university system 
                                                 
131  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, p. 253. 
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should be reformed in the wake of military rule. At the same time, the debate 
came to include more and more people, as Brazil’s university student population 
continued to rise and people continued to turn to higher education for social 
mobility. While a new generation of students continued to make their voices 
heard through UNE and other student movements, former students who had 
entered white-collar professions had become major political, social, and economic 
actors, pushing social change and transforming Brazilian politics at the end of the 
twentieth century. Although still a minority, the middle class was continuing to 
grow, and its material expectations and political power could no longer be 
ignored. 
  320 
Conclusion 
Although Tancredo Neves’ death raised questions about Brazil’s return to 
democracy, the nation continued to gradually emerge from twenty-one years of 
military rule. When a journalist asked Figueiredo in early 1985 how he wanted to 
be remembered by the Brazilian people, the last military president famously and 
pointedly responded, “Forget me.”132 Many Brazilians seemed willing to do just 
that, letting the memory of repression fade away in the face of the return to 
civilian rule.133
Although inauguration of José Sarney in March of 1985 marked the end of 
the military regime, processes of educational reform, white-collar mobilization, 
student activism, and complex state-society relations did not simply end with 
 
                                                 
 
132  “‘Me esqueçam’,” Veja 856 (30 January 1985): 28-30. 
 
133  Unlike Argentina and Chile, Brazil did not initiate a public truth commission in the wake 
of the military regime’s fall. Cardinal Arns and protestant minister Jaime Wright did successfully 
gather thousands of military documents chronicling the use of torture and repression, republishing 
them in an edited volume in 1985, but the government was uninvolved. See Arquidiocese de São 
Paulo, Brasil: Nunca Mais, (Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes Ltda, 1985). For the account of how 
Arns and Wright were able to gather the documents and publish them, see Lawrence Weschler, A 
Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New York: Viking Penguin 1991). 
The reasons for Brazil’s divergence from its neighbors are varying and complex, and 
include the military’s gradual, top-down effort to return to democracy, as well as the fact that 
while human rights abuses were widespread in Brazil, the numbers were nowhere near the 3,000 
dead during the Pinochet regime in Chile (1973-1990) or the disappeared and killed during 
Argentina’s “Dirty War” (1976-1983), which may have reached as many as 30,000 dead in just 
seven years. Additionally, the general amnesty had already pardoned all torturers and those who 
committed murder or “disappearances” in the military, and the gradual transition to democracy 
made civilian politicians much more wary of and susceptible to ongoing military intervention in 
Brazil than in Argentina, where the spectacular failure of the Malvinas/Falklands war against 
England led to the military’s complete collapse. Brazil did strip some doctors who oversaw torture 
sessions of their medical license, but failed to even investigate, much less prosecute, the military’s 
use of torture in Brazil. Only in 2010 did President Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva finally begin 
proceedings to establish a truth commission, and even then, he faced opposition from his own 
party, some military leaders, and those who just felt Brazil should leave its past exactly there – in 
the past. Even with Lula’s decision, nothing concrete has been done to establish a commission in 
early 2011. For the ongoing presence and pressure of the military in Brazilian politics after 1985, 
se Jorge Zaverucha, Frágil democracia: Collor, Itamar, FHC e os militares (1990-1998), (Rio de 
Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2000). 
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Figueiredo’s departure. Universities continued to be a major focus in defining the 
future of the now-democratic nation. As Brazil returned to democracy, students 
continued to question the role of universities in Brazil. Between 1985 and 1990, 
students criticized the University Reform and the universities’ emphasis on 
technical know-how over a richer, more humanistic education.  In the context of a 
more open and democratic society, they began to suggest that the military’s 
reform was not a real reform. They protested the rapid shift to private universities 
and isolated colleges, which by 1990 reached 696, compared to only 55 federal 
schools and another 164 state and municipal schools.134 Likewise, issues like fees 
and inadequate curricula continued to dominate students’ agendas during the 
administration of José Sarney (1985-1990). In these demands and struggles, 
students once again sought “to put the student in closer contact with reality.”135 In 
this period, UNE sponsored a handful of national conferences that specifically 
dealt with the issue of university reform, including hosting the 5th National 
Seminar on University Reform.136 As Brazilian politicians sat down to debate a 
new constitution after 1985, students once again used the debate to push their 
agenda, demanding that 18 percent of the federal budget and 25 percent of state 
and municipal budgets be dedicated to education, figures the 1988 Constitution 
ultimately codified.137
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The particularities of these issues may have changed since 1985, but their 
roots are traceable back to the 1950s. As this dissertation has demonstrated, 
universities and the issue of university reform were at center of debates regarding 
national development and middle-class politics even before the dictatorship. 
These debates were not simple struggles between students and political leaders; 
rather, they included parents, pedagogues, professionals, business leaders, and 
bureaucrats. Following the military coup of 1964, universities gained a new 
importance for these actors. They provided students with new means to challenge 
political authority of military. At the same time, military governments gave 
increasing importance to university-education and middle-class professionals in 
spurring national development, providing students and white-collar workers with 
a space to challenge some of the governments’ policies even while accepting 
others. Consequently, the struggle over educational reform and development 
revealed much more complicated and nuanced interactions between the state and 
society that moved well beyond confrontations with police or the use of torture.  
 Yet the complexities were not limited to interactions between the state and 
society between 1955 and 1990. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the idea of 
“a” student movement in Brazil does not hold; students had widely varying 
ideologies, visions, and concerns that did not always fit neatly together into a 
single platform. While much scholarly attention has focused on the importance of 
UNE, it is clear that the national organization was not the sole actor or force 
                                                                                                                                                 
137  Article 212. Available at 
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dictating the demands of student movements. Indeed UNE periodically lacked the 
authority to define the issues during Brazil’s military regime, and radical leaders 
found themselves having to readjust UNE’s platforms to address more quotidian 
issues that a majority of students supported in order to gain broader support for 
the organization. And as UNE virtually disappeared in the 1970s, students found 
new ways to mobilize, simultaneously helping lay the groundwork for UNE’s 
return in 1979 even while making it clear that UNE was not the only legitimate 
option for student mobilization. These complexities force us to revise our 
understanding of student political participation in Brazil. 
 Students were clearly major actors in challenging governments throughout 
the twenty-one years of military rule. Yet they were not the sole actors. As the 
military continued to remain in power, economic shortcomings and a general 
exhaustion with the ongoing repression led other social sectors connected to the 
universities to mobilize. Ever since 1964, military presidents had proclaimed that 
university reform would not only lead Brazil to a new era of national prosperity, 
but would also lead to an improvement in life for a growing middle class. When 
the economic context worsened in the 1970s even while democracy in Brazil 
continued to be little more than a charade, middle-class workers began to turn on 
the regime. After years of being told that they would be central to national 
development, but with few of their material or cultural expectations met, white-
collar professionals used the new spaces that the government opened for them to 
criticize same government. By the 1980s, professors, doctors, engineers, 
scientists, and architects, those same professions that the military had said would 
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transform Brazil, called for the end of military rule, helping weaken the regime 
and setting the stage for the indirect election of Tancredo Neves in 1985. Nor was 
this a temporary victory; by the 1980s, the middle-class, both students and ex-
students, had become a political force that would determine national politics. 
Twenty-one years of military rule had transformed Brazilian politics, 
society, and culture. The extension of torture to members of the middle class was 
certainly part of that shift. While the history of torture and corporal violence in 
Brazil extended back to slavery, this type of violence tended to be limited to Afro-
descendents and the socio-economically marginalized; rarely had it afflicted the 
middle class. In this regard, while the 1968 murder of Edson Luís, a poor high 
school student from the impoverished Northeast, was notable but not unique to 
Brazilian history. The torture and disappearance of “whiter” and wealthier 
students like Honestino Guimarães and Manoel Fiel Filho and the torture of 
thousands of middle-class students marked the true shift in tactics as state-
sponsored violence began to affect socioeconomic groups that it had previously 
excluded. In this way, torture and state-sponsored violence as a means of 
retaliation against resistance during the military regime marked a new phase in 
Brazilian history, and one that has understandably occupied a major space in the 
historiography of Brazil’s dictatorship. 
 Students’ relationships with the state in this period went well beyond 
resistance and subjection to torture and repression. Before, during, and after 
military rule, students and the state were involved in a complex dialectic over 
issues such as education, democracy, social justice, and what development. 
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Certainly, conflicts with police were the most visible examples of this discursive 
struggle, but they were not the only ones. Be it through newspapers, meetings 
with government officials, professional meetings, or other methods, students 
constantly interacted with the government in more subtle forms of negotiation 
regarding not just education but the broader path required for Brazil to finally 
reach its full potential on the global stage. In the process, students were able to 
wed strictly political demands such as an end to repression to more quotidian 
demands such as greater infrastructure on campuses, a greater say in the 
administration of universities, or even better food in restaurants. While they were 
not always successful in transforming the universities or society, the continuously 
forced the government to reconsider, rephrase, and readjust its own efforts 
towards education and national development. 
 In these discursive struggles, students and the state were not the only 
actors. Parents, business elites, professors, white-collar professionals, political 
exiles, and bureaucrats all informed these debates, leading to a far more 
complicated landscape in which various actors entered and exited alliances in the 
struggle for Brazil’s social and political future. The involvement of these different 
groups and widely divergent ideologies led to a far more complicated interaction 
between the state and society than the focus on student resistance and state 
repression allows for. Indeed, even treating student movements or the state as 
unified sectors belies the complexity of Brazilian politics and society during 
military rule. As we have seen, unity rarely existed between students, between 
technocrats and government officials, or between one administration and another. 
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 This complexity is due in no small part to the ways in which Brazil’s 
political and social landscapes transformed in the late-twentieth century. As 
Brazil’s population became increasingly urbanized and a nascent middle class 
began to grow, it became increasingly important to national politics, both through 
its own efforts and from the attention of political elites. Even before military rule, 
presidents Kubitschek and Goulart emphatically placed university-trained 
professionals at the center of national development, and sought to expand the 
middle class both in terms of size and political relevance. These efforts only 
accelerated under the military regime, as the university system rapidly grew, 
particularly after the 1968 University Reform. Engineers, teachers, doctors, 
physicists, and other white-collar professionals would finally lead Brazil to its 
rightful place in the world economy, according to military presidents’ policies and 
speeches.  
Despite their efforts to control education and development, time and again 
military governments ran into obstacles, be it students taking to the streets to 
proclaim their own views on the relationship between development and education 
in the 1960s or white-collar professionals who turned against the regime as it 
failed to provide the material quality of life that the university-trained middle-
class had come to expect in the 1970s and 1980s. In these processes, torture, 
arrest, and resistance to authoritarian rule were not uncommon, yet state and 
society interacted in far more complex ways. The university system is central to 
understanding these dynamics and complexities. Universities were not just 
hotbeds of activism; they were physical and discursive sites of resistance and 
  327 
negotiation where complex and shifting debates over ideas of development, 
democracy, and nation in Brazil took place. Universities provided a unified 
discursive field that brought together diverse actors with widely varying 
ideologies, groups who constantly reacted to and shaped each others’ rhetoric, 
ideals, and policies. Ultimately, Brazil’s higher education system, barely extant in 
the early-1930s, had rapidly increased between 1955 and 1990. Where there were 
fewer than 100,000 students in all of Brazil in the middle of the century, the 
number was nearly six million in 2010.138
 The university system in Brazil was not alone in witnessing significant 
expansion and transformation between 1955 and 1985. Middle class politics in 
Brazil radically transformed as well. While the middle class was just coming into 
its own as a cultural and political entity in the early-1950s,
 This expansion took part through the 
initiative of government reforms and private investment, but throughout, students, 
parents, business elites, white-collar professionals, and others shaped these 
processes in subtle and nuanced ways. In this way, universities provide an 
important window through which to understand state-society relations in Brazil in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. 
139
                                                 
 
 the thirty years 
between Kubitschek’s election and Figueiredo’s exit saw the Brazilian middle 
class become a small-but-vital group in determining social, cultural, and political 
policies. Students were at the vanguard of this shift in the 1950s, increasingly 
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becoming major voices in the national stage in determining both the paths Brazil 
should take towards development, and their roles in it. By the late-1970s, 
however, students were no longer alone, as professors, doctors, lawyers, 
architects, engineers, and other white-collar professionals joined students in 
making similar material, economic, and political demands. In this way, my 
dissertation reveals how the middle class became a major actor in national social 
and political life, a role that it continues to have today, even while it does not 
represent a majority of Brazilians. 
By looking at these social transformations, it becomes clear that the era of 
military rule was not an isolated period. Universities were central to student 
movements, politicians, business leaders, and others before, during, and after the 
military regime. Many of the policies that the dictatorship adopted actually 
resembled many of the more progressive, democratically-elected leaders that 
preceded the 1964 coup. These long-term social and political processes show new 
ways to move beyond a strict political periodization when considering Brazil in 
the latter half of the 20th century.  Neither 1964 nor 1985 marked a sudden social 
rupture, and focusing on education reminds us to consider the dictatorship as but 
one part of twentieth-century Brazilian history, disconnected neither from what 
preceded or what followed. 
Although Brazil was but one right-wing authoritarian regime in South 
America in the late-20th century, in many ways, it departed from neighboring 
regimes in Argentina and Chile. While Pinochet was the face of Chile’s 
dictatorship and a series of military juntas headed Argentina’s dictatorship, 
  329 
Brazil’s military relied on a greater façade of democracy, as evidenced by the fact 
there were five presidents who were indirectly “elected” between 1964 and 1985. 
In order to maintain legitimacy, these presidents repeatedly contorted and 
manipulated legal statutes to increase executive authority, especially when they 
ran into roadblocks to their own exercise of power. Thus it was that the 
Institutional Act No. 1 gave the military the power to strip politicians and others 
of political rights for ten years; the 1967 constitution (and the 1969 amendments) 
were specifically designed to legalize the authoritarian rule of the military; and 
Geisel’s “April Package” of 1977 dissolved Congress and created so-called 
“bionic senators” whom the president appointed with the strict intent that he could 
pass legislation. Each of these measures clearly bent the laws of Brazil to 
legitimize military authority. Yet some semblance of electoral processes did 
continue in Brazil throughout the military dictatorship, albeit in the context of 
repression, censorship, and other restrictions. This is not to say that other regimes 
were bereft of any symbolic gestures towards democracy. Notably, Pinochet 
relied on a plebiscite in 1980 to maintain power, and the 1988 plebiscite, in which 
Chileans voted “no” on another eight-year referendum on Pinochet’s rule, setting 
the stage for the 1990 elections that ultimately brought the dictator down. Yet 
neither Chile, Argentina, nor the other South American dictatorships worked as 
hard to maintain the appearance of legality as Brazil’s military leaders. 
Another way in which Brazil offers important comparisons and contrasts 
to its neighbors is in the ways education played a role in nation-building projects 
in authoritarian regimes. Both Brazil and Chile emphasized education as central to 
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creating a strong nation. Yet the paths they took diverged greatly. As this 
dissertation demonstrates, the Brazilian military regime increasingly emphasized 
the sciences in its vision of national development. While focusing on engineers, 
doctors, veterinarians, architects, and similar white-collar professions 
theoretically offered tangible improvements in the quality of living in Brazil, the 
regime also attempted to marginalize the humanities and law schools, the very 
programs that were the major sources of student opposition to military rule in the 
1960s. In complete contrast, after the coup of September 1973, the Pinochet 
regime began emphasizing the humanities in schools at all levels. In the Chilean 
regime, the humanities provided the mechanisms to create a new narrative of 
nation that celbrated Chile’s past glories and the promise of its future. Thus, while 
both Brazil and Chile turned to education to advance the idea of nation, each took 
radically different tacts. Where Brazil’s military turned to the sciences to achieve 
national glory, Chile’s became preoccupied with the humanities.140
In spite of these differences, the case of Brazil does point towards 
important ways to understand authoritarian regimes elsewhere in Latin America. 
Many works have looked at the ways in which the Pinochet regime in Chile 
(1973-1990) and the military juntas in Argentina (1976-1983) successfully used 
repression and terror to combat “subversion.”
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have begun looking at the more complicated ways in which civilians responded to 
military rule by examining the ways military regimes are remembered.142 
Certainly, the use of repression in Brazil and the historiographical emphasis on 
repression, memory, and identity reveals similarities between authoritarian 
regimes’ methods.143 Indeed, collaboration between regimes even took place 
regularly, as each country’s repressive apparatus helped others in rooting out 
“subversives.”144
                                                                                                                                                 
Patricia Politzer, Fear in Chile: Lives under Pinochet, trans. Diane Wachtell, (New York: The 
New Press, 2001).  
 However, as the case of educational policy in Brazil 
demonstrates, by moving beyond an emphasis on terror and memory and looking 
at social policy, cultural politics, we can begin to understand not only the more 
nuanced and subtle ways in which regimes tried to exert control and transform 
their societies and nations, but the ways in which different social and political 
groups shaped those processes, be it through direct resistance, collaboration, or 
more subtle forms of negotiation. Additionally, incorporating groups beyond 
radical opposition leaders and repressive military rulers, including moderate 
students, parents, business leaders, white-collar professionals, and others provides 
fertile ground to understand the nuances and complexities of how different people 
 
142  See Steve J. Stern’s three-volume set on memory and the Pinoche Regime in Chile: 
Remembering Pinochet’s Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004); Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet’s Chile, 1973-1988, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); and Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in 
Democratic Chile, 1989-2006, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
 
143  For an example of Brazilian scholarship that focuses on repression and identity, see 
Carlos Fico, Reinventando o Otimismo: Ditadura, propaganda e imaginário social no Brasil, (Rio 
de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1997). 
 
144  See John Dinges, The Condor Years:How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to 
Three Continents, (New York: The New Press, 2004). 
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interacted with states under military rule, and how those states’ policies impacted 
civilians. 
When Brazilian students took to the streets en masse to protest Edson 
Luís’s murder in 1968, they joined other student uprisings throughout the world 
that year. Students in France, Italy, Spain, Mexico, Japan, Egypt, India, and the 
United States also took to the streets, combining general complaints about the 
structure in their university system while seeking broader political changes just as 
their Brazilian counterparts did. 145
                                                 
 
 However, the particular national and 
international context in Brazil had different consequences. While students in 
France and West Germany condemned American imperialism for the Vietnam 
War, anti-imperialist stances increasingly turned to the MEC-USAID accords in 
Brazil. Likewise, internal divisions over how radical the demands should be also 
characterized these movements; for example, the student protests at Columbia 
University ultimately split into two groups: the radical Strike Coordinating 
145  Until recently, scholarship on student movements elsewhere in the world in the 1960s 
drew primarily from memoirs or journalistic accounts of the events of 1968, and the narrative 
emphasis fell heavily on Europe and the United States. See, for example, Mark Kurlansky, 1968: 
The  Year That Rocked the World, (New York: Ballantine, 2004); Andrew Feenberg and Jim 
Freedman, When Poetry Ruled the Streets: The French May Events of 1968, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001); Jiri Pehe, The Prague Spring: A Mixed Legacy, (London: 
Freedom House, 1988); and Ronald Fraser, ed., 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1988). While new work is forthcoming on student movements in South 
Asia and Africa, the scholarship on these countries thus far is limited, emphasizing narrative over 
analysis and often dating back to the 1970s. A good quick comparative summary of events in 
China, India, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Mexico can be found in Arlif Dirlik, “The Third World 
in 1968,” in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., 1968: The World Transformed, 
(Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1998): 295-317. For specific studies on India, see 
Viswa Yuvak Kendra, The Dynamics of Student Agitations, (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 
1973); fir Egypt, see Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 
1923-1973, (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985); for Japan, see Stuart J. Dowsey, ed., Zengakuren: 
Japan’s Revolutionary Students, (Berkeley: Ishi Press, 1970). These works do provide useful 
insights and narratives into events in these so-called “third world” countries, but there is much 
work to be done. Fortunately, many of these countries are addressed in forthcoming works. See 
Zachary Scarlett and Samantha Christiansen, eds., The Third World in the Global Sixties, (New 
York: Berghahn Books, forthcoming). 
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Committee, which placed American imperialism, racism, and war-mongering at 
the center of its demands, and the Students for a Restructured University, who 
emphasized internal reforms to administration and student participation on 
campus.146
When compared to other countries and regions, Brazilian society and 
politics on the surface did not look so different. Brazil, like other countries in 
South America and elsewhere witnessed the presence of a vibrant student 
movement that demanded both general political transformation and specific 
educational reforms; 1968 as a landmark year that witnessed unprecedented levels 
of activism and mobilization; and a repressive military apparatus that sought to 
use all available means to clamp down on “subversion” within a Cold War 
framework. Yet once we look at the particularities of state and society in Brazil in 
this period, clear divergences emerge, including students responding to Brazilian 
particularities in higher education and a military government that went out of its 
way to try to appeal to legal process even as it increased the use of repression. 
Collectively, these differences provide important points of comparison and 
 However, Brazil’s student movement remained unique. Anti-
imperialism had been a part of radicals’ demands since the late-1950s, well before 
students in other countries expressed serious opposition to the power of the 
United States.  
                                                 
 
146  For a first-person account of the student protests at Columbia in April 1968, see Mark 
Rudd, Underground: My Life with the SDS and the Weathermen, (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2009). 
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contrast to other countries, even while helping to reveal “what makes Brazil, 
Brazil.”147
*  *  *  *  * 
 
By the mid-1990s, the tenor of the debate over university reform had 
shifted dramatically. Brazil elected Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency 
in 1994, due largely to his success in finally reigning in Brazil’s rampant inflation 
as the Minister of Finance under Itamar Franco (1992-1994).148 Upon assuming 
the presidency, Cardoso took the controversial step of abandoning his more 
progressive economic theories (including dependency theory) from the 1970s and 
embracing neoliberal economic policies. During his administration, Brazil 
witnessed the privatization of state-owned manufacturing, telephone, and electric 
companies, among others. In his quest for privatization, Cardoso proposed 
reforming the university system to make it more closely resemble the United 
States, where students paid for at least part of their education regardless of 
whether it was a public or private university. Cardoso also instituted affirmative 
action in an attempt to have more minorities in the universities. Having already 
mobilized against increasing fees in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, students quickly 
mobilized against Cardoso’s attempt to privatize universities further, and, as had 
been the case in the 1980s, professors, functionaries, and staff at the universities 
joined them. Cardoso ultimately retreated on the issue,149
                                                 
 
 revealing the ways that 
147  For the original use of this phrase, see Roberto da Matta, O que Faz o Brasil, Brasil?, 
(Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1984). 
 
148  For more on inflation in the late-1980s and early-1990s and its effect on the Brazilian 
people, see O’Dougherty, Consumption Intensified. 
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students and university employees continued to shape national policy. 
Simultaneously, many scholars and students protested against affirmative action, 
feeling that quotas for non-whites were an assault on admission based on 
“merit.”150 The remnants of their protests against these university reforms 
remained visible on campuses into the 2000s, where graffiti proclaimed “No to 
University Reform!,” marking a significant change from students’ rhetoric 
between the 1950s and 1980s.151 With the Workers’ Party’s ascension to the 
presidency in 2002, Lula attempted to change the course, increasing educational 
funding. Yet he could not reverse the transformations in the landscape of higher 
education over the previous forty years. Even while Lula celebrated the fact that 
every state now had a federal university in 2006, people continued to criticize the 
proliferation of private schools that seemed to admit anybody, including an eight-
year-old boy in São Paulo who was admitted to a law school.152
The legacy of these battles over education and development continue to 
this day. Those white-collar professionals who used an expanded university 
system, state rhetoric, and social mobilization to form their own political voice 
during the military dictatorship continue to shape politics in Brazil. It was their 
support for Fernando Collor and his anti-corruption campaign that helped him 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
149  See Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira,” pp. 81-100. 
 
150  For example, see Peter Fry and Yvonne Maggie, “Cotas Raciais: Construindo um país 
dividido?”, Econômica 6:1 (2004): 153-161. For a scholarly argument in favor of Brazil’s 
affirmative action, see Kabengele Munanga, “Políticas de Ação Afirmativa em Benefício da 
População Negra no Brasil – Um Ponto de Vista em Defesa de Cotas,” Sociedade e Cultura 4:2 
(Jul/Dez 2001): 31-43. 
 
151  The graffiti could be found on the Fluminense Federal University as late as 2008, having 
never been washed from when it was originally painted. Photograph in the author’s collection. 
 
152 “Brazilian boy, 8, passes law school entrance exam,” The Guardian, 7 March 2008. 
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/07/brazil. Accessed 4 January 2011. 
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become Brazil’s first popularly-elected president in nearly thirty years, and it was 
their disillusionment, made evident through massive street marches and the 
university students’ caras pintadas (“painted faces”) movements that led to his 
resignation. When Lula finally won election on his fourth try, many suggested 
that it was due in no small part to his ability to finally gain the support of the 
middle-class, perhaps best exemplified by traditional middle-class conservative 
news source O Globo providing positive or neutral coverage of the Workers’ 
Party candidate on Lula’s fourth attempt.153
 Student activists from the dictatorship period also continue to shape 
modern Brazilian politics. Numerous student leaders who had opposed the 
government in the 1960s had found their way into the highest levels of 
government by the 2000s. Franklin Martins, Wladimir Palmeira, and José Dirceu 
all served in Lula’s cabinet. Others, like Daniel Aarão Reis and Clara Araújo, had 
become professors in the same federal university system that they had fought to 
reform as students. Even those who did not participate in the higher levels of the 
student movement in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s continued to actively follow 
politics, be they from the left or the right.
  
154
                                                 
 
 The middle class continues to be a 
vital part of social and political life in Brazil, a fact made possible by the growing 
153  For the centrality of the middle class to Lula’s election in 2002 and re-election in 2006, 
see “O candidato dos pobres,” Veja 1943 (15 February 2006): 42-45. For O Globo’s rise during 
the military dictatorship and status as a conservative publication, see Skidmore, The Politics of 
Military Rule in Brazil, p. 111. For O Globo’s coverage of Lula in 2002, see Alessandra Aldé, “As 
eleições presidenciais de 2002 nos jornais,” Revista ALCEU 3:6 (Jan/June 2003): 93-121. 
 
154  Personal inteviews with J.F., 19 June 2007; D.N., 13 August 2007; S.C., 10 September 
2007; F.G., 10 September 2007; and  P.C.S., 17 October 2007. 
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importance of students, the military government, business-leaders, and university-
trained white-collar professionals in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 At the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, students continue to 
push for university reform, using educational issues to express their own political 
voice and to question democratic governments they support. In late 2010, 
thousands of students who were taking the vestibular exam discovered that there 
was a printing error in the exam book, and many of the questions were out of 
order. The Ministry of Education155 responded by tossing out the exams, telling 
students they would have to re-take them at a later date. Instead of rallying in the 
streets, marching and carrying banners, students got on the internet and using 
social networking sites like Twitter to criticize MEC in 140 characters or less. 
This move is not so surprising; not only has technology become increasingly 
available to all Brazilians but, according to one report, Brazilians participate on 
Twitter more than any other country in the world.156 When students criticized 
MEC on Twitter and other social networking sites, the ministry suggested that 
those who criticized the Ministry online could face arrest (on what charges, the 
Ministry was unclear), leading to more indignation from students who pointedly 
countered that, instead of spending its time seeing how students were criticizing 
the Ministry online, perhaps it could focus on how to help students make up the 
faulty exam MEC issued.157
                                                 
 
 
155  Culture gained its own Ministry in 1985, though Education continues to go by the 
acronym MEC. 
 
156  “Why Is Twitter So Popular in Brazil?,” Time 20 October 2010. Available at  
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2026442,00.html. Accessed 10 January 2011. 
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 Much like their counterparts across the previous fifty years, students once 
again mobilized over the administration, quality, and structure of university 
entrance exams, while trying to get the government to address their educational 
needs. This brief eruption on Twitter was not an isolated instance of students 
turning to the Internet to express their discontent. Google’s social networking site 
“Orkut” boasts groups that proclaim “I hate Fernando Haddad! [the Minister of 
Education under presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff]” and “Exam preparation 
courses made me fat!”158 More seriously, UNE’s website continues to demand 
university reform and the regulation of fees, among other issues.159
                                                                                                                                                 
157  The debate took place on Twitter on 9 November 2010. http://twitter.com, accessed on 9  
November 2010. For reports on the flare-up, see “UNE e UBES criticam problemas com o Enem,” 
Carta Capital 9 November 2010, available at 
 While perhaps 
not as strong as UNE in the 1960s, student movements continue to rally around 
educational demands, attempting to shape discourse and policy. Social 
networking and media are new avenues in which students complain about the 
ways in which modern higher education is playing out in Brazil. These media 
outlets do have their flaws; while allowing hundreds or even thousands of 
individual students to make their voices heard, logging on at home does not 
facilitate organizational efforts or a broad, mass movement in the ways that UNE 
and other student movements had operated in the past. Where the future of student 
movements and their relation with MEC is headed is unclear, but the processes of 
http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/une-e-
ubes-criticam-problemas-com-o-enem, and “UNE e UBES defendem nova prova do ENEM para 
prejudicados,” Carta Capital, 10 November 2010, available at 
http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/une-e-ubes-defendem-nova-prova-do-enem-para-
prejudicados. 
 
158  Available at http://www.orkut.com/Main#Community?cmm=95222731 and 
http://www.orkut.com/Main#Community?cmm=1269977 , respectively. Accessed 11 January 
2011. 
 
159  See http://www.une.org.br/home3/une_on-line/m_4163.html . Accessed 4 January 2011. 
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resistance and complaint did not disappear with the dictatorship. Although the 
forms of protest have transformed with the rise of social networking and Internet 
access, the demands remain strikingly similar. Even in 2011, university education 
continues to be a major discursive battleground for national development and 
social life in Brazil. 
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